
Kāvyādarśa of Daṇḍin

NOTES

Parichchheda I



THE KĀVYĀDARŚA OF DAṆḌIN

NOTES

Notes to I. 1—(i) It is impossible to give an accurate rendering for हंसी. Swan, goose, flamingo, etc. do not give a very correct notion and often convey improper suggestions.

(ii) The periodical movement of हंसs to Lake Mānasa in the Himālayas is a poetic convention claiming the same authority as their दुग्धजलभेदविधौ वैदग्ध्यं (Nītiśataka, 18).

(iii) The सर्वशुक्लत्व of Sarasvatī is brought out even in familiar stanzas like या कुन्देन्दुतुषारहारधवला या शुभ्रवस्त्रावृता etc. The reservation which a commentator makes in regard to the colour of the Goddess' hair, nails, etc. (as also the invented variant शुक्लरूपा) is so evident as to be hardly worth specifying. With regard to this मङ्गलश्लोक of आचार्यदण्डिन् the story is told that a Karnatic poetess called Vijjikā [Compare, Daśakumāracharita (B. S. S. 2nd edition in one vol.), Introduction, pp. lix–lxii] took objection to the 'all-white' character which is here assigned to Sarasvatī on the ground that she for one, although Sarasvatī incarnate, was not remarkable for the possession of that particular colour—

नीलोत्पलदलश्यामां विज्जिकां मामजानता ।
वृथैव दण्डिना प्रोक्तं सर्वशुक्ला सरस्वती ॥

This present introductory verse has found its way into the late सरस्वतीरहस्योपनिषद् where it occurs as the first stanza after the treatment of the ten *mantras*.

Notes to I. 2—(i) Such an opening for a treatise like the present we meet with in a number of other treatises and manuals and digests and commentaries. It seems no more than a fashionable or convenient opening and cannot by itself be made the basis of any chronological inference.

(ii) It seems very difficult to ascertain what authors or treatises Daṇḍin exactly had in his mind. As Bharata alone, amongst the known Ālaṁkārikas, gives a ten-fold classification of the गुणs and as his definitions of them are rather primitive as compared with those of Daṇḍin, Bharata might safely be ranked amongst his predecessors. Daṇḍin is supposed to explicitly quote and refute Bhāmaha, who therefore would be another of his predecessors. See, however, the Introduction on this point. In one or two places Daṇḍin seems to have before him a view similar to that given by the Agnipurāṇa (cf. Kāvyādarśa i. 79 and Agni 346. 9) and there are besides a number of verbal identities (see the separate Appendix about parallelisms between Daṇḍin and other writers) between the Purāṇa and the Kāvyādarśa, although it may not be safe from this to conclude that the latter is necessarily posterior to the former. Of individual works Daṇḍin mentions Bṛihatkathā (i. 38) and Setubandha (i. 34) and the dubious Chhandovichiti (i. 12). Beyond these few facts the rest is all a matter of inference. A large mass of literature known to Daṇḍin is for us now a mere blank.

(iii) A लक्षण or definition is not an exhaustive enumeration of all the qualities of the definitum. It is merely a means of distinguishing it from all other objects in the world (व्यावर्तकत्वम्) and as such it *may* not give any positive quality of the thing defined. It has to be free from the faults of अव्याप्ति, अतिव्याप्ति, and असंभव and it must be expressed in the fewest possible words. For other pertinent remarks on the scope and limitations of a definition cf. Athalye's Notes to तर्कसंग्रह, sect. iii., p. 77 (B. S. S. 2nd edition).

Notes to I. 3—(i) After the मङ्गल and the प्रतिज्ञा Daṇḍin at once launches into his subject proper in a very skilful manner.—All dealings in the world are rendered possible by language [i. 3]; nay, more: language contributes to whatever is best and noblest in life [i. 4], and the good it brings does not perish with life [i. 5]. But language is a double-edged sword: there is good language and bad language, and one bad word acts like a grain of salt in a jar of milk [i. 6–7]. Hence we must discriminate between good and bad words, and this involves a study of the Śāstra [i. 8]. Such a Śāstra pointing out the excellencies, blemishes, styles, embellishments, and materials of Poetry is the present one [i. 9-10[a]].

(ii) The present stanza can be variously interpreted according to the senses one gives to शिष्ट, अनुशिष्ट and शिष्ट and according to the meaning and the relation that one assigns to the two genitives. We begin with the interpretations least satisfactory—(i) Connect the two genitives with लोकयात्रा, the idea being: "All people, whether wise [by intuition] or taught by others who are wise [by intuition], have to admit speech as the *sine qua non* of all dealings." *Criticism*: there is not much point in the antithesis—'dealings whether of the self-made wise or of the wise by instruction'. One expects an antithesis like—'dealings between all, wise as well as fools.' (ii) Connect the second genitive with वाचां and the first (in the sense of the instrumental) with the second, thus giving the sense: All dealings are made possible by speech for which laws have been laid down (शिष्टानां) by great sages like Pāṇini (शिष्टैः) or by his successors, whoever they were, who derived their light from Pāṇini (अनुशिष्टैश्च). *Criticism*: Besides the forced construction of the genitive this interpretation involves a surrender of the full force of अपि. (iii) Connect both the genitives with वाचां—Speeches (Sanskrit, Prākrits, etc.) for which rules have been (and can be) laid down by sages, and the most primitive speech of man, intuitive with him, and therefore beyond the

province of rules (शिष्टानां = संस्कृतादिसर्वभाषाप्रकृतिभूतानां मौलिकानां, स्वतः शिष्टानां वा). *Criticism*: This involves the large assumption of an original oneness of human language; and why should even that primitive speech be above rules? It may be that God or Nature had in that primitive speech arbitrarily fixed the meanings of words, but that is no less true of a large percentage of words even in the शिष्टानुशिष्ट forms of language. (iv) The interpretation which we prefer, and according to which the शिष्टानुशिष्ट forms of language include Sanskrit, the Prākrits and in fact all forms that have reached the grammar-stage; the remaining forms (शिष्टानां) comprising all the dialects of the vulgar or the ignorant or the uncivilized people that are not general or consistent or advanced enough to demand a grammatical treatment. In fact even the most primitive and uncivilized man needs some kind of language howsoever crude and unpolished.

Notes to I. 4—(i) The great importance of language in the evolution of human society is well illustrated by such a hymn as RV. x. 125 or even by the familiar philosophic adage—वाचारम्भणं विकारः। For some pertinent remarks on the subject see Max Müller, 'Three Lectures on the Vedānta Philosophy' pp. 141-150.

Notes to I. 5—(i) The interpretation of this stanza involves some difficulty. Daṇḍin seems to have intended to say that, whereas in an ordinary mirror the reflection (प्रतिबिम्ब) can stand only as long the reflecting-object (बिम्ब) is held before it, in the mirror-in-the-form-of-literature the प्रतिबिम्ब stands even though the बिम्ब be absent. But the actual expression of this idea is defective. As तेषां can refer only to राज्ञां, the kings must be taken to represent the बिम्ब that is असंनिहित or absent. The प्रतिबिम्ब of this बिम्ब is the glory of those kings as sung by poets. But this glory (यशः) is said to be the बिम्ब—cf. आदिराजयशोबिम्बं. Hence the whole trouble. The

commentator प्रेमचन्द्र suggests that we should take here विम्ब in the sense of प्रतिविम्ब; but when the whole idea of the stanza centres round the distinction between बिम्ब and प्रतिबिम्ब such a confusion of expression is not at all likely. We must, therefore, think of the यशस् in a twofold manner : the यशस् as it is actually passed on from speaker to speaker in the life-time of a king and amongst his own subjects and dependents, and the यशस् as figured forth in the imagery of the poet and likely therefore to endure in that form for ages to come. The former is the बिम्ब and the latter its प्रतिबिम्ब. This enables us to get over the difficulty in the first part of the stanza. Now it is common experience that the praise of a sovereign or ruler is made by his contemporaries only while he retains authority. When he is gone his praise also, in normal circumstances, is no more heard. But if the praise has once found gifted expression in literature then, even though the kings be gone—and even though the यशोबिम्ब in the form of the praise by their contemporaries be silenced along with the kings—the glory as mirrored forth in the literature (प्रतिबिम्ब) endures for ever.

(ii) It is words like पश्य, for which no subtler reason than the exigencies of the metre should have been adequate, that are responsible for the tradition that Daṇḍin केनापि काव्यरहस्यं बुभुत्सुना नृपतितनयेन भूयोभूयः सविनयमनुरुध्यमानः composed the काव्यादर्श. Attempts to determine who the pupil of Daṇḍin was are therefore premature; cf. Daśak. (B. S. S.), Introd. p. lviii.

(iii) The idea of this stanza is well expressed by बिह्लण in his विक्रमाङ्कदेवचरित (i. 26–27)—

पृथ्वीपतेः सन्ति न यस्य पार्श्वे कवीश्वरास्तस्य कुतो यशांसि ।
भूपाः कियन्तो न बभूवुरुर्व्यां जानाति नामापि न कोपि तेषाम् ॥
लङ्कापतेः संकुचितं यशो यद्यत् कीर्तिपात्रं रघुराजपुत्रः ।
स सर्व एवादिकवेः प्रभावो न कोपनीयाः कवयः क्षितीन्द्रैः ॥

Compare also भामह (i. 6–7)—

उपेयुषामपि दिवं सन्निबन्धविधायिनाम् ।
आस्त एव निरातङ्कं कान्तं काव्यमयं वपुः ॥

commentator प्रेमचन्द्र suggests that we should take here विम्ब in the sense of प्रतिविम्ब; but when the whole idea of the stanza centres round the distinction between बिम्ब and प्रतिबिम्ब such a confusion of expression is not at all likely. We must, therefore, think of the यशस् in a twofold manner : the यशस् as it is actually passed on from speaker to speaker in the life-time of a king and amongst his own subjects and dependents, and the यशस् as figured forth in the imagery of the poet and likely therefore to endure in that form for ages to come. The former is the विम्ब and the latter its प्रतिबिम्ब. This enables us to get over the difficulty in the first part of the stanza. Now it is common experience that the praise of a sovereign or ruler is made by his contemporaries only while he retains authority. When he is gone his praise also, in normal circumstances, is no more heard. But if the praise has once found gifted expression in literature then, even though the kings be gone—and even though the यशोबिम्ब in the form of the praise by their contemporaries be silenced along with the kings—the glory as mirrored forth in the literature (प्रतिबिम्ब) endures for ever.

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लङ्कापतेः संकुचितं यशो यद्यत् कीर्तिपात्रं रघुराजपुत्रः ।
स सर्व एवादिकवेः प्रभावो न कोपनीयाः कवयः क्षितीन्द्रैः ॥

Compare also भामह (i. 6–7)—

उपेयुषामपि दिवं सन्निबन्धविधायिनाम् ।
आस्त एव निरातङ्कं कान्तं काव्यमयं वपुः ॥

रुणद्धि रोदसी चास्य यावत् कीर्तिरनश्वरी ।
तावत् किलायमध्यास्ते सुकृती वैबुधं पदम् ॥

Notes to I. 6—(i) A similar pun on the word गो (गौः) we find in the नैषधीयचरित xvii. 75—

मुक्तये यः शिलात्वाय शास्त्रमूचे सचेतसाम् ।
गोतमं तमवेक्ष्यैव यथा वित्थ तथैव सः ॥

which incidently determines the form of the name of the author of the Nyāyasūtras.

(ii) On this whole question of the importance of the correct use and understanding of words compare the introductory part of the Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāshya, which seems to have been an elaboration of Nirukta i. 18ff. Compare also Uttara-Rāmacharita v. 31.

Notes to I. 7—(i) If Daṇḍin the author of the Kāvyādarśa be identical with Daṇḍin the author of the Daśakumāracharita, it will have to be conceded that it would be difficult to find another person whose practice so poorly conforms to his own theory. Compare Agashe's introduction to Daśakumāracharita (B. S. S. 2nd edition) pp. xxvi–xxvii. Daṇḍin proves himself a very facile poet as far as his achievement in the Kāvyādarśa is concerned; and such obvious blemishes as दीपकावृती (ii. 4) and असावनुक्रोशाक्षेपः (ii. 158) are capable of other adequate solutions. See Notes to the stanzas concerned.

Notes to I. 8—(i) The figure in the stanza is प्रतिवस्तूपमा. For a definition see ii. 46.

Notes to I. 9—(i) Daṇḍin here clearly seems to have in mind certain treatises on Poetics or Alaṁkāra which probably gave a detailed classification of the various kinds of styles in poetic composition as affected by peoples of different tastes and countries. Bharata does

not speak of different मार्गs; Bhāmaha, like Daṇḍin, alludes (i. 31–32) to just two while the Agnipurāṇa speaks of four (Adhyāya 340), as also does Viśvanātha the author of Sāhityadarpaṇa (ix. 1ff.). Vāmana (ii. 9) and Rudraṭa (ii. 4) on the other hand give three, but Bhoja as many as six (ii. 28) : वैदर्भी, पाञ्चाली, गौडीया, आवन्तिका, लाटीया and मागधी. It is evident however that Daṇḍin refers here to a treatise other than the Agnipurāṇa, the Nāṭyaśāstra, and the Bhāmahālaṁkāra. We have discussed the question in detail in the Introduction, to which the reader is therefore referred.

Notes to I. 10—(i) शरीरं अलंकाराश्च—The rest of the first Parichchheda speaks of the 'Body' of Poetry while its अलंकारs come in for treatment in the last two Parichchhedas. Under 'Body' Daṇḍin includes the गुणs which are figuratively spoken of as the breaths or प्राणs in the Body (i. 42). This figurative mode of description is fully brought out, though in a slightly modified form, in the following passage from Sāhityadarpaṇa (i. 2)—काव्यस्य शब्दार्थौ शरीरं रसादिश्चात्मा गुणाः शौर्यादिवद् दोषाः काणत्वादिवद् रीतयोवयवसंस्थानविशेषवद् अलंकाराः कटककुण्डलादिवदिति ।

(ii) Widest divergence of views prevails amongst Sanskrit Ālaṁkārikās as to the nature of Poetry. The various opinions held or combated exhibit a remarkably clear grasp of the central problem and a critical acumen no less keen than what is in evidence in European works of criticism. Only, as the views occur in erudite and little-read commentaries and subcommentaries, they have not received the attention they merit. Our Sanskrit Commentary attempts a résumé of most of these views.

(iii) Bharata does not attempt a formal definition of Kāvya. He however mentions in the beginning of the 16th Adhyāya of the Nāṭyaśāstra as many as 26 embellishments of Kāvya, including the गुणs and the अलंकारs strictly so called. The definition in the Agnipurāṇa seems to be an attempt to engraft on the

definition of Daṇḍin some later improvements. It runs thus (337. 6-7)—

........इष्टार्थव्यवच्छिन्ना पदावली ।
काव्यं स्फुरदलंकारं गुणवद्दोषवर्जितम् ॥

Bhāmaha's definition is (i. 16) शब्दार्थौ सहितौ काव्यं, though he implies that it should be सालंकार (i. 13) and निर्दोष (i. 11). Vāmana, although he calls रीति or style the very soul of Poetry (रीतिरात्मा काव्यस्य ii. 6), does not ignore the गुणs and अलंकारs, as the very first sūtra (काव्यं ग्राह्यमलंकारात्) of his work clearly shows. Compare also his vṛitti on I. i. 1—काव्यशब्दोयं गुणालंकारसंस्कृतयोः शब्दार्थयोर्वर्तते । भक्त्या तु शब्दार्थमात्रवचनोत्र गृह्यते। Rudraṭa's definition is शब्दार्थौ काव्यम् (ii. 1), and that of वाग्भट (p. 14)—शब्दार्थौ निर्दोषौ सगुणौ प्रायः सालंकारौ काव्यम्। Hemachandra's definition is in the same style (p. 16) अदोषौ सगुणौ सालंकारौ च शब्दार्थौ काव्यम् and Vidyānātha in the प्रतापरुद्रयशोभूषण also agrees (p. 42)—

गुणालंकारसहितौ शब्दार्थौ दोषवर्जितौ ।
गद्यपद्योभयमयं काव्यं काव्यविदो विदुः ॥

Other definitions are that of the author of the ध्वनिकारिकाs (i. 1)—

काव्यस्यात्मा ध्वनिरिति बुधैर्यः समाम्नातपूर्वः ।

of मम्मट in the काव्यप्रकाश (i. 4)—

तददोषौ शब्दार्थौ सगुणावनलंकृती पुनः क्वापि ।

of Jain वाग्भट in वाग्भटालंकार (i. 2)—

साधुशब्दार्थसंदर्भं गुणालंकारभूषितम् ।
स्फुटरीतिरसोपेतं काव्यं कुर्वीत कीर्तये ॥

of विश्वनाथ in the साहित्यदर्पण (i. 3)—

वाक्यं रसात्मकं काव्यं दोषास्तस्यापकर्षकाः ।
उत्कर्षहेतवः प्रोक्ता गुणालंकाररीतयः ॥

of जयदेव in the चन्द्रालोक (i. 7)—

निर्दोषा लक्षणवती सरीतिर्गुणभूषिता ।
सालंकाररसानेकवृत्तिर्वाक् काव्यनामभाक् ॥

of Bhoja in the सरस्वतीकण्ठाभरण (i. 2)—

निर्दोषं गुणवत् काव्यमलंकारैरलंकृतम् ।
रसान्वितं कविः कुर्वन् कीर्तिं प्रीतिं च विन्दति ॥

and lastly of जगन्नाथ in the रसगंगाधर (p. 4)—

रमणीयार्थप्रतिपादकः शब्दः काव्यम् ।

(iv) From all these different definitions it is evident that (i) while भामह, रुद्रट, वामन, वाग्भट, मम्मट, हेमचन्द्र, and विद्यानाथ give an equal prominence to शब्द or word as well as to अर्थ or sense as constituting the essence of poetry, Daṇḍin, the author of the अग्निपुराण, विश्वनाथ, जयदेव, and जगन्नाथ hold the word-element in poetry as entitled to a prior consideration. The difference between these two views is well brought out by जगन्नाथ who remarks (pp. 5–6)—शब्दार्थयुगुलं न काव्यशब्दवाच्यम् । मानाभावात् । काव्यमुच्चैः पठ्यते काव्यादर्थोऽवगम्यते काव्यं श्रुतमर्थो न ज्ञात इत्यादिविश्वजनीनव्यवहारतः प्रत्युत शब्दविशेषस्यैव काव्यपदार्थप्रतिपत्तेश्च । .... । तस्माद्वेदशास्त्रपुराण-लक्षणस्येव काव्यलक्षणस्यापि शब्दनिष्ठतैवोचिता । In this connection it must be said that although जगन्नाथ is here technically correct, an important comment upon the view is supplied by the following—"Good poetry stands midway between prose and music. The moment it becomes possible to say, here the delight given is sensuous and due to the form alone, or here the delight given is intellectual and due to the idea alone, at that moment the poetry ceases to be of the highest quality." It is with an exactly similar purpose that मम्मट and others were led to emphasise both the word and the sense in an equal measure, making them ancillory to Rasa.

(v) Another point that comes out from a close examination of the several definitions given above is the relative emphasis that is to be laid upon दोषाभाव, गुण, रीति, अलंकार, रस and ध्वनि. Bharata, the oldest extant Ālaṁkārika, has made रस the most essential factor in poetry, as his conception of poetry was mainly dramatic. Compare Nāṭyaśāstra (vii. 7)—

योऽर्थो हृदयसंवादी तस्य भावो रसोद्भवः ।
शरीरं व्याप्यते तेन शुष्ककाष्ठमिवाग्निना ॥

He has accordingly treated of the Guṇas, Doshas and Alaṁkāras only as being subordinate to Rasa. See Prof. Sovani's paper on "Pre-dhvani Schools" in the R. G. B. Commemoration Volume. This view is repeated in the Agnipurāṇa (336. 33)—

वाग्वैदग्ध्यप्रधानेऽपि रस एवात्र जीवितम् ।

and in the सरस्वतीकण्ठाभरण (v. 8)—

वक्रोक्तिश्च रसोक्तिश्च स्वभावोक्तिश्च वाङ्मयम् ।
सर्वानुग्राहिणीं तासु रसोक्तिं प्रतिजानते ॥

and Ālaṁkārikas like Rudraṭa and Bhaṭṭanāyaka seem to have accepted it.—As contrasted with this Rasa School of Bharata is the Alaṁkāra School, the oldest known writer belonging to which is perhaps Bhāmaha, although he by no means was the originator of it. Alaṁkāras according to Bhāmaha depend upon वक्रोक्ति or imaginative speech ; compare (ii. 85)—

सैषा सर्वैव वक्रोक्तिरनयार्थो विभाव्यते ।
यत्नोस्यां कविना कार्यः कोलंकारोनया विना ॥

and Guṇas (Doshābhāvas) and Rasas are either not absolutely essential factors in poetry or are subordinate to Vakrokti or Alaṁkāra. This view was further elaborated by वक्रोक्तिजीवितकार who tried to include ध्वनि also under वक्रोक्ति.—Another school, which was really older than Bhāmaha and which is now represented by Daṇḍin and Vāmana, made रीति the soul of poetry. A रीति is a style of composition affected by certain writers, and it naturally includes a due consideration of all the other factors of poetry. But as the school tended to make invidious distinctions between वैदर्भी, गौडी and other styles, it inevitably provoked opposition and so had not a long history. Its attempt to classify the entire poetical output into so many ready-made styles—however true to facts it may once have been—was bound ultimately to be discarded in favour of other more penetrating principles of division.—The last school of Ālaṁkārikas that we notice is that heralded by the author of the ध्वनिकारिकाs—according to Professor Sovanī his name was Sahṛidaya—and by Ānandavardhana the author of the Dhvanyāloka. This school enunciated the important principle that the real excellence of poetry consists in the व्यङ्ग्य or suggested sense ; and it classified poetry into उत्तम, मध्यम and अवर classes according to the presence or absence in it of an inner meaning or ध्वनि. The principle thus

enunciated has been followed without question by Mammaṭa and by the majority of later Ālaṁkārikas.

It would take us far too afield if we were to indicate here the actual criticisms passed by the followers of one school upon those of the others. Our Sanskrit commentary has found room for some of them. For the rest we would refer the curious to Viśvanātha's Sāhityadarpaṇa (Eng. Transl. by Ballantyne, pp. 3–10), the Rasagaṅgādhara and similar treatises. Compare also Jacobi's introduction to his German translation of the ध्वन्यालोक (ZDMG, LVI and LVII).

Notes to I. 11—(i) Vṛitta is a stanza the metre of which is regulated by the number and position or order of succesion of syllables in each quarter or pāda; a Jāti on the other hand is regulated by the number of aggregate syllabic instants (an आर्या for instance has 12–18–12 and 15 instants in its four pādas) quite irrespective of their position in the quadrant. The Vṛittas are further sub-divided into सम or even in which the number and position of syllables in the four quadrants are exactly alike; अर्धसम or semi-even in which alternate quadrants are alike but the odds differ from the even; and विषम or uneven wherein the quadrants are all dissimilar. The Jātis are similarly sub-divided into आर्याs, वैतालीयs and मात्रासमकs. There are, besides these well-known varieties treated of in regular manuals, a number of other abnormal or irregular modes of metrical composition in vogue, both in Vedic and Vernacular languages, that are here simply passed over. Compare however **i. 37** below.

Notes to I. 12—(i) The question whether Chhandovichiti is the name of a special work dealing with metres or only a generic appelation in the sense of Chhandaḥśāstra is hotly debated. If this stanza in the Kāvyādarśa had stood alone, the view that Daṇḍin here alludes to a specific work would hardly have provoked

opposition. But Daṇḍin refers [iii. 171] in a similar context to the Kalāparichchheda which, for parity of reasons, will have to be regarded as another title of a book on fine arts. And then the next question to be determined would be the authorship of the book or books mentioned. If they are definite books, it is unlikely that they are of Daṇḍin's own composition; and we must agree with Mr. Agashe (l. c., p. liii) in holding that, even though these be actual titles of Daṇḍin's own works, they cannot, any more than the Kāvyādarśa, be called prabandhas such as seem to have been intended in the well-known stanza—

त्रयोऽग्नयस्त्रयो देवास्त्रयो वेदास्त्रयो गुणाः ।
त्रयो दण्डिप्रबन्धाश्च त्रिषु लोकेषु विश्रुताः ॥

But it seems to us that Chhandovichiti is only a generic name and is as such used by Āpastamba (ii. 4. 11), Subandhu in his Vāsavadattā (Vāṇīvilāsa ed. p. 135), and twice by Vāmana in his Kāvyālaṁkāra(i. 3. 3)—शब्दस्मृत्यभिधानकोशच्छन्दोविचितिकलाकामशास्त्रदण्डनीतिपूर्वा विद्याः and (i. 3. 6)—छन्दोविचितेर्वृत्तसंशयच्छेदः as also by राजशेखर in his काव्यमीमांसा(p. 49)—अभिधानकोशः छन्दोविचितिः अलंकारतन्त्रं च काव्यविद्याः । Mr. R. Narasimhachar in the introduction (p. 35) to his edition of Nāgavarma's Kāvyāvalokanam, a standard Kannaḍa work on Poetics of the 12th century, mentions a Canarese work called छन्दोविच्चिति, also composed by the same Nāgavarman. In any case, even though Chhandovichiti be taken to designate a definite work, hardly any ground exists for fathering its authorship upon Daṇḍin himself. The very manner of reference to it—सा विद्या नौः etc.—precludes such a possibility.

Notes to I. 13—(i) Muktaka is a solitary stanza complete in sense and requiring no help of context for its interpretation; Kulaka is a group of stanzas forming one complete utterance, the principal verb occurring once at the beginning or at the end (e. g. stanzas 15—19 below); Kośa is of the nature of an anthology,

though not necessarily of multiple authorship; and Saṁghāta is what may be called 'Longer Poems' dealing with a theme of the poet's own invention. It is perhaps conceivable that these varieties may find a place in a Mahākāvya under appropriate circumstances.

Notes to I. 14—(i) As will be evident from a reference to the Appendix on parallelisms between Daṇḍin and other Rhetoricians, a practically identical definition of the Mahākāvya is to be found in Agnipurāṇa (337. 24-32), Bhāmaha's Kāvyālaṁkāra (i. 19 ff.), Bhoja's Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa (v. 128 ff.), Viśvanātha's Sāhityadarpaṇa (vi. 315 ff.), etc. Except where there is a compelling external ground for determining the priority or posteriority of one author over the other, it would be unsafe to raise any chronological superstructure on the basis of a mere identity or similarity of definitions. All writers may equally be borrowing their words from a common original source no longer extant. See Introduction for further pertinent remarks on the point.

(ii) For instances of आशीः etc. see Sanskrit Commentary.

Notes to I. 15—(i) इतिहास (इति + ह + आस, 'thus it was') is a generic name which includes all chronicles, legendary tales, and heroic sagas which always existed in a floating or 'ballad' form before they were reduced to a literary form. The Mahābhārata as we know took over many such and embraced them within itself by way of आख्यानs and उपाख्यानs. The Brihatkathā was another store-house for them; but it is evident that a large number of them have either perished or have not yet found a literary record.

(ii) That every poem, every darśana, every literary effort in fact, was required to subserve some purushārtha is a peculiarly Indian feature which throws out of court all works of a light fanciful nature

ministering to just the passing impulses of the mind. But in this case, as in so many others, the practice proved better than the theory.

(iii) For a detailed clasification of the heroes or नायकs see Sāhityadarpaṇa ii. 30ff.

Notes to I. 16—(i) The charge sometimes brought against Sanskrit poetry, viz. the absence of any nature descriptions in it, is amply refuted by this passage. Two remarks must, however, be made. The descriptions offered are more often subjective than purely objective, and they are sometimes vitiated by an undue *penchant* for figures of speech and other artificial devices to which Sanskrit yields itself more readily than almost any other literary language. And in course of time the topics and the modes of description got stereotyped, and even gifted writers rarely permitted themselves a free exercise of originality.

Notes to I. 17—(i) In the typical Mahākāvya the hero was required always to come out victorious in the end. In poetry as in drama there was in India a general feeling against a tragic ending. And yet we find the ऊरुभङ्ग of भास and the हम्मीरमहाकाव्य of नयचन्द्रसूरि as instances to the contrary. However, the normal objection to tragic ending seems to have been based on the fact that, while poetic justice requires that the hero's fate be deserved and not arbitrary, if the hero who meets such a fate is at the same time to win the sympathy of the audience, the poet would thereby be doing something detrimental to the moral interests of men. The Greek idea of Nemesis overtaking a person when his virtues practised to excess turn into vices, or the modern psychological idea that every emotion—no matter of what kind or character—leaves the man all the better and the soberer for it, does not seem to have been properly grasped by Indian formulators of poetic theory.

Notes to I. 18—(i) The Rasas play such an important part in the exposition of the Indian theory of poetry that it is necessary that an early effort be made by the student to grasp them in all their divisions and bearings. A detailed exposition of these will be found in the Sanskrit commentary to ii. 275. Here it will suffice to say that Rasa or poetic sentiment is a peculiar affection of the mind giving rise to the well-known emotions such as those of love, heroism, etc. Sanskrit rhetoricians acknowledge only nine or ten manifest varieties, each having its own generating and intensifying causes (आलम्बन and उद्दीपन विभावs), the bodily movements attendant upon it as its effects (अनुभावs), and the fleeting psychological moods such as dejection etc. through which the mind passes during its course (व्यभिचारिन्s).—In addition to the regularly accepted and full-fledged varieties of poetic sentiments as described above, there are other permanent moods (स्थायिन्s) not developed in all their accessories [e. g. देवादिविषया रतिः], as also certain fleeting moods slowly gaining in intensity and permanence, which both of them are styled Bhāvas. They are in fact the lesser Rasas—the Rasas, and Bhāvas together with the Vyabhichārins exhausting between themselves almost all the varying emotions to which the human mind is liable.

(ii) सुसंधिभिः—For various interpretations see the Commentary. It does not seem probable that Daṇḍin is here referring to agreeable coalescence of vowels and consonants. It is too general a condition of every prose and poetic composition to be made specifically the part of a definition of the महाकाव्य. Further, that the subject matter of a succeeding canto be briefly mentioned or alluded to in the last few verses of the preceding canto (such as we generally find to be the case for instance in the Rāmāyaṇa of Vālmīki) is a rule the reason and utility of which is obvious in cases where the cantos represent the recitations finished at a sitting (as in the case of the Rāmāyaṇa), but which would be without any purpose in normal circumstances. We are inclined therefore to take the

'joints' here as referring to the interlinking of the several parts of the story. It is likely that, overladen by so many descriptions and digressions, the thread of the narrative would be lost sight of unless sufficient care is taken beforehand The same is done in a detailed and specific manner in a Sanskrit drama ; but we need not look for the नाट्यसंधिs in a Mahākāvya, although Hemachandra in his Kāvyānuśāsana (p. 330ff) seems so to understand the matter.

Notes to I. 19—(i) भिन्नवृत्तान्त—This rule seems to be a very ancient one seeing that it is observed even in the Rāmāyaṇa as we have it now.

(ii) A Kalpa is a period measured by 432,000,000 human years, at the end of which there is the universal dissolution or *pralaya.*

Notes to I. 20—(i) Note that the ultimate test of good poetry is and ought to be always the approbation of the discerning public. That this was a potent factor which even poets like Kālidāsa and Bhavabhūti had to reckon with is sufficiently clear from stanzas like आपरितोषाद्विदुषां [Śākuntala] and ये नाम केचिदिह नः [Mālatī-Mādhava]. Rājaśekhara in his Kāvyamīmāṁsā [Gaekwad's Oriental Series No. 1., pp. 54-55] gives elaborate rules for the management of an assembly of learned persons for adjudging the merits of poetic compositions. They were generally held under the patronage of some king, though literary centres like Ujjain had their own ब्रह्मसभाs for काव्यशास्त्रपरीक्षा. Thus it stands recorded about these last—

इह कालिदासमेण्ठावत्रामररूपसूरभारवयः ।
हरिचन्द्रचन्द्रगुप्तौ परीक्षिताविह विशालायाम् ॥

and of similar sessions at Pāṭaliputra we hear—

अत्रोपवर्षवर्षाविह पाणिनिपिङ्गलाविह व्याडिः ।
वररुचिपतञ्जली इह परीक्षिताः ख्यातिमुपजग्मुः ॥

The whole description in the Kāvyamīmāṁsā is worth reading.

Notes to I. 21—(i) In spite of the identical expressions प्रागुपन्यस्य and वंशवीर्यश्रुतादि in this and the following stanzas and stanza i. 22 of भामहालंकार—

नायकं प्रागुपन्यस्य वंशवीर्यश्रुतादिभिः ।
न तस्यैव वधं ब्रूयादन्योत्कर्षाभिधित्सया ॥

it is clear that Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin are here speaking of two distinct matters. Bhāmaha means merely to express his disapproval of a disastrous ending to the hero's career whereas Daṇḍin takes the triumph of the hero for granted and is merely expressing his opinion as to whether it may not be more effective rhetorically to set forth at first the opponent of the hero in all his pomp and glory and then, through the superior virtue and prowess of the hero, to secure his downfall. We invite particular attention of the reader to this case which proves that mere identity of expression between two works is not a sufficient basis for making any chronological deductions. The range of words in a highly technical and scientific treatise is always necessarily narrow and there are often identities in expression that are not intended.

There is yet another observation that we wish to make in this connection. Bhāmaha, after laying down his prohibition against tragic ending, seems to justify the position he takes against some who apparently favoured the other view by the passage (i. 23)—

यदि काव्यशरीरस्य न स व्यापितयेष्यते ।
न चाभ्युदयभाक् तस्य मुधादौ ग्रहणं स्तवे ॥

We do not exactly know what this view was and who held it but whoever these writers were they seem to have used in the formulation of their view the expressions ....प्रागुपन्यस्य वंशवीर्यश्रुतादिभिः which we find now in Daṇḍin as well as in Bhāmaha. How can it be possible under the circumstance to say that Daṇḍin borrowed the expression from Bhāmaha or Bhāmaha from Daṇḍin ?

Notes to I. 22—(i) This and the preceding verse are taken over from here bodily into the Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa (v. 137-138). Such wholesale and unacknowledged borrowings are much too frequent with Sanskrit writers, especially when dealing with a scientific subject. That there should be no patent or copyright about scientific discoveries is in fact a regular Indian idea recently so nobly illustrated by the Bose Research Institute of Calcutta.

Notes to I. 23—(i) The reading of N, आख्यायिकाकथे as a Dvandva compound, adopted by us seems to be the genuine reading. There is no difficulty about the justification of the Dvandva compound as आख्यायिका is more अभ्यर्हित and can be correctly placed in the beginning. The more generally adopted reading lacks the connecting च.

Notes to I. 24—(i) When a person narrates his own experiences for the benefit of others that becomes an autobiography, and an आख्यायिका according to the older view was a species of autobiography. When others narrate the hero's experiences either to the hero himself [there is only one recorded instance of this kind : Caesar's General narrating unto Caesar his own movements and exploits] or to the general public that is a Kathā. This seems to have been one of the distinctions made between आख्यायिका and कथा. Bhāmaha at any rate distinctly lays down that in a कथा whether composed in Sanskrit or in Apabhraṁśa अन्यैः स्वचरितं तस्यां नायकेन तु नोच्यते। Other points of distinction between these are—

आख्यायिका	कथा
(1) नायकवाच्या	— नायकेतरवाच्या
(2) वक्त्र and अपरवक्त्र metres	— Their absence;आर्यादि metre
(3) उच्छ्वास division	— Its absence ; लम्भ division
(4) कन्याहरणसंग्रामविप्रलम्भोदयादयः—	... ...
(5) कविभावकृतचिह्न —	... ...
(6) [Composed in Sanskrit]—	Composed in Sanskrit and all other languages

(ii) We have already quoted in the Sanskrit Commentary the passage from Bhāmaha which sets forth the distinction between आख्यायिका and कथा. Now Daṇḍin is against making any rigid distinction between the two; and because the expressions used by Bhāmaha and by Daṇḍin in this connection are largely identical many people have imagined that the view controverted by Daṇḍin is that of Bhāmaha himself. Others who find chronological difficulties in accepting the priority of Bhāmaha over Daṇḍin (see Introduction on this point) are content to posit an unknown predecessor from whom Daṇḍin must have borrowed his views and expressions. But it does not seem to have been realised that the view controverted by Daṇḍin *actually differs* in one particular from that of Bhāmaha, and that therefore neither of these two writers need necessarily have borrowed his expressions from the other. Thus while the view controverted by Daṇḍin made the Kathā नायकेनेतरेण वा (=च) वाच्या i. e. partly autobiographical and partly impersonal narrative, भामह requires the कथा to be exclusively an impersonal narration (नायकेन तु नोच्यते) on the ground, forsooth, that a noble person should not be boastful about his own exploits,—as if this objection would not equally apply to the hero of an आख्यायिका! But भामह's dictum स्वगुणाविष्कृतिं कुर्यादभिजातः कथं जनः has only the कथा in view, whereas—and this is another distinction between भामह and the view controverted by Daṇḍin—Daṇḍin's defence in the latter half of this stanza applies equally to आख्यायिका as well as कथा (i. e. in those portions of it which are नायकवाच्य).

Notes to I. 25—(i) It seems that Daṇḍin was acquainted with आख्यायिकाs as well as कथाs that did not conform to the rigid requirements of rhetoricians. If under the the circumstances भामह knew दण्डिन् how could he lay down the rigid rule—अन्यैः स्वचरितं तस्यां नायकेन तु नोच्यते ?

Notes to I. 26—(i) It seems to have been a settled convention that आख्यायिका and कथा, although varieties of prose composition, should occasionally introduce some verses, वक्त्र and अपरवक्त्र (for definitions see Sanskrit Commentary) being restricted to आख्यायिका and आर्यादि metres (भामह's expression is गाथाश्लोकमात्रादि) to कथा. Dandin is against this puerile restriction as also against the ruling that the subdivisions of an आख्यायिका must be called उछ्वासs and that of a कथा लम्भs (or लम्भकs) Dandin's manner of reference seems to suggest that the rule about the nomenclature of subdivisions was generally observed (भेदश्च दृष्टः), while that about the employment of specific metres was not held to be so rigorously binding.

Notes to I. 27—(i) The correct name is लम्भ (लम्भक) and not लम्ब (लम्बक). It comes from the root लभ् and signifies 'conquest'. The successive chapters of a कथा were expected to narrate a fresh conquest of the hero: this at least seems to have been the case in the original Bṛihatkathā (see Lacôte, Essai sur Guṇāḍhya et la Bṛhatkathā, pp. 222 ff). The word राज्यलम्भ is frequently used in the Mahābhārata and सुबन्धु's well-known allusion to the बृहत्कथा (Hall, p.110)–अस्ति सुधाधवलैर्बृहत्कथारम्भै–(v. l. लम्भै, लम्भकै)रिव शालभञ्जिकोपेतैः.........वेश्मभिरुपशोभितं.......... कुसुमपुरं नाम नगरम्—properly interpreted plainly says that the subject-matter of each लम्भ of the बृहत्कथा was the conquest of a fresh शालभञ्जिका or विद्याधरी.

Notes to I. 28—(i) Lacôte in his French essay above referred to (p. 282) suggests that Dandin was led to obliterate the traditional distinction between आख्यायिका and कथा because he found that गुणाढ्य in his बृहत्कथा did not observe that distinction. For instance, according to Lacôte's showing (p. 220), the original बृहत्कथा, with the exception of the कथामुख section, was a narration by नरवाहनदत्त of his own victories, while the traditional view as recorded by भामह laid down— स्वचरितं तस्यां नायकेन

तु नोच्यते । Can it be that भामह did not know the बृहत्कथा ? He does refer to a कथा in अपभ्रंश language in i. 28.

(ii) The modern classical examples of कथा, such as the कादम्बरी and the हर्षचरित, illustrate Daṇḍin's own view in as much as they do not rigidly observe the traditional distinction between आख्यायिका and कथा.—The remaining species of आख्यानs include possibly what are known as खण्डकथाs or incomplete stories which narrate the fortunes of a subordinate character upto the point where he is introduced into the main story and then interlink his fate with that of the main hero ; or परिकथाs which are said to exhibit a mixture of a regular कथा with आख्यायिका probably because they contain stories within stories or autobiographies within autobiographies ; and कथानिकाs which the Agnipurāṇa defines as (337.20)—

भयानकं सुखपरं गर्भे च करुणो रसः ।
अद्भुतोन्ते सुक्लृप्तार्थो नोदात्ता सा कथानिका ॥

Notes to I. 29—On a reference to the Sanskrit passage from भामह quoted in the commentary to i. 23 above it will be seen that the position of the line कन्याहरणसंग्रामविप्रलम्भोदयान्विता (and even of the line preceding it) is such that we cannot be positive whether Bhāmaha means it to go with an आख्यायिका or with a कथा. Since the subject matter of an आख्यायिका according to भामह can be anything of a dignified character (cp. उदात्तार्था in i. 25), we are rather, against the usual view, inclined to regard the two lines as describing the characteristics of a कथा. In fact कन्याहरण etc. are just the proper subjects for a लम्भ or 'conquest'. The gist of Daṇḍin's contention is that in this circumstance at least there is nothing to differentiate गद्य compositions from पद्य compositions like सर्गबन्ध. Compare for instance i. 16—17 above. Lacôte observes (p. 282)—La différence entre la kathā et le sargabandha serait seulement, si j'entends bien Daṇḍin, dans ce fait que le sujet du sargabandha serait généralement emprunté à l'itihāsa et qu'il y serait

question des quartre fins de la vie humaine. Or, la Bṛhatkathā n'a rien pris à l'itihāsa et elle comporte tous les autres ingrédients de la mixture recommandée par Daṇḍin. La definition n'est-elle pas comme fait pour elle ?

(ii) It is a question whether विप्रलम्भ cannot be taken here in the sense of 'deception' or धूर्तचरित, a fitting subject for being introduced into a thrilling narration. The technical sense of the term which we have adopted above in I. 17 need not of course be disregarded entirely.

Notes to I. 30—(i) It is not clear what kind of a चिह्न they used for an आख्यायिका or a कथा in prose. The commentary A in the Madras edition says—यथा सर्गान्ते माघेन श्रीशब्दः भारविणा लक्ष्मीशब्दः प्रवरसेनेन च अंशान्ते अनुरागशब्दः हस्तिमल्लेन च लम्भान्ते लम्भशब्दः इत्यादि। Nothing is known about हस्तिमल्ल. Presumably he wrote some कथा on the model of the बृहत्कथा and used the word लम्भ (in the sense of conquest) at the end of each section.

(ii) The text of the भामहालंकार i. 27[ab] should be—कवेरभिप्रायकृतैरङ्कनैः instead of as printed by Mr. Trivedi at the end of his edition of the प्रतापरुद्रयशोभूषण (B. S. S. LXV).

Notes to I. 31—(i) Of the ten principal varieties of रूपक नाटक and प्रकरण are the ones most familiar, and next to them, भाण and प्रहसन. The Trivandrum Sanskrit Series has published, amongst the plays of भास, the मध्यमव्यायोग, and the Gaekwad's Oriental Series, No. VIII, contains an example each of व्यायोग, भाण, ईहामृग, डिम, प्रहसन and समवकार. That the varieties are not the mere creations of the theorists but that the theory was formulated on observation would be sufficiently clear from this. It must be admitted, however, that the theoretical elaboration of the रूपक along the lines of the पञ्चसंधिs was based upon a particular species of it, viz. what

may be called the court-play or the play of harem-intrigue. But plays such as the मालविकाग्निमित्र of Kālidāsa and the रत्नावली or प्रियदर्शिका of श्रीहर्ष do not exhaust the variety of the Sanskrit theatre. The court-play very naturally got multiplied in copies and consequently preserved through royal patronage, and dramatic theory regarded that as the type and framed its technical terms to suit its theme, but there always have existed varieties not recognised by the theorist and not always amenable to his rule; and a truer light on the origin of the Indian drama is more likely to come from a judicious investigation of these varieties (and their survivals in the modern Hindu life) than where it is usual to seek for it.

Notes to I. 32—(i) Literature was divided into three varieties according to its form [i. 11]; language is a new fundamentum divisionis yielding four distinct varieties, and the effect of combining these two principles of division is exhibited below in i. 37-38. Thus, we have four varieties in पद्य, viz. सर्गबन्ध, स्कन्धक, ओसर, and नाटक (i. 37) and as many presumably in गद्य and in मिश्र, although Daṇḍin does not think it necessary to specify them all. A third principle of division, but of limited application, is enunciated in i. 51.

(ii) The age, origin, and varieties of the Prākrits is too large a subject to be disposed of in a note. A few points of view might however be here offered with propriety. Pāli, the language of Buddhistic canon, in as much as it retains most of the inflections and nearly two-fifths of the vocabulary of the older Sanskrit unchanged, is commonly regarded as the first corrupt form of that language and even—though wrongly—as the parent (the correcter relation would be that of an elder sister) of the later Prākrits. But it is doubtful whether the Pāli of the Canon really represents the language spoken by the Buddha. In the Bhabra edict Aśoka refers to certain *dhammapaliyāyāni* or sacred texts and the reference might be presumed to retain the exact form of the texts as actually pro-

nounced by the Buddha. Now expressions like अलियवसानि and लाघुलोवादे मुसावादं अधिगिच्य are departures from the regular Pāli and exhibit an affinity with the Māgadhī. Can it be that the pre-canonic language of Buddhism was not very different from the pre-canonic language of Jainism—a fact which is rendered also probable from the circumstance that Mahāvīra and Gotama Buddha belonged to the same province and age?

We may even generalise and say that the canonic language is always a few stages removed from the current language; and this has led some scholars to assume the presence of dialects even in Vedic times. The phenomenon of the cerebralization of the dentals in Vedic and Sanskrit words which have lost the primitive ऋ, र् or ष् is adduced in support of this fact, and Pāli and the later Prākrits are traced back right on to the Vedic dialects which (some of them) exhibit the Prākritic tendency to cerebralization. Yāska the author of the Nirukta, as is well-known, mentions (II. 2) a number of dialectical variations in Sanskrit—अथापि भाषिकेभ्यो धातुभ्यो नैगमाः कृतो भाष्यन्ते........नैगमेभ्यो भाषिकाः। ...अथापि प्रकृतय एवैकेषु भाष्यन्ते विकृतय एकेषु । शवतिर्गतिकर्मा कम्बोजेष्वेव भाष्यते...विकारमस्यार्येषु भाषन्ते शव इति। दातिर्लवनार्थे प्राच्येषु दात्रमुदीच्येषु। Kātyāyana and Patañjali frequently mention (cp. महाभाष्य I. 5, I. 259, etc.) Prākritic corruptions as current in the language of the layman. The origin of the Prākrits is thus lost in obscurity and they have a longer history than it is usual to assume for them.

Notes to I. 33—(i) Instances of *tadbhava* words are दंसण (from दर्शन), फंस (from स्पर्श), मग्ग (from मार्ग), etc.; and of *tatsama* words the classical example is Mālatī-Mādhava vi. 10—

सरले साहसरागं परिहर रम्भोरु मुञ्च संरम्भं ।
विरसं विरहायासं सोढुं तव चित्तमसहं मे ॥

which is the same in Sasnkrit as well as Prākrit. For other extreme cases compare Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa ii. 8–10. The so-called Deśī words are, some of them,

tadbhava words that have undergone very great corruption (e. g. कुहुडो from sk. कुब्ज, छिप्प from sk. पुच्छ), while others probably are derived from the language of the aborigines of the various provinces whom the Aryans conquered. In this connection it is curious to note that some of these Deśī words (e. g. मटची) have found their way even into texts like the छान्दोग्य (i. 10).

Notes to I. 34—(i) The earliest available reference to Mahārāshṭra occurs in the Mahāvaṁśa (cir. 500 A. D.) where mention is made of a Buddhistic mission to Mahāraṭṭa in the 17th year of the reign of the emperor Aśoka. But references to Vidarbha (Ait. Brāh. vii. 34. 9, Bṛihad. Up. ii. 6. 3, iv. 6. 21), to the Dākshiṇātyas (Nir. iii. 5), and to countries and people to the South are traceable much earlier. The name is sometimes derived from Mallas (Māras or Mahārs) + rāshṭra in the sense of a kingdom of the low-caste people called Mahārs, and more usually from Mahā + Rāshṭrikas in the sense of the 'great Rāshṭrakūṭas' and of the country inhabited by them; but Prof. Kane's suggestion that the name merely signifies 'the great kingdom' and is formed on the analogy of words like सुराष्ट्र, देवराष्ट्र, गोपराष्ट्र, etc. (JBBRAS, 1917) has much to recommend itself.

(ii) Vararuchi, probably the oldest Prākrit grammarian, recognises four Prākrit languages: महाराष्ट्री, पैशाची, मागधी, and शौरसेनी; and the Jain Canon which, according to tradition, was written down in 454 A. D. presupposes a long anterior development and literary usage of the महाराष्ट्री. Prākrit grammarians have always regarded the Mahārāshṭrī as the normal Prākrit and the dramatists from Bhāsa downwards assign to it a pre-eminent position. We would not be far wrong therefore if we assign a period of some twelve hundred years (from the first century before Christ to the tenth century after Christ) for the bloom of the Mahārāshṭrī Prākrit, the latter date marking the beginnings of the modern Marāṭhī.

(iii) The Prākrit poem called Setubandha on which Daṇḍin is so lavish in bestowing his praise is praised also by Bāṇa in the Harshacharita (Introd. St. 15)—

कीर्तिः प्रवरसेनस्य प्रयाता कुमुदोज्ज्वला ।
सागरस्य परं पारं कपिसेनेव सेतुना ॥

The work is published in the Kāvyamālā (no. 47) and from the last stanza of the poem—

एत्थ समप्पइ एअं सीआलम्भेण जणिअरामब्भुअअं ।
रावणवह त्ति कव्वं अणुराअङ्कं समत्थजणणिव्वेसं ॥

and the several colophons we gather that its original name was रावणवह. The name सेतुबन्ध is however justified by the fact that the poem opens with the meeting of राम with मारुति after his return from लङ्का and devotes nearly 8 Āśvāsakas out the total number of 15 to the circumstances leading to the construction of the Setu. The accuracy of Daṇḍin's description of the poem as सागरः सूक्तिरत्नानां will be evident even to a casual reader of the poem : it contains, as compared with its subject matter, a disproportionately large number of moral maxims and sententious reflections. The identity of प्रवरसेन, the Royal author of the poem, is not yet established. It is usual to assign the poem to the second century after Christ.

Notes to I. 35—(i) Śaurasenī is the usual language of the prose passages (as Mahārāshṭrī that of the verses) in a normal play. The language is much allied to the Mahārāshṭrī, and the circumstance that the name is derived from a country (and a people) noted for the Kṛishṇa-līlā has led some to assume a connection between Kṛishṇa-līlā and the origin of Indian drama.—Gauḍī is regarded by Hoernle as a type of Prākrit distinct from the Śaurasenī and forming along with it the two main Prākrit types. Gauḍī probably is the same as Māgadhī.—Lāṭī, the language of Lāṭa-deśa, is not easily to be identified. It is possibly the same as the दाक्षिणात्या of the Nāṭyaśāstra (xvii. 48).

(ii) Mahārāshṭrī and the three or four other languages mentioned by Daṇḍin are genuine Prākrits, i. e., are in the main derived from Sanskrit, being its slightly corrupt forms. The speakers of these **Prākrits** were also for the most part Aryans by descent, or at least aliens thoroughly assimilated to Aryan civilization. Such does not seem to have been the case with the so-called Apabhraṁśas.

Notes to I. 36—(i) The distinction between the Prākrits and the Apabhraṁśas which Daṇḍin here makes contains a great historical or rather ethnological principle underlying it. The Apabhraṁśas are जातिभाषाs and not देशभाषाs, they are not the languages of a settled people but of several nomadic tribes. As the Nāṭyaśāstra says (xvii. 49)—

शव(?का)राभीरचाण्डालसचर(?शबर)द्रविडोद्र(?ण्ड)जाः ।
हीना वनेचराणां च विभाषा नाटके स्मृता ॥

These languages therefore exhibit a larger divergence from Sanskrit and a greater admixture with alien words and idioms (म्लेच्छशब्दोपचारा). The speakers, some of them, were aboriginal inhabitants while others, part of the non-Aryan emigrants into India. The modern Vernaculars of India are derived from the older Prākrits through the several Apabhraṁśas. The Apabhraṁśas had an extensive literature of their own. Hemachandra devotes a considerable part of his grammar to a study of their peculiarities.

(ii) The Ābhīras (cowherds) were a foreign race of settlers in India. Dr. Bhandarkar (see his book on Vaiṣṇavism etc. p. 37) is inclined to give them a considerable share in the propagation of the adoration of the child-god. 'The cowherds among whom the boy-god Kṛishṇa lived belong to a nomadic tribe of the name of Ābhīras. They must have migrated in large hords into the country. They were at first mere nomads and afterwards settled in the country from about the eastern confines of the Panjāb to the

vicinity of Mathurā, and in the south up to Surāshṭra, or Kathiawad. The Ābhīras probably brought with them the worship of the boy-god and legends connected with him, as also the name Christ (=Kṛishṇa). The descendants of the old Ābhīras continue to be called Āhirs even to the present day.'—This view however is now upset by the circumstance that the Ābhīras are mentioned by Patañjali (cir. 150 B. C.) as a tribe already settled in the country (cf. Mahābhāshya, I. 252 and Ind. Ant. for 1918, p. 36). This carries the probable date of their migration into India to at least three hundred years before Christ.

(iii) The Aryans of the period of the Brāhmaṇas speaking what it is usual to designate as the 'middle Sanskrit' came into prolonged contact with an aboriginal or alien race whose vocal organs were unused to the utterance of Sanskrit sounds. This led to phonetic decay and the creation of the earliest variety of Prākrit (possibly allied to the Pāli). The Aryans and the alien race in time formed a consolidated community. When, after some time, this community, spreading eastwards and southwards, met other alien races, there arose newer varieties of Prākrit exhibiting further divergence from Sanskrit and greater admixture with Deśisms. In the Apabhraṁśa stage the same process was only still further intensified. From the point of view of Sanskrit (शास्त्रे तु) therefore all these languages from first to last are अपभ्रंश s or corruptions, the difference being one of degree only.

Notes to I. 37—(i) The four-fold classification of literature on the basis of language mentioned in i. 32 above is now illustrated. The metre Skandhaka is thus defined (प्रा॰ पिङ्गल, i. 63)—

चउमत्ता अट्ठगणा पुव्वद्धे उत्तद्ध होइ समरूपा ।

its scheme being—

— —, — —, ⏑⏑ —, ⏑⏑⏑⏑, — ⏑⏑, ⏑ — ⏑, ⏑⏑ —, ⏑⏑ — |
— —, — —, ⏑⏑ —, — ⏑⏑, — —, ⏑ — ⏑, — ⏑⏑, — — ||

It has 28 varieties.—Āsāra is a variety of दण्डक with a scheme like the following—

1 2 3 4 5 29

⏑⏑⏑, ⏑⏑⏑, – ⏑ –, – ⏑ –, – ⏑ –, – ⏑ –, – ⏑ –, etc.... – ⏑ – ।

but this is usually in Sanskrit. The Osara, supposing that to be the correct reading, is a variety of Apabhraṁśa composition of which no illustration is quotable.

(ii) The rules about the employment of the Prākrits by the various characters in a play are most elaborately given in the Nāṭyaśāstra (xvii. 50ff.)—

मागधी तु नरेन्द्राणामन्तःपुरनिवासिनाम् ।
चेटानां राजपुत्राणां श्रेष्ठिनां चार्धमागधी ॥
प्राच्या विदूषकादीनां धूर्तानामप्यवन्तिजा ।
नायिकानां सखीनां च सूरसेनाविरोधिनी ॥
योधनागरकादीनां दाक्षिणात्याथ दीव्यताम् ।
बाह्लीकभाषोदीच्यानां खसानां च स्वदेशजा ॥
शबराणां शकादीनां तत्स्वभावश्च यो गणः ।
स(श)कारभाषा योक्तव्या चण्डाली पुक्कसादिषु ॥
अङ्गारकारव्याधानां काष्ठयन्त्रोपजीविनाम् ।
योज्या शबरभाषा तु किंचिद्वानौकसी तथा ॥
गवाश्वाजाविकौष्ट्रादिघोषस्थाननिवासिनाम् ।
आभीरोक्तिः शाबरी वा द्राविडी द्रविडादिषु ॥
सुरङ्गा खनकादीनां सौण्डीकाराश्च रक्षिणाम् ।
व्यसने नायकानां स्यादात्मरक्षासु मागधी ॥

That these rules are not purely arbitrary and were based upon actual observation of facts need not be questioned. Intelligible intercourse is not impossible between people speaking such diverse tongues. One can find instances of it in a city like Bombay even to the present day. That the rules, which were not without some justification once, should have become unmeaning and even a positive hinderance in course of time is of course what one naturally expects in such a case.

Notes to I. 38—(i) While stanza i. 37 gives the result of the application of language-classification to पद्य (cp. i. 11) or poetical compositions, the present stanza

does the same with reference to गद्य compositions, कथा being Daṇḍin's general name for all its varieties. The so-called मिश्र compositions are मिश्र in a double sense: in regard to the form and in regard to the language.

(ii) This well-known allusion by Daṇḍin to the Bṛihatkathā has been made the subject of repeated discussion and comment by scholars from various points of view. As Daṇḍin uses the word प्राहुः, 'they say', in this connection it is believed by some that Daṇḍin had no first-hand knowledge of it. As against this, compare Lacôte and the French extract from his Essay given under i. 29. The Bṛihatkathā was written in the पैशाची language, and since Daṇḍin seems to regard पिशाच and भूत as synonyms, presumably he knew the traditional story about the origin of the Bṛihat-kathā (given below) and was consequently sufficiently removed from the time of Guṇāḍhya to believe in its veracity. The Kāśmīrian version of this legend one can read in the कथासरित्सागर and in the बृहत्कथामञ्जरी, Lambhaka 1, whereas the Nepalese version is given by the Nepāla-mahātmya, Chaps. xxvii-xxx. The story is as follows—

At the pressing request of Pārvatī while God Śiva was narrating to her the marvellous tales about the seven Vidyādharas which none knew till then, the attendant Pushpadanta (or Bhṛiṅgin according to N.) entered unnoticed and listened. Pushpadanta narrates them to his wife Jayā, who repeats them to Pārvatī and the whole secret is out. Pushpadanta is cursed and becomes a mortal. [The Kāśmīrian version says that Pushpadanta became Vararuchi alias Kātyāyana the grammarian and has a long story about Vararuchi; the Nepalese version on the contrary makes Bhṛiṅgin = Guṇāḍhya and tells about him the same story that the K. version assigns to Mālyavant, a friend of Pushpadanta, who interceded for him and was likewise cursed for his impudence]. In the course of his wanderings he enters the Vindhya forest and meets a Piśācha called Kāṇabhūti unto whom he repeats the Vidyādhara tales and so, as already promised him, he secures his release from the curse.

The Piśācha Kāṇabhūti was a Yaksha under curse and his release from the curse depended upon his repeating the marvellous tales (of course in the language of piśāchas or goblins) to another privileged person. Such a person was the attendant Mālyavant,

a friend of Pushpadanta, who had also to pass through the same curse. Mālyavant becomes Guṇāḍhya the author of the Bṛihatkathā. The legend places him at the court of Sātavāhana or Hāla the reputed author of the Prākrit authology called Sattasaī (Saptaśatī). His literary rival at the court was Śarvavarman the founder of the Kātantra School of Grammar. Through circumstances that need not be here repeated Guṇāḍhya is condemned to a silence in Sanskrit, Prākrit and the Deśī or Vernacular languages. He leaves the court, meets Kāṇabhūti, and through him secures a new outlet for his literary genius. It only remains to add that of the original seven stories comprising seven lacs of verses only one—that of Naravāhanadatta—came to be accidently preserved. The major part of his literary labours came to be burnt by the author himself in a mood of despondency.

The original Bṛihatkathā is no longer available and it must be considred a great literary loss seeing that the work wielded on Indian literature an influence second only to that of the Mahābhārata. Thus says Bāṇa, Harshacharita, Introd. stanza 17—

समुद्दीपितकन्दर्पा कृतगौरीप्रसाधना ।
हरलीलेव नो कस्य विस्मयाय बृहत्कथा ॥

And in the introductory part of the आर्यासप्तशती Govardhana sings (stanzas 33-34)—

अतिदीर्घजीविदोषाद्व्यासेन यशोपहारितं हन्त ।
कैर्नोच्येत गुणाढ्यः स एव जन्मान्तरापन्नः ॥
श्रीरामायणभारतबृहत्कथानां कवीन् नमस्कुर्मः ।
त्रिस्रोता इव सरसा सरस्वती स्फुरति यैर्भिन्ना ॥

The Daśarūpa (i. 68) finally recommends young dramatists to study, along with the Rāmāyaṇa, the Bṛihatkathā, which is a store-house for marvellous plots.

The two Kāśmīrian summaries in Sanskrit—the कथासरित्सागर and the बृहत्कथामञ्जरी—give us a general idea as to the contents of the original Paiśāchī Kathā. A third and an independent summary in Sanskrit—the बृहत्कथाश्लोकसंग्रह—furnishes much matter for critical comparison and Lacôte in his French essay above referred to, after a careful study of the problem extending to some 300 pages, arrives at valuable results regarding the original form of Guṇāḍhya's work.

(iii) The so-called 'goblin language' has recently come to occupy the attention of scholars. Grierson (JRAS, 1905, pp. 285ff.; ZDMG, lxvi, p. 65; and 'The Piśāchī Language of N. W. India') tries to prove that the wild tribes of the extreme North-West, immediately to the South of the Hindu Kush, are the modern representatives of the ancient Piśāchas; and this conclusion has been generally accepted. The Piśāchī was therefore a living language of an actual tribe. A somewhat similar conclusion based upon a comparative study of the several Purāṇas was arrived at by S. P. L. Narasiṁhaswāmi of Vizagapatam in a suggestive little pamphlet on the 'Bhūtas' published in 1915. He regards the Bhūtas as an ancient Himālayan tribe with narrow or small eyes, thick lips, dark or yellowish skin and short stout stature; scantily dressed in skins, eating flesh as well as food (*anna*), and with a system of sexual relations which Plato recommends for his Republic (नैषां भार्यास्ति पुत्रो वा etc.). The tribe was divided into clans or gaṇas and was under the lead of a tribal chief called Rudra. Several such Rudras are mentioned, as also their Rudrāṇīs. The Bhūtas had to wage a long war with the Asuras (who came into the country after them) and later, in the Deva-Asura battles, they sided with the Devas. Under the guidance of Kātyāyanī the Bhūtas achieved their greatest triumphs against the Asuras, and subsequently settled down to more peaceful occupations.

(iv) Lacôte suggests that, apart from the story of his self-imposed silence in three languages, Guṇāḍhya may have decided to write in the Paiśāchī because it was free from the extreme de-consonantization of the Mahārāshṭrī and was in other respects nearer to Sanskrit than the current literary Prākrits; because the few striking characteristics of the language (such as the change of धर्मः to खम्मो, राजा to राचा, ढक्का to ठक्का, वदन to वतन, भगवती to फकवती, गुण to गुन, सलिल to सळिळ) which came in quite regularly gave that element of agreeable novelty that Guṇāḍhya of set purpose wanted to

give; and because, for the rest, he could bodily transfer all other literary turns of expressions directly from Sanskrit into the new vehicle without giving insult or awakening suspicion.

Notes to I. 39—(i) It is generally supposed that this stanza classifies literature according as it is meant to appeal (primarily but not exclusively) to the eye or to the ear. This would in that case give a new fundamentum divisionis as contrasted with the two earlier ones mentioned in i. 11 and i. 32 above. The श्रव्य variety, according to this explanation would include all महाकाव्यs, all कथाs, all compositions in fact except the very small quantity of songs written to accompany Lāsya and other दृश्य prabandhas. The difficulty in the way of this explanation is that Lāsya, Chhalita, Śampā, and others (in so far as they can be called literature at all) form a part not of all literature in general but of that particular variety of it which naturally comes in for discussion after the mention of padya or metrical prabandhas (i. 37) and gadya or prose compositions (i. 38) in different languages: viz. the miśra compositions. It seems to us therefore that Daṇḍin is here not attempting a fresh grouping of the whole body of literature but is trying to determine how far and in what sense drama can be called literature. There are elements in a play (scenery, music, dancing, apparel, etc.) which—howsoever indispensable for its success—can by no stretch of language be called literature. These Daṇḍin is not discussing here at all: they are of the nature of intrusions from sister arts. There are however, as necessary constituents of a normal Sanskrit play, a number of songs and rhythmical movements accompanied by songs which—as far as the words of the songs go (for they ought to be appropriate to the character and the occasion)—come within the province of literature. Compare नाट्यशास्त्र, xxxii. 3—

एभ्यस्त्वङ्गान्यथोद्धृत्य नानाछन्दःकृतानि च ।
काव्यत्वं यानि गच्छन्ति तानि वक्ष्याम्यहं द्विजाः ॥

In regard to these factors in a play Daṇḍin says that they are प्रेक्षार्थम्; the literary element in them is almost a negligible quantity. The rest of the play is wholly श्रव्यम् and it is in this twofold manner that the contents of a play can be analysed.

(ii) Modern students of old Sanskrit plays, as a general rule, give so little attention to the stage conditions in ancient India and are so much in the habit of treating them as 'arm-chair' literature that nearly half the effect intended by the dramatists is mostly lost on them. I have even observed that, through a failure to realise that the words of the plays were always accompanied by appropriate action on the stage, even eminent scholars have misunderstood many a passage in them. I shall only mention one instance: Vikramorvaśīya (Pandit's edition) act ii, speech 104—उर्वशी—एथ्थ णो समविभाआ पीदी। Pandit gives a note to prove that एथ्थ = now, and others try to explain the reason why Urvaśī can now alone say what she says. Could it only have been realised that the immediately preceding speech of the king—

राजा— समाश्वासनमिति किमुच्यते।

तुल्यानुरागपिशुनं ललितार्थबन्धं पत्रे निवेशितमुदाहरणं प्रियायाः।
उत्पक्ष्मणो मम सखे मदिरेक्षणायास्तस्याः समागतमिवाननमाननेन॥

would be accompanied by appropriate acting—that the king for instance would kiss the Bhūrjapatra and that Urvaśī naturally would envy its lot—no misunderstanding of the plain reference of एथ्थ to the letter in question would have been possible.

(iii) We are consequently apt to ignore the very large share that singing and dancing had in producing the ultimate effect of an ancient Indian play: and the remark holds true of the ancient Greek play as well. The metrical parts of a play—the ślokas—were of course not sung except in very rare cases when an actual stage-direction to that effect was given as in ईसीसि चुम्बिदाइं or अहिणवमहुलोलुवो in the Śākuntala. But on occasions like exits and entrances of new or important

characters, at the commencement of new Acts, or whenever an event rich in emotions was being enacted on the stage, music of an appropriate nature always accompanied. As Bharata says (xxxii. 318ff.)—

नानारसार्थयुक्ता नृणां या गीयते प्रवेशेषु ।
प्रावेशिकी तु नाम्ना विज्ञेया सा ध्रुवा तज्ज्ञैः ॥
अङ्कान्ते निष्क्रमणे पात्राणां गीयते प्रयोगेषु ।
निष्कामोपगतगुणां विद्यान्नैष्कामिकीं तां तु ॥
क्रममुल्लङ्घ्य विधिज्ञैः क्रियते या द्रुतलयेन नाट्यविधौ ।
आक्षेपिकी ध्रुवासौ द्रुता स्थिता वापि विज्ञेया ॥
या च रसान्तरमुपगतमाक्षेपवशाद्द्रुतं प्रसाधयति ।
रागप्रसादजननीं विद्यात् प्रासादिकीं तां तु ॥
विषसंमूर्छिते भ्रान्ते वस्त्राभरणसंयमे ।
दोषप्रच्छादने या च गीयते सान्तरच्छदा ॥
बद्धे निरुद्धे पतिते व्याधिते मूर्छिते मृते ।
अवकृष्टा ध्रुवा कार्या भावे च करुणाश्रये ॥
औत्सुक्ये ह्यवहित्थे च चिन्तायां परिदेविते ।
श्रमे दैन्ये विषादे च स्थिता कार्या ध्रुवा बुधैः ॥
एवमर्थविधिं ज्ञात्वा कालं देशमृतुं तथा ।
प्रकृतिं भावलिङ्गं च ततो योज्या ध्रुवा बुधैः ॥

So much as regards singing; and considering the very high development which this science had attained amongst the ancient Hindus the prominent part assigned to it in Sanskrit plays is what we should naturally expect. In view of this the Prākrit songs in the 4th Act of the Vikramorvaśīya gain a new significance and we should not be too hasty in rejecting them as quite spurious.

(iv) In Nāṭaka and Prakaraṇa rhythmical movements did not play as important a part perhaps as they did in the other varieties of the Rūpaka such as Vyāyoga or Samavakāra. The technicalities of these are explained by Bharata in Chapters iv, x, xi, xii, and xxv; and in view of these it is quite probable that stage-directions like बहुविधं नाट्यं कृत्वा स्थितः in the second Act of the Mṛichchhakaṭika or विविधं नृत्यं कृत्वा in the tenth Act of the Malatī-Mādhava should have furnished a much greater element of amusement to the

audience than what we are apt to suppose. And even where such express stage-directions were lacking the पूर्वरङ्ग—like the Orchestra in Greek plays—supplied much that we cannot well realise in modern times.

(v) The various explanations offered by commentators of लास्य, छलित, and शम्पा are recorded in our Sanskrit commentary. Lāsya should include all rhythmical movements (accompanied by appropriate music) be they of men or women, of higher characters or of lower. Chhalita is singing of a particular kind followed by a pantomime representation of the words of the song, and its best illustration is to be found in the Mālavikāgnimitra, Act 2. The word शम्पा is more difficult to explain. The word occurs in the Nāṭyaśāstra (v. 62) in the description of the पूर्वरङ्ग while the variant शम्या is to be met with in the same treatise xxxi. 13, 23 etc., where the technicalities of instrumental music are explained. We believe that शम्पा is the proper reading and it denotes a specific feature of the पूर्वरङ्ग. Daṇḍin accordingly means to say that all those elements that go to the composition of an ordinary play (such as Pūrvaraṅga, music, dancing, singing and pantomime) partake in some measure of a literary character and that they should therefore be regarded as दृश्य elements, everything else being regarded as an exclusively श्रव्य element in the drama.

Notes to I. 40—(i) Already in i. 9 Daṇḍin has alluded to the existence of various mārgas or recognised styles of composition. The rest of this Parichchheda is devoted to a critical study of the two most important of these styles : the Vaidarbha and the Gauḍa, describing and illusrtating the guṇas or characteristics of each, which Daṇḍin (with an allusion to the figurative expression used by him in i. 10) calls the breaths in the 'body' of kāvya. Regarding mārgas or rītis in general compare note (i) to i. 9. and note (v) to i. 10.

(ii) In view of the remark of Mammaṭa (ix. 81)— एतास्तिस्रो वृत्तयः वामनादीनां मते वैदर्भीगौडीपाञ्चाल्याख्या रीतयो मताः it has become necessary to distinguish a रीति from a वृत्ति. The distinction is clearly shown by Bhoja in his Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa ii. 27, 34, etc.—

वैदर्भादिकृतः पन्थाः काव्ये मार्ग इति स्मृतः ।
रीङ् गताविति धातोः सा व्युत्पत्त्या रीतिरुच्यते ॥
या विकाशेथ विक्षेपे संकोचे विस्तरे तथा ।
चेतसो वर्तयित्री स्यात् सा वृत्तिः सापि षड्विधा ॥

From this it appears that while रीति denotes a style of literary composition as affected by certain people and includes all the characteristics of word and sense that are peculiar to it, Vṛitti rather has in view the effect produced by a literary composition upon the mind of the reader or the hearer. Rīti in other words is mostly a matter of external arrangement while Vṛitti concerns itself with the psychological effect produced by the arrangement as well as by the sense of which that arrangement is a vehicle. Every रीति has a वृत्ति corresponding to it; but one and the same रीति conceivably may produce different वृत्तिs and the same वृत्ति may be produced in different रीतिs, although a fondness for symmetry has led the theorists to assign a distinct वृत्ति for each रीति. Bhojarāja recognises six रीतिs and he consequently says (ii. 35ff.)—

कैशिक्यारभटी चैव भारती सात्वती परा ।
मध्यमारभटी चैव तथा मध्यमकैशिकी ॥
सुकुमारार्थसंदर्भा कैशिकी तासु कथ्यते ।
या तु प्रौढार्थसंदर्भा वृत्तिरारभटीति सा ॥
कोमलप्रौढसंदर्भा कोमलार्थाथ भारती ।
प्रौढार्था कोमलप्रौढसंदर्भां सात्वतीं विदुः ॥
कोमले प्रौढसंदर्भा त्वर्थे मध्यमकैशिकी ।
प्रौढार्था कोमले बन्धे मध्यमारभटीष्यते ॥

Normally however only four वृत्तिs are recognised. In chapter xx Bharata gives a mythological explanation about their origin and observes (xx. 24 et passim)—

ऋग्वेदाद्भारती वृत्तिर्यजुर्वेदात् तु सात्वती ।
कैशिकी सामवेदाच्च शेषा चाथर्वणात् तथा ॥

या वाक्प्रधाना पुरुषप्रयोज्या स्त्रीवर्जिता संस्कृतवाक्ययुक्ता ।
स्वनामधेयैर्भरतैः प्रयुक्ता सा भारती नाम भवेत् तु वृत्तिः ॥
या सात्वतेनेह गुणेन युक्ता न्यायेन वृत्तेन समन्विता च ।
हर्षोत्कटा संहृतशोकभावा सा सात्वती नाम भवेत् तु वृत्तिः ॥
या श्लक्ष्णनेपथ्यविशेषचित्रा स्त्रीसंयुता या बहुनृत्तगीता ।
कामोपभोगप्रभवोपचारा तां कैशिकीं वृत्तिमुदाहरन्ति ॥
प्रस्तावपातप्लुतलङ्घितानि च्छेद्यानि मायाकृतमिन्द्रजालम् ।
चित्राणि युद्धानि च यत्र नित्यं तां तादृशीमारभटीं वदन्ति ॥

From this passage it would seem that in a play the वृत्तिs were helped on by appropriate apparel, music, and acting in the production of the intended psychological effect. Finally, Bharata gives (xx. 63f.) the following distribution of the वृत्तिs amongst the various rasas—

हास्यशृङ्गारकरुणैर्वृत्तिः स्यात् कैशिकी रसैः ।
सात्वती यापि च ज्ञेया वीराद्भुतसमाश्रया ॥
रौद्रे भयानके चैव विज्ञेयारभटी बुधैः ।
बीभत्से करुणे चैव भारती संप्रकीर्तिता ॥

The Sāhityadarpaṇa scheme (vi. 122) is slightly different—

शृङ्गारे कैशिकी वीरे सात्वत्यारभटी पुनः ।
रसे रौद्रे च बीभत्से वृत्तिः सर्वत्र भारती ॥

Notes to I. 41—(i) A keen controversy exists amongst the Ālaṁkārikas as to the number and nature of these Guṇas. Bharata, our oldest extant authority, recognises (xvi. 92) ten Guṇas, which are the same as those of Daṇḍin—

श्लेषः प्रसादः समता समाधिर्माधुर्यमोजः पदसौकुमार्यम् ।
अर्थस्य च व्यक्तिरुदारता च कान्तिश्च काव्यार्थगुणा दशैते ॥

Nor do the definitions of these Guṇas by Bharata very much differ from those by Daṇḍin, and the important point to note is that neither of them makes the distinction between शब्दगुणs and अर्थगुणs. The same is true of Vāgbhaṭa in his Vāgbhaṭālaṁkāra (iii. 2ff.) and of the Jain Vāgbhaṭa in his Kāvyānuśāsana (P. 29). Looking to the definitions of these Guṇas by Daṇḍin

it will become clear that Daṇḍin regards some of them (e. g. श्लेष, समता, सुकुमारता, and ओजः) as primarily शब्दगुणs; others (e. g. प्रसाद, अर्थव्यक्ति, उदारत्व, कान्ति, and समाधि) as primarily अर्थगुणs; while गुणs like माधुर्य he seems to have regarded as belonging both to शब्द as well as अर्थ. But it was reserved for Vāmana, as far as we know, to at once double the number of गुणs by making each of them a शब्दगुण as well as an अर्थगुण (cp. iii. 2. 1). Bhoja still further enlarges their number: He gives 24 शब्द-गुणs (i. 63ff.) and again as many अर्थ(वाक्यार्थ)गुणs with identical names (i. 78ff.). The author of the Agni-purāṇa (Chapter 346) is apparently following a different scheme when he gives श्लेष, लालित्य, गाम्भीर्य, सौकुमार्य, उदारता, रूढि and यौगिकी as seven शब्दगुणs and माधुर्य, संविधान, कोमलत्व, उदारता (?), प्रौढि, and सामयिकता as six अर्थगुणs, as also प्रसाद, सौभाग्य, यथासंख्य, प्रशस्यता, पाक, and राग as six उभयगुणs.

(ii) A revolt against this needless multiplication of entities was first definitely pronounced by Mammaṭa who says (viii. 68, 72)—

माधुर्यौजःप्रसादाख्यास्त्रयस्ते न पुनर्दश।
केचिदन्तर्भवन्त्येषु दोषत्यागात् परे श्रिताः।
अन्ये भजन्ति दोषत्वं कुत्रचिन्न ततो दश॥

And he has been followed in this view by Viśvanātha the author of the Sāhityadarpaṇa (viii. 1), by Hemachandra in his Kāvyānuśāsana, chapter iv, and by the majority of later Ālaṁkārikas. The exact way in which the ten guṇas have been reduced to just three can be understood by a reference to the Vṛitti on Kāvyaprakāśa viii. 72 and on the first two sūtras of Hemachandra, Chapter iv, where also will be found a discussion as to whether the गुणs signify anything more than the mere negative condition of दोषाभाव. The most reasonable attitude as regards this last question is that both गुणs as well as दोषs convey a definite positive meaning in spite of the fact that some दोषs approach गुणाभावs and some गुणs approach दोषाभावs. That this is the view of Daṇḍin is clear from the fact that he has thought it necessary, after treating of the

Guṇas in this Parichchheda, to give a separate treatment of the दोषs in iii. 125-185.

(iii) We have just alluded to the classification of Guṇas into external or those belonging to words and internal or those belonging to sense. But in regard to this a crucial point has been raised : To what do the Guṇas belong? Mammaṭa distinctly says in his Vṛitti on viii. 1—आत्मन एव हि यथा शौर्यादयः न आकारस्य तथा रसस्यैव माधुर्यादयो गुणाः न वर्णानाम् and if we sometimes speak of them as belonging to words or sense that is only उपचारेण. The main reason of this distinction seems to have been the fact that रस is regarded as the principal element in a kāvya to which शब्द and अर्थ are both subordinated; and as the Guṇas—whatever their nature—help and accelerate the production of the emotional effect intended, it is right that they should be regarded as contributory to रस the अङ्गिन्. This view of the case has however been combatted by Jagannātha (Rasagangādhara, pp. 33-55) who observes—येमी माधुर्यौजःप्रसादा रसमात्रधर्मतयोक्तास्तेषां रसधर्मत्वे किं मानम् । प्रत्यक्षमेवेति चेन्न । दाहादेः कार्याद् अनलगतस्योष्णस्पर्शस्य यथा भिन्नतानुभवस्तथा द्रुत्यादिचित्तवृत्तिभ्यो रसकार्येभ्योन्येषां रसगतगुणानामननुभवात् ।......................। तथा च शब्दार्थयोरपि माधुर्यादेरीदृशस्य सत्त्वाद् उपचारो नैव कल्प्यः इति तु मादृशाः । Nāgeśabhaṭṭa concludes his commentary on the above passage with the remark—इदमपरमत्र बोध्यम् । आह्लादकत्वरूपमाधुर्यस्य आह्लादकरूपे रसे स्थितिः कथं वक्तुं युक्ता । We think that Mammaṭa is here led away by a theory whereas the view of Jagannātha is the common-sense view of the matter causing no violence to current usage.

Notes to I. 42—(i) Vaidarbhī has been on all hands admitted as the best of styles. This is how बिह्लण praises it (विक्रमाङ्कदेवचरित i.9)—

अनभ्रवृष्टिः श्रवणामृतस्य सरस्वतीविभ्रमजन्मभूमिः ।
वैदर्भरीतिः कृतिनामुदेति सौभाग्यलाभप्रतिभूः पदानाम् ॥

The great Kālidāsa is its best known votary : वैदर्भरीतिसंदर्भे कालिदासः प्रगल्भते । It is said to be शुद्धा when no compound word is at all used in the kāvya (cp. Vāmana

i. 2. 19). The other रीतिs are sometimes regarded as stepping stones to the वैदर्भी, but as the genius of each is peculiar to itself, Vāmana rejects this view of the case; for, says he,—न शणसूत्रवानाभ्यासे त्रसरसूत्रवानवैचित्र्यलाभः ।

(ii) The Guṇas of the Vaidarbhamārga we shall now exhibit along with their opposites or विपर्ययs in a tabular statement, pointing out at the same time such of the opposites as both the Vaidarbhas and the Gauḍas agree to reject—

गुण	विपर्यय	Remarks
1 श्लेषः (i. 43)	— शैथिल्यं (i. 43) —	...
2 प्रसादः (i. 45)	— व्युत्पन्नं (i. 46) —	...
3 समता (i. 47)	— वैषम्यं (i. 50) —	...
4 माधुर्यं (i. 51)		
A श्रुत्यनुप्रासः (i. 52)	— वर्णावृत्तिः (i. 55) —	{ A in शब्द B in अर्थ
B अग्राम्यता (i. 62)	— ग्राम्यता (i. 66) —	Rejected by both
5 सुकुमारता (i. 69)	— दीप्तं (i. 72) —	...
6 अर्थव्यक्तिः (i. 73)	— नेयत्वं (i. 74) —	Rejected by both
7 उदारत्वं (i. 76, 79)	— ... —	...
8 ओजः (i. 80)	— ... —	{ V. attempt a simpler(अनाकुल) kind in prose; G. attempt an उद्भट kind both in prose and in verse.
9 कान्तिः (i. 85)	— अत्युक्तिः (i. 92) —	...
10 समाधिः (i. 93)	— ... —	...

Notes to I. 43—(i) The commentator Premachandra has gone hopelessly wrong in his interpretation of this and the following stanzas, and has even succeeded in dragging Böhtlingk after him. He says: 'श्लेष has शैथिल्य but not of a pronounced or glaring kind. For instance, मालतीमाला लोलालिकलिला is शिथिल as being made of अल्पप्राण syllables, and yet the अनुप्रास secures cohesiveness or श्लेष. Hence this is an example of श्लेष; only it is of a kind that the Gauḍas cultivate by reason of the अनुप्रास. The वैदर्भs do not care for such an अनुप्रास.

Their example of श्लेष is—मालतीदाम लङ्घितं भ्रमरैः। Here although there is शैथिल्य by reason of the majority of अल्पप्राण syllables yet the presence of the conjunct and महाप्राण vocables—ङ्घि and भ्र—secures the element of cohesion necessary for श्लेष.' This explanation of the matter (wherein the Bengāli commentator's partiality for the Gauḍa style is plainly discernible) would possibly have been acceptable if stanzas i. 43 and 44 had stood alone; but Daṇḍin has used the word शैथिल्य in two other places: i. 60 and i. 69, where Premachandra's explanation gives rise to certain difficulties and forced constructions which it is best to avoid altogether. Thus the line—च्युतो मानोधिको रागो मोहो जातोसवो गताः (i. 59) is शिथिल because it is अल्पप्राणाक्षरोत्तर; but cannot the presence of धि, हो, स, etc. make it श्लिष्ट? No! because a succession of ओ sounds produces weariness and consequently a lack of cohesion (बन्धस्य अगाढत्वम्). Again in i. 69 we are told that a series of कोमल syllables gives rise to बन्धशैथिल्य, and the example intended is—मालतीमाला लोलालिकलिला which was earlier (according to Premachandra) given as an example where the शैथिल्य-दोष was successfully overcome by अनुप्रास, thus giving rise to श्लेष! We cannot easily reconcile ourselves to this contradiction.

(ii) Stanza i. 69 distinctly regards मालतीमाला लोलालिकलिला as an exampls of शैथिल्य and this fact should not be lost sight of in interpreting i. 43. Daṇḍin here first defines श्लिष्ट by अस्पृष्टशैथिल्य. Then he proceeds to explain the technical term शैथिल्य which he had to introduce in the definition by defining (अल्पप्राणाक्षरोत्तरं शिथिलम्) and illustrating it (मालतीमाला लोलालिकलिला यथा) and stating the reason why the Gauḍas prefer शैथिल्य although a दोष. Turning back to श्लेष (of which शैथिल्य is a विपर्यय) Daṇḍin now illustrates it by मालतीदाम लङ्घितं भ्रमरैः। This we think is the correct way of taking the two stanzas before us. Compare also Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa i. 31 where—

आलीयं मालतीमाला लोलालिकलिला मनः।
निर्मूलयति मे मूलात् तमालमलिने वने॥

is given as an example of शिथिल the विपर्यय of श्लेष. For an explanation of अल्पप्राण consult our Commentary.

(iii) The following are some of the definitions of श्लेष given by other writers. Thus Bharata (Nāṭyaśāstra xvi. 93-94)—

ईप्सितेनार्थजातेन संबद्धानुपरस्परम् ।
श्लिष्टता या पदानां हि श्लेष इत्यभिधीयते ॥
विचारगहनं यत् स्यात् स्फुटं चैव स्वभावतः ।
स्वतः सुप्रतिबद्धं च श्लिष्टं तत् परिकीर्तितम् ॥

The Agnipurāṇa (346. 6)—

सुश्लिष्टसंनिवेशत्वं शब्दानां श्लेष उच्यते ।

Vāmana, Kāvyālaṁkārasūtra (iii. 1. 10) with Vritti—

मसृणत्वं श्लेषः । मसृणत्वं नाम तत् यस्मिन् सति बहून्यपि पदान्येकवद्भासन्ते ।
Elsewhere he quotes an earlier definition in verse which runs thus—

यत्रैकपदवद्भावः पदानां भूयसामपि ।
अनालक्षितसंधीनां स श्लेषः परमो गुणः ॥

This same Guṇa as belonging to अर्थ is defined by Vāmana as—घटना श्लेषः । क्रमकौटिल्यानुल्बणत्वोपपत्तियोगो घटना ।

Bhoja, Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa (i. 66, i. 78)—

गुणः सुश्लिष्टपदता श्लेष इत्यभिधीयते । and संविधाने सुसूत्रता । the first being a शब्दगुण and the last an अर्थगुण.

Jain Vāgbhaṭa, Kāvyānuśāsana (p. 30)—

यत्र पदानि परस्परस्फूर्तानीव स श्लेषः ।

The other Vāgbhaṭa (iii. 11)—

श्लेषो यत्र पदानि स्युः स्यूतानीव परस्परम् ।

Jagannātha, Rasagaṅgādhara (p. 56)—

शब्दानां भिन्नानामप्येकत्वप्रतिभानप्रयोजकः संहितयैक जातीयवर्ण-विन्यासविशेषो गाढत्वापरपर्यायः श्लेषः ।

(iv) As observed before Mammaṭa refuses to recognise श्लेष as a separate Guṇa, but includes it (when a शब्दगुण) under ओजः regarding it as बन्धवैकट्य (cp. सा० द० p. 431); while श्लेष as an अर्थगुण as made out by Vāmana and Bhoja is according to Mammaṭa not a Guṇa at all (see का० प्र०, वृत्ति on viii. 72 and सा० द० viii. 16), but वैचित्र्यमात्रम्. This seems rather a hard saying, although it has to be admitted that as a Guṇa श्लेष is very hard to feel

and harder still to rationally explain. Thus Vāmana tells us that सूत्रं ब्राह्मसुरःस्थले । भ्रमरीवल्गुगीतयः । and तटित्कलिलमाकाशम् । are not examples of श्लेष by themselves ; but they can be made perfect examples of it by the following changes—ब्राह्मं सूत्रमुरःस्थले । भ्रमरीमञ्जुगीतयः । and तडिज्जटिलमाकाशम् । respectively.

Notes to I. 44—(i) The reading तद्दिष्टं as being the more difficult one and the one countenanced by our best Mss. is more likely to be the correct reading. The word दिष्ट is here used in the sense of अनुज्ञात ; compare Kirātārjunīya, v. 28—

अस्मिन् रतिश्रमनुदश्च सरोजवाताः
स्मर्तुं दिशन्ति न दिवः सुरसुन्दरीभ्यः ॥

"The winds do not permit the ladies to think of heaven", i. e., they make them forget it. Similarly here गौडैः दिष्टं—The Gauḍas permit, admit, or accept it. The expression बन्धगौरवात् is of course to be construed with the उत्तरार्ध.

Notes to I. 45—(i) The Guṇa called Prasāda or lucidity is accepted by all Ālaṁkārikas old as well as new ; and the definitions of it given by them all (with the exception of those of Vāmana and Jagannātha) virtually agree. The two authors just mentioned—while apparently accepting the general requirement of प्रसाद, viz. पदानां श्रवणमात्रेणैव अर्थप्रत्यायकत्वम्—seem to have thought that there was nothing in the fact of the mere use of words in their most obvious senses that can be called a positive merit in poetry. Its absence, it is true, would be a blemish ; but a guṇa has got to be positive in character. Hence the further requirement about a dexterous combination of श्लथत्व (शैथिल्य) and ओजस् (गाढत्व). The degree in which शैथिल्य and ओजस् were to be admitted depended naturally upon the good sense of the poet, and it is conceivable that the one or the other of these would be introduced to a degree that would hinder the ready intelligibility of the poem. This last, I think,

has actually happened in the case of the illustration of Prasāda given by Jagannātha.

(ii) The example of Prasāda given by Daṇḍin is probably based upon a reminiscence of the Śākuntala i. 19—मलिनमपि हिमांशोर्लक्ष्म लक्ष्मीं तनोति, though it is equally likely that the coincidence is merely accidental, especially in view of the words with which the example begins.

Notes to I. 46—(i) The commentator Premachandra here roundly accuses Daṇḍin of being unfair to the Gauḍas. He says—वस्तुतस्तु वैदर्भपक्षपातितया ग्रन्थकृता एवमुक्तं गौडानामपि दोषाणामनङ्गीकारादिति ध्येयम् । We believe however that Daṇḍin has here hit upon a real defect of Gauḍa poetry. It requires a very great self-restraint—such as even the great Bhavabhūti did not always possess—not to let one's learning in the Śāstras unseasonably intrude itself into poetry. Even learning, like art, more often consists in concealing itself.

Notes to I. 47—(i) The reading विषमं (instead of अविषमं) adopted by us needs to be justified. The reading is noticed by the commentator हरिनाथ and possibly by the author of the हृदयंगमा, the commentary marked B in the Madras edition. It is also given by one of our Mss., though it is neither the oldest nor the best. The reading अविषमं makes good sense while the reading विषमं has got to be taken in the possible but not usual sense of विशेषेण समम्—अविषमम् इति यावत् as Cb remarks. While every thing therefore points to अविषमम् as the proper reading, what is *proper* reading need not necessarily be the *original* reading—and this is a valid canon of textual criticism which editors often ignore. No editor is expected to give a text better or correcter than what the author himself wrote. In this particular case, assuming अविषमम् to be the original reading, it becomes very difficult to explain how it came to be changed into विषमम् as it must have been since विषमम् is an

authenticated reading. On the other hand it is easy enough to explain how the original reading विषमम्, in the course of successive manipulation at the hands of scribes, teachers, and pupils, got bettered into अविषमम्. Cæteris paribus the more difficult reading is more likely to be the original reading.

(ii) Samatā as a शब्दगुण depends upon a consistent and harmonious grouping of word-sounds in a stanza, whereas as an अर्थगुण it calls for syntactical parallelism between the various elements that constitute, say, a given nature-description or such other poetic theme; or, according to some, it consists in a consistent and harmonious grouping of the things successively mentioned in the poem. In the description of a season such as वसन्त for example it is necessary that no feature is introduced that is not peculiar to वसन्त or that somehow disturbs the general impression sought to be conveyed. Later writers do not recognise समता as a guṇa.

Notes to I. 48—(i) Although the stanza before us contains examples of two kinds of structures: mṛidu and sphuṭa, one in each श्लोकार्ध, yet the stanza forms but one sentence and can as such be regarded as a single example of vishama or uneven structure made up of a combination of soft and harsh structures. That is exactly how Bhoja regards this stanza in the सरस्वतीकण्ठाभरण i. 32, where he observes—अत्र पूर्वार्धस्य मृदुबन्धत्वादुत्तरार्धस्य च गाढबन्धत्वात् समबन्धेषु विषममिति विषमो नाम शब्दप्रधानः समताविपर्ययो दोषः।

Notes to I. 49—(i) Here again although the first half can be regarded as an example of madhyama or temperate structure and the second half as an example of vishama or uneven structure made up of a sphuṭa (3rd quarter) and a mṛidu (4th quarter) structure—with the reading मुखानिलैः the 4th quarter would be in madhyama

structure—yet since the stanza forms but one sentence it should as a whole be regarded as an example of vishamabandha. Bhoja in fact (i. 127) does so regard it.

Notes to I. 50—(i) The word इति which begins this stanza can possibly be referred to the latter half of stanza 49 alone which, as we have seen, is by itself an example of वैषम्य; but the three earlier श्लोकार्धs have neither a prefatory यथा nor a concluding इति and so remain syntactically unconnected. Secondly, it does not seem likely that Daṇḍin's assertion—वक्त्रे काव्यपद्धतिः can have reference only to a solitary श्लोकार्धे; it is more likely that the assertion has in view both the stanzas preceding it, which are two separate examples of वैषम्य. Nor must it be forgotten that an example of वैषम्य must invariably include parts which taken by themselves exhibit समता. Daṇḍin accordingly seems to be here killing two birds with one stone. The halves are by themselves examples of samatā but the whole forms an example of vaishamya. This seems to be the best way of interpreting the stanzas before us.

(ii) The third pāda is to be understood as अर्थडम्बर and अलंकारडम्बर, and not as अर्थालंकार and डम्बर. The second term includes all excessive ornamentations whether in words or in sense, while the first should include all modes of expression that cannot be technically classed as शब्दालंकारs or अर्थालंकारs but that are exaggerated or even grotesque in form as well as substance.

Notes to I. 51—(i) All definitions of माधुर्य from Bharata downwards agree in regarding it as a subtle quality which one can feel but which defies all analysis. Bharata simply says that माधुर्य is what does not weary (नोद्वेजयति, xvi. 98) you, what in other words क्षणे क्षणे नवतामुपैति, Māgha, iv. 17). Vāgbhaṭa in his Kāvyānuśāsana (P. 30) tells us that माधुर्य is what causes the heart to

melt in joy (यत्र आनन्दमन्दं मनो द्रवति). The Vāgbhaṭālaṁkāra (iii. 14), like Daṇḍin, calls माधुर्यं सरसार्थपदत्व (i. e. having both the अर्थ and the पद full of रस). Vāmana (iii. 1. 20 and iii. 2. 10) and Bhoja (i. 68 and 80) make it to be पृथक्पदत्व (i. e. समासदैर्घ्याभावः) as applying to words—but this view has been controverted; for, as Hemachandra observes (P. 198), समासेपि माधुर्यदर्शनात्—and उक्तिवैचित्र्य or क्रोधाद्यावप्यतीव्रता as applied to sense. Finally Jagannātha combines all shades of meaning under his definition of शब्दगतमाधुर्य as संयोगपरह्रस्वातिरिक्तवर्णघटितत्वे सति पृथक्पदत्वम् (P. 56) and of अर्थगतमाधुर्य as एकस्या एवोक्तेर्भङ्ग्यन्तरेण पुनःकथनात्मकमुक्तिवैचित्र्यम् (P. 59). But in all these definitions one can clearly discern the presence of a subtle subjective factor, which Mammaṭa (viii. 68) and the new school of Ālaṁkārikas definitely avow: compare for instance Viśvanātha (Sāhityadarpaṇa viii. 2)—

चित्तद्रवीभावमयो ह्लादो माधुर्यमुच्यते ।
संभोगे करुणे विप्रलम्भे शान्तेधिकं क्रमात् ॥

(ii) This subtle psychological factor is known as रस which, as Daṇḍin says, is produced both by the words as well as by the sense. We will have to reserve a fuller treatment of the रसs and of the way they affect the mind for another occasion (vide below, ii. 275) and for the present must content ourselves with a reference to our note (i) to i. 18.—From Daṇḍin's treatment of माधुर्य it is evident that he regards it as both a शब्दगुण (illustrated in i. 53) and an अर्थगुण (illustrated in i. 64). The विपर्यय of the former as cultivated by the Gauḍas is illustrated in i. 56 and 57, while the विपर्यय of the latter as illustrated in i. 63 is discarded both by the Vaidarbhas and the Gauḍas.

Notes to I. 52—(i) Upon hearing a certain sound (produced by the first letter of a word) if we become conscious of the fact that the sound is similar to—but not identical with—the sound heard just immediately before it (i. e., the sound of the last letter of the preceding word), and when there is a juxtaposition of

words giving rise to this kind of similar-sound-producing alliteration, we experience a kind of रस which leads to माधुर्य.—Such is Daṇḍin's account of the शब्दगत-माधुर्य. Now similarity of sound exists between words belonging to the same स्थान such as कण्ठ, तालु, मूर्धन्, दन्त, ओष्ठ, etc. Hence the technical name for this kind of grouping of words is श्रुत्यनुप्रास ; and the effect produced by it depends upon an economy of effort due to our not having to pass from one स्थान to another. The economy however is not excessive. When one and the same letter is repeated in succession there is a minimum effort in articulation, but the same parts of the organ-of-speech being used too often may produce weariness, or in any case may lead to a privation of the joy and the pleasure which springs from variety. At the same time, the variety itself must not be too great, as that would lead to a disturbance of harmony and repose. That all artistic effect depends upon an economy of effort as thus understood is a valid scientific principle recognised even in modern times.

(ii) The variant तद्रूपादिपदासत्तिः 'the juxtaposition of a word whose आदि or initial letter is possessed of similarity' yields as good a sense as does the one we have adopted; but the word सानुप्रासा which follows has to be understood in this stanza in a limited sense (i. e. as referring to श्रुत्यनुप्रास and not to वर्णानुप्रास), which can more easily be done if we construe-तद्रूपा [अत एव] सानुप्रासा, i. e., तद्रूपत्वेन सानुप्रासा पदासत्तिः । Frankly however this is a case of double reading, and as our oldest Mss. give तद्रूपादि॰ we might just as well have adopted that reading in the text.

Notes to I. 53—(i) The श्रुतिसाम्य contained in this stanza is fully exhibited in our Sanskrit commentary. How the श्रुतिसाम्य is रसावह it is very difficult to say. The रस intended is probably शान्त and it depends as much upon the presence of the माधुर्य as of the other qualities cultivated by the Vaidarbhas. But, as observed before,

the total effect is purely subjective and if we do not feel it we have to deny to ourselves the title to be called सहृदय.

Notes to I. 54—(i) The word अनुप्रास in the 2nd and 3rd pādas of this stanza is used in its more usual sense as defined by i. 55 below. Compare also the use of the word in i. 44 above. It would seem that the Gauḍas practised अनुप्रास for its own sake, not caring to make it subordinate to the Sentiment. That at least is Daṇḍin's charge against them.

Notes to I. 55—(i) The compound वर्णावृत्तिः can be dissolved so as to make one or two or more than two vocables repeated, and 'vocable' (वर्ण) can include both vowels as well as consonants, although the consonants are what are primarily meant in the case of an अनुप्रास. The more the number of repeated vocables and the more often the repetition, the greater the value of the poem in the eyes of the Gauḍas. 'Pādeshu' is illustrated in i. 56 and 'Padeshu' in i. 57.

(ii) For the various divisions and subdivisions of अनुप्रास consult our Sanskrit Commentary. Bhoja in the 2nd परिच्छेद gives a most elaborate scheme of classification containing six main varieties (श्रुति, वृत्ति, वर्ण, पद, नामद्विरुक्ति, and लाट) and nearly a hundred sub-varieties. Others are less extravagant; but the fact may be noted that of all the languages in the world Sanskrit lends itself most readily to many a *tour de force* which has found its way even in our महाकाव्यs.

Notes to I. 56—(i) Premachandra (and after him Böhtlingk) has misunderstood the purpose of this stanza. It is an example of पादेषु वर्णावृत्तिः as mentioned in the commentary marked B in the Madras edition. It is not necessary therefore, as Böhtlingk proposes, to read

स्तवक instead of स्तबक; and his long note in this connection labours under the mistake of regarding Bengāli pronunciation as typical of the whole of India. The point illustrated is not the repetition of two ज्ञ्s in pāda *a*, of two क्ष्s and two व्s in pāda *b*, of two न्s and two ल्s in pāda *c*, and of four dentals in pāda *d* [B.'s reading अनिलः for अल्निः is clearly a misprint]; but of the common vocable न्द् in the four pādas. It is worth noting that the illustration shows not a single instance of श्रुत्यनुप्रास.

Notes to I. 57—(i) In the first pāda we have here a repetition of two वर्णs च् and आ; and in the second of three वर्णs म्, ब्, and अ. The third pāda contains a Yamaka due to the repetition of the vocable मन्म. As it is not necessary that all पादs should exhibit the अनुप्रास, it is best to regard the first two पादs alone as giving the instance of the kind of अनुप्रास cultivated by the Gauḍas. This example also contains no श्रुत्यनुप्रास except the questionable cases of the assimilation of the nasals at the end of चान्द्रमसं and बिम्बं to the consonants immediately following. It will be observed that the वर्णs repeated include consonants as well as vowels, though, as observed before, a repetition of the latter is not essential in an अनुप्रास.

Notes to I. 58—(i) Because an example like i. 53, acceptable to the Vaidarbhas, is rejected by the Gauḍas, it does not follow that an example rejected by the Gauḍas, e. g. रामामुखाम्भोजसदृशश्चन्द्रमाः, will be acceptable to the Vaidarbhas. As a matter of fact the presence of the long compound and the questionable propriety of making the moon resemble the lotus which in its turn resembles the mouth are things that would suffice to condemn it in the eyes of the Vaidarbhas. All attempts to show that the instance has a case or two of श्रुत्यनुप्रास are therefore gratuitous.

Notes to I. 59—(i) Bhojarāja quotes this stanza as an example of the दोष called असमस्त based upon ओजोविपर्यय. His words are (i. 36)—अत्र सति असमस्तपदाभिधाने सत्यपि चार्थसौकुमार्ये श्लेषादिगुणसामग्र्यभावान्न वैदर्भी रीतिः। नापि यथोक्तलक्षणाभावाद्गौडीयादयः इति खण्डितरीतित्वात् अयमोजोविपर्ययः शब्दार्थप्रधानो गुणविपर्ययो दोषो भवति। The commentator रत्नेश्वर observes upon this passage as follows—यद्यप्यत्र अनुप्रासोस्ति तथापि रीतिमन्तरेण मृतशरीर इव काव्ये नालंकरणतामध्यास्ते। ततश्च न प्रकृतः कोपि चमत्काराविर्भाव इति नास्यैव काव्यतां प्रयोजयतीत्यर्थः।

Notes to I. 60—(i) The reading नियच्छति, in spite of B., seems to be the correct one. Bhoja has the same reading and याज्ञवल्क्य iii. 115 uses the word in the sense of 'attains': cp.—तालज्ञश्चाप्रयासेन मोक्षमार्गं नियच्छति।

(ii) Daṇḍin's remark that the Southerners do not cultivate such an Anuprāsa leaves room for an implication that the Gauḍas might occasionally allow such harsh or loose structures. Hence Premachandra observes—वस्तुतस्तु दोषाणां रसपरिपन्थितया गौडानामपि परिहरणीयत्वात् ग्रन्थकृता वैदर्भपक्षपातितया दाक्षिणात्या इत्युक्तम्। Bhoja in any case, as we saw, does not regard the stanza in question as acceptable to the Gauḍas.

Notes to I. 61—(i) The figure called Yamaka is treated at length in the 3rd Parichchheda, 1-77. The distinction between अनुप्रास and यमक consists in this that (*a*) while in अनुप्रास there is a repetition of one or more consonants (sometimes but not necessarily along with the vowels) in यमक both the vowel (or vowels) and the consonants have to be necessarily repeated and that too in the same order of sequence. Thus कपिः पिकः would be अनुप्रास, not यमक. (*b*) You have not to consider the sense of the words in an अनुप्रास, but in the यमक you have to see that, if an identical group of vocables conveying some meaning is repeated, it is not identical in sense. For instance गच्छ गच्छ is not यमक; but the repetition of a meaningless group of vocables, like मन्म in i. 57 pāda *c* above, can constitute a यमक. As a consequence the

appreciation of the रस is delayed in a यमक, and hence Daṇḍin does not wish to discuss that figure under माधुर्य one essential condition of which is the immediate production of रस.

Notes to I. 62—(i) The importance which Daṇḍin here assigns to an absence of coarseness or vulgarity is quite creditable to him. Even some of our best Sanskrit poets, tried by Daṇḍin's rigorous rule, would be found wanting in this respect. That the diction of poetry can never be taken over directly from life follows as a corollary from this.

Notes to I. 63—(i) One should have thought that the instance given hardly deserved to be branded as being particularly vulgar. But Daṇḍin shows himself here as an extreme purist. Agashe is therefore justified in refusing to make the same Daṇḍin author both of the Kāvyādarśa and of the Daśakumāracharita (P. xxix, Introd. B. S. S. edition of the Daśakumāra). The supposition that Daṇḍin probably wrote the Daśakumāra as a young man and the Kāvyādarśa as a sober old man—which we have no ground to make—is itself an admission of the cogency of Agashe's arguments. It must be stated however that the above is not the only argument upon which the distinction between Daṇḍin the romancer and Daṇḍin the rhetorician is made.

Notes to I. 64—(i) The distinction consists in the fact that i. 63 is a straight proposal while i. 64 reaches the same end by an innuendo.

Notes to I. 65—(i) Daṇḍin demands that even in descriptions of coarse or lascivious themes one must observe decorum. How unsparingly would he have then

criticised many a passage in some of our standard authors, remarkable for nothing but an उत्तानशृङ्गार ! The reflection that such passages are not confined to Sanskrit (or even to Indian literature for the matter of that) can hardly be a source of consolation.

Notes to I. 66—(i) It is but fair to demand that a person writing in Sanskrit shall not use words which when uttered together, as in a sentence, might give rise to a new word *in Sanskrit* made up of the last vocables of a preceding and the initial vocables of a succeeding word, and conveying a vulgar meaning; but he is not bound to see that in other languages also the combination of vocables does not convey an undesirable suggestion. The stock example given by Mammaṭa (vii. illustration no. 213)—रुचिं कुरु—gives rise to the word चिकु which, in the vernacular of Kāśmīr, has an अश्लील significance; but the poet responsible for the stanza in question might have been altogether innocent of that fact. It is too much to expect that a writer in one language should be conversant with all the other languages in the world. That reminds me of a student of mine who objected to the line—मम विरहजां न त्वं वत्से शुचं गणयिष्यसि (Śākuntala iv. 19, Patankar's ed.) because it suggests the vernacular word for a barber!

Notes to I. 67—(i) Please note that Daṇḍin, in spite of his pronounced preference for the Vaidarbha style, does not wish to paint the Gauḍas blacker than he really thought them to be.

Notes to I. 68—(i) The use of the word विभक्त clearly implies the distinction between माधुर्य as a शब्दगुण and माधुर्य as an अर्थगुण which Daṇḍin appears to have recognised. His not doing the same in the case of the other guṇas and Vāmana's doing it systematically in the case of all

the ten guṇas argues for the priority of Daṇḍin over Vāmana by a considerable number of years; and this irrespective of the suggested identity of the rhetorician Vāmana with his namesake, the joint author of the Kāśikā.

Notes to I. 69—(i) There are in use amongst Sanskrit rhetoricians a number of distinctive appelations for words (and styles) which it is necessary to learn to distinguish clearly. Thus we have—

1 अल्पप्राण and महाप्राण;	4 कोमल and परुष;
2 शिथिल and श्लिष्ट;	5 सुकुमार and निष्ठुर;
3 मृदु and स्फुट or कठिन;	6 मधुर and कठोर;

7 ललित and विकट, उद्भट, उद्धत, दीप्त, उल्बण, गाढ, प्रौढ, or ओजस्वि.

Most of these are synonymous pairs, and writers are not always exact in their use of them. Thus अल्पप्राण and महाप्राण have a precise significance in grammar. अयुग्मा वर्गयमगा यणश्चाल्पासवः स्मृताः। वर्गाणां प्रथमतृतीयपञ्चमाः प्रथमतृतीययमौ यरलवाश्च अल्पप्राणाः अन्ये महाप्राणाः इत्यर्थः। But looking to the etymological sense of the terms we have inserted the important qualification that the अल्पप्राणवर्णs, from the point of view of Rhetoric, should not include conjunct consonants causing an आघात or stress upon the preceding vowel. Thus grammatically the line—चकर्ति विरहार्त्यां सा त्वत्कीर्तिश्रुतिमङ्गना, with the exception of ह्रा, सा, and श्रु, consists of अल्पप्राण letters; but the Ālaṁkārikas would class it as महाप्राण or rather as परुष owing to the numerous harsh conjunct consonants. Conversely, the stanza—

मधुरया मधुबोधितमाधवीमधुसमृद्धिसमेधितमेधया ।
मधुकराङ्गनया मुहुरुन्मदध्वनिभृता निभृताक्षरमुज्जगे ॥

consists of a number of महाप्राण वर्णs as grammar understands them; but the general effect of the stanza is pleasing on the whole and it is often given as an instance of माधुर्य.

The second pair—शिथिल and श्लिष्ट—has been precisely defined by Daṇḍin, i. 43ff. See our Sanskrit Commentary and English Notes on the passages concerned. Pairs 3, 4, 5, and 6 are mostly synonymous as far as

their application to the word-element in poetry is concerned; and the last group of words conveys a sense not very much, if at all, distinct from these pairs. The soft, sweet, tender, delicate or elegant vocables are—क्, ख्, ग्, घ्; च्, छ्, ज्, झ्; त्, थ्, द्, ध्, न्; and प्, फ्, ब्, भ्, म् preceded by a nasal of its own class; as also र् and ण् when joined to short vowels. The harsh, sharp, rugged, hard, stiff, stately, stilted, exalted, fiery, gaudy, energetic, virile or vehement vocables are—ट, ठ, ड, ढ; श्, ष्; क्ख्, ग्घ्; च्छ्, ज्झ्; त्थ्, द्ध्; प्फ्, ब्भ्; as also all double consonants and all conjuncts with र् as the first or the last member. There are also other elements that lead respectively to कोमलता or कठोरता, viz., the absence or presence of long compounds, the sparing or repeated use of identical syllabic combinations, etc. Jagannātha in his रसगङ्गाधर (pp. 62–74) has given a large number of instructive illustrations in the matter which are worth attentive perusal.

So far as regards कोमलता as based on mere word-element. But कोमलता and परुषता result also from the sense conveyed. These need not be here considered.—The curious may be referred to the Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa, Parichchheda 1.

Notes to I. 70—(i) Daṇḍin seems here to have made a rather subtle distinction between कोमलता and सुकुमारता. If all the letters in a poem are कोमल as explained in Note (i) to i. 69 the result would be शैथिल्य; it is only when there is a slight admixture of harder vocables (such a ह्री, and भि: and न ~ प्र in the present stanza) with prevailingly tender or कोमल vocables that there results the सुकुमारतागुण as Daṇḍin conceives it. Even so, however, it is necessary to distinguish सुकुमारता from मधुरता, especially शब्दगतमधुरता. As Daṇḍin understands it, मधुरता can only result from श्रुत्यनुप्रास (or वर्णानुप्रास). The stanza मण्डलीकृत्य etc. does not contain a single case of श्रुतिसाम्य; it is not therefore मधुर, but it is सुकुमार. Further the basis of मधुरता is always रसव्यञ्जकता, and it is with reference to the रस produced that the value of a poem from the point of view of मधुरता is to be determined.

On the other hand सुकुमारता can exist irrespective of the रस—the रस in any case is not its differentia, and we do not have to appreciate the sense of a poem before declaring it to be सुकुमार. Mādhurya, however,—even शब्दगतमाधुर्य—presupposes a reference to the sense of the poem; and from this point of view we can even ignore the distinction between शब्दगतमाधुर्य and अर्थगतमाधुर्य that we have made on an earlier occasion (P. 46, 60–61). Why श्रुत्यनुप्रास alone should be able to produce the रस, and not सुकुमारता also, is more than what one can say.

Notes to I. 71—(i) The reading मुखम् for मनः which we have adopted on the authority of our oldest Ms. N, is certainly the original reading. The external test applicable in the case is the reading मुदम् given by M, which can be a scribal mistake for मुखम् but not for मनः which has not the ending म्. Further, द can be misread for व (the latter portion of the Devanāgarī letter ख), as any one familiar with the manner of writing these letters in old Mss. can easily understand. Internally or subjectively also मुखं आरोहति—gains a place upon the lips—gives a sense better than मनः आरोहति and certainly better than मुदं आरोहति (supposing the expression to be at all possible). The reading मुखमारोहति suggests that Daṇḍin is here quoting a stanza already familiar to his readers and already appreciated by them.

(ii) Daṇḍin's statement to the effect that, in spite of the absence of a striking alaṁkāra in the stanza मण्डलीकृत्य etc. (i. 70), it is the guṇa सुकुमारता that alone lends it its value as poetry involves his adhesion to the important principle that a kāvya can exist without alaṁkāras, but that it must have one or more guṇas, which are described as the very life of poetry. Now the stanza in question does contain a समासोक्ति as Daṇḍin defines that figure (ii. 205ff.), but it is not रसपरिपोषक because, apparently, Daṇḍin wishes us to understand here a simple statement about the dance of the peacocks and no implication about its serving as

an उद्दीपक for विप्रलम्भश्रृङ्गार. Hence he says—नालंकारोपि तादृशः। For valid examples of समासोक्ति other than that given by Daṇḍin see our Sanskrit Commentary to ii. 205 and 206.

Guṇa being thus regarded as the *sine qua non* of poetry Daṇḍin would not have subscribed to the view of the moderns represented in the definition—रसात्मकं वाक्यं काव्यम् and Jagannātha's criticism of that view is therefore in accordance with Daṇḍin's own pronouncement in the matter.

Notes to I. 72—(i) The commentator Premachandra takes the word न्यक्ष in the sense of परशुराम on the basis of the following dubious etymology—न्यक्षन्ति विप्रवधादिरूपनीचकर्म कुर्वन्तीति न्यक्षः कार्तवीर्याः तान् स्यति नाशयतीति; and all because he wants to defend the Gauḍas by proving that the passage before us is tinged by heroic sentiment and as such can very well stand the harsh, grating expressions used for giving vent to that sentiment. With न्यक्ष as a synonym for the blind क्षत्रिय the possibility of the defence on the ground of वीररस is altogether cut off.

Notes to I. 73—(i) An ancient definition of this guṇa quoted by Vāmana at the end of iii. 1 is worth repeating—

पश्चादिव गतिर्वाचः पुरस्तादिव वस्तुनः ।
यत्रार्थव्यक्तिहेतुत्वात् सोऽर्थव्यक्तिः स्मृतो गुणः ॥

Notes to I. 74—(i) This stanza is quoted by Bhoja in his Vṛitti under Sarvasvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa i. 34 as an example of नेयत्वदोष, altering the fourth पाद into नेया लौहित्यहेतवः ।

Notes to I. 75—(i) Compare i. 67 above. With the reading शब्दह्रानानुबन्धिनी we will have to take अनुबन्धिनी in the unusual sense of 'hindering'.

Notes to I. 76—(i) As will be evident from the several definitions of this guṇa quoted in our Sanskrit Commentary a considerable difference of opinion seems to prevail amongst the Ālaṁkārikas old as well as new regarding the nature of औदार्य or उदारता. It is uncertain therefore what the sense might have been that Bhavabhūti gave to this term in his familiar allusion to it (मा॰ मा॰ i. line 48) in—

यत् प्रौढित्वमुदारता च वचसां यच्चार्थतो गौरवं
तच्चेदस्ति ततस्तदेव गमकं पाण्डित्यवैदग्ध्ययोः ॥

If we understand it in the sense given to it in an old definition quoted by Vāmana towards the end of iii. 1—विकटत्वं च बन्धस्य कथयन्ति ह्युदारताम् it becomes very hard to keep it distinct from प्रौढित्व also mentioned by Bhavabhūti.

(ii) Daṇḍin does not mention any विपर्यय corresponding to उदारता. Apparently therefore both the Vaidarbhas and the Gauḍas cultivated this guṇa. The reading सर्वपद्धतिः given by N makes this quite explicit, and has, probably just on that very reason, to be rejected. It must be stated in this connection that Bhoja (i. 41) does mention a sort of a विपर्यय for this guṇa—

यस्तु रीतेरनिर्वाहादौदार्यस्य विपर्ययः
वाक्यं तदनलंकारमलंकारविदो विदुः ॥

and illustrates it by—

दीर्घपुच्छश्चतुष्पादः ककुद्मांल्लम्बकम्बलः ।
गोरपत्यं बलीवर्दस्तृणमत्ति मुखेन च ॥

observing—तदिदमपुष्टार्थत्वादनुत्कृष्टविशेषणमनुदारं निरलंकारमाचक्षते। सोऽयमौदार्यविपर्ययो नाम शब्दार्थप्रधानो गुणविपर्ययो दोषः ।

Notes to I. 77—(i) The point seems to be that the forlorn look of the mendicants, having once fallen upon the king's face, no longer requires to look upon another donor's face ; nor does it have to look upon the king's own face a second time. The latter, it will be seen, is an important condition.

Notes to I. 78—(i) It has to be confessed that Daṇḍin's example of उदारता is not a very happy one. The word अन्यत् in pāda *c* refers as much to अपकर्ष as to descriptions of वीर्य, धैर्य, and other qualities.

Notes to I. 79—(i) Compare Notes to i. 76 above. It is uncertain whom Daṇḍin has in mind in this stanza. The definition given by Bharata (xvi. 102) makes no reference to 'appropriate epithets'; although Bharata as quoted by हेमचन्द्र (P. 119)—बहुभिः सूक्ष्मैश्च विशेषैः समेतमुदारम् इति भरतः—does make that reference. The reference is quite explicit in the Agnipurāṇa (346. 9)—उत्तानपदतौदार्यं युतं श्लाघ्यैर्विशेषणैः, but we cannot from this fact draw any valid chronological inference.

(ii) Epic poetry all over the world always uses a number of standing epithets in describing men and events, which are not merely 'padding' devices but serve to fix the objects described on the minds of the reader. Readers of Tennyson can realise how very effectively these epithets—especially alliterating epithets—can be used in poetry.

Notes to I. 80—(i) The quality called ओजः is accepted by all Ālaṁkārikas ancient as well as modern. Mammaṭa tells us that ओजस् is दीप्त्या आत्मविस्तृतेर्हेतुः—leads to the expansion of the heart through brilliancy—and that its effect is seen in वीर, बीभत्स, and रौद्र रसs respectively in an ascending degree of intensity. The difference between these रसs is well brought out by a commentator on the काव्यप्रकाश—वीरे तु जिगीषैव वैरिवशीकरणमात्रस्योद्देश्यत्वात् । बीभत्से जुगुप्सितविषये ममतानास्पदत्वेन तितिक्षा न तु जिघांसा । रौद्रे तु अपकारिणि वधावधिकः प्रयास इति जिघांसैव न तु जिगीषा न वा तितिक्षेति क्रमशो दीप्तेराधिक्यम् ।

Notes to I. 81-84—(i) Daṇḍin means to say that the Vaidarbhas also do at times admit ओजस् even in metrical compositions; but they always take care to see that the ओजस् does not come in the way of प्रसाद or माधुर्य.

Vāgbhaṭa gives (iii. 13)— समराजिरस्फुरदरिनरेशकरिनिकरशिरःसरससिन्दूरपूरपरिचयेनेवारुणितकरतलो देवः as an example of ओजस् in prose.

Notes to I. 85–88—(i) It is not always easy to keep the various allied guṇas distinct. The guṇa कान्ति can be confused with सौकुमार्य and माधुर्य; but these latter are primarily शब्दगुणs depending upon the use of specific vocables, while between themselves, as we saw [Note (i) to i. 70 above], माधुर्य requires श्रुत्यनुप्रास, and सौकुमार्य the prevailing use of tender vocables. Next, amongst the five अर्थगुणs recognised by Daṇḍin [see Note (i) to i. 41 above], प्रसाद and अर्थव्यक्ति concern themselves with the use of specific words in specific senses or with the complete utterance of a thought in a sentence; while समाधि involves a process of transference of qualities from one thing to another. These three guṇas therefore are sufficiently distinctive.

(ii) The guṇas most likely to be confused with one another are औदार्य and कान्ति. Both are of the nature of subjective evaluations which Daṇḍin has not clearly defined. Probably we can distinguish them from the circumstance that, while both of them must not err on the side of exaggeration, कान्ति concerns itself with the description of a natural phenomenon or the narration of a striking event in general, and उदारता fixes its attention upon just one specific quality of a person or thing and tries to bring out the excellence of that quality alone. Vāmana towards the end of iii. 1. quotes an ancient stanza to the effect that in the absence of कान्ति a poem is labelled trite or commonplace (पुराणचित्रस्थानीयं or पुराणच्छाया). In fact कान्ति (and to some extent उदारता also) consists in an endeavour to cultivate fresh and striking modes of expression without making them unnatural, exaggerated or grotesque, as it often happened with Carlyle.

Notes to I. 89–92—(i) A sort of contrast seems to have been intended between लोकयात्रानुवर्ति Vaidarbhas and the विदग्ध

Gauḍas. In their descriptions, word-arrangements, and alaṁkāras while the Vaidarbhas generally aim at simplicity and naturalness, the Gauḍas make their poetry obtrusive by a show of learning and by too great a straining for effect. They forget that *ars est celare artem.*

Notes to I. 93-99—(i) There seems to prevail a considerable difference of opinion regarding the exact nature of this guṇa. Daṇḍin's account of समाधि makes it very difficult to distinguish it from certain अर्थालंकारs like अतिशयोक्ति and रूपक which, according to the moderns, depend upon an आरोप or superimposition of one thing (or its qualities) upon another. But Daṇḍin's idea of अतिशयोक्ति (ii. 214) is rather vague and not the same as that of the moderns (cf. मम्मट x. P. 762— निगीर्याध्यवसानं तु प्रकृतस्य परेण यत्); and from Daṇḍin's point of view the difference between रूपकालंकार and समाधिगुण may be said to consist in the fact that in the guṇa there is a transference of just the qualities (or actions) of one thing to another while in the अलंकार one धर्मिन् is itself substituted for another धर्मिन्. Moreover it must not be ignored that in रूपक the उपमान and the उपमेय are both शब्दोपात्त while in समाधिगुण the new धर्म (e. g. निमीलन्ति) actually supplants the existing धर्म (viz. विकसन्ति) so that, as regards the धर्म at any rate, there is निगीर्याध्यवसान. It is in fact difficult to say under what figure Daṇḍin might have classed the figure अतिशयोक्ति as the moderns understand it. The reason why Daṇḍin was probably led to regard the transference of qualities as guṇa rather than as an alaṁkāra may also have been the circumstance that for समाधिगुण the धर्मs and the क्रियाs transferred from other things to the object under description have to be such as, through long usage, have already lost their original metaphoric value. Thus पद्मोन्मीलन does not necessarily suggest the comparison of the lotus with the eye unless our special attention is drawn to it. In fact, as Carlyle I believe has somewhere said,

there is so much of poetry embedded in some of the most common words in our current speech that one wonders at the amount of real poetic feeling that must have gone to the making of it. Take a word like 'attention' used by us a few lines above. Is not the picture of a person with an out-stretched neck (L. tendo) a very vivid representation of the state of mind connoted by the word? The Sanskrit word उत्कण्ठा is based upon the same process of poetic transference.

(ii) A Samādhi based upon such transference is according to Daṇḍin an अर्थगुण; but Bhoja regards it as a शब्दगुण, with what reason it is hard to discover. In fact a शब्दगुणसमाधि is a distinct category altogether, and Vāmana has to give a separate definition for it following an older view represented by the stanza quoted by him towards the end of iii. 1—

आरोहन्त्यवरोहन्ति क्रमेण यतयो हि यत् ।
समाधिर्नाम स गुणस्तेन पूता सरस्वती ॥

Then as to the अर्थगुणसमाधि, the definition of Bharata (xvi. 97)—

अभियुक्तैर्विशेषस्तु योर्थस्यैवोपलभ्यते ।
तेन चार्थेन संपन्नः समाधिः परिकीर्त्यते ॥

seems to be nearer the etymological significance of the term समाधि and is accordingly the most primitive, although Daṇḍin too, in his own way, attempts an etymological explanation of the term. The अर्थगुणसमाधि as Vāmana (iii. 2. 6) understands it is the same as that of Bharata, and in his Vṛitti Vāmana tells us that it is just because the new meaning to be discovered in a poem requires 'concentration' that the गुण itself is called समाधि—समाधिकारणत्वात् समाधिः । अवहितं हि चित्तमर्थान् पश्यति । It seems therefore that समाधि is that quality of a poem which makes it possible for a discerning and sympathetic critic, after close investigation, to discover new and ever newer elements of beauty in it. It is in this sense that the poem can become for its reader, in the words of Keats, 'a joy for ever.' It is only the best of poets that can stand such a critical scrutiny—and that too only in their very best works. Daṇḍin's

claim to regard समाधि as काव्यसर्वस्व (i. 100) can thus only become fully justified. The अर्थगुणसमाधि as Bhoja understands it – व्याजावलम्बनं यत् तु स समाधिरिति स्मृतः (i. 84) is again, like Vāmana's शब्दगुणसमाधि, a distinct category for which दर्भाङ्कुरेण चरणः क्षत इत्यकाण्डे etc. from the Śākuntala is given as an illustration.

(iii) Jagannātha, however, argues (P. 63) that if समाधि is to be conceived, after Bharata and Vāmana, as अभियुक्तैः अर्थविशेषोपलम्भः or अर्थदृष्टिः or अवर्णितपूर्वोऽयमर्थः पूर्ववर्णितच्छायो वेति कवेरालोचनम् then, for the same reason, कविप्रतिभा (which is a कविगुण) will also have to be regarded as a काव्यगुण ; and if कविप्रतिभा, why not a good memory or a good hand-writing ? It must be some such considerations as these that led Daṇḍin to reject Bharata's conception of समाधि and to put a new meaning into the old word. The Agnipurāṇa cuts the knot by not recognising समाधि at all.

Notes to I. 100—(i) There is no समाधिविपर्यय recognised by Daṇḍin. To the Vaidarbhas as well as to the Gauḍas Samādhi therefore is a quality in poetry to be equally aspired for.

Notes to I. 101–102—Even amongst the writers of the Vaidarbha (or the Gauḍa) school it must always happen that, in the midst of a general resemblance as regards the cultivation of certain specific गुणs (or their विपर्ययs), there exist differences between writers and writers as regards the emotional value of their compositions or the artistic perfection of them. These individual characteristics can possibly be brought out and accounted for in a critical biography of the poet, but it is impossible, says Daṇḍin, to record them adequately in a little manual dealing with the elements of theoretical Poetics. It is not likely that by तद्भेदाः Daṇḍin is thinking of the other मार्गs, a discussion of which he had purposely omitted on an earlier occasion (i. 40).

Notes to I. 103-105—(i) Our Sanskrit Commentary has collected together most of the leading views of other Ālaṁkārikas as to the factors that go to the making of the poet, and a convenient statement of the same in English is to be found in an article on the 'Making of the Sanskrit Poet' contributed by F. W. Thomas to the R. G. Bhandarkar Commemoration Volume pp. 375-386. It will be seen that Daṇḍin has here taken quite a rational view of the matter by laying almost equal emphasis upon inborn genius (or fancy) which is the *sine qua non* of all poetic writing,—यां विना काव्यं न प्रसरेत् प्रसृतं वा उपहसनीयं स्यात्, as Mammaṭa says—upon culture acquired through books as well as by actual observation of the world, and upon constant practice in the art under expert and sympathetic guidance. The last condition secures perfection of form ; and we know for instance that poets like Tennyson or Bhavabhūti touched and retouched their writings until they were quite satisfied with them. The second condition determines what might be called, adopting Aristotelian terminology, the matter of poetry ; and although it is true that even an unschooled person who has not seen much of the world can yet produce, from out of the themes falling within his limited experience, poetry that is immortal, it must nevertheless be admitted that the majority of readers like to read a composition that has a broad out-look and a rich suggestiveness.


(ii) It is difficult to determine the exact nature of the poet's प्रतिभा and of its *modus operandi.* There are, as Bacon says, minds that note similarities and minds that note differences, and as no satisfactory explanation as to the why of the thing is as yet offered by any critic or scientist we might just as well accept Daṇḍin's explanation of it by a reference to a pre-natal factor called अपूर्व or वासना. One thing is certain. If a person has this divine gift in him he is able, in his attempt to give an adequate expression to it, to undergo 'infinite pains'. The theme so fills his mind and heart that he rises superior to his physical environments and goes

on producing poetry often because he cannot help himself. Considerations such as fame, wealth, etc. (which the texts include amongst the प्रयोजनs of poetry) do not move him: He is hardly conscious of them while he is actually working at his theme. The production of the Art is to the artist himself its own true reward; and if he writes for the world it is partly because the world has a right to a share in the joy which is peculiarly his, and partly because he knows that his own joy would be very much intensified by a conscious realisation of the fact that there are other kindred spirits who can be made to experience that same joy with himself. My conviction, as Mahomed said, 'gets infinitely strengthened the moment I find it shared by another brother-soul'.

Kāvyādarśa of Daṇḍin

NOTES

PARICHCHHEDA II



PARICHCHHEDA II

Notes to II. 1—(i) Compare Note (i) to i. 10. Kāvya, according to Daṇḍin, is—इष्टार्थव्यवच्छिन्ना पदावली; that is to say, he gives more prominence to the word-element in poetry as compared with the sense-element. This does not mean that the Guṇas which are the *sine qua non* of poetry, and the Alaṁkāras which serve as decoration, must belong to the word-element, the विशेष्य, exclusively; for, the विशेषणs, the subordinate elements of the Body, have also their own decorations. Thus there is no inconsistency in Daṇḍin's having defined Kāvya as he has done and then having divided the Alaṁkāras (and impliedly the Guṇas also—cp. Note (i) to i. 41) into those belonging to word and those belonging to sense. Modern Ālaṁkārikas such as Mammaṭa, having once subordinated both the word as well as the sense to Rasa, are constrained to regard the Guṇas as well as the Alaṁkāras as belonging to Rasa, the *aṅgin*. For a criticism of this view see our Note (iii) to i. 41 and the Sanskrit Commentary to the present stanza.

(ii) The distinct function of the Guṇas and the Alaṁkāras is brought out by Daṇḍin by calling the former the life-breaths and the latter the ornaments of poetry. The Guṇas abide in poetry समवायवृत्त्या while the Alaṁkāras संयोगवृत्त्या; there is between them a distinction in kind,—a distinction which later became one of degree, as with वामन (iii. 1. 1–2) or with प्रतीहारेन्दुराज (p. 17)—गुणाः खलु काव्यशोभाहेतवो धर्माः। येषां तु गुणोपजनितशोभे काव्ये शोभातिशयहेतुत्वं तेलंकाराः। Compare however the following from अलंकारशेखर, p. 20—

अलंकृतमपि श्रव्यं न काव्यं गुणवर्जितम्।
गुणयोगस्ततो मुख्यो गुणालंकारयोगयोः ॥
अलंकारसहस्रैः किं गुणो यदि न विद्यते।
विक्रीयन्ते न घण्टाभिर्गावः क्षीरविवर्जिताः ॥

Compare also (Agnipurāṇa, 346. 1)—

अलंकृतमपि प्रीत्यै न काव्यं निर्गुणं भवेत्।
वपुष्यललिते स्त्रीणां हारो भारायते परम् ॥

Mammaṭa's अनलंकृती पुनः क्वापि implies the same thing.

(iii) The progressive development in the theory, and with it in the number, of the Alaṁkāras forms an interesting chapter in the history of Sanskrit Rhetoric. The subject is too large, however, to be adequately discussed in a note. Our Introduction has attempted a rapid review of the main stages reached during the process, to which the reader is therefore referred. It would be noted in this place that Daṇḍin must have lived at a time when the development of the Alaṁkāras in the way of progressive division and subdivision was in full swing; and he seems to have been anxious rather to give an epitomized statement of the principal results arrived at than to add his own quota to the process of amplification. In fact he has even had to reject some of the Alaṁkāras recognised by his predecessors (cp. ii. 358–359 and notes thereon).

Notes to II. 2—(i) The *fundamenta divisionis* of the Alaṁkāras have been variously stated in different texts. The simplest division into शब्दगत and अर्थगत, even after the addition of a third class of उभयगत, proved quite inadequate. It is however given by the अग्निपुराण, and most elaborately by Bhoja. It was soon found necessary to introduce various subclassifications based on the psychological principle involved in the process, or on some such underlying peculiarity. Similarity, identity, contrast; causation, word-grouping, *lokavyavahāra*; Rasa, Rhetoric, Technicality: these were some of the principles of classification accepted. Compare, for instance, the Alaṁkārasarvasva, and particularly the following list based upon the Pratāparudrīya (pp. 338–339) [wherein the Alaṁkāras not recognised by Daṇḍin are shown in square brackets]—

रूपक, [परिणाम, संदेह, भ्रान्तिमत्, उल्लेख,] अपह्नुति,—
based on अभेदप्रधान-
दीपक, तुल्ययोगिता, [दृष्टान्त,] निदर्शना, [प्रतिवस्तूपमा,]
सहोक्ति, [प्रतीप,] व्यतिरेक,—based on भेदप्रधान-
उपमा, [अनन्वय, उपमेयोपमा, स्मरण,]—based on
भेदाभेदसाधारण-

} साधर्म्य;

उत्प्रेक्षा, अतिशयोक्ति,—based on अध्यवसाय ;
विभावना, विशेषोक्ति, [विषम, चित्र, असंगति, अन्योन्य, व्याघात, अतद्गुण,] भाविक, [विशेष,]—based on विरोध;
यथासंख्या, [परिसंख्या, अर्थापत्ति, विकल्प, समुच्चय,]—based on वाक्यन्याय ;
परिवृत्ति, [प्रत्यनीक, तद्गुण,] समाधि(= समाहित), [सम,] स्वभावोक्ति, उदात्त, [विनोक्ति,]—basd on लोकव्यवहार ;
[काव्यलिङ्ग, अनुमान,] अर्थान्तरन्यास,—based on तर्कन्याय ;
[कारणमाला, एकावली, मालादीपक, सार,]—based on शृङ्खलावैचित्र्य ;
[व्याजोक्ति, वक्रोक्ति, मीलन,]—based on अपह्नव ; and
समासोक्ति, [परिकर,]—based on विशेषणवैचित्र्य.

It became soon obvious that any such classificatory principle or principles, would gradually tend to become inadequate, as there would always remain some Alaṁkāras recognised by rhetoricians and falling outside their scope. Thus of the 35 or rather 34 Alaṁkāras recognised by Daṇḍin the following 14 are not included in the above list:—आवृत्ति, आक्षेप, हेतु, सूक्ष्म, लेश, प्रेयस्, रसवत्, ऊर्जस्विन्, पर्यायोक्त, श्लिष्ट, विरोध, अप्रस्तुतप्रशंसा, व्याजस्तुति, and आशीः (not to mention संकीर्ण). Some of these, e. g., प्रेयस्, रसवत्, ऊर्जस्विन्, are sometimes classed as रसमूलक ; while आक्षेप, पर्यायोक्त, अप्रस्तुतप्रशंसा, व्याजस्तुति and आशीः will have to be classed as नाट्यालंकारs, i. e., merely as effective modes of expression, such as those enumerated by Bharata in the beginning of the 16th chapter of the Nāṭyaśāstra. The tendency towards a wanton increase merely in the number of the Alaṁkāras (and of subdivisions within an Alaṁkāra), which marked the latest phase in the history of the Alaṁkāraśāstra, made any attempt to trace the Alaṁkāras to their बीज—such as Daṇḍin contemplates—an altogether hopeless task.

(ii) But already in some quarters, as in the case of the Guṇas,—see note (ii) to i. 41—a revolt against this gratuitous multiplication of entities had begun to assert itself. Thus Hemachandra rejects परिकर, यथासंख्य, विनोक्ति, भाविक, उदात्त, रसवत्, प्रेयस्, ऊर्जस्विन्, भाव, समाहित, आशीः, and प्रत्यनीक as distinct Alaṁkāras—and some of them, it will be seen, are recognised even by Daṇḍin and Bhāmaha. Udbhaṭa's Kāvyālaṁkārasārasaṁgraha is

likewise moderate in its enumeration of Alaṁkāras, while even so late a text as the Alaṁkāraśekhara of Keśavamiśra (which is believed to have utilised the Sūtras of Śauddhodani) lays down with emphasis (p. 29)—एवं स्युरर्थालंकाराश्चतुर्दश न चापरे । stating further (p. 38) that he has justified the position he has taken in his अलंकारसर्वस्व, a work which apparently has not come down to us. Daṇḍin, it will be noted, holds a middle position between the two extremes of needless amplification and unwarrantable curtailment.

(iii) Who the पूर्वाचार्यs are that Daṇḍin had in his mind it is difficult to decide. As the treatment of the Alaṁkāras in Bharata, or in the Agnipurāṇa for the matter of that, is very meagre these cannot have been intended by him ; and as to Bhāmaha, since his list of Alaṁkāras (cp. ii. 4, ii. 66, ii. 86, ii. 88, ii. 93, iii. 1-4), made up of detached and successive lists as it is, agrees in general statement and even in the order in which the Alaṁkāras are mentioned with that of Daṇḍin, it is doubtful if Daṇḍin would regard Bhāmaha—even though he be his predecessor—as one of the पूर्वाचार्यs referred to in the present stanza. On this point see further our Introduction. It seems that a large mass of literature known to Daṇḍin is now lost to us. Cp. note (ii) to i. 2. The Commentary श्रुतानुपालिनी enumerates, amongst Daṇḍin's predecessors, काश्यप, ब्रह्मदत्त, and नन्दिस्वामि, names otherwise almost unknown.

Notes to II. 3—(i) Daṇḍin here admits that as regards the Alaṁkāras there is no difference of practice between the Vaidarbhas and the Gauḍas (साधारणमलंकारजातम्); but this is rather unexpected. That craving for simplicity and directness in the one and hyperabole and ornateness in the other which led them to cultivate distinctive काव्यगुणs is bound to make itself felt even in their choice of the Alaṁkāras and their frequency ; although this fact, it is obvious, would not make any difference in the definitions of the Alaṁkāras as such.

Notes to II. 4—(i) We are not quite certain as to the genuineness of this list of Alaṁkāras (stanzas 4-7), although all the Mss. give it. It is the practice of some of the later Alaṁkārikas to preface their treatment of the Alaṁkāras by a few mnemonic verses of their own composition; but some writers, e. g. Mammaṭa, have not obliged their would-be students in this manner; and just as in the case of Mammaṭa a commentator has added a versified enumeration at the beginning of the tenth Ullāsa (although never as a part of Mammaṭa's own work), so, it seems to us, must have been the case with Daṇḍin. It is only on some such supposition that we can account for the ungrammatical दीपकावृती (or the unmetrical दीपकावृत्ती); and also for the further fact that in this enumeration some figures (e. g. लव, अप्रस्तुतस्तोत्र) appear under strange, and others (e. g. विशेष for विशेषोक्ति) under misleading, names. We cannot bring ourselves to believe that Āchārya Daṇḍin could not have avoided such solecisms and ambiguities if he had meant it.

(ii) Vibhāvana is often rendered as Presumption,—but that is a name that we must reserve for अर्थापत्ति, which भोज and others recognise as a distinct figure-of-speech—or as Peculiar Causation. It is rather an imagining or a guessing or a divining of a novel cause to account for the effect that has already taken place. Possibly 'Unmotivated Effect' will explain the idea of the figure and would serve to distinguish it from 'Non-operative Cause', by which term we could render the figure विशेषोक्ति as it is ordinarily defined. Daṇḍin's account of the figure is however a little bit different. See below.

(ii) The latter half of this stanza is identical with Bhāmaha ii. 66, first half.

Notes to II. 5—(i) The second half of this staza is identical with Bhāmaha iii. 1, first half. We have already commented upon the name 'Lava'. Later Ālaṁkārikas make a distinction between the figure called

समाधि (which is the same as Daṇḍin's समाहित) and the figure समाहित which is a रसमूल Alaṁkāra Compare Ruyyaka, pp. 163, 185; Viśvanātha, pp. 568, 576; Viśveśvara in the Alaṁkārakaustubha, pp. 372, 416. Bhoja gives the two figures, but what he calles समाधि approaches the समाधिगुण (cp. note (ii) to i. 93-92), while he does not at all recognise the रसमूलक Alaṁkāra called समाहित in other texts. Bhoja, however, agrees with Daṇḍin in calling by the name समाहित the figure named समाधि by मम्मट and others.

Notes to II. 6—(i) We have already commented upon the use of the abbreviated name विशेष for विशेषोक्ति. Viśesha as a figure distinct from विशेषोक्ति is recognised, amongst others, by Rudraṭa, Ruyyaka, Mammaṭa, Viśvanātha, and Jagannātha.

Notes to II. 7—(i) The figure आशी: recognised by Daṇḍin is recognised by no other Ālaṁkārika except Bhāmaha and Vāgbhaṭa the author of the Kāvyānuśāsana. It should be noted, however, that the name occurs amongst the 36 effective literary devices mentioned by Bharata in the beginning of the 16th Chapter. Bhāvika usually translated by 'Vision' will have to be rendered, consistently with Daṇḍin's explanation of the term, by some such expression as Sustained-Intuition.

Notes to II. 8—(i) Besides the two names for this figure given by Daṇḍin the figure is also called स्वभाव (अलंकारशेखर, p. 35) and स्वरूप (अग्निपुराण 344. 3); while रुद्रट groups this figure along with a number of others under the head of वास्तव figures, i. e., those that have the portrayal of the thing-as-it-is as their object. Compare (viii. 10–12)—

वास्तवमिति तज्ज्ञेयं क्रियते वस्तुस्वरूपकथनं यत् ।
पुष्टार्थमविपरीतं निरुपममनतिशयमश्लेषम् ॥

तस्य सहोक्तिसमुच्चयजातियथासंख्यभावपर्यायाः ।
विषमानुमानदीपकपरिकरपरिवृत्तिपरिसंख्याः ॥
हेतुः कारणमाला व्यतिरेकोन्योन्यमुत्तरं सारम् ।
सूक्ष्मं लेशोवसरो मीलितमेकावली भेदाः ॥

The first question that has to be determined in regard to this figure is whether a mere photographic faithfulness to the object under description is what is demanded. Can we for instance regard the following from भामह (ii. 94)—

आक्रोशन्नाह्वयन्नन्यानाधावन् मण्डलै रुदन् ।
गा वारयति दण्डेन डिम्भः सस्यावतारणीः ॥

as a valid example of स्वभावोक्ति ? On this point opinion seems to have been divided: at any rate, some of the earlier writers did not think it necessary to specifically formulate the requirements of this figure, although it must have been all along assumed that वैचित्र्य, strikingness, that *sine qua non* of all अलंकारs, would be demanded in the case of this अलंकार also. When the question was actually asked, there was no doubt as to the answer to be given. Thus Ruyyaka says (p. 177)—इह वस्तुस्वभाववर्णनमात्रं नालंकारः । तत्त्वे सति सर्वं काव्यमलंकारः स्यात् । न हि तत् काव्यमस्ति यत्र न वस्तुस्वभाववर्णनम् । It was the कविप्रतिभामात्रगम्यं सूक्ष्मवस्तु that alone came legitimately under the province of this Alaṁkāra. Hence the साहित्यदर्पण says (x. 93)—स्वभावोक्तिर्दुरूहार्थस्वक्रियारूपवर्णनम् ।

(ii) Bhoja finds it necessary to distinguish this figure from the [Artha-]guṇa called अर्थव्यक्ति, which he understands in a sense different from that of Daṇḍin (compare our Sanskrit Commentary to i. 73, p. 83). But his distinction—

अर्थव्यक्तेरियं [=जातिः] भेदमियता प्रतिपद्यते ।
जायमानमियं वक्ति रूपं सा सार्वकालिकम् ॥

is not always observed, and Mammaṭa was perhaps justified in regarding the अर्थव्यक्तिगुण defined as वस्तुस्वभावस्फुटत्वम् as comprehended under the figure स्वभावोक्ति.

Notes to II. 9-13—(i) Besides the classification given by Daṇḍin, which has for its basis the fourfolds संकेत of words recognised by the grammarians (cf. चतुष्टयी शब्दानां प्रवृत्तिः । जातिशब्दा गुणशब्दाः क्रियाशब्दा यदृच्छाशब्दाश्च । Mahābhāshya I. 19), Svabhāvokti can also be differentiated into various sorts according to its आश्रय, स्वरूप, and हेतु. The आश्रय is the theme ; and this can be अर्भक, तिर्यक्, मुग्धाङ्गना, and the like. Svarūpa indicates the particular aspect which is chosen for description, and this can be (A) बुद्धिपूर्वकः शरीरावयवसंनिवेशः or संस्थान, (B) अबुद्धिकारितः शरीरावयवसंनिवेशः or अवस्थान, (C) वेष, and (D) व्यापार. By हेतु are meant the particular conditions of देश, काल, शक्ति, etc. which are adduced to lend probability to the theme under description. For details see Bhoja iii. 6-8 and the examples there given.

(ii) The tendency of most writers is to make short shrift with this figure, which is rather a pity ; for, apart from simile and other embellishments, there is a considerable skill involved in the process of observation and the subsequent operation of chosing the details and marshalling them out in an effective order. It is the presence of this very skill in a pre-eminent degree which makes those long descriptive passages in writers like Scott such fascinating reading. Not that there is no nature-description in Sanskrit poetry ; poets like Kālidāsa and Bhavabhūti—and the Epics above all—contain many a descriptive passage that can stand comparison with the best in other literatures ; but quite as often the description has been vitiated by the intrusion of the subjective factor and a *penchant* for pretty turns and quaint conceits which lend an unpleasant artificiality to the whole. Primitive poetry depends for its effect almost exclusively upon Svabhāvokti.

(iii) There are two figures more or less allied to Svabhāvokti that have to be distinguished from it. The figure उदात्त (below, ii. 300) aims also at a description, but its object is some exalted personage or extraordinary eminence of some sort, whereas it is dis-

tinctly laid down (Bhoja, iii. 8)—मुग्धाङ्गनाभकस्तिर्यङ्नीचपात्राणि चाश्रय: । Further, as understood by later writers, the exalted theme in the case of the उदात्त must always be brought in subordinately (उपलक्षणतया), although Daṇḍin does not lay down this condition. The other figure allied to Svabhāvokti is Bhāvika (ii. 364), taking it in the sense in which भामह, उद्भट, मम्मट and others understand it and not in the peculiar sense which Daṇḍin assigns to it. The difference between Svabhāvokti and Bhāvika is one of time. The former deals with the actual present : the latter is an attempt to rehabilitate the past or to visualise the future. For further remarks on the subject compare our Notes to ii. 364ff.

Notes to II. 14—(i) A few leading definitions of Upamā given by other writers are—

Bharata (Nāṭyaśāstra xvi. 42)—

यत्किंचित् काव्यबन्धेषु सादृश्येनोपमीयते ।
उपमा नाम सा ज्ञेया गुणाकृतिसमाश्रया ॥

Agnipurāṇa (344. 6)—

उपमा नाम सा यस्यामुपमानोपमेययोः ।
सत्ता चान्तरसामान्ययोगित्वेपि(?) विवक्षितम् ॥
किंचिदादाय सारूप्यं लोकयात्रा प्रवर्तते ।

Udbhaṭa in the Kāvyālaṁkārasaṁgraha (P. 16)—

यच्चेतोहारि साधर्म्यमुपमानोपमेययोः ।
मिथो विभिन्नकालादिशब्दयोरुपमा तु तत् ॥

Rudraṭa (Kāvyālaṁkāra, viii. 4)—

उभयोः समानमेकं गुणादि सिद्धं भवेद्यथैकत्र ।
अर्थेन्यत्र तथा तत् साध्यत इति सोपमा द्वेधा ॥

Bhāmaha (ii. 30)—

विरुद्धेनोपमानेन देशकालक्रियादिभिः ।
उपमेयस्य यत् साम्यं गुणलेशेन सोपमा ॥

Vāmana (Kāvyālaṁkārasūtrā, IV. ii. 1)—

उपमानेनोपमेयस्य गुणलेशतः साम्यमुपमा ।

Bhoja (Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa, iv. 5)—
प्रसिद्धेरनुरोधेन यः परस्परमर्थयोः ।
भूयोवयवसामान्ययोगः सेहोपमा मता ॥

Ruyyaka (P. 25)—
उपमानोपमेययोः साधर्म्ये भेदाभेदतुल्यत्वे उपमा ।

Mammaṭa (x. 1)—
साधर्म्यमुपमा भेदे ।

Vāgbhaṭālaṁkāra (iv. 50)—
उपमानेन सादृश्यमुपमेयस्य यत्र सा ।
प्रत्ययाव्ययतुल्यार्थसमासैरुपमा मता ॥

Vāgbhaṭa (Kāvyānuśāsana, P. 33)—
चमत्कारिसाम्यमुपमा । सा प्रत्ययाव्ययतुल्यार्थसमासैश्चतुर्धा ।

Hemachandra (Kāvyānuśāsana, P. 239)—
हृद्यं साधर्म्यमुपमा ।

Vidyādhara (Ekāvalī, viii. 2)—
विलक्षितति सति साधर्म्ये स्यादुपमानोपमेययोरुपमा ।

Vidyānātha (Pratāparudrīya, P. 351)—
स्वतःसिद्धेन भिन्नेन संमतेन च धर्मतः ।
साम्यमन्येन वर्ण्यस्य वाच्यं चेदेकदोपमा ॥

Viśvanātha (Sāhityadārpaṇa, x. 14)—
साम्यं वाच्यमवैधर्म्यं वाक्यैक्य उपमा द्वयोः ।

Appayyadīkshita (Chitramīmāṅsā, P. 6)—
उपमानोपमेयत्वयोग्ययोरर्थयोर्द्वयोः ।
हृद्यं साधर्म्यमुपमेत्युच्यते काव्यवेदिभिः ॥

Jagannātha (Rasagaṅgādhara, P. 157)—
सादृश्यं सुन्दरं वाक्यार्थोपस्कारकमुपमालंकृतिः ।

Viśveśvara (Alaṁkārakaustubha, P. 4)—
एकवाक्यवाच्यं सादृश्यं भिन्नयोरुपमा ।

(ii) It will be noticed that all these definitions of the Ālaṁkārikas agree in the main. The यथाकथंचित् in Daṇḍin's definition, which has its analogue in the definitions of the Nāṭyaśāstra and the Agnipurāṇa, implies that the similarity is largely कविकल्पित and that it may hold in respect of any conceivable aspect or aspects of the two things to be compared. This neces-

sarily requires that the objects be two in reality ; and it is this implication that has been expressly brought out by qualifications such as मिथो विभिन्नदेशकालादिशब्दयोः, द्वयोः, भेदे or भिन्नयोः । The word उद्भूतम् is represented in other definitions by चेतोहारि, चमत्कारि, हृद्यम् or सुन्दरम्. The specific mention of the technical terms उपमान and उपमेय in the definitions and the substitution of the word साधर्म्यम् (समानो धर्मो ययोस्तौ सधर्माणौ तयोर्भावः) for the simpler सादृश्य, as also some late qualifications like, एकवाक्यवाच्य (उपमेयोपमायां वाक्यद्वयम् तदतिव्याप्तिवारणाय), उपमानोपमेयत्वयोग्ययोः, etc. serve to exclude from the sphere of उपमा such varieties as अन्योन्योपमा, अद्भुतोपमा, मोहोपमा, संशयोपमा, निर्णयोपमा, प्रतिषेधोपमा, असाधारणोपमा, प्रतिवस्तूपमा, and तुल्ययोगोपमा which Daṇḍin embraces under the general term उपमा but which later Ālaṁkārikas raised to the dignity of independent figures. Daṇḍin's conception of उपमा, and of सादृश्य which is its basis, is thus very wide and general.

(iii) We have already given above (Note (i) to ii. 2) Vidyānātha's list of figures based on similarily, and the extracts in our Commentary (P. 129) sufficiently illustrate this point. The fundamental importance of the relation of semblance was indeed very early perceived. The Agnipurāṇa for instance divides सादृश्यम् (defined as धर्मसामान्यम्) into उपमा, रूपक, सहोक्ति and अर्थान्तरन्यास and रुद्रट similarly defines औपम्यम् as (viii. 1)—

सम्यक् प्रतिपादयितुं स्वरूपतो वस्तु तत्समानमिति ।
वस्त्वन्तरमभिदध्याद्वक्ता यस्मिंस्तदौपम्यम् ॥

and enumerates the following figures as based upon that relation—

उपमोत्प्रेक्षारूपक अपह्नुतिः संशयः समासोक्तिः ।
मतमुत्तरमन्योक्तिः प्रतीपमर्थान्तरन्यासः ॥
उभयन्यासभ्रान्तिमदाक्षेपप्रत्यनीकदृष्टान्ताः ।
पूर्वसहोक्तिसमुच्चयसाम्यस्मरणानि तद्भेदाः ॥

The justification for the enumeration of these (and others) as distinct figures (and not mere varieties of उपमा) should consist in the circumstance that the सादृश्यमूलकवैचित्र्य in these figures is subordinated to some other वैचित्र्य (of identity, doubt, error, contrast, etc.). Daṇḍin at least, as we will presently see, brought in this

other वैचित्र्य as the basis for a distinctive figure none too frequently; and hence it is that Daṇḍin has been able to get on with fewer figures but with larger sub-varieties under each figure than most writers.

(iv) Upamā has played a very large rôle even outside the Alaṁkāraśāstra. It is usual to derive the word उपमा from उप + √मा, to measure, in the sense of what approximates another in measure, dimension, quality, etc.; but in the Ṛigveda the word seems to have been connected with the adjective उपम in the sense of the highest: cp.—दधो यत् केतुमुपमं समत्सु (vii. 30. 3); or pre-eminent: cp,—ईयुषीणामुपमा शश्वतीनाम् (i. 113.15). The two words, it is probable, are quite distinct; but the influence of the one in determining the evolution of the meaning of the other is undeniable. The Śatapatha-brāhmaṇa was already familiar with the later use of of the word : cp. तदप्युपमास्ति (xii. 5. 1. 5).

(v) The Niruktakāra Yāska has an elaborate note on the use of उपमा in the Ṛigveda. After pointing out (i. 4, iii. 15f.) that the निपातs इव, न, चित्, and नु as also यथा, था, आ, वत् are under certain circumstances used उपमार्थे he says (iii. 13ff.)—यदतत् तत्सदृशमिति गार्ग्यः। तदासां कर्म। ज्यायसा वा गुणेन प्रख्याततमेन वा कनीयांसं वाप्रख्यातं वोपमिमीते। अथापि कनीयसा ज्यायांसम्। Then he gives the following varieties of उपमा with their illustrations—

कर्मोपमा—यथा वातो यथा वनं यथा समुद्र एजति (V. 78·8);

भूतोपमा—मेषो भूतो ३ भियन्नयः (Viii. 2·40);

रूपोपमा—हिरण्यरूपः स हिरण्यसंदृक् (ii. 35·10);

सिद्धोपमा—अङ्गिरस्वन्महिव्रत प्रस्कण्वस्य श्रुधी हवम् (i. 45·3);

and लुप्तोपमा-अर्थोपमा—सिंहः (पूजायाम्), काकः (कुत्सायाम्).

He has also elsewhere pointed out the influence of simile in the building up of the language (काक इति शब्दानुकृतिः। तदिदं शकुनिषु बहुलम्, iii. 18, दुन्दुभिरिति शब्दानुकरणम्, ix. 12); in the formation of technical terms (उष्णीषिणी वेत्यौपमिकम्, vii. 12, पिपीलिकमध्येत्यौपमिकम्, vii. 13); and upon the growth of Vedic mythology in general (अपां च ज्योतिषश्च मिश्रीभावकर्मणो वर्षकर्म जायते तत्रोपमार्थेन युद्धवर्णा भवन्ति, ii. 16).

(vi) Only two of these varieties recognised by **Yāska** deserve a particular attention. What he calls लुप्तोपम is the रूपक of the Ālaṁkārikas, and Daṇḍin's definition of that figure is suggestive in that connection: उपमैव तिरोभूतभेदा रूपकमुच्यते। The degree of this तिरोधान upon which the later distinction between रूपक and अतिशयोक्ति is made to depend is equally ignored by Yāska as well as Daṇḍin. Next, the सिद्धोपमा of Yāska is what might be called a well-known or कविसमयसिद्ध analogy. Compare in this connection the definition of रुद्रट quoted above. This सिद्धोपमा contained in it the germ of what are known as मूर्धाभिषिक्त दृष्टान्तs or popular न्यायs which, as we saw, were made the basis or बीज of a number of Alaṁkāras. Interpreted more scientifically the सिद्धोपमा eventually became a regular प्रमाण called उपमिति which is a process of analogical knowledge from the known and the familiar to the unknown and the unfamiliar. Bhoja who recognises a distinct figure of speech corresponding to each of the several Pramāṇas of the Mīmāṅsakas (प्रत्यक्षपूर्वाणि प्रमाणानि च जैमिनेः, iii. 3) defines the alaṁkāra called उपमान as follows :—

सदृशात् सदृशज्ञानमुपमानं द्विधेह तत्।
स्यादेकमनुभूतेर्थेननुभूते द्वितीयकम्॥

His example is —

तां रोहिणीं विजानीहि ज्योतिषामत्र मण्डले।
समूहस्तारकाणां यः शकटाकारमाश्रितः॥

Most people would probably fail to see any figure in the example or at least any valid ground for regarding it as a *new* figure.

(vii) Having defined उपमा Daṇḍin next gives us a number of sub-varieties of it—some 32 or 33 in number —which do not seem to have been based upon any principle of division. And some of the sub-varieties mentioned by him have so little distinctive about them that अभिनवगुप्त in his commentary on the नाट्यशास्त्र (Madras Govt. ms. fol. 390) observes :—शिक्षितैरपि दण्डिप्रभृतिभिर्ये निरूपिता उपमाभेदास्तत्र यो भेदकोंशः आचिख्यासासंशयनिर्णयादिरर्थः स तादृक् पृथगलंकारतया गणितः। Bhāmaha's criticism (ii. 37 f.) is in the same vein, no matter whether it is directed against Daṇḍin or some other writer —

यदुक्तं त्रिप्रकारत्वं तस्याः कैश्चिन्महात्मभिः ।
निन्दाप्रशंसाचिख्यासाभेदादत्राभिधीयते ॥
सामान्यगुणनिर्देशात् त्रयमप्युदितं ननु ।
मालोपमादिः सर्वोपि न ज्यायान् विस्तरो मुधा ॥

It has to be noted however that the Agnipurāṇa gives a classification of the उपमाs analogous to that of Daṇḍin [viz:—धर्म, वस्तु, परस्पर, विपरीत, नियम, अनियम, समुच्चय, व्यतिरेक, बहु, माला, विक्रिया, अद्भुत, मोह, संशय, निश्चय, वाक्यार्थ, गमन (रशना ?), प्रशंसा, निन्दा, कल्पिता, सदृशी, and असदृशी], besides giving another classification into 18 sub-varieties similar to those of Mammaṭa (344. 7-9)—


समासेनासमासेन सा द्विधा प्रतियोगिनः ॥
विग्रहादभिधानस्य ससमासान्यथोत्तरा ।
उपमा द्योतपकद्नोपमेयपदेन च ॥
ताभ्यां च विग्रहात् त्रेधा ससमासान्तिमा त्रिधा ।
विशिष्यमाणा उपमा भवन्त्यष्टादश स्फुटाः ॥

The varieties called निन्दा and प्रशंसा are even mentioned and illustrated by Bharata himself (xvi. 48 ff.), though neither Bharata nor the Agnipurāṇa mentions the आचिख्यासोपमा, the main butt of attack. The author of the Alaṁkāraśekhara gives the following ten sub-varieties of उपमा (xi. 3)—

वाक्यार्थातिशयश्लेषनिन्दाभूतविपर्ययाः ।
संशयो नियमः स्वं च विक्रियेत्युपमा दश ॥

But no other writer whose work is extant divides उपमा in the manner adopted by Daṇḍin. Daṇḍin's classification is primitive and, so far as any principle underlies the division, it is just the sense intended by the speaker (अर्थानुरोधेन विभागः).

(viii) We can here advantageously consider some other classifications of उपमा that have been advanced. There is one in particular which might be styled grammatical classification (व्याकरणप्रयोगानुरोधेन) which has been adopted by उद्भट (p. 16), रुद्रट (viii. 5 ff.), मम्मट and most other later writers. But it seems to be not unknown to the author of the Agnipurāṇa (cp. 344. 8-9) who gives, as just mentioned, 18 varieties based on this principle as against Mammaṭa's 25. These last we will now exhibit in a tabular form—


उपमा, 25 Kinds
पूर्णा, 6 Kinds
लुप्ता, 19 Kinds
श्रौती, 3 Kinds
आर्थी, 3 Kinds
१ वाक्ये
२ समासे
३ तद्धिते
४ वाक्ये
५ समासे
६ तद्धिते
एकलुप्ता, 13 Kinds
त्रि[वाचकधर्मोपमान]लुप्ता, 1 Kind
द्विलुप्ता, 5 Kinds
२५ समासे
धर्मलुप्ता, 5 Kinds
उपमानलुप्ता, 2 Kinds
वाचकलुप्ता, 6 Kinds (all आर्थी)
१२ आर्थी वाक्ये
१३ आर्थी समासे
वाक्ये
समासे
११ तद्धिते (आर्थी)
७ श्रौती
८ आर्थी
९ श्रौती
१० आर्थी
१४ समासे
१५ कर्मक्यचि
१६ आधारक्यचि
१७ क्यङि
१८ कर्मणमुलि
१९ कर्तृणमुलि
वाचकधर्मलुप्ता, 2 Kinds
धर्मोपमानलुप्ता, 2 Kinds
वाचकोपमेयलुप्ता, 1 Kind
२० क्विपा
२१ समासगा
२२ समासे
२३ वाक्ये
२४ क्यचि

Later writers have introduced further subtle complexities in this classification which is in the first place made to contain 7 more varieties, 3 under पूर्णा and 4 under लुप्ता and in the next place there is introduced a further principle of five-fold sub-classification: इयं चैवं-भेदोपमा वस्त्वलंकाररसरूपाणां प्रधानव्यङ्ग्यानां वस्त्वलंकारयोर्वाच्ययोश्चोपस्कारकतया पञ्चधा। इतश्चान्येपि प्रभेदाः कुशाग्रीयधिषणैः स्वयमुद्भावनीयाः। तत्र क्वचिदनुगाम्येव धर्मः। क्वचिच्च केवलं बिम्बप्रतिबिम्बभावमापन्नः। क्वचिदुभयम्। क्वचिद्वस्तुप्रतिवस्तुभावेन करम्बितं बिम्बप्रतिबिम्बभावम्। क्वचिदसन्नप्युपचरितः। क्वचिच्च केवलशब्दात्मकः। एभिर्भेदैः प्रागुक्तानां सधर्माणां भेदानां यथासंभवं गुणने बहुतरा भेदा भवन्ति (रसगङ्गाधर, p. 172 ff.).

(ix) Another principle of division is suggested by Bharata (xvi. 43)—

एकस्यैकेन सा कार्या एकस्य बहुभिस्तथा।
अनेकेषां तथैकेन बहूनां बहुभिस्तथा॥

For illustrations see अलंकारकौस्तुभ p. 141 f. The varieties known as मालोपमा and रशनोपमा are sub-varieties under the second division of Bharata. Upamā, like Rūpaka, can also be divided as follows:—उपमा द्विविधा निरवयवा सावयवा च। निरवयवा द्विधा शुद्धा मालारूपा च। सावयवापि द्विधा समस्तवस्तुविषया एकदेशविवर्तिनी च। For details see Bhoja (iv. 20 ff.)

(x) Our Sanskrit Commentary on p. 129 quotes a passage from Chitramīmāñsā illustrating how an example like चन्द्र इव मुखम्, by a slight phrasing, can be turned into a number of other Alaṁkāras. As an Alaṁkāra Upamā is to be kept distinct from रूपक where the सादृश्य (usually defined as तद्भिन्नत्वे सति तद्गतभूयोधर्मवत्त्व) is तिरोभूत; and from उत्प्रेक्षा wherein, in spite of the occasional presence of words like इव, the matter of the similarity is not लोकप्रसिद्ध but purely a creation of the poet's imagination. Compare—

यदायमुपमानांशो लोकतः सिद्धिमृच्छति।
तदोपमैव येनेवशब्दः सादृश्यवाचकः॥
यदा पुनरयं लोकादसिद्धः कविकल्पितः।
तदोत्प्रेक्षैव येनेवशब्दः संभावनापरः॥

(xi) The fourfold requirement of an उपमा, viz. उपमेय, उपमान, साधारणधर्म, and वाचकशब्द is not always present to Daṇḍin's mind. As Viśveśvara observes (p. 19) दण्डिनस्तु सादृश्यस्य प्रतीयमानतामात्राभिप्रायेणोपमाव्यवहारः। He has in fact

given many a variety where no वाचकपद is given and where the सादृश्य is only तात्पर्यपर्यालोचनया गम्यम् ; cp. ii. 25, 26, 27 etc. Dandin's whole conception of उपमा and his attempted classification of it is very crude and uncritical. Nor is there any attempt to present a systematic grouping of the varieties given.

Notes to II. 15—(i) This and the next variety have been thus defined in the Agnipurāṇa (344. 10)—

यत्र साधारणो धर्मः कथ्यते गम्यतेथवा ।
ते धर्मवस्तुप्राधान्याद्धर्मवस्तूपमे उभे ॥

The point of distinction between the two seems to be the fact that while in the first the उपमान is summoned up merely to bring out the nature of the उपमेयगतधर्म, in the second the उपमान as a whole is compared with the उपमेय as a whole, the two being regarded as entirely alike.

(ii) The intended साधारणधर्म can be expressed in various ways : by a simple word as in ii. 15 (आताम्रम्), by श्लिष्ट epithets which are शब्दपरिवृत्तिसह as in ii. 28 (see Com.), or by श्लिष्ट epithets which are शब्दपरिवृत्त्यसह as in ii. 29 (सालकानन). Again the साधारणधर्म may be made the theme of a solitary sentence as in करतलम् अम्भोरुहमिव आताम्रम् or of compound or coordinate sentences as in यथा करतलम् आताम्रं तथा अम्भोरुहमाताम्रम् or करतलम् आताम्रम् अस्ति अम्भोरुहं च आताम्रम् अस्ति । In the latter case we sometimes have what is called the वस्तुप्रतिवस्तुभाव (एकस्यैव धर्मस्य पृथक्छब्दाभ्यामुपादानम्) as in करतलमाताम्रं रक्तिमोद्भासितं चाम्भोरुहम् or the बिम्बप्रतिबिम्बभाव (वस्तुतो भिन्नयोर्धर्मयोः परस्परसादृश्यादभिन्नयोः पृथगुपादानम्) as in—अम्भोरुहं भ्रमद्भृङ्गं लोलनेत्रं मुखं तव where नेत्र and भृङ्ग are related to each other as बिम्ब and प्रतिबिम्ब although the लोलत्व of the one and the भ्रमण of the other being practically one have between them the वस्तुप्रतिवस्तु relation. Jagannātha would call this वस्तुप्रतिवस्तुभावकरम्बितबिम्बप्रतिबिम्बभाव.

Notes to II. 16—(i) The first line gives two separte examples of वस्तूपमा. If we were to read the line—राजीव इव

ते वक्त्रे (Loc. case) नेत्रे मधुकराविव it would be the second kind of वाक्यार्थोपमा illustrated in ii. 45.

Notes to II. 17—(i) This is recognised as distinct Alaṁkāra by रुद्रट, रुय्यक, मम्मट, विश्वनाथ, जगन्नाथ and most other modern writers. The Sāhityadarpaṇa defines it as (x. 87)—

प्रसिद्धस्योपमानस्योपमेयत्वप्रकल्पनम् ।
निष्फलत्वाभिधानं वा प्रतीपमिति कथ्यते ॥

Daṇḍin's enumeration of it as a variety of उपमा has been thus criticised by Jayaratha, in his Alaṁkāra-sarvasva-Vimarśinī (p. 165)—उपमाप्रकारत्वं चानयोर्न वाच्यम् । उपमानस्याक्षेपादुपमेयकल्पनाच्च । न हि तत्र तदस्तीति ततोनयोः (प्रतीपप्रकारयोः) सुप्रत्यय एव भेदः । This in effect means that the प्रतीप has a वैचित्र्य which does not necessarily go to the formation of the real essence of an उपमा. But as Daṇḍin began by making his definition of उपमा rather very wide, he had no option but to regard the प्रतीप as a sub-variety of उपमा. It is so recognised by Bhoja (iv. 23) and by the Agnipurāṇa (344. 12) where it is called विपरीतोपमा.

(ii) This विपर्यासोपमा is to be distinguished from निन्दोपमा (ii. 30) and प्रतिषेधोपमा (ii. 34) from the circumstance that the degradation of the प्रसिद्धोपमान is only implied in विपर्यासोपमा but is explicitly brought out in the other two varieties, stating points of inferiority in the उपमान.

Notes to II. 18—(i) A good example of this variety would be

हासः प्रसूनमिव हास इव प्रसूनं
पाणिः प्रवाल इव पाणिरिव प्रवालः ।
केशो द्विरेफ इव केश इव द्विरेफः
सा भाति वीरुदिव सेव विभाति वीरुत् ॥

It is recognised by the Agnipurāṇa and thus defined (344-11)—तुल्यमेवोपमीयेते यत्रान्योन्येन धर्मिणौ । परस्परोपमा सा स्यात् । In the examples of this variety given above the common quality is not stated; but it has got to be the same, being conveyed by the same word or by synonymous expressions. Hence the example—

सविता विधवति विधुरपि सवितरति तथा दिनन्ति यामिन्यः ।
यामिनयन्ति दिनानि च सुखदुःखवशीकृते मनसि ॥

cannot constitute an अन्योन्योपमा, as the साधारणधर्म in सविता विधवति is शीतलत्व and that in विधुरपि सवितरति the दाहकत्व.

(ii) This variety is raised to the dignity of a distinct figure called उपमेयोपमा by later Ālaṁkārikas. It has been defined by उद्भट as (p. 67)—

अन्योन्यमेव यत्र स्यादुपमानोपमेयता ।
उपमेयोपमामाहुस्तां पक्षान्तरहानिगाम् ॥

Regarding the qualification पक्षान्तरहानिगाम् in the above definition प्रतीहारेन्दुराज observes—नात्र उपमानोपमेयभावे तात्पर्यं किंतु एतदेव द्वयमेवंविधं विद्यते नत्वन्यदेतयोः सदृशं वस्त्वन्तरं विद्यते इति । अतश्च एतत्पक्षद्वितयव्यतिरिक्तस्य पक्षान्तरस्यात्र हानेर्विवक्षितत्वात् परस्परमुपमानोपमेयभावो न दुष्यति । It is doubtful however whether Daṇḍin is here thinking of the तृतीयसदृशव्यवच्छेद as much as of the heightening of their mutual excellence — अन्योन्योत्कर्षशंसिनी. This implies that both the उपमेय and the उपमान must be प्रकृत, as nobody would spend any effort in showing forth to advantage the charm of what is not the theme on hand. Compare the examples given by हेमचन्द्र and अप्पय्यदीक्षित as quoted in our Sanskrit Commentary. Bhoja (iv. 23) calls this उभयोपमा.

(iii) In नियमोपमा (ii. 19) the तृतीयसदृशव्यवच्छेद is expressly made. Here it is implied only. The implication is to be explained as follows—चन्द्र इव मुखमिति मुखे चन्द्रसाम्ये वर्णिते चन्द्रेपि मुखसादृश्यमर्थतः सिध्यति साधारणधर्मस्योभयानुगामित्वात् । तत्र चन्द्रे मुखसाम्ये शब्दतो वर्ण्यमाने मुखचन्द्रयोः परस्परमेव साम्यं न त्वन्येनेति सदृशान्तरव्यवच्छेदः फलति (अलंकारकौस्तुभ, p. 176).

(iv) Bhāmaha recognises उपमेयोपमा as a distinct figure and it is worth observing that Daṇḍin does not feel the necessity of criticising the recognition of the उपमेयोपमा as a distinct figure as he has done for instance in the case of अनन्वय, ससंदेह, उपमारूपक, and उत्प्रेक्षावयव (ii. 358–359) all of which are figures admitted by Bhāmaha. Nor does Bhāmaha for his part offer any justification for regarding उपमेयोपमा as a distinct figure. As for as this circumstance goes therefore we cannot establish any conclusion either way regarding the chronological relation between दण्डिन् and भामह.

Notes to II. 19-20—(i) In अनियमोपमा the तृतीयसदृशव्यवच्छेद is made highly probable but is not विवक्षित. In नियमोपमा it is openly asserted. In अन्योन्योपमा, as we saw, it was left to be inferred. Both these varieties are recognised by the Agnipurāna. The अलंकारशेखर defines नियमोपमा as—यत्र इतरव्यावृत्त्या साम्यलाभः ।

Notes to II. 21—(i) In धर्मोपमा there is only a single common quality sought to be expressed; in the present variety a large number of those are mentioned; in अतिशयोपमा, the next variety, their number is so overwhelming that the poet contents himself by stating just the one solitary aspect or quality which is *not* common. Again, in समुच्चयोपमा more than one साधारणधर्म is brought in; in बहूपमा (ii. 40) more than one उपमान is adduced. The result is that while in the former between the उपमेय and the उपमान a number of distinct common qualities are sought to be conveyed, in the latter it is the intensity of the one self-same quality that stands out prominently. The variety is recognised by the Agnipurāṇa.

Notes to II. 22—(i) See Note (i) to ii. 21. This variety fails to produce the impression of an identity between the उपमेय and the उपमान because the भेद is not entirely तिरोहित, as happens in a रूपक (see ii. 66, below). At the same time it must be remembered that the solitary भेद between the उपमेय and the उपमान which is put forward is not meant to suggest the superiority or the inferiority of the one over the other, as is the case, for instance, in निन्दोपमा, प्रतिषेधोपमा, and the Alaṁkāra called व्यतिरेक (ii. 180).

(ii) This variety is not recognised by the Agnipurāṇa, unless we choose to identify it with what the Purāṇa styles व्यतिरेकोपमा which is thus defined (345. 13)—

बहोर्धर्मस्य साम्येपि वैलक्षण्यं विवक्षितम् ।
यदुच्यतेतिरिक्तत्वं व्यतिरेकोपमा तु सा ॥

The Agnipurāṇa, be it noted in passing, does not recognise व्यतिरेक as a distinct figure-of-speech, whereas

Daṇḍin who does it can only be supposed to have distinguished between अतिशयोपमा and व्यतिरेक in the manner above indicated. A good example of this variety is given by the अलंकारशेखर (p. 30)—

कल्पद्रुमो न जानाति न ददाति बृहस्पतिः ।
अयं च जगतीजानिर्जानाति च ददाति च ॥

Notes to II. 23—Daṇḍin seems to have been alone in recognising उत्प्रेक्षितोपमा as a sub-variety of Upamā. We have already indicated in a general way (cp. Note (x) to ii. 14) the distinction between उपमा and उत्प्रेक्षा. Utpreksha may be said to be more particularly concerned with that human faculty which, Shakespeare tells us, "bodies forth the forms of things unknown and gives to airy nothing a local habitation and a name." In a regular Utprekshā it is the actual साम्य between the उपमेय and the उपमान—or some aspect connected with it —that is poetically conceived. In the variety before us there is an उत्प्रेक्षण; but it has nothing to do with the साम्य between मुख and पद्म which is the immediate subject of assertion. The उत्प्रेक्षण comes in only secondarily : the poetic fact of the stanza could have been expressed without bringing in the 'bragging of the Moon': for instance—अस्याः मुखश्रीः न केवलमिन्दावेव अपि तु पद्मेपि सा अस्त्येव । The introduction of the bragging Moon lends an added surprise-element which is not disagreeable. Hence this is not a regular उत्प्रेक्षा but merely an उत्प्रेक्षितोपमा. The Com. श्रुतानुपालिनी however explains—यस्यकस्यचिदन्यथावस्थिताया वृत्तेरन्यथाकथनमुत्प्रेक्षा । अत्रापि मुखश्रियं चन्द्रे निरस्य पद्मेपि तदुत्प्रेक्षाकथनात् उत्प्रेक्षितोपमेति ।

Notes to II. 24—(i) उद्भ्रु, as the more difficult reading and also the one intrinsically more poetic, seems to be the genuine reading which got ousted by the more familiar word सुभ्रु.

(ii) This variety has been admitted by the Agnipurāṇa and is thus defined (344. 16)—

त्रैलोक्यासंभवि किमप्यारोप्य प्रतियोगिनि ।
कविनोपमीयते या प्रथते साद्भुतोपमा ॥

To assert that the प्रतियोगिन् (=उपमान) resembles or can resemble the अनुयोगिन् only under conditions impossible of fulfilment is in effect to say that the उपमेय is without a peer. As the conditions are अद्भुत or त्रैलोक्यासंभवि the variety is called अद्भुतोपमा, the अद्भुतता consisting not in the component elements (उद्गतभ्रूकुटित्व, विभ्रान्तलोचनत्व etc.) taken by themselves, but in the peculiar combination of them that is demanded : अद्भुतोपमायां सिद्धस्य धर्मिणो धर्म्यन्तरावयवैर्योगः अद्भुतः as Ca remarks. The Alaṁkāraśekhara calls this same variety अभूतोपमा (defined, p. 30, as—यत्रासंसृष्टज्ञानेन संसर्गमारोप्य साम्यप्रसञ्जनं सा), a name which Daṇḍin has reserved for another distinct variety (see ii. 38, below.)

(ii) Adbhutopamā is to be distinguished from Abhūtopamā and from Asambhavitopamā; and the distinction is rather subtle. In अभूतोपमा the presumptive उपमान is not a विशेषणविशिष्टवस्तु wherein the विशेषणs cannot coexist with the विशेष्य, but rather a single simple वस्तु which is nowhere to be met with in nature, as for instance the concentrated essence of the charms of all lotuses; cp. उपमानस्य वस्तुन उपमेयेसंभाव्यमानस्य कथनादभूतत्वेनाभूतोपमामिति (श्रु. पा., p. 36). In असंभावितोपमा it is not the धर्म of a *new* धर्मिन् which is ascribed to the प्रस्तुतधर्मिन् and which is inconsistent with it (as happens in the अद्भुतोपमा), but the प्रस्तुतधर्मिन् is itself said to have a quality which it can never have. Or, looking at it from another point of view, for effecting the comparison between the उपमेय and the उपमान, in an अभूतोपमा a non-existent उपमान is postulated and in an अद्भुतोपमा an existing and well-known उपमान is associated with impossible विशेषणs brought over from another धर्मिन्. The ultimate result is that the उपमेय remains without peer. Such is not the case in an असंभावितोपमा where the point of comparison is just the *fact of the incompatibility* of the धर्मs that the धर्मिन् (the उपमान) is expected to possess; and the comparison does become possible in that respect.

(iii) The कल्पितोपमा as recognised by भरत and the Agnipurāṇa (which merely quotes भरत) comes most near to अद्भुतोपमा. Bharata thus illustrates it (xiv. 51)—

क्षरन्तो दानसलिलं लीलामन्थरगामिनः ।
मतङ्गजा विराजन्ते जङ्गमा इव पर्वताः ॥

Here जङ्गमताविशिष्टपर्वतs or moving mountains is an अद्भुत phenomenon. What भोज calls उत्पाद्योपमा is no other than this अद्भुतोपमा. Bhoja's illustration is the verse उभौ यदि व्योम्नि etc; regarding which he remarks (p.352)—अत्रोपमानार्थमुत्पाद्योपमेयेन प्रतीयमानमभिधीयमानं च सादृश्यमभिहितमिति सेयमुत्पाद्योपमा । Hemachandra (p. 247) unsuccessfully attempts to make a sort of a distinction between उत्पाद्योपमा and कल्पितोपमा; but the most clear presentation of that view is to be seen in Rudraṭa viii. 13–16. Mammaṭa regards Daṇḍin's अद्भुतोपमा as a subvariety of अतिशयोक्ति.

Notes to II. 25—(i) Mohopamā springs from the close similarity between the उपमेय and the उपमान, so close that a rational being would go to the length of actually mistaking the one for the other. This variety is accordingly not only a step in advance of अतिशयोपमा (where the element of difference was consciously realised) but in advance of रूपक, where the भेद is completely submerged, though it is there at the back of one's consciousness so that an actual blunder cannot arise.

(ii) In संशयोपमा (ii. 26) the person is struck by the close similarity but is still doubting. If he perceives the उपमान as उपमान the result would be निर्णयोपमा (ii. 27); but if he perceives the उपमान as उपमेय, the result would be मोहोपमा. Again, if after a temporary but actual error the person corrects himself and perceives the thing as it is, the result would be तत्त्वाख्यानोपमा (ii. 36). As between निर्णयोपमा and तत्त्वाख्यानोपमा it is to be noticed that while in both the ultimate perception is a real perception, in the former it is preceded by a moment of doubt or hesitation, in the latter by one of actual blunder.

(iii) All the four varieties of उपमा just considered must be based upon सादृश्य. If the doubting or the blundering is the result of normal causes mentioned in—

कामशोकभयोन्मादचौरस्वप्नाद्युपप्लुताः ।
अभूतानपि पश्यन्ति पुरतोवस्थितानिव ॥

the result cannot be an अलंकार. It goes without saying also that the सादृश्य ought to be कविप्रतिभानिर्मित.

(iv) The मोहोपमा of Daṇḍin has given rise to two independent Alaṁkāras of later writers: भ्रान्तिमान् and उल्लेख. Ullekha might be said to be a मालाभ्रान्ति and is thus defined by जगन्नाथ (p. 270)—एकस्य वस्तुनो निमित्तवशाद्यदनेकैर्ग्रहीतृभिरनेकप्रकारकं ग्रहणं तदुल्लेखः। The common property between the उपमेय and the उपमान which has been the source of the error is not stated in the example; but it can be stated also; compare—

नीलोत्पलमिति भ्रान्त्या विकासितविलोचनम्।
अनुधावति मुग्धाक्षि पश्य मुग्धो मधुव्रतः॥

And this circumstance makes it possible for us to include under मोहोपमा the figures of speech called मीलित, सामान्य, and तद्गुण, for definitions of which and for their mutual distinctions see particularly साहित्यदर्पण x. 89-90.

Notes to II. 26-27—(i) This and the next variety of उपमा have given rise to an independent Alaṁkāra called संशय, संदेह or ससंदेह with its sub-varieties of शुद्ध, निश्चयगर्भ, and निश्चयान्त. Śuddha is an ordinary संशयोपमा a good example of which is furnished by Rudraṭa (viii. 60)—

किमिदं लीनालिकुलं कमलं किं वा मुखं सुनीलकचम्।
इति संशेते लोकस्त्वयि सुतनु सरोवतीर्णायाम्॥

while निश्चयान्त is निर्णयोपमा. Of निश्चयगर्भ the stock example is—

अयं मार्तण्डः किं स खलु तुरगैः सप्तभिरितः
कृशानुः किं साक्षात् प्रसरति दिशो नैष नियतम्।
कृतान्तः किं साक्षान्महिषवहनोसाविति चिरात्
समालोक्याजौ त्वां विदधति विकल्पान् प्रतिभटाः॥

Viśvanātha's निश्चयालंकार (x. 39) illustrated in—

वदनमिदं न सरोजं नयने नेन्दीवरे एते।
इह सविधे मुग्धदृशो भ्रमर मुधा किं परिभ्रमसि॥

is slightly different from निर्णयोपमा or निश्चयान्तससंदेह. As Viśvanātha himself remarks—न ह्ययं निश्चयान्तः संदेहः। तत्र संशयनिश्चययोरेकाश्रयत्वेनावस्थानात्। अत्र तु भ्रमरादेः संशयः नायकादेर्निश्चयः।

(ii) From ii. 358 below it seems clear that some predecessors of Bhāmaha did regard ससंदेह as an inde-

pendent figure. Now Bhāmaha thus defines and illustrates the figure (iii. 42-43)—

उपमानेन तत्त्वं च भेदं च वदतः पुनः ।
ससंदेहं वचः स्तुत्यै ससंदेहं विदुर्यथा ॥
किमयं शशी न स दिवा विराजते
कुसुमायुधो न धनुरस्य कौसुमम् ।
इति विस्मयाद्विमृशतोऽ[पि मे] मति-
स्त्वयि वीक्षिते न लभतेऽर्थनिश्चयम् ॥

But we do not have merely in that fact any certain indication that Daṇḍin could have meant no other writer but Bhāmaha.

Notes t II. 28-29—(i) These two varieties differ from धर्मोपमा (ii. 15) only in the added circumstance that the तुल्यधर्म is here expressed by paronomastic words, the श्लेष being आर्थ in the former and शाब्द in the latter (श्लिष्टे खलु अर्थवशेन साम्यम् अत्र शब्दवशेन). The two varieties can therefore both of them in a sense be called श्लेषोपमा, as has been done by the author of the अलंकारशेखर who gives the joint example (p. 30)—

तमालपत्राभरणा राजते विलसद्भ्रुवाः ।
बालेवोद्यानमालेयं सालकाननशोभिनी ॥

(ii) The variants सरूपोपमा and संदानोपमा for समानोपमा are worth noting. The first is an attempt to bring the first word of the definition into the संज्ञा, while the second (which has the high authority of J and N and which therefore we might have adopted) implies that the उपमेय and the उपमान are in this variety tied together (like miscellaneous cattle in a cowpen) to one and the same rope in the form of similarly-sounding words, and resemble each other only in that accidental circumstance.

Notes to II. 30-31—(i) A normal उपमान contains the common quality in a more pronounced degree than a normal उपमेय; and this is the reason why in a विपर्यासोपमा (ii. 17) the mere reversal of that relation inplied the lowering of the उपमान in respect of that common quality. The

fight for superiority between the उपमान and the उपमेय about pre-eminence in this quality is represented as still undecided in विरोधोपमा (ii. 33). In निन्दोपमा the claim of the उपमान is allowed in regard to the common quality, but certain *extraneous* facts are adduced (e. g. बहुरजस्त्व, क्षयशालित्व, etc.) which should lower it and consequently the उपमेय also in our estimation. In प्रतिषेधोपमा (ii. 34) the उपमान is represented as fighting a forlorn fight for regaining its normal pre-eminence in respect of the common quality. All these varieties therefore can be regarded as उपमा varieties, because underlying them all is the presupposition that the उपमान and the उपमेय have a certain specific quality in common; and the question at issue merely is, who has the quality to a greater or less degree. The figure-of-speech called व्यतिरेक (ii. 180) has also to be distinguished from these उपमा varieties, in regard to which see our Notes to ii. 180.

(ii) As observed before, भरत and the author of the Agnipurāṇa mention these two varieties of उपमा, and their recognition is criticised by Bhāmaha (see Note (vii) to ii. 14, above). The illustrations for them given by Bharata are (xvi. 49-50)—

प्रशंसाया यथा—

दृष्ट्वा तु तां विशालाक्षीं तुतोष मनुजाधिपः ।
मुनिभिः साधितां कृच्छ्रात् सिद्धिं मूर्तिमतीमिव ॥

निन्दा यथा—

सा तं सर्वगुणैर्हीनं सस्वजे कर्कशच्छविम् ।
वानकं नकिनं [? वने कण्टकिनं] वल्ली दवदग्धमिव द्रुमम् ।

From these it would seem that Vāmana is probably right when he says (iv. 2.7, वृत्ति)—स्तुतौ निन्दायां तत्त्वाख्याने चास्याः प्रयोगः । What is intended by this three-fold division is therefore उपमानमात्रस्य विषयप्रदर्शनम् as the कामधेनु observes. Daṇḍin however seems to have taken a different view of the case. Whether he was the first to do so is however difficult to decide. The निन्दोपमा as defined and illustrated in the Alaṁkāraśekhara comes near to the प्रतिषेधोपमा (ii. 34); for there the definition

is—यत्रोपमानस्य निन्दया प्रतिक्षेपः सा निन्दोपमा, and the illustration—

नागेन्द्रहस्तास्त्वचि कर्कशत्वादेकान्तशैत्यात् कदली विशेषाः ।
लब्ध्वापि लोके परिणाहि रूपं जातास्तदूर्वोरुपमानबाह्याः ॥

Notes to II. 32—See note (vii) to ii. 14 above. Because no other Alaṁkāra writer known to us (except Vāmana) mentions आचिख्यासोपमा and because Bhāmaha criticises the recognition of this variety, it would be perhaps unfair to conclude that Bhāmaha must have meant Daṇḍin alone, seeing that a vast amount of literature known to Bhāmaha and even mentioned by him by name is no longer available to us.

Notes to II. 33-34—See Note (i) to ii. 30 above. The variety called प्रतिषेधोपमा it must be admitted comes nearest to the व्यतिरेक; we can possibly distinguish them from each other by supposing that in प्रतिषेधोपमा the point at issue is the degree of कान्ति or आह्लादकत्व (the common quality) of the जडत्वकलङ्कित्वविशिष्ट इन्दु and the मुख. Both possess it and the moon is declared to be not a match to the face as far as the possession of this quality goes. In व्यतिरेक some quality or qualities are stated wherein the उपमान and the उपमेय are declared to be equal to one another; but at the same time another distinct quality possessed by the उपमेय and denied to the उपमान is adduced which serves to establish the superiority of the उपमेय over the उपमान considered as a whole.

Notes to II. 35-36—The name चटूपमा has nothing very distinctive or appropriate about it.—For the distinction between निर्णयोपमा and तत्त्वाख्यानोपमा see Note (i) to ii. 25.

Notes to II. 37—Daṇḍin uses both कक्षा (i. 53,95) and कक्ष्या in the sense of area, region, boundary-line, province, equality, similarity, etc. The reading कान्तिम् (which our Sanskrit Commentary explains) seems to be merely an

easier substitute for कक्ष्याम्. The word कक्ष्या is Vedic, regarding which see Nirukta ii. 2.

(ii) As Daṇḍin himself tells us (ii. 358), this variety was regarded by others as constituting a distinct alaṁkāra called अनन्वय· Bhāmaha thus defines and illustrates it (iii. 44–45)—

यत्र तेनैव तस्य स्यादुपमानोपमेयता ।
असादृश्यविवक्षातस्तामित्याहुरनन्वयम् ॥
ताम्बूलरागवलयं स्फुरद्दशनदीधिति ।
इन्दीवराभनयनं तवेव वदनं तव ॥

The stock example of this alaṁkāra is the one given by Vāmana (iv. 3. 14.)—

गगनं गगनाकारं सागरः सागरोपमः ।
रामरावणयोर्युद्धं रामरावणयोरिव ॥

(iii) As अन्योन्योपमा results in तृतीयसदृशव्यवच्छेद so असाधारणोपमा results in द्वितीयसदृशव्यवच्छेद. In the अन्योन्योपमा example in ii. 18 आनन is both उपमान and उपमेय, but in different sentences; whereas in असाधारणोपमा in one and the same sentence the face becomes both उपमान and उपमेय. It must be distinctly understood, however, that if yesterday's face is compared with to-day's face of the same lady that becomes an ordinary उपमा pure and simple. In other words, between मुख the उपमेय and मुख the उपमान in the example under discussion there must be only कल्पितभेद and not देशकालदशाविशेषादिकृतभेद. In the same way the verse—

एतावति प्रपञ्चे सुन्दरमहिलासहस्रभरितेपि ।
अनुहरति सुभग तस्या वामार्धं दक्षिणार्धस्य ॥

does not contain an असाधारणोपमा, but is merely a वस्तूपमा. Nor again does the verse given by Daṇḍin later (ii. 276)—

अद्य या मम गोविन्द जाता त्वयि गृहागते ।
कालेनैषा भवेत् प्रीतिस्तवैवागमनात् पुनः ॥

regarding which अप्पय्यदीक्षित observes (चि॰ मी॰ p. 42)—अत्र गृहागतं श्रीकृष्णं प्रति विदुरवाक्ये इयं त्वदागमनप्रभवा प्रीतिर्बहुकालव्यवहितेन पुनरपि त्वदागमनेनैव भवेत् नान्येनेत्युक्तिभङ्ग्या त्वदागमनप्रभवप्रीतेः सैव सदृशी न त्वितरप्रभवेति व्यज्यते — constitute an example of this variety.

(iv) In असाधारणोपमा although the face is declared to be without a peer the form of the assertion is conceived outwardly in the manner of an उपमा· Where however even this outward form is not preserved that is recognised by जगन्नाथ as a distinct figure called असम· As he says (p. 210 f.)—सर्वथैवोपमानिषेधोसमाख्योलंकारः । यथा—

भुवनत्रितयेपि मानवैः परिपूर्णे विबुधैश्च दानवैः ।
न भविष्यति नास्ति नाभवन्नृप यस्ते भजते तुलापदम् ॥

अत्र सर्वथैवोपमाननिषेधेन सादृश्यस्याप्रतिष्ठानान्नोपमागन्धोपि । This however is over-subtlety for which Jagannātha has been taken to task by the author of the Alaṁkāra-kaustubha (p. 174).

Notes to II. 38–39—See Note (ii) to ii. 24 above. In regard to the illustration given for असंभावितोपमा it has been well observed (aneant the ruling that उपमान must be लोकप्रसिद्ध while चन्दनप्रभवविष is not लोकप्रसिद्ध)—अत्र चन्द्रप्रभवविषादेर्वा-गुपमाया अविवक्षितत्वात् किंतु यथा चन्द्रबिम्बाद्विषमसंभावितं तथा त्वन्मुखात् पुरुषा वाग् इत्युपमास्वीकारात् । एवं च असंभावितोपमा इत्यस्य असंभावितोपमा-नकत्वं नार्थः किंतु असंभावितत्वं तदुपमायाः साधारणधर्म इत्येव ।

Notes to II. 40—(i) Compare Note (i) to ii. 21 above. Bharata already tells us (xvi. 43)—

एकस्यैकेन सा कार्या एकस्य बहुभिस्तथा ।
अनेकेषां तथैकेन बहूनां बहुभिस्तथा ॥

And his examples in order are—तुल्यं ते शशिना वक्त्रम्, शशा-ङ्कवत् प्रकाशन्ते ज्योतींषि, श्येनबर्हिणभासानां तुल्याक्षः and घना इव गजाः । Here of course, in its most primitive form, the distinction is made to depend upon whether the उपमान or the उपमेय or both are in the singular or the plural gender. Now मालोपमा (ii. 42) is एकस्य बहुभिः उपमा, and in Daṇḍin's statement the distinction between बहूपमा and मालोपमा is this. In बहूपमा a number of उपमानs are adduced in the hope that in their cumulative effect at least they would approximately convey the extent of the common quality possessed by the उपमेय, which they are unable to do singly. In मालोपमा on the other hand any one of the several उपमानs is conceived as being adequate by

itself to bring out the common quality, and the wealth of illustration serves merely to show off the poet's प्रतिभा.

Notes to II. 41—(i) The Alaṁkāraśekhara thus defines and illustrates this variety (p. 31)—यत्रोपमेयमुपमानविकारतयोच्यते सा विक्रियोपमा यथा—

हरिणादथ तन्नयनादथ पद्मात् पद्मपत्राच्च ।
आहृत्य कान्तिसारं विधिरसृजत् सुभ्रुवो दृष्टिम् ॥

Notes to II. 42—See Note (i) to ii. 40 above. The illustration in the text is based upon identical साधारणधर्म; but this is not essential. With भिन्नसाधारणधर्म a good example of मालोपमा is the familiar stanza—

मातेव रक्षति पितेव हिते नियुङ्क्ते
कान्तेव चाभिरमयत्यपनीय खेदम् ।
कीर्तिं च दिक्षु वितनोति तनोति कीर्तिं
किं किं न साधयति कल्पलतेव विद्या ॥

The अलंकारकौस्तुभ gives also the following example—

अलक्षितगतागतैः कुलवधूकटाक्षैरिव
क्षणानुनयशीतलैः प्रणयकेलिकोपैरिव ।
सुवृत्तमसृणोन्नतैर्मृगदृशामुरोजैरिव
त्वदीयतुरगोत्तमैर्धरणिचक्रमाकम्पते ॥

Apparently it is a series based upon भिन्नसाधारणधर्म which alone is recognised as मालोपमा by the author of the Agnipurāṇa. Compare (344. 14–15)—

यत्रोपमा स्याद्बहुभिः सदृशैः सा बहूपमा ।
धर्माः प्रत्युपमानं चेदन्या मालोपमैव सा ॥

(ii) Daṇḍin does not recognise what is known as रशनोपमा defined by the Agnipurāṇa (344. 20) as—


उपमेयं यदन्यस्य तदन्यस्योपमा मता ।
यद्युत्तरोत्तरं याति तदासौ गमनो(? रशनो)पमा ॥

and thus illustrated by रुद्रट (vii. 28)—

नभ इव विमलं सलिलं सलिलमिवानन्दकारि शशिबिम्बम् ।
शशिबिम्बमिव लसद्द्युति तरुणीवदनं शरत् कुरुते ॥

For other varieties see रसगङ्गाधर pp. 181 ff. and अलंकारकौस्तुभ pp. 146 ff.

Notes to II. 43-45—(i) By वाक्य Daṇḍin seems to have meant a complete utterance of a thought setting forth all its कारक relations: in other words a picture with all appropriate details and back-ground. The face, the eyes, and the teeth form one set as against which is placed the lotus, the bees, and the pollen in the first example; and similar corresponding sets are present in the second example. And when in this manner an अवयवसंपन्न अवयविन् is compared with another similar अवयविन्—with the trifling subsidiary distinction of the presence or absence of an additional independent वाचक for each अवयव—the result is a वाक्यार्थोपमा. Hence it is that after dividing उपमाs as shown below—



the author of the Alaṁkārakaustubha cites stanza ii. 45 as an example of भेदे परंपरिता, the comparison between one pair of उपमान and उपमेय leading on to and depending upon the next pair.

(ii) In the two examples of वाक्यार्थोपमा given by Daṇḍin the समानधर्म between the various pairs of उपमानs and उपमेयs in each is clearly felt although not actually expressed. But it is not absolutely necessary that there should be this सादृश्यापेक्षता everywhere. The अलंकारशेखर cites the following where there is प्रत्येकं सादृश्यानपेक्षा—

कामिनीनयनकज्जलपङ्कादुत्थितो मदनमत्तवराहः ।
कामिमानसवनान्तरचारी कन्दमुत्खनति मानलतायाः ॥

(iii) It is perhaps necessary to draw attention to the fact that वाक्योपमा is different from वाक्यार्थोपमा. We have just seen what वाक्यार्थोपमा is. The nature of वाक्योपमा becomes evident from the circumstance that it is distinguished from what is called समासोपमा and प्रत्ययोपमा (following Rudraṭa) or from वृत्त्युपमा (following Hemachandra) वृत्ति being समासतद्धितनामधातुभेदेन त्रिविधा. The stock example of वाक्यार्थोपमा given by Vāmana is—

पाण्ड्योयमंसार्पितलम्बहारः
क्लृप्ताङ्गरागो हरिचन्दनेन ।
आभाति बालातपरक्तसानुः
सनिर्झरोद्गार इवाद्रिराजः ॥

Notes to II. 46-47—Although in this variety the साम्य is always implied and never actually expressed, there being no उपमावाचकशब्द present, Daṇḍin is perhaps justified, in view of his own general conception of उपमा, in not regarding प्रतिवस्तूपमा as a distinct Alaṁkāra. It is not recognised as such by भोज, भामह, and रुद्रट. The further subsidiary difference as to the manner of implying the साम्य (by वस्तुप्रतिवस्तुभाव or by बिम्बप्रतिबिम्बभाव, regarding which see Note (ii) to ii. 15 above) upon which the distinction between प्रतिवस्तूपमा and दृष्टान्त turns is also not of consequence enough to give rise to a new alaṁkāra, and Jagannātha practically concedes this (pp. 337-8)—अस्य चालंकारस्य प्रतिवस्तूपमाभेदकमेतदेव यत् तस्यां धर्मो न प्रतिबिम्बितः किंतु शुद्धसामान्यात्मनैव स्थितः इह तु प्रतिबिम्बितः । .... । एकस्यैवालंकारस्य द्वौ भेदौ प्रतिवस्तूपमा दृष्टान्तश्च । यच्चानयोः किंचिद्वैलक्षण्यं तत् प्रभेदताया एव साधकम् नालंकारताया इति सुवचम् । Hence Daṇḍin's प्रतिवस्तूपमा as an उपमा variety may be said to stand in the place of both प्रतिवस्तूपमा and दृष्टान्त of later आलंकारिकs.

(ii) The following quotation from जयरथ's Alaṁkārasarvasvavimarśinī (p. 28) is illuminating as to the distinction between वस्तुप्रतिवस्तुभाव, where the things are really one but two only in the phrasing, and बिम्बप्रतिबिम्बभाव, where the two things are really distinct but have to be temporarily identified—लोको हि दर्पणादौ बिम्बात् प्रतिबिम्बस्य भेदेपि मदीयमेवात्र वदनं संक्रान्तमित्यभेदेनाभिमन्यते। अन्यथा हि प्रति-

बिम्बदर्शने कृशोहं स्थूलोहमित्याद्यभिमानो नोदीयात् भूषणविन्यासादौ नायिका नाद्रियेरन् ।

(iii) Some remarks of the श्रुतानुपालिनी on this stanza are also worth quoting—प्रतिवस्तूपमा । प्रतिशब्दः सदृशार्थवाची तेन सदृशवस्तूपमेत्यर्थः । ननु इवादिरहितसदृशोपन्यासः अर्थान्तरो नाम भवति । तथाहि—

ज्ञेयः सोर्थान्तरन्यासो वस्तु प्रस्तुत्य किंचन ।
तत्साधनसमर्थस्य न्यासो योन्यस्य वस्तुनः ॥

इति वक्ष्यति (ii.169)। अत्रापि–वस्तु किंचिदुपन्यस्य सदनं (v. l.) तत्सधर्मेण इत्युक्तम् । तस्मादयमर्थान्तरन्यास एव कथमुपमेत्याह—साम्यप्रतीतिरस्तीति । सदृशप्रतिभानं विद्यते इत्युपमेत्युच्यते । एतदुक्तं भवति । इवाद्यभावे समानताप्रतीतिः उपमःनवादिना (?) तद्द्योतनाय प्रयुक्तेः । अर्थान्तरस्त्वलंकारः असदृशस्योपन्यासेन वस्त्वन्तरसाधनमिति तत्साधनसमर्थस्येतिवचनात् न तत्सधर्मेण इति । In other words–अर्थान्तरन्यासे समर्थ्यसमर्थकभावो विवक्षितः अत्र पुनरुमानोपमेयभावः।

(iv) In order to give adequate account of a number of devices other than उपमा and रूपक for expressing similarity between two things Bhoja has invented a new alaṁkāra called साम्य or सामान्य which he thus defines and divides (iv. 34)—

द्वयोर्यत्रोक्तिचातुर्यादौपम्यार्थोवगम्यते ।
उपमारूपकान्यत्वे साम्यमित्यामनन्ति तत् ॥
तदानन्त्येन भेदानामसंख्यं तस्य तूक्तयः ।
दृष्टान्तोक्तिः प्रपञ्चोक्तिः प्रतिवस्तूक्तिरेव च ॥
तत्रेवादेः प्रयोगेण दृष्टान्तोक्तिं प्रचक्षते ।
इवादेरप्रयोगेण प्रपञ्चोक्तिं मनीषिणः ॥
वस्तु किंचिदुपन्यस्य न्यसनात् तत्सधर्मणः ।
साम्यप्रतीतिरस्तीति प्रतिवस्तूक्तिरुच्यते ॥

This alaṁkāra accordingly would do duty for प्रतिवस्तूपमा and दृष्टान्त of the ālaṁkārikas. For the various subdivisions of प्रतिबस्तूक्तिसाम्य and the illustrations followed by Bhoja's illuminating critical remarks see Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa itself. Sāmyā as an alaṁkāra is recognised by Rudraṭa also (viii. 105ff.).

Notes to II. 48-49—(i) How to distinguish this variety from the figure-of-speech called तुल्ययोगिता which Daṇḍin defines and illustrates in ii. 330–332 is a rather subtle question. Both are attempts at समीकरण between

two things one of which is distinctly superior (अधिक or गुणोत्कृष्ट), and the common property adduced is some क्रिया, which word includes both qualities and actions, as is evident from the examples given. The only express condition present in the definition of the figure तुल्ययोगिता and absent in the definition of the sub-variety तुल्ययोगोपमा is स्तुतिनिन्दार्थम्; but it is not quite satisfactory to make the distinction turn upon this circumstance, for then तुल्ययोगिता would come nearer to the varieties निन्दोपमा and प्रशंसोपमा (ii. 30–31). We can probably bring out the distinction by supposing that in the उपमा variety the हीन is consciously realised as the उपमेय or the प्रकृतवस्तु while in the figure तुल्ययोगिता the उपमान-उपमेय relation, even though actually present (as in ii. 331), is deliberately set aside, the साम्य being only गम्य or implied and not शब्दोपात्त as in the other case; and this agrees with the later definitions of तुल्ययोगिता like that of मम्मट (नियतानां सकृद्धर्मः । नियतानाम् = प्राकरणिकानामेव अप्राकरणिकानामेव वा). Udbhaṭa is even more explicit (p. 60)—

उपमानोपमेयोक्तिशून्यैरप्रस्तुतैर्वचः ।
साम्याभिधायि प्रस्तावभाग्भिर्वा तुल्ययोगिता ॥

(ii) If this statement of the difference between तुल्ययोगोपमा and तुल्ययोगिता is correct it follows that Daṇḍin's तुल्ययोगोपमा approaches the figure-of-speech called दीपक as it is defined by मम्मट—सकृद्वृत्तिस्तु धर्मस्य प्रकृताप्रकृतात्मनाम्—for there the common property exists between things consciously realised as उपमेय and उपमान. Compare रुय्यक (p. 71)—प्रस्तुताप्रस्तुतयोर्व्यस्तत्वे तुल्ययोगिता समस्तत्वे दीपकम् । From Daṇḍin's view of the case however the distinction between दीपक and तुल्ययोगोपमा is clear. In तुल्ययोगोपमा there is an attempted समीकरण between अधिक and हीन things; this is absent in the दीपक of मम्मट. At the same time the दीपक requires the साम्य to be expressed only once for all; in तुल्ययोगोपमा it may be repeated. Daṇḍin is thus looking to the etymology of the name all along, while there is a tendency in later writers to ignore that altogether. It would be noted in passing that the दीपक here spoken of is not the दीपक as Daṇḍin de-

fines it (ii. 97ff.) which is more a शब्दालंकार than an अर्थालंकार. See Notes to the figure in question.

(iii) We have so far attempted to set forth the distinction that Daṇḍin probably must have made between तुल्ययोगोपमा and तुल्ययोगिता; but writers who do not admit this उपमा variety have defined तुल्ययोगिता in terms that Daṇḍin might have reserved for तुल्ययोगोपमा. The definition of Bhāmaha is (iii. 26)—

न्यूनस्यापि विशिष्टेन गुण्यसाम्यविवक्षया ।
तुल्यकार्यक्रियायोगादित्युक्ता तुल्ययोगिता ॥

That of Ruyyaka (p. 70)—

औपम्यस्य गम्यत्वे पदार्थगतत्वे नप्रस्तुतानामप्रस्तुतानां वा समानधर्माभिसंबन्धे तुल्ययोगिता ।

That of Vāmana (iv. 3. 26)—

विशिष्टेन साम्यार्थमेककालक्रियायोगस्तुल्ययोगिता ।

Bhoja, finally, while giving for तुल्ययोगिता a definition identical with that of Daṇḍin, further adds (iv. 55)—

अन्ये सुखनिमित्ते च दुःखहेतौ च वस्तुनि ।
स्तुतिनिन्दार्थमेवाहुस्तुल्यत्वे तुल्ययोगिताम् ॥

for which his illustration is—

आहूतस्याभिषेकाय विसृष्टस्य वनाय च ।
न मया लक्षितस्तस्य स्वल्पोप्याकारविभ्रमः ॥

(iv) The distinction between प्रशंसोपमा (ii. 31) and तुल्ययोगोपमा seems to be the circumstance that in the former some extraneous facts not germain to the intended साम्य (e. g. शम्भुशिरोधृतत्व) are adduced for heightening the value of the उपमान while in तुल्ययोगोपमा the superiority is based upon the degree or intensity of the self-same साम्य as measured by marked difference in results achieved, difficulties encountered, etc. In other respects the two varieties seem allied. We do not think that the fact of the सादृश्य being वाच्य in the one (तौ तुल्यौ) and व्यङ्ग्य in the other would have been adduced by Daṇḍin as the additional distinctive feature.

Notes to II. 50—(i) An ordinary उपमा—अम्भोरुहमिवाताम्रं करतलम् can be put in the form of a हेतूपमा in this manner:

करतलमाताम्रत्वेन अम्भोरुहमनुकरोति. In समुच्चयोपमा (ii. 21) we had a similar presentation of the similarity; only there a number of हेतुs were adduced to bring out the साम्य between the same उपमेय and उपमान; while in the example before us a number of हेतुs are adduced to bring out the साम्य between one and the same उपमेय and a series of उपमानs with which it is to be compared.—As in बहूपमा (ii. 40) or मालोपमा (ii. 42) a series of successive उपमानs are here given but that वैचित्र्य upon which this variety primarily turns is the presentation of the साम्य in the form of a हेतु. It is perhaps not essential that the हेतुs (and the उपमानs) in a हेतूपमा be always more than one.

Notes to II. 51-56—(i) Like गुणs the दोषs have been most elaborately treated by Indian Ālaṁkārikas. They have been named and classified according as they belong to syllables, words, sentences, sense, sentiments, and alaṁkāras. A detailed treatment of these is given in the Sāhityadarpaṇa vii, or Kāvyaprakāśa vii. Daṇḍin affords a treatment of them in this place and later in iii. 125-185. In regard to the Upamādoshas our Sanskrit Commentary supplies the needful supplementary information from Vāmana, Bhoja, and other writers.

(ii) The extra line in ii. 56 which we have enclosed in square brackets, like a number of other lines and verses, is clearly an interpolation; but having been once accepted in the editio princeps of Premachandra and so passed on into works of reference it would have been most inconvenient to omit them and so change the subsequent verse-numbering. In one place (ii. 158-163) where a transposition of stanzas was felt by us to be on critical grounds absolutely called for we have for the same reason transposed the stanzas and yet retained their original verse-numbering, believing that nobody would grudge us giving credit for being able to count the numbers from 158 to 163 correctly.

Notes to II. 57-65—(i) Daṇḍin's list of सादृश्यसूचक words is helpful and is in any case borrowed from him by most subsequent writers, and naturally with variations and attempts at completion. Thus the अलंकारकौस्तुभ supplies words like सुहृद् चौर, सोदर, and their synonyms, and even the Mss. variants add one or two more. As the matter is not very vital we did not think it necessary to go into all these later lists with a view to determine the text of Daṇḍin's list, especially as it would have been necessary not only to refer to the printed editions but even the Ms. material of these other alaṁkāra works.

(iii) The colophon इत्युपमाचक्रम् (and other similar colophons to mark the conclusion of the treatment of an alaṁkāra with a number of subdivisions) is generally given in Mss. with omission of इति and substitution of synonyms like सङ्घ etc. for चक्र and other small variants. We have ignored the variants and have generally followed best Ms. authority in giving the colophons or omitting them.

Notes to II. 66—(i) The name of this figure is thus explained—यदा तु विषयी (उपमानमप्रकृतम्) विषयं (प्रकृतमुपमेयम्) रूपवन्तं करोति तदा अन्वर्थाभिधानं रूपकम्। Rūpaka has to be carefully distinguished from उपमा (especially the varieties of it called अतिशयोपमा and मोहोपमा), from समासोक्ति (ii. 205), from अतिशयोक्ति (ii. 214), from उत्प्रेक्षा (ii. 221), and from अपह्नुति (ii. 304)—amongst alaṁkāras recognised by Daṇḍin; and from परिणाम, ससंदेह, भ्रान्तिमान् and उल्लेख—amongst alaṁkāras not recognised by Daṇḍin. The various definitions of रूपक given by ālaṁkārikas (we quote a few of the more important of them below) are an attempt merely to sharpen the outline of the figure with a view to this differentiation. Thus Bharata (xvi. 57) defines the figure as under—

स्वविकल्पैर्विरचितं तुल्यावयवलक्षणम्।
किंचित्सादृश्यसंपन्नं यद्रूपं रूपकं तु तत्॥

Bhāmaha (ii. 21)—

उपमानेन यत् तत्त्वमुपमेयस्य रूप्यते।
गुणानां समतां दृष्ट्वा रूपकं नाम तद्विदुः॥

Udbhaṭa (p. 9)—

श्रुत्या संबन्धविरहाद्यत् पदेन पदान्तरम् ।
गुणवृत्ति प्रधानेन युज्यते रूपकं तु तत् ॥

Rudraṭa (viii. 38, 40)—

यत्र गुणानां साम्ये सत्युपमानोपमेययोरभिदा ।
अविवक्षितसामान्या कल्प्यत इति रूपकं प्रथमम् ॥
उपसर्जनोपमेयं कृत्वा तु समासमेतयोरुभयोः ।
यत्तु प्रयुज्यते तद्रूपकमन्यत् समासोक्तम् ॥

Vāmana (iv. 3. 6)—

उपमानेनोपमेयस्य गुणसाम्यात् तत्त्वारोपो रूपकम् ।

Bhoja (iv. 24)—

यदोपमानशब्दानां गौणवृत्तिव्यपाश्रयात् ।
उपमेये भवेद्वृत्तिस्तदा तद्रूपकं विदुः ॥

Ruyyaka (p. 34)—

अभेदप्राधान्ये आरोपे आरोपविषयानपह्नवे रूपकम् ।

Vidyānātha (p. 371)

आरोपविषयस्य स्यादतिरोहितरूपिणः ।
उपरञ्जकमारोप्यमाणं तद्रूपकं मतम् ॥

We have already quoted the definition of Jagannātha in the Sanskrit Commentary.

(ii) The distinction of रूपक from उपमा Daṇḍin has given in his very definition of रूपक by the qualification तिरोभूतभेदा. The distinction between उपमान and उपमेय (for the साम्य between them always presupposes a भेद) can be made to disappear when, in spite of the difference, one asserts their identity either because he erroneously believes in their identity (cp. मोहोपमा and the remarks made in our Notes to ii. 25 regarding भ्रान्तिमान् and उल्लेख); or because he wants purposely (poetically speaking) to deceive some one (e. g. in अपह्नुति, cp. our Notes to ii. 95 also); or because he is himself in doubt (e. g. संशयोपमा and the figures ससंदेह etc.); or because, in a poetic fancy, he imagines them to be identical (as happens in an उत्प्रेक्षा). It may also happen when, for purposes of poetic effect and with a view to bring out the extreme similarity of the उपमान and the उपमेय, the उपमान is made not only to lend its रूप to the उपमेय but actually to usurp its place so that only one word and

one name—that of the उपमान—is used instead of two. As the प्रतापरुद्रीय (p. 371) trenchantly remarks—संदेहालंकारे विषयस्य संदिह्यमानतया तिरोधानम्। भ्रान्तिमदलंकारे भ्रान्त्या विषयतिरोधानम्। अपह्नुत्यलंकारे अपह्नवेनारोपविषयतिरोधानम्।—to which we might add—उत्प्रेक्षायां कविसंभावनया विषयविषयिणोरभेदाध्यवसायः। अतिशयोक्तौ कविप्रौढोक्त्या विषयस्य विषयिणा निगरणात्मकोऽध्यवसायः। Regarding our last statement it will be noted that Daṇḍin's conception of अतिशयोक्ति is somewhat different from the one given above after the manner of मम्मट; but on this point see our Notes to ii. 214.

(iii) As to the rest, it may be observed that while रूपक involves an आरोप or superimposition of the उपमान upon the उपमेय, that आरोप has to be based upon similarity and not upon कार्यकारण relation as in आयुर्घृतम्; but the ground of the आरोप—the common property—can never be expressed as such in the Rūpaka (अविवक्षितसामान्या as Rudraṭa says : see below, Note ix) and there is also an absence, naturally, of the सादृश्यवाचकशब्द. A रूपक in its simplest form therefore comes nearer to the धर्मवादिलुप्ता उपमा and if the example बाहुलता is taken as बाहुः लता इव it would be not a रूपक at all. Where such a confusion is likely to result there must always be something in the sentence which is either रूपकसाधक or उपमाबाधक, regarding which, besides the remarks in our Commentary, compare the following from the काव्यप्रकाश (pp. 927ff.)—तत्र

सौभाग्यं वितनोति वक्त्रशशिनो ज्योत्स्नेव हासद्युतिः।

इत्यत्र मुख्यतया अवगम्यमाना हासद्युतिर्वक्त्रे एवानुकूल्यं भजते इत्युपमायाः साधकम् शशिनि तु न तथा प्रतिकूलेति रूपकं प्रति तस्या अबाधकता।

वक्त्रेन्दौ तव सत्ययं यदपरः शीतांशुरभ्युद्यतः।

इत्यत्र अपरत्वमिन्दोरनुगुणं न तु वक्त्रस्य प्रतिकूलमिति रूपकस्य साधकतां प्रतिपद्यते न तूपमाया बाधकताम्।

राजनारायणं लक्ष्मीस्त्वामालिङ्गति निर्भरम्।

इत्यत्र पुनरालिङ्गनमुपमां निरस्यति सदृशं प्रति परप्रेयसीप्रयुक्तस्य आलिङ्गनस्यासंभवात्।

पादाम्बुजं भवतु नो विजयाय मञ्जु-
मञ्जीरशिञ्जितमनोहरमम्बिकायाः।

इत्यत्र मञ्जीरशिञ्जितम् अम्बुजे प्रतिकूलमसंभवादिति रूपकस्य बाधकम् नतु पादेनु-क्रूलमित्युपमायाः साधकमभिधीयते विध्युपमर्दिनो बाधकस्य तदपेक्षया उत्कटत्वेन प्रतिपत्तेः । एवमन्यत्रापि सुधीभिः परीक्ष्यम् ।

(iv) A समासोक्ति (see ii. 205, below) involves an assertion about the अप्रस्तुत which suggests a corresponding assertion about the प्रस्तुत, one assertion being made to do duty for both on the basis of an implied आरोप of the अप्रस्तुत upon the प्रस्तुत based upon सादृश्य. However, in a समासोक्ति the प्रस्तुत is not actually expressed as in a रूपक, and it is because the व्यवहार predicated of the अप्रस्तुत resembles the व्यवहार of the प्रस्तुत which is intended to be described that the प्रस्तुतप्रतीति results by way of an implication. In Rūpaka, on the other hand, the अप्रस्तुत in its entirety (रूप, व्यवहार, and all) is identified with the प्रस्तुत but, at the same time, the basis of this identification or superimposition is not actually expressed. Cp. on the point साहित्यदर्पण (p. 534)—रूपके अप्रकृतम् आत्मस्वरूप-संनिवेशेन प्रकृतस्य रूपमवच्छादयति। इह तु स्वावस्थासमारोपेणावच्छादितस्वरूपमेव तं पूर्वावस्थातो विशेषयति । अत एवात्र व्यवहारसमारोपो न तु स्वरूपसमारोप इत्याहुः । For further remarks see our Notes to ii. 205.

(v) The figure called परिणाम, which not only our author but even मम्मट does not recognise and regarding which, even between those that recognise it—रुय्यक, विश्वनाथ, विद्याधर, जगन्नाथ and अप्पय्यदीक्षित—there seems to be a slight difference of opinion, is in our opinion a matter of over-subtlety. In the line—प्रसन्नेन दृगब्जेन वीक्षते मदिरेक्षणा if दृगब्ज is regarded as a रूपक the lotus or अब्ज must transfer its रूप completely to the eye or दृक्. The eye, in other words, must lose all its character as an eye and take upon itself the character of the lotus. Accordingly दृगब्ज can bloom but cannot see. This is not a रूपक therefore. It cannot also be an उपमा, for वीक्षते or प्रसन्नत्व cannot become a common property residing more prominently on the उपमान lotus and less prominently on the उपमेय eye. We must hence invent a new figure in which the भेद between the उपमान and the उपमेय is तिरोभूत, but the result is not that उपमान has transferred its रूप to the उपमेय, but rather उपमान has itself assumed the रूप of the उपमेय so that the lotus can

see. This therefore is the figure called परिणाम. Compare the Chitramīmañsā (p. 59)—रूपके प्रकृतमप्रकृतरूपापन्नं भवति परिणामे तु अप्रकृतं प्रकृतरूपापन्नं भवति । In this connection it has to be observed that न्यायपञ्चानन (as quoted by the अलंकारकौस्तुभ, p. 161) regards दृगब्ज in the line in question as an उपमा based upon a common property like रमणीयत्व, and this seems to be the best solution of the difficulty.

(vi) We will consider one little point about this figure before we pass on to a consideration of its subdivisions. Rūpaka as we saw is an आरोप of the उपमान upon the उपमेय based upon सादृश्य, and the question is, is the आरोप primarily of the word upon the word, or of the thing-denoted-by-the-word upon the thing-denoted-by-the-word, or of both simultaneously. Says Pratīhārendurāja (p. 11)—तत्र त्रयो दर्शनभेदाः । केचिदत्र शब्दारोपपूर्वकमर्थारोपं ब्रुवते अपरे त्वर्थारोपपूर्वकं शब्दारोपम् । अन्यैस्तु शब्दारोपार्थारोपयोर्यौगपद्यमभिधीयते । अयमेव च पक्षो युक्त इव दृश्यते । तदाहुः—

शब्दोपचारात् तद्रूपं रूपके कैश्चिदुच्यते ।
ताद्रूप्यारोपतश्चान्यैः शब्दारोपोत्र कथ्यते ॥
उपमानगुणैस्तुल्यानुपमेयगतान् गुणान् ।
पश्यतां तु सकृद्भाति तत्र तच्छब्दरूपता ॥

तत्रेति उपमेये इत्यर्थः तच्छब्दरूपतेति उपमानशब्दारोप उपमानशब्दारोपश्च ।

(vii) As Daṇḍin himself observes (ii. 96) Rūpaka, like Upamā, is capable of infinite divisions made more or less on the same basis. There is first of all the merely grammatical aspect of it which gives the first three varieties of Daṇḍin: समस्त, असमस्त and समस्तव्यस्त, as also the सविशेषणरूपक (ii. 82). Next, there is what might be called the rhetorical aspect, which accounts for the varieties called आक्षेपरूपक (ii. 91), समाधानरूपक (ii. 92), and तत्त्वापह्नवरूपक (ii. 95), as well as for विरुद्धरूपक (ii. 84), हेतुरूपक (ii. 86), उपमारूपक (ii. 89), and व्यतिरेकरूपक (ii. 90), where it will be seen that Rūpaka proper is associated with some other additional rhetorical device. The usual divisions of रूपक given in the Texts are the same as those exhibited in the tree given under Note (i) to ii. 43–45 above. Daṇḍin's सकलरूपक is the same as साङ्गसमस्तवस्तुविषयरूपक while his अवयव, अवयविन्, and

एकाङ्गरूपकs (with the further sub-divisions of युक्त, अयुक्त and विषम) may roughly correspond to एकदेशविवर्तिरूपक. What is known as परम्परितरूपक with its two sub-divisions of अश्लेषमूल and श्लेषमूल are practically one with Daṇḍin's रूपकरूपक (ii. 93) and श्लिष्टरूपक (ii. 87), while the subdivisions based on simple or serial arrangement Daṇḍin does not recognise at all.

(viii) The Alaṁkārakaustubha observes (p. 228) that some attempt to make out a variety of रूपक called वाक्यार्थरूपक on the analogy of the वाक्यार्थोपमा described in ii. 43ff.—वाक्यार्थे विषये वाक्यार्थान्तरारोपः वाक्यार्थरूपकम् । यथा विशिष्टोपमायां विशेषणानामुपमानोपमेयभावोर्थगम्यस्तथात्रापि वाक्यार्थघटकपदार्थानां रूपकमर्थगम्यम् । तद्यथा—

आत्मनोस्य तपोदानैर्निर्मलीकरणं हि यत् ।
क्षालनं भास्करस्येदं सारसैः सलिलोत्करैः ॥

This however is regarded by the majority of Ālaṁkārikas as निदर्शना. Compare the familiar example of it—

त्वत्पादनखरत्नानां यदलक्तकमार्जनम् ।
इदं श्रीखण्डलेपेन पाण्डुरीकरणं विधोः ॥

After a long and technical discussion the अलंकारकौस्तुभकार decides against the acceptance of वाक्यार्थरूपक, the instances quoted for it being merely those of निदर्शना. See further our Notes to ii. 348.

(ix) We have said above (Note iii) that in a Rūpaka the common property can never be expressed *as a common property*. For a common thing has to be shared by more than one while in a रूपक the उपमान and उपमेय are conceived as but one thing. All the same there is always a common property implied as the very basis of the आरोप required for रूपक, and if this धर्म is expressed as belonging to उपमान alone, or primarily to the उपमान and secondarily in a sort of a reflex fashion to उपमेय, that does not violate the requirements of the figure. Consider for example the illustration in ii. 87. The compound word वक्त्राम्बुज is to be dissolved here in a manner so as to give more prominence to अम्बुज (i. e. वक्त्रमेवाम्बुजम् according to Pāṇini II. i. 72) and therefore the adjectives राजहंसोपभोगार्हं and भ्रमरप्रार्थ्यसौरभम् must be

primarily predicable of अम्बुज alone, which they are, seeing that the senses of राजहंस and भ्रमर that suit वक्त्र are only secondarily suggested and that too after an effort. With this important condition governing the expression of the common property, therefore, we can obtain for रूपक the various sub-varieties that turn upon the manner of expressing the common property. Says Jagannātha (p. 243)—साधारणधर्मश्चात्राप्युपमायामिव क्वचिदनुगामी क्वचिद्बिम्बप्रतिबिम्बभावमापन्नः क्वचिदुपचरितः क्वचिच्च केवलशब्दात्मा । सोपि क्वचिच्छब्देनोपात्तः क्वचित् प्रतीयमानतया नोपात्तः । For the corresponding examples see रसगङ्गाधर itself.

Notes to II. 67-68—(i) The अलंकारशेखर thus versifies Daṇḍin's examples of समस्तरूपक—

तस्या बाहुलता पाणिपद्मं चरणपल्लवम् ।
मुखेन्दुरक्षिभ्रमरौ सर्वस्वं पुष्पधन्वनः ॥


It will be noted that the illustration in ii. 67 is also a सकलरूपक, but it is adduced merely to illustrate the nature of the Metaphor-out-of-Compound.

Notes to II. 69-70—(i) The compound ताम्राङ्गुलिदलश्रेणि should rather have been dissolved as—अङ्गुलिरेव दलम् अङ्गुलिदलम् । ताम्रं च तत् अङ्गुलिदलं च ताम्राङ्गुलिदलम् । ताम्राङ्गुलिदलानां श्रेणयः यस्मिन् तत् ताम्राङ्गुलिदलश्रेणि । This mode connects ताम्र primarily with दल the उपमान. Compare Note (ix) to ii. 66 above.—Similarly the common property between चरण and पङ्कज—मूर्ध्नि धारण—is to be so understood as being applicable primarily to the lotus and secondarily to the foot. This is what Daṇḍin intends to imply by तद्योग्यस्थानविन्यासात् in ii. 70.

Notes to II. 71-72—(i) In the example given it will be noted of course that मुक्तारुचः, the adjective qualifying मञ्जरीः, involves just an ordinary Upamā. What object the poet intended to superimpose upon मुख does not clearly appear. It cannot be कमल as we do not associate पल्लव and मञ्जरीs with it.

Notes to II. 73-74—(i) The compound वदनपङ्कजम् can be dissolved so as to result in उपमा as well as in रूपक. If the other adjectives (वल्गितभ्रु, गलद्घर्मजलम्, आलोहितेक्षणम्) as well as the predicate (मदावस्थां विवृणोति) had been such as to apply primarily to पङ्कज and only secondarily to वदन that would have been रूपकसाधक. As it is, unless we accept Premachandra's proposed emendation into वदनमम्बुजम्, it would be very hard to establish a रूपक here. Appearances point towards उपमा based upon an extraneous साम्य such as आह्लादकत्व (see our Note (v) to ii. 66); and if an extraneous साम्य has to be after all brought in why not imagine it to be, say, फुल्ल or विकसित, which would go primarily with पङ्कज and so make वदनपङ्कज a रूपक (निरङ्गरूपक as it would be called) in accordance with Daṇḍin's intentions?

Notes to II. 75-76—(i) The divisions intended can be thus exhibited—



(ii) The word अत्र in ii. 76 cannot refer to एकाङ्गरूपक seeing that in the examples given all the अवयवs or constituent parts have the आरोप; it can refer to constituent parts, and the divisions into युक्त and अयुक्त are divisions of रूपक involving आराप on (some or all)

अवयवs. They cannot be divisions of रूपक according to a fresh fundamentum divisionis seeing that we can have incompatibility between अवयवs and अवयवs, and between the अवयविन् and some of its अवयवs, but never between the अवयविन् and all its अवयवs; the अवयविन् cannot in fact be called अवयविन् at all in that case.

Notes to II. 79–80—(i) In the example given the विषमता consists in the fact that while कपोल and भ्रू are the अवयवs of मुख the उपमेय, इन्दु the उपमान has only some अवयवs corresponding to it that are actually stated (or are suggested) but not all. For instance, कपोल suggests the प्राचीदिक् reddened at moon-rise, but as लता cannot be associated with the moon the भ्रू should in this example have been conceived of as the कलङ्कलेखा. In spite of this circumstance the general impression is that of the superimposition of the उपमान along with its अवयवs upon the उपमेय along with its अवयवs, although the correspondenc does not exist in all the details as in a सकलरूपक.

Notes to II. 81–82—(i) This सविशेषणरूपक can be distinguished from सकलरूपक by reason of the circumstance that in the latter it is possible to have the आरोप on the अवयविन् (e.g. चरणे पङ्कजत्वम्) independently of the अवयवारोपs, which merely serve to heighten the charm of the अवयव्यारोप. In the present variety the आरोप of ध्वजत्व upon पाद the अवयविन् becomes meaningless taken by itself. It can become plausible only if पाद as well as the ध्वज are taken as विशेषणविशिष्ट. The विशेषणविशेष्यभाव is a more intimate relation than the अवयवावयविभाव.

Notes to II. 83-84—(i) The विरोध would have been more pointedly brought out if for the word इन्दु in the illustration had been substituted the synonym अमृतांशु.

Notes to II. 85-86—(i) The distinction between हेतुरूपक and हेतूपमा (ii-50) is of course sufficiently obvious.

Notes to II. 87—(i) See note (ix) to ii. 66. The stanza is omitted by M. The usual explanatory stanza is lacking in this case, regarding which the श्रुतानुपालिनी observes— स्पष्टत्वात् [श्लिष्टरूपकं] शास्त्रकृता न व्याख्यातम्। This might seem to raise a suspicion about the genuineness of ii. 87, but it is given by the best Mss. Compare also ii. 313.

Notes to II. 88-90—(i) Our Sanskrit Commentary follows प्रेमचन्द्र. But प्रेमचन्द्र has not been able to explain the varieties satisfactorily and had to give a new example of his own to suit his own explanation of the definition in ii. 88. A better explanation perhaps would be to take गौण=the secondary or आरोपित (moon) and मुख्य=the actual moon. As in both the varieties illustrated in ii. 89 and ii. 90 the मुखचन्द्रमाः is compared (or contrasted) with the actual moon it is evident that such a comparison can only take place if and after the चन्द्रत्व is superimposed upon the face. The रूपक must therefore already exist, and all that is done in addition is to bring out the similarity of the मुखचन्द्रमाः (and impliedly but not expressedly of the मुख) with the actual moon in an उपमानरूपक and the dissimilarity between them in a व्यतिरेकरूपक. The श्रुतानुपालिनी apparently so interprets these varieties; for it says—गौणोऽप्रधानः मुख्यः प्रधानः। मुखचन्द्रस्य साक्षाच्चन्द्रस्य चेति। And we can accordingly take प्रतिगर्जति=आह्वानं करोति तेन सदृश इत्यर्थः following again the same commentary. For a similar use of गौण and मुख्य compare ii. 160.

(ii) In the second line of ii. 90 the reading of M is decidedly superior, but all other Mss. are against it.

(iii) Bhāmaha alone amongst extant ālaṁkārikas accepts उपमारूपक as a distinct alaṁkāra. He thus defines and illustrates it (iii. 34-35)—

उपमानेन तद्भावमुपमेयस्य साधयत्।
यां वदत्युपमामेतदुपमारूपकं यथा॥
समग्रगगनायाममानदण्डो रथाङ्गिणः।
पादो जयति सिद्धस्त्रीमुखेन्दुनवदर्पणः॥

Here Vishṇu's foot is declared to be a novel mirror. The conceipt is quite out of the common; and while

the आरोप of दर्पणत्व upon पाद does give rise to the Rūpaka, yet in so far as the दर्पण is said to be a new or strange दर्पण, the full force of the रूपक does not show itself, being thwarted by a possible उपमा standing out in the back-ground. This is probably the purport of Bhāmaha's definition. Daṇḍin's definition of the figure is so differently worded from that of Bhāmaha that it would be hazardous to imagine that there is some kind of a connection between the two in spite of the fact that Daṇḍin and Bhāmaha are the only two writers extant who have anything to say of उपमारूपक. Bhāmaha accepts it as an independent figure; Daṇḍin (cp. ii. 358) turns it into a sub-variety of Rūpaka: but there is nothing of the nature of a dispute or controversy between the statements of the two concerning this figure. It is likely therefore that the two writers are following independent traditions in regard to their explanation of this figure.

(iv) The tenth canto of the Bhaṭṭikāvya is composed to illustrate figures of speech. Amongst them उपमारूपक is illustrated by x. 60--

गिरिपरिगतचञ्चलापगान्तं
जलनिवहं दधतं मनोभिरामम् ।
गलितमिव भुवो विलोक्य रामं
धरणिधरस्तनशुक्लपट्टचीनम् ॥

Here the foaming river-mouths as they fell into the ocean, are compared to the dropped upper-garment (गलितं पट्टचीनमिव) from the mountain-breasts (धरणिधरस्तन) of the earth at the sight of her lord Rāma. The comparison of the streams with the garment is based upon the आरोप of स्तनत्व on the mountains; and so this is उपमारूपकम्—उपमासहितं रूपकमित्यर्थः—as the commentator भरतमल्लिक says. It would be difficult to apply Daṇḍin's definition to the present example.

Notes to II. 91–92—(i) The distinction between आक्षेपरूपक and विरुद्धरूपक is sufficiently obvious. Premachandra understands ii. 91 all wrong, and Böhtlingk follows Premachandra. An आक्षेपरूपक is an आक्षेप following up-

on a रूपक and serving to weaken the full effect of the आरोप required for the रूपक, while a समाधानरूपक is, so to say, an आक्षेप of an आक्षेपरूपक. Thus in ii. 91 the नायक, while calling the face the moon, suggests that in as much as the face is अन्योपतापिन् while the real moon is शीतल, the चन्द्रत्वारोप made upon the मुख is not completely justified. The समाधानरूपक adds to all this a further remark to the effect that possibly the face-moon might be शीतल in reality (and so the आरोप might be fully justified): only his own ill luck comes in the way of his realising the शीतलत्व or the आह्लादकत्व of the face-moon. Premachandra (perhaps under the influence of the ideas in the two earlier stanzas) thinks that in ii. 91 the नायक wishes to say that the चन्द्रत्वारोप is derogatory to the मुखचन्द्र because the real moon is अन्योपतापिन् while the face-moon is not so. Any सहृदय reader would at once perceive that such an interpretation murders all the delicate suggestions of the stanza.

Notes to II. 93—(i) Regarding the designation of the figure the following extract from the श्रुतानुपालिनी is quite explicit—अत्र मुखस्य पङ्कजत्वेन रूपितस्य पुना रङ्गत्वेन रूपणात् भ्रुवोर्लतात्वेन रूपितयोः नर्तकीत्वेन रूपणात् रूपकरूपकमिति संज्ञा । It will be observed however that रङ्ग is not an अवयव of the नर्तकी as दल was of the पङ्कज in ii. 69, the example for सकलरूपक. The नर्तकीत्वारोप is helped by, and is only rendered possible by the रङ्गत्वारोप; hence this variety comes nearer to the परंपरितरूपक of later writers, which has been defined as (साहित्यदर्पण, x. 29)—यत्र कस्यचिदारोपः परारोपणकारणम् । Whether, however, Daṇḍin intended to make every रूपकरूपक a परंपरितरूपक as thus explained we have no definite grounds to assert. Seeing however that the पङ्कजत्वारोप upon the face and the लतात्वारोप on the eye-brows are not based upon any definite साधर्म्य that would help the principal आरोप in the verse, it is possible that Daṇḍin wants us to understand रूपकरूपक as रूपकेण रूपकम् i. e. रूपकानुप्राणितरूपकम् or परंपरितरूपकम् and that the subordinate आरोपs of the पङ्कजत्व and लतात्व do not vitally affect the character of this Rūpaka variety.

Notes to II. 94-95—(i) Compare the nature of तत्त्वाख्यानोपमा (ii. 36). There, subsequent to an erroneous judgment (whether of the nature of मोह or of अपह्नुति the author does not indicate: but both are possible) based upon सादृश्य between the उपमेय and the उपमान, the real nature of the उपमेय was finally determined upon. In the present Rūpaka variety there is just an opposite process of the mind from reality to error—only the error is not अनाहार्य but is a conscious poetic device which can deceive neither the speaker nor anybody else. In so far however as there is an attempt to conceal facts the name of the variety explains itself.

(ii) Daṇḍin admits an independent figure of speech called अपह्नुति (ii. 304-309). In ii. 309 he alludes to what is called उपमापह्नुति by which he presumably means a sub-variety of उपमा—but there is none with this name amongst the given उपमा varieties—and in the present stanzas he mentions a तत्त्वापह्नवरूपक. It is rather difficult to determine in the first instance whether these are three independent alaṁkāras and in the next place what is the exact distinction between them as Daṇḍin sees it. Now some hold that by उपमापह्नुति Daṇḍin means तत्त्वापह्नवरूपक—उपमारूपकयोरनतिभेदात् as Ca puts it. Cp. ii. 96 also. Cb thinks that by उपमापह्नुति is meant अपह्नुतोपमा or लुप्तोपमा, adding शशाङ्कवदने इत्यत्र द्योतकसामान्यलोपः दृष्ट एव । Premachandra explains उपमापह्नुतिः by सादृश्यापह्नुतिः —सादृश्यापह्नवपूर्वकसादृश्यातिशयस्थापनरूपेत्यर्थः—and thinks that प्रतिषेधोपमा (ii. 34) is what Daṇḍin intends in ii. 309. Cs also agrees in this. Now in view of the fact that in outward form at least the उपमा variety exemplified in ii. 36 bears an unmistakable resemblance to any ordinary case of अपह्नव, and in view further of the fact that the तत्त्वाख्यानोपमा may be a judgment subsequent to a तत्त्वापह्नवरूपक (as also to a मोहोपमा), it is not impossible that in ii. 309 Daṇḍin might be equally plausibly thinking of ii. 36. And in any case we can regard the उपमापह्नुति as separate from तत्त्वापह्नवरूपक. If उपमापह्नुति = ii. 36 we have already—Note (i) above—shown its distinction from तत्त्वापह्नवरूपक; while if उपमापह्नुति = ii. 34, as

प्रतिषेधोपमा and तत्त्वापह्नवरूपक are quite distinct on the very face of them no attempt need be made to distinguish the one from the other.

(iii) But we must learn to clearly distinguish तत्त्वापह्नवरूपक from the figure अपह्नुति as Daṇḍin defines it. To later writers the two are undistinguishable. Some think that in the Rūpaka variety one dharmin as a whole is negated and another asserted in its place, while in the alaṁkāra called अपह्नुति there is the negation of a certain dharma of the dharmin and the assertion of another instead. This, however, will not hold in the case of स्वरूपापह्नुति (ii. 308). A better differentia would be what is supplied by the adjective उद्भासितगुणोत्कर्षम् in the definition, which suggests that the negated (प्रकृत, उपमेय) and the asserted (अप्रकृत, उपमान) things ought to have a similarity between them. This is not the case in the figure अपह्नुति where anything can be negated and another asserted in its place : cp. अपह्नुत्य किंचिदन्यार्थदर्शनम् ।

Notes to II. 96—(i) Regarding the sub-divisions of Rūpaka Bhāmaha says (ii. 22)—समस्तवस्तुविषयमेकदेशविवर्ति च । द्विधा रूपकमेवेष्टम् । Consequently when Daṇḍin mentions innumerable varieties of Rūpaka as being current he must have had others than Bhāmaha in his mind.

Notes to II. 97—(i) In the various definitions of Dīpaka that are in the field two or three issues have been raised. In the first place, is it necessary that दीपक be based upon similarity ? Bharata, Daṇḍin, Bhāmaha, Bhoja, the author of Vāgbhaṭālaṁkāra, and Viśvanātha are quite silent on the point. Rudraṭa regards Dīpaka as a matter-of-fact (वास्तव) figure and not an औपम्य figure. Udbhaṭa explicitly demands साम्य (p. 14)—

आदिमध्यान्तविषयाः प्राधान्येतरयोगिनः ।
अन्तर्गतोपमाधर्मा यत्र तद्दीपकं विदुः ॥

while Vāmana (iv. 3. 18—उपमानोपमेयवाक्येष्वेका क्रिया), Ruyyaka (p. 71), Mammaṭa (p. 775—सकृद्वृत्तिस्तु धर्मस्य प्रकृताप्रकृतात्म-

नाम्), and Jagannātha (p. 322—प्रकृतानामप्रकृतानां चैकसाधारणधर्मान्वयो दीपकम्), do the same thing; though Mammaṭa, for instance, admits a variety of दीपक (the so-called कारकदीपक) where the साम्य is not in evidence. In as much however as every Dīpaka demands one word syntactically related to more than one sentence, we can always regard the thing connoted by that word as the साम्य, and so we need not make much of the condition about the औपम्य being गम्य, as Ruyyaka puts it. The next issue raised is about the धर्मिन्s that are said to possess the गम्य common धर्म. Most writers insist that the धर्मिन्s be partly प्रकृत and partly अप्रकृत but they must not be all either प्रकृत alone or अप्रकृत alone. This last, according to them is a case of तुल्ययोगिता (see Note (i) to ii 48, above). Now Daṇḍin is not particular on this point: his examples suggest that he admits all प्रकृतs (e. g. ii. 100), all अप्रकृतs (e. g. ii. 101), and some प्रकृतs and some अप्रकृतs (e. g. ii. 99). Regarding the distinction between दीपक and तुल्ययोगिता the following extract from the अलंकारकौस्तुभ (p. 296–297) may be said to be the last word on the controversy— अत्र वदन्ति—दीपकमपि तुल्ययोगितायामेवान्तर्भवति धर्मस्य सकृद्वृत्तेरुभयत्राविशेषात् प्रकृताप्रकृतत्वादिविशेषस्य चावान्तरभेदसाधकत्वेपि अलंकारान्तरतायामसाधकत्वात्। अन्यथा श्लेषस्य तद्भेदयोरपि भिन्नालंकारत्वापत्तेः। तस्मात् प्रकृतानामेव प्रकृताप्रकृतानां चैकधर्मान्वय इति तुल्ययोगिताया एव त्रयो भेदा वक्तुमुचिताः। तस्माद्दीपकस्य तुल्ययोगिताया भेदं वदतां प्राचीनानां दुराग्रह इति तच्चिन्त्यम्।

नानाधिकरणस्थानां शब्दानां संप्रदीपकः।
एकवाक्येन संयोगो यस्तु दीपकमुच्यते॥

यथा—

सरांसि हंसैः कुसुमैश्च वृक्षा मत्तैर्द्विरेफैश्च सरोरुहाणि।
गोष्ठीभिरुद्यानवनानि चैव यस्मिन्नशून्यानि सदा क्रियन्ते॥

इति भगवता भरतमुनिना (xvi. 55–56) दीपकस्याङ्गीकारात् तत्रैव तुल्ययोगितान्तर्भावस्यौचित्यादिति दिक्।

(ii) A large number of varieties of Dīpaka are conceivable. Daṇḍin first gives a four-fold distinction based upon the same principle as in ii. 13 and then gives three sub-varieties under each according to the position of the common word. Regarding this last principle of sub-division Jagannātha remarks (p. 327)—

वस्तुतस्तु धर्मस्यादिमध्यान्तगतत्वेपि चमत्कारवैलक्षण्याभावात् त्रैविध्योक्तिरापातमात्रात् । अन्यथा धर्मस्य उपाद्युपमध्योपान्त्यगतत्वे ततोपि किंचिन्न्यूनाधिकदेशवृत्तित्वे चानन्तभेदप्रसङ्गात् । —Mammaṭa and others, as before observed, admit a variety called कारकदीपक defined in the अलंकारकौस्तुभ (p. 291) as—यत्रैकमेव कारकमन्वयमेति क्रियासु बह्वीषु and illustrated by विश्वनाथ (p. 520) as—

दूरं समागतवति त्वयि जीवनाथे
भिन्ना मनोभवशरेण तपस्विनी सा ।
उत्तिष्ठति स्वपिति वासगृहं त्वदीय-
मायाति याति हसति श्वसति क्षणेन ॥

In connection with this variety another similar gratuitous principle of sub-division (not enunciated by Daṇḍin) turns upon the case of the common कारक, and so we have Dīpakas of कर्तृ, कर्म, करण, संप्रदान, अपादान, संबन्धिन्, and अधिकरण —all severally illustrated in the अलंकारकौस्तुभ pp. 292 ff. Regarding कारकदीपक Jayaratha remarks (p. 73)—अत्र...क्रियाणां प्रस्तुतानामेकाधारगतत्वेन समुच्चीयमानत्वाच्च समुच्चयालंकारो न तु कारकदीपकम् । तद्धि प्रस्तुताप्रस्तुतानां क्रियाणामौपम्यसद्भावे भवति । Similar remarks are also passed by Jagannātha (pp. 324–325). The varieties illustrated by our author in ii 109, ii. 111, ii. 113 are an attempt to combine the दीपकवैचित्र्य with the वैचित्र्य of some other figure or mode of expression; while the माला variety and other chain-varieties can always be superadded to almost every figure-of-speech. This alaṁkāra is liable to लिङ्गवचनभेददोष (illustrated by Jagannātha, p. 328 f.) which makes the syntactical relation rather difficult to establish.

Notes to II. 98–102—(i) The first line of ii. 99 seems to have been misunderstood by Böhtlingk. The elephants are of course the king's war-elephants and not 'die welt tragenden Elephanten.'

Notes to II. 103–106—(i) The distinction between the Dīpaka variety illustrated in ii. 106 and the figure called सहोक्ति illustrated in ii. 352–354 consists in the fact that while कृतम् has to be supplied severally in the

various statements in ii. 106, no such necessity exists in the सहोक्ति illustrations. The omission of त्रयमेतत् समं would have been an improvement.

Notes to II. 107-115—(i) As Daṇḍin says distinctly, the instance in ii. 107 contains an आदिदीपक. Since the word वृद्ध्यै is the common word it follows that in an आदिदीपक it is enough if it occurs somewhere in the first sentence and not necessarily in the very beginning of that sentence.

(ii) The variety illustrated in ii. 111 is distinct from the so-called कारकदीपक of the moderners. See above Note (ii) to ii. 97. The emendation suggested by Premachandra is good but not backed up by any manuscripts.

(iii) The statement in ii. 115 testifies to the existence before Daṇḍin's day of writers who gave a still larger number of Dīpaka varieties. Bhāmaha (ii. 25) gives just three.

Notes to II. 116—(i) Daṇḍin distinctly says that every आवृत्ति is an amplified दीपक; the one can therefore always be turned into the other. Consequently, regarding the necessity of a basic साम्य, and the requirement that the things adduced be all प्रकृतs alone, or अप्रकृतs alone, or both together, the remarks made in Note (i) to ii. 97 hold true of this figure also. This figure is not recognised as a distinct figure by any other writer except Jayadeva the author of the Chandrāloka (stanza 45) who calls it आवृत्तिदीपक. Bhoja (iv. 78) regards it as a sub-variety of Dīpaka.

Notes to II. 117—(i) The figure called एकार्थदीपक illustrated in ii. 111 also employed synonyms; but they were connected with one word; here the synonyms विकसन्ति etc. are connected with separate words.

Notes to II. 118-119—(i) The शब्दालंकार called यमक also has words or syllabic groups repeated; but there the

repetitions cannot be dispensed with, while in an आवृत्ति the sense of the passage does not suffer by doing away with the repetitions. In other words, आवृत्ति can be turned into a दीपक while यमक cannot be so transformed.

Notes to II. 120—(i) Different views about the nature of Ākshepa are current and naturally the definitions of this figure differ from writer to writer. Daṇḍin's definition—प्रतिषेधोक्तिराक्षेपः—is the simplest in the field and of widest application. As Jegannātha (p. 424) remarks—इतरे तु निषेधमात्रमाक्षेपः । चमत्कारित्वं चालंकारसामान्यलक्षणप्राप्तमेव । तच्च व्यङ्ग्यार्थे सति संभवतीति सव्यङ्ग्यो निषेधः सर्वोप्याक्षेपालंकारः । Others delimit the field of this alaṁkāra to the negation of the उपमान alone. As Vāmana (iv. 3.27) says—उपमानाक्षेपश्चाक्षेपः । तुल्यकार्यार्थस्य नैरर्थक्यविवक्षायामाक्षेपः, as he explains the Sūtra in his Vṛitti. Vāmana's example is—

तस्याश्चेन्मुखमस्ति सौम्य सुभगं किं पार्वणेनेन्दुना
सौन्दर्यस्य पदं दृशौ यदि च ते किं नाम नीलोत्पलैः ।
किं वा कोमलकान्तिभिः किसलयैः सत्येव बिम्बाधरे
हा धातुः पुनरुक्तवस्तुरचनारम्भेष्वपूर्वो ग्रहः ॥

This is the same as प्रतीपालंकार which Mammaṭa (p. 894) thus defines and explains—

आक्षेप उपमानस्य प्रतीपमुपमेयता ।
तस्यैव यदि वा कल्प्या तिरस्कारनिबन्धनम् ॥

अस्य धुरं सुतरामुपमेयमेव वोढुं प्रौढमिति कैमर्थ्येन यत् उपमानमाक्षिप्यते यदपि तस्यैवोपमानतया प्रसिद्धस्य उपमानान्तरविवक्षया अनादरार्थमुपमेयभावः कल्प्यते तत् उपमेयस्योपमानप्रतिकूलवर्तित्वात् उभयरूपं प्रतीपम् । As we have seen Mammaṭa's second Pratīpa is the same as Daṇḍin's विपर्यासोपमा (ii. 17); while Daṇḍin's प्रतिषेधोपमा (ii. 34) perhaps comes nearer to the first kind. The प्रतिषेधालंकार recognised by the कुवलयानन्दकारिकाकार (stanza 164) is of course a different species altogether.

(ii) Others introduce other delimiting conditions. They say for instance that while आक्षेप is a प्रतिषेधोक्ति it ought not to be a real downright प्रतिषेध. The thing intended ought to be conveyed (in an even more telling fashion) by the apparent denial of it. As the Alaṁkārasarvasva (p. 114) clearly puts it—

इह प्राकरणिकोर्थः प्राकरणिकत्वादेव वक्तुमिष्यते। तथाविधस्य विधानार्हस्य निषेधः कर्तुं न युज्यते। स कृतः बाधितस्वरूपत्वात् निषेधायत इति निषेधाभासः संपन्नः। तस्यैतस्य करणं प्रकृतगतत्वेन विशेषप्रतिपत्त्यर्थम्। अन्यथा गजस्नानतुल्यं स्यात्। The definitions of most later writers are framed so as to include all these conditions. Thus—

Mammaṭa—

निषेधो वक्तुमिष्टस्य यो विशेषाभिधित्सया।

Viśvanātha (x. 65)—

वस्तुनो वक्तुमिष्टस्य विशेषप्रतिपत्तये।
निषेधाभास आक्षेपः।

Bhāmaha (ii. 68) and Udbhaṭa (p. 29)—

प्रतिषेध इवेष्टस्य यो विशेषाभिधित्सया।
आक्षेप इति तं सन्तः शंसन्ति द्विविधं (कवयः) यथा (सदा)॥

It will be seen that Daṇḍin's example of वृत्ताक्षेप fits in with all these requirements and it would be a regular illustration for the figure as above defined.

(iii) With regard to the आक्षेप described in Note (ii) the negation of the इष्टप्राकरणिक theme is usually grounded on the fact of the thing being already too well known, or of the speaker's being powerless to do justice to it—वक्ष्यमाणविषये अशक्यवक्तव्यत्वम् उक्तविषये अतिप्रसिद्धत्वं च—as a commentator observes. It is divided into four sub-varieties. Compare Sāhityadarpaṇa (p. 547)—तत्र वक्ष्यमाणविषये क्वचित् सर्वस्यापि सामान्यतः सूचितस्य निषेधः क्वचित् अंशोक्तौ अंशान्तरे निषेध इति द्वौ भेदौ। उक्तविषये च क्वचित् वस्तुस्वरूपस्य निषेधः क्वचित् वस्तुकथनस्येति द्वौ। इत्याक्षेपस्य चत्वारो भेदाः। For illustrations see the work cited. Daṇḍin is alone, amongst extant writers, to give a classification of this figure based upon आक्षेप्यभेद.

(iv) As the Ākshepa described in Note (ii) was of the nature of an apparent negation of what is intended to be asserted, so on the same analogy we can have another variety of the nature of an apparent assertion of what is sought to be negated. Compare Alaṁkārasarvasva (p. 120)—यथा इष्टस्येष्टत्वादेव निषेधोऽनुपपन्नः एवमनिष्टस्याप्यनिष्टत्वादेव विधानं नोपपद्यते। तत् क्रियमाणं प्रस्खलद्रूपत्वान्निषेधे पर्यवस्यति। ततश्च विधेरुपकरणीभूतो निषेध इति विधिनायं निषेधोऽनिष्टविशेषपर्यवसायी। It will be seen that most of Daṇḍin's exam-

ples of Ākshepa fall under this variety. The figure-of-speech called रोध is, as Bhoja says, (iv. 64)—नाक्षेपः पृथक्। Its nature is—क्रियासूद्योगिनां हेतुद्वारा उक्त्या युक्त्या च निवारणम्। Some of our author's examples (e. g. वर्तमानाक्षेप, ii. 123) are primarily of the nature of Rodha as thus understood.

(v) Howsoever understood Ākshepa has to be distinguished from Virodha and from Apahnuti; and the distinction is not very difficult to make. In Virodha (see ii. 333) there is expressed contradiction between the two things with a view to bring out some peculiar विशेष of the theme under discussion. In Ākshepa with the same intention there is a contradiction; but it is between the actual expression and the real intention of the speaker which is not expressed.—In an Apahnuti a certain thing (in some aspects of it or as regards its entire nature) is negated and another asserted in its place, the negated and the asserted things being both actually expressed in words. Such is not the case in an Ākshepa as we have just seen.—The distinction between some specific varieties of Ākshepa and other allied figures admitted by Daṇḍin will be dealt with in our Notes to the stanzas concerned.

Notes to II. 121-126—(i) Vṛittākshepa is the same as Uktavishaya Ākshepa of later writers. The four-fold condition for this variety, in the words of the Alaṁkāra-sarvasva, is—एवं च आक्षेपे इष्टार्थः तस्य निषेधः निषेधस्यानुपपद्यमानत्वाद्-सत्यत्वं विशेषप्रतिपादनं चेति चतुष्टयमुपयुज्यते। Here अनङ्गविजय is the theme intended to be described; that has been declared to be impossible; this declaration of course is not seriously intended; and ultimately the marvellous nature of the victory stands out most prominently before the readers. Hence this is a regular example fulfilling all conditions.

(ii) Vartamānākshepa is otherwise designated as Rodha. Bhoja (p. 422) however calls it शुद्धो निषेधाक्षेपः and observes—अत्र कुतः कुवलयं कर्णे करोषि इत्यस्य निषेधवाक्यस्य

किमपाङ्गमित्यादिना प्रश्नपरेणापि निषेधपर्यवसायिना वाक्येन समर्थनं क्रियत इत्ययं शुद्धो निषेधाक्षेपः। —As to Bhavishyat Ākshepa it is to be noted that it is not the same as the वक्ष्यमाणविषय variety of the other school; for in that variety वस्तुकथनमेव निषिध्यते, whereas here it is the *thing* that might happen in future that is attempted to be averted by anticipation.

Notes to II. 127-130—(i) Compare the illustration given in ii. 127 with the illustration of Virodha in ii. 337. Most modern writers would regard both as cases of Virodha. It will however be observed that while the second line of ii. 127 is enough to make it an example of Virodha, it is the first line with its denial of 'tenderness' that makes the verse an example of Ākshepa.

(ii) The principle underlying these two varieties is the same as that in ii. 15-16.

Notes to II. 131-132—(i) The example is of the nature of an attempt to deny an actually existing fault and the consequent fear. The epithet अदुष्टस्य is to be noted. Now in a Vibhāvanā (ii. 199) there is a negation of the cause but an assertion of the effect, leading to a guessing of some subsidiary cause. Here there is a negation of the [प्रधान or principal] cause (दोष), but likewise a *negation* of the effect (भयम्). In addition, there is an assertion of subordinate causes of fear such as चक्षूराग etc. together with a negation of their effect, viz. fear. Thus fear is an effect of दोष (प्रधानकारण) as well as of चक्षूराग (अप्रधानकारण), and if the principal cause is said to be lacking there is nothing unusual if the result does not follow irrespective of whether the subordinate causes are or are not present. Consequently Prema-chandra's attempt to distinguish this figure from Vibhāvanā (which is reproduced in our Sanskrit Commentary) is not very much called for. The main point of the illustration is the cool and unblushing denial of his fault by the lover.

(ii) We can more reasonably attempt to distinguish this variety from Viśeshokti (ii. 323), esp. the variety known as हेतुविशेषोक्ति (ii. 328). Mammaṭa defines विशेषोक्ति as—अखण्डेषु कारणेषु फलावचः, and we have seen that in the illustration under discussion at least the subordinate कारणs are all there, but no effect ensues. But the gist of the illustration is in the epithet अदुष्टस्य. That is what makes this a प्रतिषेधोक्ति.

Notes to II. 133–134—(i) In ii. 131 the subordinate causes were present but as the principal cause was negated the effect was lacking. Here in ii. 133 the causes (all of them) are present and yet the expected result does not follow. This would accordingly be a case of विशेषोक्ति as usually understood. Only, Daṇḍin's idea of Viśeshokti appears to have been a little different from that of Mammaṭa and others (see Notes to ii. 323). According to our author a विशेषोक्ति is intended विशेषदर्शनायैव. The प्रतिषेध of death, the expected result, does not imply any special विशेष belonging either to the कारणs or the नायिका that we can discover. Hence this is no विशेषोक्ति in Daṇḍin's acceptance of the term.

(ii) An Ākshepa as understood by the writers quoted in Note (ii) to ii. 120 is also for विशेषप्रतिपत्ति ; compare—न निषेधमात्रमाक्षेपः किंतु यो निषेधो बाधितः सन्नर्थान्तरपर्यवासितः कंचिद्विशेषमाक्षिपति स आक्षेपः । But that is not Daṇḍin's view of the matter, and while we are trying to read Daṇḍin's work we must lay aside all extraneous ideas.

Notes to II. 135–156—(i) In these verses Daṇḍin shows how one identical theme—the hinderance of the lover's departure—can be poetically treated in various ways so as to form examples of different kinds of Ākshepa. The verses are probably of Daṇḍin's own authorship, which shows that he was not without some poetical powers. The verses have been much quoted in other writers : see the Appendix on Parallelisms. The Alaṁkārakaustubha gives an ex-

ample of आक्षेप which combines most of these prohibition-varieties and adds some more of its own (p. 309)—

मा याहीत्यपमङ्गलं व्रज पुनः स्नेहेन हीनं वच-
स्तिष्ठेति प्रभुता यथारुचि कुरुष्वेवाप्युदासीनता ।
नो जीवामि विना त्वयेति वचनं संभाव्यते वा न वा
तत् किं शिक्षय नाथ यत् समुचितं वक्तुं त्वयि प्रस्थिते ॥

Our readers are probably already familiar with the classical passage in this strain from the end of the Pūrvārdha of Bāṇa's Kādambarī.

(ii) Regarding the illustration of प्रभुत्वाक्षेप (ii. 137) Bhoja observes (p. 427)—अत्र यद्यपि यात्रोद्यतः प्रियो रुध्यते [तथापि] प्रभूतार्थलाभादीनां कारणानां गमनपरत्वमेव न निवारणपरत्वम् । अतोयं न रोधः किं तर्हि आक्षेप एव भवति ।

(iii) Regarding the illustration of आशीर्वचनाक्षेप (ii. 142) Bhoja observes (p. 421)—अत्र गच्छ इत्यस्य विधिवाक्यस्य ममापि जन्म तत्रैव भूयात् इत्याशिषानुकुलतयैव मरणसूचनान्निषेधः क्रियते इति शुद्धोयं विध्याक्षेपः । The Alaṁkārasarvasva passes the following comment on the same stanza (p. 120)—अत्र कयाचित् कान्तस्य प्रस्थानमात्मनोनिष्टमप्यनिराकरणमुखेन विधीयते । न चास्य विधिर्युक्तः अनिष्टत्वात् । सोयं प्रस्खलद्रूपत्वेन निषेधमागूरयति । फलं चात्र अनिष्टस्य प्रस्थानस्यासंविज्ञानपदनिबन्धनमत्यन्तपरिहार्यत्वप्रतिपादनम् । एतच्च ममापि तत्रैवेत्याशीःप्रतिपादनेनानिष्टपर्यवसायिना व्यञ्जितम् ।

(iv) Regarding the illustration of यत्नाक्षेप (ii. 147) Bhoja observes (p. 424)—अत्र यथोक्तमुक्त्वा किं करोमि इत्यानुकूल्येनैवाह । अत्र किमः प्रश्नार्थत्वेपि युक्त्या निषेधार्थत्वं गम्यते । सोयं यौक्तोनुकूलश्च विध्याक्षेपो रोध इत्युच्यते । अयमेव चास्या वैयात्योक्तिपक्षे यौक्तः प्रतिकूलविध्याक्षेपो रोधो भवति ।

(v) The two stanzas about मूर्छाक्षेप (ii. 155, 156) are probably interpolations. Our oldest Mss. J and N omit them, and the fact that the Madras edition takes them before the two stanzas dealing with रोषाक्षेप points to the same conclusion. The interpolated stanzas were naturally placed at the end of a series dealing with the same theme. We had to retain them in the text so as not to disturb the numbering of the editio princeps.

Notes to II. 157-158 and 161-162—(i) Even our oldest Mss J and N give in the first pāda of ii. 158 the hypermetrical reading—असावनुक्रोशाक्षेपः। The reading given by us is a conjectural emendation suggested by the variant given by V. Our Ms. N puts stanzas ii 159, 160 after stanza ii. 162 and this fact we believe is not a pure accident. Probably this was Daṇḍin's sequence. In any case this sequence can afford an explanation of the change of the original correct reading to the present hypermetrical reading which is clearly influenced by असावनुशयाक्षेपः of ii. 162, which words were probably, in the original exemplar, written immediately underneath the words सानुक्रोशोऽयमाक्षेपः or in such a position as to make the wandering of the eye from the one to the other quite easy.—Since all our Mss. give the hypermetrical reading, it further follows that our present copies are traceable to one original copy, and that the variæ lectiones are accordingly subsequent to the date of J, our oldest extant copy.

Notes to II. 159-160—(i) While most of the preceding varieties of Ākshepa were based upon some psychological or other attendant of the prohibition, in the varieties which follow Daṇḍin as usual is attempting to combine the आक्षेपवैचित्र्य with the वैचित्र्य of some other figure. The examples are self-explaining.

(ii) In view of the use of the words मुख्य and गौण in this stanza as applied to the actual and the figurative moon the explanation of the same words we gave in our Notes to ii. 88 gains additional plausibility.

Notes to II. 163-164—(i) Compare ii. 26 and 27. It will be noticed that in संशयोपमा the पद्म was अप्रकृत and the मुख the प्रकृत; such a distinction is not intended between शरदम्भोद and हंसकदम्बक. Further in the उत्तरार्ध of ii. 163 there is only a removal of the doubt, not an assertion as in ii. 27, second line.

Notes to II. 165-166—For Daṇḍin's conception of अर्थान्तरन्यास see Note to ii. 169 below.

Notes to II. 167-168—(i) In ii. 131 the कारण itself was negated ; here something else is negated on the strength of a कारण or हेतु adduced. Generally a कारण is कारक or productive cause and a हेतु a ज्ञापक or probatory cause. See ii. 235.

Notes to II. 169—(i) As in the case of Ākshepa, Daṇḍin's definition of Arthāntaranyāsa is also rather crude and wanting in the later pruning and refining with a view to make it more precise and to delimit its field from that of other alaṁkāras or sub-varieties of them. To begin with, Daṇḍin speaks of वस्तु प्रस्तुत्य अन्यस्य वस्तुनः न्यासः and वस्तु has been here taken to mean a theme or a complete statement, so that an ordinary हेतु of an अनुमान is naturally excluded. Compare Vāmana, Vṛitti on iv. 3. 21—वस्तुग्रहणात् पदार्थस्य हेतोर्न्यसनं नार्थान्तरन्यासः । The figures-of-speech known as अनुमान or काव्यलिङ्ग (neither of which however our author admits) are in consequence differentiated from this figure. Between काव्यलिङ्ग and अनुमानं the element of mutual distinction is the fact that in the former it is the कारकहेतु (e. g. वह्नि of धूम) while in the latter it is the ज्ञापकहेतु (e. g. धूम of वह्नि) that is set forth, and there is further the circumstance that in the figure-of-speech known as अनुमान there is adduced the complete paraphernalia of a logical inference including the व्याप्ति. Both the figures nevertheless agree in this that both वह्नि the कारकहेतु and धूम the ज्ञापकहेतु are individual objects and not statements or वस्तुs.

(ii) Objections can be taken however to the above statement of the case on the ground that in an अनुमान the पञ्चम्यन्तहेतु is often a condensed and even complex statement, and in the काव्यलिङ्ग Mammaṭa and others recognise a variety where the कारकहेतु is a वाक्यार्थ. Hence a better differentia between अनुमान and काव्यलिङ्ग

on the one hand and अर्थान्तरन्यास on the other is furnished by the condition that while the relation between say वह्नि and धूम in first two figures is not of the nature of genus-to-species or species-to-genus, it is invariably that in the case of the समर्थ्यवस्तु and the समर्थकवस्तु occurring in the latter alaṁkāra. As Daṇḍin does not lay down this condition and does not also recognise the figures अनुमान and काव्यलिङ्ग, the problem does not arise in his case at all. Daṇḍin's हेत्वलंकार however (ii. 235) does duty for both अनुमान and काव्यलिङ्ग and in our Notes to that figure we shall attempt to distinguish it from the figure now under discussion.

(iii) We will next draw attention to the word प्रस्तुत्य in the definition of this figure. This means that in an अर्थान्तरन्यास it is always the प्रस्तुत or the प्राकरणिक that is sought to be corroborated by the अप्रस्तुत, both प्रस्तुत and अप्रस्तुत being actually expressed, and that further the statement of the प्रस्तुत should come first in order. Where the order of statements is reversed Bhoja recognises a distinct sub-variety. Compare (p. 429)—

जो जस्स हिअअदइओ दुक्खं देन्तो वि सो सुहं देइ ।
दइअणहदूमिआणं वि वड्ढइ त्थणआणं रोमञ्चो ॥

अत्र साधनसमर्थं वस्तु प्रथमत एवोपन्यस्य पश्चात् तत्साध्यमभिहितमिति विपर्यासादयं विपर्ययो नामार्थान्तरन्यासः । Similarly when an attempt is made to suggest (and corroborate) the unexpressed प्रस्तुत by the expressed अप्रस्तुत or the unexpressed अप्रस्तुत by the expressed प्रस्तुत there results the figure of speech called समासोक्ति (ii. 205) that has to be distingnished from अर्थान्तरन्यास, where both प्रस्तुत and अप्रस्तुत are expressed. With reference to this distinction it may be noted in passing that Daṇḍin's समासोक्ति embraces both समासोक्ति proper (प्राकरणिकेनाप्राकरणिकाक्षेपः) and the अप्रस्तुतप्रशंसा of Mammaṭa and others (अप्राकरणिकेन प्राकरणिकाक्षेपः), and that his account of अप्रस्तुतप्रशंसा (ii. 340) is slightly different from the one usually current [see Notes to that figure].

(iv) If we compare Daṇḍin's definition of अर्थान्तरन्यास with his definition of प्रतिवस्तूपमा (ii. 46) we become conscious of a distinctive cha acteristic of this figure

which must be carefully grasped. In an अर्थान्तरन्यास there is always समर्थ्यसमर्थक relation between the two वस्तुs, one being adduced in corroboration of the other. Jagannātha gives a clear exposition of 'corroboration' (p. 471)—समर्थनं च इदमेवम् इदमनेवं वा स्यादिति संशयस्य प्रतिबन्धकः इदमित्थमेवेति दृढप्रत्ययः । In प्रतिवस्तूपमा (and in Daṇḍin's view this embraces the so-called दृष्टान्त—compare Notes to ii. 46) the two वस्तुs are merely related by an element of similarity, upon which in fact the figure depends: cp. साम्यप्रतीतिरस्तीति in the definition. The साम्य or analogy, it is true, may be eventually used as a corroboration but that is not the primary and immediate object of the figure. Compare प्रतीहारेन्दुराज (p. 35)—न खलु तस्य [दृष्टान्तस्य] समर्थ्यसमर्थकभावपुरःसरीकारेण प्रवृत्तिः बिम्बप्रतिबिम्बभावमात्रस्य शब्दस्पृष्टत्वात्। अर्थाद्धि तत्र समर्थ्यसमर्थकभावावसायः । अर्थान्तरन्यासे तु समर्थ्यसमर्थक-भावेनैवोपक्रमः ।

(v) The analogical semblance required for प्रतिवस्तूपमा [and दृष्टान्त] is more likely to be found between two general statements or between two particular statements, while corroboration is usually made of a particular by a general or of a general by a particular statement. Most later writers accordingly introduce the above circumstance into the very definition of अर्थान्तरन्यास which has been accordingly defined by Ruyyaka (viii. 79)—

धर्मिणमर्थविशेषं सामान्यं वाभिधाय तत्सिद्धयै ।
यत्र सधर्मिकमितरं न्यस्येत् सोर्थान्तरन्यासः ॥

by Mammaṭa (p. 804)—

सामान्यं वा विशेषो वा तदन्येन समर्थ्यते ।
यत् तु सोर्थान्तरन्यासः ।

and by Jagannātha (p. 471)—

सामान्येन विशेषस्य विशेषेण सामान्यस्य वा यत् समर्थनं तदर्थान्तर-न्यासः ।

Our author however does not regard this as essential and accordingly in ii. 175 he makes one particular corroborate another particular (see Notes to the stanza). Bhāmaha (ii. 71), Bhoja (iv. 67), Vāmana (iv. 3. 21), and others give also non-commital defini-

tions similar to that of Daṇḍin. We give the first—

उपन्यसनमन्यस्य यदर्थस्योदिताहते ।
ज्ञेयः सोर्थान्तरन्यासः पूर्वार्थानुगतो यथा ॥

and the last—

उक्तसिद्धयै वस्तुनोर्थान्तरस्यैव न्यसनमर्थान्तरन्यासः ।

(vi) Finally, अर्थान्तरन्यास has to be distinguished from निदर्शन (ii. 348). According to the अलंकारकौस्तुभ (p. 265) the two themes or statements brought together in a निदर्शना have an identical or very nearly identical purport (किंचित् तत्सदृशं फलम्), while in an अर्थान्तरन्यास there is between the two a समर्थ्यसमर्थक—relation based upon सामान्यविशेषसंबन्ध. Compare (ibid.)—एवं च पूर्वोत्तरवाक्यार्थकार्यकारणभावद्वये यत्र सामान्यविशेषरूपधर्मावच्छिन्नत्वं तत्रैवार्थान्तरन्यास इति फलितम् ।

(vii) As to the divisions of अर्थान्तरन्यास Daṇḍin's classification stands alone by itself. Other principles of division adopted are according to Bhoja (iv. 68)—

स उपन्यस्तवस्तूनां साधर्म्येण च कथ्यते ।
वैधर्म्येण च विद्वद्भिर्वैपरीत्येन कुत्रचित् ॥

Udbhaṭa (p. 32) gives a further classification हिशब्दोक्त्यान्यथापि वा। Alaṁkārasarvasva (p. 109), Sāhityadarpaṇa (x. 62) and other works mention a third important sub-variety :—कार्यं च कारणेनेदं कार्येण च समर्थ्यते। The majority of writers however refuse to recognise this sub-variety. Viśvanātha tries his best to establish its existence, while the last and one of the very best incisive comment on the same is by Jagannātha (p. 474). We refrain from going here into the controversy.

(viii) A further varying upon the nature of this figure is responsible for the figures of speech known as विकस्वर, उभयन्यास, प्रत्यनीकन्यास, and प्रतीकन्यास. An illustration of विकस्वर is—स न जिग्ये महान्तो हि दुर्जयाः सागरा इव। regarding which the Alaṁkārakaustubha observes (p. 320)—अत्र विशेषसमर्थनाय सामान्योपन्यासेपि पुनः सामान्यसमर्थनाय विशेषोपन्यास इति विकस्वरोलंकारान्तरम्। Rudraṭa (viii. 85–86) thus explains and illustrates Ubhayanyāsa—

सामान्यावप्यर्थौ स्फुटमुपमायाः स्वरूपतोपेतौ ।
निर्दिश्येते यस्मिन्नुभयन्यासः स विज्ञेयः ॥

सकलजगत्साधारणविभवा भुवि साधवोऽधुना विरलाः ।
सन्ति कियन्तस्तरवः सुस्वादुसुगन्धिचारुफलाः ॥

Bhoja, finally, thus illustrates and explains प्रत्यनीकन्यास and प्रतीकन्यास (p. 430)—

विरला उवआरिच्चिअ णिरवेक्खा जलहरव्व वच्चन्ति ।
झिज्जन्ति ताण विरहे विरलच्चिअ सरिप्पवाहव्व ॥

अत्र यदिदमुपकृत्य अनपेक्षितप्रत्युपकाराणां गमनम् यच्चाकृतप्रत्युपकाराणां तद्विरहेवसादनम् तदुभयमपि जलधरसरित्प्रवाहयोरन्योन्यातिशयितयोरुपन्यस्यमानं प्रत्यनीकन्यासो भवति ।

का कथा बाणसंधाने ज्याशब्देनैव दूरतः ।
हुंकारेणैव धनुषः स हि विघ्नानपोहति ॥

अत्र विघ्नप्रोत्सारणसमर्थाया बाणमोक्षणलक्षणायाः क्रियायाः प्रथमावयवभूतं ज्याशब्दं धनुषो हुंकारमिवेति तत्साधनमुपन्यस्य प्रतीकन्यासमभिधत्ते ।

Vikasvara is admitted by the Kuvalayānandakāra (verse 123); Ubhayanyāsa as an independent Alaṁkāra by Rudraṭa and Vāgbhaṭa (p. 44), and as a subvariety of अर्थान्तरन्यास by Bhoja, who is alone in recognising the last two alaṁkāras as additional subvarieties of the same figure.

Notes to II. 170-173—(i) Daṇḍin's distinction between विश्वव्यापि and विशेषस्थ is not strictly logical. It turns upon the mere extent of the denotation. But the proposition—All obey Fate, and the proposition—All great men relieve suffering, are equally universal propositions as Logic understands them, and can both be adduced with equal cogency in support of the particular propositions subsumed under them.

Notes to II. 174-175—(i) The eight sub-varieties given by Daṇḍin go by pairs and hence our Sanskrit Commentary, following the commentary called श्रुतानुपालिनी, renders श्लेषाविद्ध by अविरोधिन्. In the illustration the अविरोध is brought out from the circumstance that प्रियभवन and दाक्षिण्य go harmoniously together, while the विरोध is shown in as much as मालिन्य (or दोष) and आह्लादन do not sort together. This is perhaps possible; although in this interpretation varieties 3 and 4 have

little to distinguish them from the next pair. As it is however not absolutely necessary that all the varieties go by pair, it would perhaps involve less forced interpretation if श्लेष is given the usual interpretation of the use of words in two senses. The word दाक्षिण्य—upon which the entire point of the corroboration turns —is so used in ii. 174. Other sub-varieties, it is true, may also use paronomastic words; but in श्लेषाविद्ध variety it is the most important word that is so used Compare Cb—दाक्षिण्यशब्दस्य स्वाभाविकार्थो बहवः। तेषु अन्यतमः साध्यतया निर्दिष्टः साधनभूतेनान्यतमेन साध्यते इति श्लेषाविद्धः। विरोधवति युक्तात्मनि युक्तायुक्ते च अर्थान्तरन्यासे श्लेषानुबन्धे सत्यपि प्रागुक्तन्यायेन न तद्व्यपदेशः।

(ii) In ii. 175 the समर्थ्यवस्तु is made up of a proposition which embraces a विरोध and it is corroborated by another proposition which also embraces a similar विरोध. The two propositions, as we understand matters, are both particular. It would accordingly be an instance of दृष्टान्त in other writers; but Daṇḍin would classify it as अर्थान्तरन्यास because the idea of corroboration is evidently the leading idea of the उत्तरार्ध. If the idea of साम्य were the more prominent one it would be, according to Daṇḍin, a case of प्रतिवस्तूपमा. We consequently prefer taking the word द्विजेश्वर in the sense of 'a good brahman'.

Notes to II. 176-179.—(i) The distinctive principle underlying the last four varieties is very elusive. In ii. 176 the समर्थ्यवस्तु [and not the समर्थकवस्तु also as in ii 175] involves some one doing something improper or against one's nature; in ii. 177 both the समर्थ्य and the समर्थक propositions involve the doing of an appropriate action; in ii. 178 the action in the समर्थ्य proposition is accordant for one agent but discordant for another agent; and in ii. 179 the action is discordant for one agent and therefore accordant for another agent. Cb and Cs understand विपर्यय=अन्यभावापत्तिः or अतथाभवनम् and explain इन्दोः शीततया [तस्य] संबन्धिनामपि शीतत्वेन भवितव्यम्। अतथाभवनं विपर्ययः। The point is however debatable.

Notes to II. 180—(i) Vyatireka consists of two parts—साधर्म्यकथन and भेदकथन—both of which are essential to the nature of the figure. The Upamā-variety called अतिशयोपमा (ii. 22) aimed at bringing out the साधर्म्य alone (इयत्येव भिदा नान्या); the varieties called निन्दोपमा and प्रशंसोपमा, although mentioning with disapprobation or approbation certain points of inferiority or superiority in the Upamāna, did nevertheless content themselves with asserting, the साधर्म्य with more or less emphasis (cp. समानमपि सोत्सेकम् and तौ तुल्यौ); and the variety named विपर्यासोपमा, ii. 17, (=प्रतीप of later writers) mentioned साधर्म्य but did not mention the भेद, which was left merely to be inferred from the circumstance of the उपमेय and the उपमान having changed their normal relation. It must also be noted that the साधर्म्य and the भेद must each concern itself with a *distinct* गुण. As Jagannātha observes (p. 347)—प्रतीपादौ उपमानतामात्रकृत एवोत्कर्षः न वैधर्म्यकृतः । साधर्म्यस्यैव प्रत्ययात् । अधिकगुणवत्त्वमात्रम् उपमानगतापकर्षमात्रं वा न व्यतिरेकस्वरूपम् । The same writer later likerwise remarks (p. 350)—ननु अस्यालंकारस्य वैधर्म्यमूलस्य उपमाप्रतिकूलत्वमेवोचितम् न तूपमागर्भत्वम् तस्याः साधर्म्यमूलकत्वात् अस्य च तन्निषेधरूपेणैव प्रवृत्तेः। न चेष्टापत्तिः सिद्धान्तभङ्गप्रसङ्गात् । सत्यम् । यद्गुणपुरस्कारेण यस्य यत्सादृश्यनिषेधः उत्कर्षपर्यवसायी तस्य तद्गुणपुरस्कारेण तत्सादृश्यस्याप्रतिष्ठानेपि गुणान्तरेण सादृश्यप्रत्ययस्य दुर्वारत्वात्। यदि च तत्सादृस्यसामान्यनिषेधो विवक्षितः स्यात् गुणविशेषपुरस्कारोनर्थकः स्यात् धनेनायमस्मादधिक इत्युक्ते विद्यया रूपेण कुलेन च सम इति सर्वजनीनप्रत्ययात्। एवं च प्रतीयमानमपि सादृश्यं गुणान्तरकृतनिषेधोत्थापितेनोत्कर्षेण हतप्रभमिव बन्दीकृतमिव न चमत्कारविशेषमाधातुं प्रभवतीति प्राचामाशयः ।

(ii) The variety called प्रतिषेधोपमा (ii. 34) comes nearer to this figure. As Daṇḍin gives it as an Upamā variety some kind of साम्य between the moon and the face must evidently have been intended. The point of the साम्य is not here actually expressed. If we imagine that it is the कान्ति the example becomes a regular व्यतिरेक with the implied साम्य as regards कान्ति and the expressed भेद in consequence of कलङ्क and जडता—compare ii. 187 below. If however we regard the point of साधर्म्य and वैधर्म्य to be the same—say आह्लादकत्व—and interpret the example to mean that the moon, because of its two defects, cannot be a match to the face as regards charm-

ingness—and this is how Daṇḍin wants us to understand the passage—we can distinguish प्रतिषेधोपमा from व्यतिरेक because in the former there is not गुणविशेषवत्त्वेन उत्कर्षः as Jagannātha would say. Compare to the same effect the definition of Rudraṭa (vii. 86)—

यो गुण उपमेये स्यात् तत्प्रतिपन्थी च दोष उपमाने ।
व्यस्तसमस्तन्यस्तौ तौ व्यतिरेकं त्रिधा कुरुतः ॥

As the Agnipurāṇa does not recognise Vyatireka as a distinct figure, what it defines as Vyatirekopamā (344. 13–14)—

बहोर्धर्मस्य साम्येपि वैलक्षण्यं विवक्षितम् ।
यदुच्यतेतिरिक्तत्वं व्यतिरेकोपमा तु सा ॥

must be taken to include both व्यतिरेक and प्रातिषेधोपमा.

(iii) As to the varieties of this figure, since one aspect of it is उपमा,—as Jagannātha observes—उपमाप्रभेदाः सर्वे एवात्र संभवन्ति। But it is usual to recognise only three of them according as the साधर्म्य is शब्दोपात्त (i. e. both इवादीनामुपादाने शाब्दम् and तुल्यादीनामुपादाने आर्थम्) or प्रतीत. Next as to भेदकथनम्—उपमानस्यापकर्षनिमित्तम् उपमेयस्योत्कर्षनिमित्तं चेत्युभयमपि यत्रोक्तं तत्रैकः। अपकर्षहेतुमात्रस्य उत्कर्षहेतुमात्रस्य उक्तौ द्वयोरप्यनुक्तौ च त्रयो भेदाः इति चत्वारः। This gives by combination 12 varieties, and the introduction of श्लेष in the statement of भेद at once doubles their number. A further principle of sub-division is the relation between the two things brought together for comparison and contrast, which might be either class-concepts or individuals (स्वजातिव्यतिरेक or स्वव्यक्तिव्यतिरेक); and the last differentia is the motive for भेद which may be simple or rendered complex by involving a further process of similarity within the difference, as in ii. 193, 194. All these principles are admitted by Daṇḍin, though not actually illustrated.

(iv) In all latter-day discussions about Vyatireka there is a theme that comes in invariably for treatment the genesis of which is to be found in the following statement of Rudraṭa (vii. 89–90)—

यो गुण उपमाने वा तत्प्रतिपन्थी च दोष उपमेये ।
भवतो यत्र समस्तौ स व्यतिरेकोयमन्यस्तु ॥
क्षीणः क्षीणोपि शशी भूयो भूयो विवर्धते सत्यम् ।
विरम प्रसीद सुन्दरि यौवनमनिवर्ति यातं तु ॥

Ruyyaka (p. 80) explains the point of the example of this उपमानादुपमेयस्याधिकगुणत्वे व्यतिरेक by saying—चन्द्रापेक्षया च यौवनस्य न्यूनगुणत्वम् । शशिवैलक्षण्येन तस्यापुनरागमात् । As against this Mammaṭa asserts (p. 784)— अत्र यौवनगतास्थैर्याधिक्यं हि विवक्षितम् । Jayaratha the author of अलंकारसर्वस्वविमर्शिनी and Viśvanātha the author of साहित्यदर्पण side with the older school while Jagannātha follows Mammaṭa. The following full extract from the रसगङ्गाधर (pp. 352–353) will make the position on either side quite clear— नन्वत्र उपमानादुपमेयस्य न्यूनत्वं व्यतिरेक इति न युक्तम् तस्य हि वास्तवेनाहृद्यत्वात् । यौवनस्य चास्थिरत्वे प्रतिपाद्ये चन्द्रापेक्षयाधिकगुणत्वमेव विवक्षितम् यदेतच्चन्द्रवत् यातं सन्न पुनरायातीति । [इति चेदसदेतत् ।] यतोत्र चन्द्रवद्गतं सद्यौवनं यदि पुनरागच्छेत् तत् प्रियं प्रति चिरमीर्ष्याद्यनुबन्धो युज्येत । इदं पुनर्हतयौवनं यातं सत् पुनर्नागच्छतीति ईर्ष्याद्यन्तरायपरिहारेण निरन्तरतयैव प्रियेण सह जनुः सफलयितव्यम् । धिगीर्ष्याम् । त्यज प्रियं प्रति मन्युम् । कुरु प्रसादम् । इति प्रियवयस्योपदेशे प्रियं प्रति कोपोपशमाय चन्द्रापेक्षया यौवनस्यापुनरागमनं न्यूनगुणत्वेन विवक्षितमिति न्यूनत्वमपि व्यतिरेकः रसपरिपोषकतया चास्यापि हृद्यत्वम् इति ॥ [Jagannātha replies] तदुभयमप्यसत् । अस्मिन् हि प्रियहितकारिण्या वचने चन्द्रादप्यधिकगुणत्वमेव विवक्षितम् न न्यूनगुणत्वम् । चन्द्रो हि पुनः पुनरागमनेन लोके सुलभः अत एव न तादृशमाहात्म्यशाली । इदं च पुनर्यौवनमपुनरागमनेनातिदुर्लभतरत्वादत्युत्कृष्टमिति मानादिभिरन्तरायैः शठजनश्लाघनीयैर्विदग्धया भवत्या मुधा गमयितुमसांप्रतमिति तावदुपात्तगुणकृतमुत्कृष्टत्वं स्फुटमेव । सकलसुखनिदानत्वाद्यनुपात्तगुणकृतोप्युत्कर्षोत्र वाक्यार्थपरिपोषाय सहृदयसरणिमवतरति । अन्यथा किमित्यस्य कदर्थयौवनस्य कृते मया मानाद्विरंस्यते यातु नाम यौवनमिति प्रतिकूलेनार्थेन प्रकृतार्थस्यापुष्टतापत्तेः ।

Notes to II. 181–184—(i) As we have seen (Note (iii) to ii. 180) it has been customary to have, along with एक and उभय Vyatireka, अनुभय Vyatireka with the three sub-varieties depending upon the manner of expressing साधर्म्य, each with further two-fold differentiation depending upon the presence or absence of श्लेष. The three श्लेष varieties from out of these six are declared to be impossible. Says Uddyota on Kāvyaprakāśapradīpa (p. 793)—अत्रेदं चिन्त्यम् । उपात्तवैधर्म्यांशे श्लेषेणैव व्यतिरेकस्य श्लेषमूलकत्वमुचितम् नतु यत्रकुत्रापि श्लेषेण । एवं चोभयानुपादाने श्लेषकृतभेदत्रयं चिन्त्यमेव । To which may be added the conclusion of Jagannātha—इत्थं च चतुर्विंशतिर्भेदा इति प्राचामुक्तिर्विपुलोदाहरणाभिज्ञैर्यथाकथंचिदुपपादनीया ।

Notes to II. 185-188—(i) These three varieties are an attempt, after Daṇḍin's manner, to combine the वैचित्र्य of this figure with that of some other figure or figures.

Notes to II. 189—(i) As before observed (Note (iii) to ii. 180), शब्दोपादानसादृश्य includes what is called शाब्दसाधर्म्य as well as आर्थसाधर्म्य. Regarding this distinction Mammaṭa notes (pp. 664 ff.)—यथेववादिशब्दाः यत्पराः तस्यैवोपमानताप्रतीतिरिति यद्यप्युपमानविशेषणान्येते तथापि शब्दशक्तिमहिम्ना श्रुत्यैव षष्ठीवत् संबन्धं प्रतिपादयन्तीति तत्सद्भावे श्रौती उपमा । तथैव तत्र तस्येव (पा० V. i. 116) इत्यनेन विहितस्य वतेरुपादाने ॥ तेन तुल्यं मुखम् इत्यादावुपमेये एव तत् तुल्यमस्य इत्यादौ चोपमाने एव इदं च तच्च तुल्यम् इत्युभयत्रापि तुल्यादिशब्दानां विश्रान्तिरिति साम्यपर्यालोचनया तुल्यताप्रतीतिरिति साधर्म्यस्य आर्थत्वात् तुल्यादिशब्दोपादाने आर्थी । तद्वत् तेन तुल्यं क्रिया चेद्वतिः (पा० V. i. 115) इत्यनेन विहितस्य वतेः स्थितौ ॥ In प्रतीयमानसादृश्य the उपमावाचकशब्द is altogether absent.

Notes to II. 190-192—(i) Compare ii. 190 with ii. 22. In the latter इयत्येव भिदा नान्या emphatically declares the साधर्म्य. In the former only the भेद is stated and the साधर्म्य is left to be inferred. It should also be noted that ii. 22 mentions a circumstance that can be regarded as उपमानोत्कर्षहेतु while the जलसंरोहि of ii. 190—by an easy change into जडसंरोहि and even without it—can constitute an उपमानापकर्षहेतु.

(ii) On ii. 191, which Bhoja quotes, he observes (p. 237)—अत्र कान्तामृगेक्षणयोः प्रतीयमानसादृश्ययोः भ्रूविलासमदरागौ तदभावौ च विसदृशौ भेदकाविति सोयं प्रतीयमानसादृश्ययोरसदृशव्यतिरेकः ।

Notes to II. 193-196—(i) The essence of a सदृशव्यतिरेक consists in the fact that in it what is offered as a भेदक or distinguishing characteristic between the उपमान and the उपमेय has in it an element of सादृश्य. The सादृश्य however is sufficiently subdued to allow the भेदप्रतीति to gain hold upon our mind at least in the first instance. Bhoja observes on this stanza as follows (p. 305)—

अत्र मुखाम्भोजयोः फुल्ले सुरभिगन्धिनी इति पदाभ्यामभिधीयमानसादृश्ययोः सदृशमेव भ्रमद्भ्रमरत्वं लोलदृष्टित्वं च भेदकमुपन्यस्तामिति सोयं शब्दोपात्तसादृश्ययोः सदृशव्यतिरेकः ।

(ii) The illustration in ii. 194 and its explanation in ii. 195 have given rise to a serious difference of opinion amongst the commentators, which is partly helped by a difference of reading in ii. 195. The reading adopted by us is supported by strong manuscript authority while P's substitution of चन्द्रहंसयोः for वियदम्भसोः is hardly motivated, although he remarks—अत्र पूर्वार्धान्ते वियदम्भसोरिति उत्तरार्धान्ते चन्द्रहंसयोरिति पाठो न मनोरमः । It is even doubtful if P. had any Mss. to back him.

(iii) The commentaries A and B printed in the Madras edition are at one in regarding ii. 194 as containing two illustrations of सदृशव्यतिरेक, one in each *ardha*, the first being प्रतीयमान(=कथंचित् उन्नीयमान)साधर्म्ये and the second प्रतीत(=प्रसिद्ध)साधर्म्ये, both however being distinct from ii. 193, which is a case of शब्दोपात्तसाम्य. The full statement of the figure according to this view is—

पूर्वार्धे	उत्तरार्धे
उपमान—चन्द्र	उपमान—नभस्
उपमेय—हंस	उपमेय—पयस्
प्रतीतसाम्य—शुद्धि	प्रतीयमानसाम्य—शौक्ल्य [v. l. सौक्ष्म्य]
भेदक—अम्बर, तोय	भेदक—नक्षत्र, कुमुद
भेदकसादृश्य—नीलत्व	भेदकसादृश्य—मनोहारित्व.

Our criticism of this view is—(i) it is not quite clear why two examples are needed: Daṇḍin hardly ever introduces an extra sub-variety in this way. (ii) The words प्रतीत and प्रतीयमान are given a rather unusual sense. (iii) The भेदकसादृश्य has to be extraneously brought in. It is not likely that where the main point of the illustration is the सादृश्य of the भेदक Daṇḍin would leave that to be entirely supplied. (iv) It is not explained why the भेदकs of the first example are made the उपमान and उपमेय in the second. It cannot be a mere accident. Lastly, (v) Why should शुद्धि be प्रसिद्ध and शौक्ल्य [or सौक्ष्म] be अप्रसिद्ध? And in any case why does ii. 195 first explain the example in the उत्तरार्धे and then that in the पूर्वार्धे rather than vice versa?

(iv) A better way of understanding the passage would probably be to regard ii. 194 as forming one example of सदृशव्यतिरेकिता with प्रतीयमान(=शब्दानुपात्त)साम्य. Thus—

उपमान—चन्द्र

उपमेय—हंस

शब्दानुपात्तसाम्य—शुद्धि, which is apprehended first (प्रतीत)

भेदक—नभस्, पयः

भेदकसादृश्य—नक्षत्रमालिता, उत्फुल्लकुमुदत्व; this is apprehended as an after-thought.

The only difficulty in the way of this interpretation is the two dual locatives (or genitives) connected by च in ii. 195. The locatives can be translated by—"*between* the moon and the haṅsa, *in regard to* sky and water, a difference etc."; and च could be regarded as explative. Bhoja, it must be added, favours the earlier interpretation. His remarks on this stanza are (p. 305)—अत्र पूर्वार्धे चन्द्रहंसयोः प्रतीयमानसादृश्ययोरम्बरोत्तंसत्वतोयभूषणत्वे उत्तरार्धे तु नभःपयसोर्नक्षत्रमालित्वोत्कुमुदत्वे सदृशे एव भेदके । सोयं प्रतीयमानसादृश्ययोः सदृशव्यतिरेकः ।

Notes to II. 197-198—(i) Bhoja remarks on this illustration as follows (p. 303)—अत्र यौवनप्रभवस्य तमसः तमोजात्या सह दृष्टिरोधकरमिति सादृश्यमुक्त्वा अरत्नालोकसंहार्यमवार्यं सूर्यरश्मिभिरिति व्यतिरेको विहितः । सोयं स्वजातिव्यतिरेकः ।

(ii) This stanza is made to support the weight of a chronological argument for the priority of Bāṇa's Kādambarī over the Kāvyādarśa of Daṇḍin—a weight which it is too weak to sustain; for, even though the conclusion be sound it should not be supported by an unsound argument. Peterson (Daśakumāra, First Edition, Preface) and Pandit Maheśchandra Nyāyaratna before him (A. S. B., Proceedings 1887, p. 193) regard Kāvyādarśa ii. 197 as a reminiscence of Bāṇa in his Kādambarī, (B. S. S. p. 102, l. 16)—केवलं च निसर्गत एव अभानुभेद्यमरत्नालोकोच्छेद्यमप्रदीपप्रभापनेयमतिगहनं तमो यौवनप्रभवम् । Nothing need hinder us, as far as the two passages alone are concerned, from regarding the Kādambarī idea as an elaboration of that in the Kāvyādarśa. More probably the two are quite independent of each other.

Notes to II. 199—(i) Compare Notes (i) and (ii) to ii. 131–132. In further distinction of कारणाक्षेप from विभावना it may be stated that while the former stops at a mere denial of the cause the main point of the latter turns rather upon the विभावन or imagining of the new cause (or स्वाभाविकत्व) to explain the effect. The name of this figure can be explained as विभाव्यते कारणान्तरादि यस्याम् (the way that Daṇḍin suggests) or विशिष्टस्य कार्यस्य भावनं यत्र (the way that Bhāmaha (ii. 77), Udbhaṭa (P. 38), and Ruyyaka (P. 124) prefer), both explanations of course amounting to the same thing. But it is interesting to note, as an indication of a difference in tradition, that Daṇḍin and Bhāmaha give different explanations. We may also mention another fact in this connection that would point to the same conclusion. In the definition of this figure Bhāmaha, Udbhaṭa, Vāmana Mammaṭa and others use the word क्रिया instead of कारण or हेतु, which is chosen by Daṇḍin, Bhoja, Ruyyaka, Rudraṭa, Viśvanātha, Jagannātha, and others. Pratīhārendurāja explains the use of the word क्रिया as follows (p. 38)—इह यत्किंचित् ज्ञायते तत् सर्वं क्रियाफलम् । क्रियामुखेन कारणेभ्यः कार्योत्पत्तेः प्रातीतिकेन रूपेण परिदृश्यमानत्वात् सर्वेषां फलभूतानां क्रियैवाव्यवहितं कारणम् । यत्र च क्रिया प्रतिषिध्यते अथ च क्रियाफलस्योत्पत्तिरुपदिश्यते तत्र विभावनाख्योलंकारः । Ruyyaka's comment on this terminology is worth quoting (p. 125)—इह च लक्षणे यद्यप्यन्यैः कारणपदस्थाने क्रियाग्रहणं कृतं तथापीह कारणपदमेव विहितम् । नहि सर्वैः क्रियाफलमेव कार्यमभ्युपगम्यते वैयाकरणैरेव तथाभ्युपगमात् । अतो विशेषमनपेक्ष्य सामान्येन कारणपदमेवेह निर्दिष्टम् ।

(ii) The production of an effect without a cause is a violation of the natural law of causation—is a सृष्टिक्रमविरोध. As Jagannātha observes (p. 435)—विरोधमूला हि विभावनाद्यलंकाराः । विरोधस्यैव विद्युत्प्रभाववदापाततः प्रतिभासमानस्य चमत्कारबीजत्वात् । Vibhāvanā, however, is to be distinguished from the figure-of-speech called Virodha (ii.333 ff.) where the things brought in opposition to each other are equipotent and are not related to each other by any causal relation. As the Alaṁkārasarvasva says (p. 124)—कारणाभावेन चोपक्रान्तत्वात् बलवता कार्यमेव बाध्यमानत्वेन प्रतीयते न तु तेन कारणाभावः इत्यन्योन्यबाधकत्वानुप्राणिताद्विरोधालंकारात् भेदः । To

the same effect writes the author of the Sāhitya-darpaṇa (p.551)—विभावनायां कारणाभावेन उपनिबध्यमानत्वात् कार्यमेव बाध्यत्वेन प्रतीयते। विशेषोक्तौ च कार्याभावेन कारणमेव। इह त्वन्योन्यं द्वयोरपि बाध्यत्वमिति भेदः। We can in brief say that Virodha is a general name for figures-of-speech based on contradiction, and that विभावना as well as विशेषोक्ति are particular cases of Virodha that have been recognised as independent figures.

(iii) The contradiction involved in a Vibhāvanā is of course an apparent contradiction which admits of an easy solution by कारणान्तरविभावन or स्वाभाविकत्वविभावन. The solution, however, ought to be quite easy: समाधौ सुलभे सति, as Bhāmaha (ii.77) and Udbhaṭa after him (p.38) observe; and yet at the same time there must be some kind of an actual problem to be solved. Thus in the illustration in ii. 200 क्षीबत्व has two senses: पानमत्तता, the primary sense, and शरत्कालजनितोत्साहविशेषः, the secondary sense. Now सुरापान is not the cause of the उत्साहविशेष and so there is no contradiction in the statement that the कादम्बs are अपीतक्षीब. Such is the solution or समाधि. The difficulty arose from the identification of the secondary sense of क्षीबता with the primary sense. Adapting the explanation of Jagannātha (p.432) to the case in point we can say—अत्र यस्य कार्यस्योत्पत्तिर्निबध्यते न हि तदीयकारणत्वेनावगतस्य व्यतिरेकः प्रतीयते। यदीयकारणव्यतिरेकश्च प्रतीयते न हि तस्य कार्यस्योत्पत्तिर्निबध्यते। क्षीबत्वं चात्र शरत्कालजनितोत्साहविशेषः। न तु पानमत्तता। पानं च न कालजनितमत्ततायाः कारणम्। अपि तु वारुणीविकार-विशेषस्य। तथा च कथमत्र विभावना इति चेन्न। मुख्यं हि क्षीबत्वं पानमत्तता। गौणं च शरत्कालजनितोत्साहविशेषः। तयोर्गौणमुख्ययोः क्षीबयोः सादृश्यमूलेन अभेदाध्यवसानरूपेणातिशयेन सति भेदस्थगने मत्तताकारणमपि पानं शरत्कालीनो-त्साहकारणं संपद्यते। तदभावे चात्र कार्याभिन्नतयाध्यवसितस्य पीडाविशेषस्योप-निबन्धनान्न विभावनानुपपत्तिरूपो दोषः। एवं चास्मिन्नलंकारे सर्वत्रापि कार्यांशे अभेदाध्यवसानरूपातिशयोक्तिरनुप्राणकतया स्थिता। तथा च आयसादिपिण्डवदेकी-कृतस्य वस्तुतः सदृशवस्तुद्वयैकावयवसंबन्धिकारणव्यतिरेकसामानाधिकरण्येन अपरा-वयवमादाय पर्यवसानं भवति। तत्र च कार्यांशः कारणभावरूपविरोधिनो बाध्यतयैव स्थितः न बाधकतया। कार्यांशस्य कल्पितत्वात् कारणाभावस्य च स्वभावसिद्धत्वात्। अत एव कार्यांशो रूपान्तरेण पर्यवस्यति इति। तथा च प्रकृतस्थले एवं निष्पन्नम्। वस्तुतः कारणभेदात् पानादिजन्यं क्षीबत्वं भिन्नम् भिन्नं च शरत्कालजन्यम्। तच्च सादृश्यात् अभेदाध्यवसानेन अभिन्नं भवति। तथा च पानादिकारणाभावेपि शरज्जन्यस्य

विजातीयस्य क्लीबत्वस्य स्थितिः संभवत्येव । तस्मात् कारणाभावे कथं कार्योत्पत्तिः इति शंकाया नोत्थितिः ।

(iv) Vibhāvanā can be variously sub-divided. The commonest division is two-fold: उक्तनिमित्ता and अनुक्तनिमित्ता; but we can have more. For instance the प्रसिद्धहेतु might be itself bodily negated (स्वरूपतः) or there may be a statement of its powerlessness to discharge its function though actually present (व्यापाराभावः as in ii. 338), or its deficiency in regard to its qualities and attributes (अवच्छेदकाभावः as in ii. 324) or as regards its associated adjunct (सहकार्यभावः). For illustrations and details see Alaṁkārakaustubha, pp. 311-12, where some of the examples given are, according to Daṇḍin, examples of Virodha and not of Vibhāvana. The Kuvalayānandakāra gives six kinds of Vibhāvanā, as under (stanzas 76ff.)—

विभावना विनापि स्यात् कारणं कार्यजन्म चेत् ।
अप्यलाक्षारसासिक्तं रक्तं तच्चरणद्वयम् ॥
हेतूनामसमग्रत्वे कार्योत्पत्तिश्च सा मता ।
अस्त्रैरतीक्ष्णकठिनैर्जगज्जयति मन्मथः ॥
कार्योत्पत्तिस्तृतीया स्यात् सत्यपि प्रतिबन्धके ।
नरेन्द्रानेव ते राजन् दशत्यसिभुजंगमः ॥
अकारणात् कार्यजन्म चतुर्थी स्याद्विभावना ।
शङ्खाद्वीणानिनादोऽयमुदेति महदद्भुतम् ॥
विरुद्धात् कार्यसंपत्तिर्दृष्टा काचिद्विभावना ।
शीतांशुकिरणास्तन्वीं हन्त संतापयन्ति ताम् ॥
कार्यात् कारणजन्मापि दृष्टा काचिद्विभावना ।
यशः पयोराशिरभूत् करकल्पतरोस्तव ॥

In criticism of this six-fold division Jagannātha says (p. 434)—तस्मादाद्येन प्रकारेण प्रकारान्तराणामालीढत्वात् षड् प्रकारा इत्यनुपपन्नमेव । Rudraṭa (ix. 16–21) in a like manner, after laying down that विभावना is a figure of speech based upon अतिशय, attempts a three-fold division of it, which is also not distinctive enough. More worthy of consideration is the classification of Bhoja who, after giving the two-fold distinction of कारणान्तरविभावना and स्वाभाविकत्वविभावना after the manner of Daṇḍin, gives a three-fold sub-classification as follows (iii. 10ff.)—

शुद्धा चित्रा विचित्रा च त्रिविधा सा निगद्यते ।
शुद्धा यत्रैकमुद्दिश्य हेतुरेको निवर्तते ॥

अनेको यत्र सा चित्रा विचित्रा यत्र तां प्रति ।
तयान्यया वा गीर्भङ्ग्या विशेषः कश्चिदुच्यते ॥

Vibhāvanā is closely allied to Viśeshokti and more comment on this figure will be found in our Notes to ii. 323.

Notes to II. 200–202—(i) Bhoja regards these as examples of शुद्धा विभावना as above defined. His explanation of ii. 200 is—अत्रैकैकं कादम्बादिकमुद्दिश्य क्षीबतादेः पीतत्वादिरेकैकः प्रसिद्धहेतुर्व्यावर्तते हेत्वन्तरं च शरत्प्रभावो विभाव्यते । सेयं शुद्धा नाम कारणविभावनायां विभावना । and of ii. 201 in similar terms—अत्रैकैकं दृष्ट्यादिकमुद्दिश्य असितत्वादेरनञ्जितत्वादिरेकैको हेतुर्व्यावर्त्यते स्वाभाविकत्वं चासितत्वादि दृष्ट्यादेर्विभाव्यते । सेयं शुद्धा नाम स्वाभाविकविभावनायां विभावना ।

Notes to II. 203–204—(i) In ii. 203 there is no विभावन of anything. There is no कारणान्तर and the स्वाभाविकत्व is शब्दोपात्त. We can possibly say that the प्रसिद्धहेतु that is denied is itself विभाव्य; but it is a question if Daṇḍin so understands the matter.

Notes to II. 205–207—(i) The following are some of the more important definitions of Samāsokti—

Agnipurāṇa (345. 17)—

यत्रोक्तं गम्यतेऽन्योर्थस्तत्समानविशेषणः ।
सा समासोक्तिरुदिता संक्षेपार्थतया बुधैः ॥

Bhāmaha (ii. 79)—

यत्रोक्ते गम्यतेऽन्योर्थस्तत्समानविशेषणः ।
सा समासोक्तिरुद्दिष्टा संक्षिप्तार्थतया यथा ॥

Udbhaṭa (page 39)—

प्रकृतार्थेन वाक्येन तत्समानैर्विशेषणैः ।
अप्रस्तुतार्थकथनं समासोक्तिरुदाहृता ॥

Vāmana (iv. 3. 3)—

उपमेयस्यानुक्तौ समानवस्तुन्यासः समासोक्तिः । संक्षेपवचनात् समासोक्तिरित्याख्या ।

Ruyyaka (page 84)—

विशेषणानां साम्यादप्रस्तुतस्य गम्यत्वे समासोक्तिः ।

Bhoja (iv. 46, 49)—

यत्रोपमानादेवैतदुपमेयं प्रतीयते ।
अतिप्रसिद्धेस्तामाहुः समासोक्तिं मनीषिणः ॥
संक्षेपेणोच्यते यस्मात् समासोक्तिरियं ततः ।
सैवान्योक्तिरनन्योक्तिरुभयोक्तिश्च कथ्यते ॥

Mammaṭa (page 741)—

परोक्तिर्भेदकैः श्लिष्टैः समासोक्तिः ।

Viśvanātha (x. 56)—

समासोक्तिः समैर्यत्र कार्यलिङ्गविशेषणैः ।
व्यवहारसमारोपः प्रस्तुतेऽन्यस्य वस्तुनः ॥

And finally, Jagannātha (page 367)—

यत्र प्रस्तुतधर्मिको व्यवहारः साधारणविशेषणमात्रोपस्थापिताप्रस्तुतधर्मिकव्यवहाराभेदेन भासते सा समासोक्तिः ।

(ii) It will be observed that while Daṇḍin gives for this figure a most elementary definition, the advance in the various other definitions consists in introducing further conditions and qualifications in the definition with a view to delimit its sphere and to distinguish it from other allied figures such as प्रतिवस्तूपमा, तुल्ययोगोपमा, अर्थान्तरन्यास, तुल्ययोगिता, and अप्रस्तुतप्रशंसा. The first point to be noted is that, as far as Daṇḍin's definition goes, it includes cases where the अप्रस्तुत conveys the प्रस्तुत or the प्रस्तुत the अप्रस्तुत; but all the writers whose definitions are quoted above—except the first two—include only the former case under समासोक्ति, designating the latter as अप्रस्तुतप्रशंसा. Daṇḍin recognises the figure अप्रस्तुतप्रशंसा, but as he understands प्रशंसा as स्तुति and not mere कथन, his definition is not अतिव्याप्त. See our note to ii. 340.—In the second place, while Daṇḍin only requires that the two वस्तुs be तुल्य, some of the later writers want that they should be alike as regards their विशेषणs and that further these विशेषणs be paronomastic or श्लिष्ट. Ruyyaka's remarks in this connection are quite explicit (p. 84)—इह प्रस्तुताप्रस्तुतानां क्वचिद्वाच्यत्वं क्वचिद्गम्यत्वमिति द्वैविध्यम् । वाच्यत्वं च श्लेषनिर्देशभङ्ग्या पृथगुपादानेन वेत्यपि द्वैविध्यम् । एतद्विविधमपि

श्लेषालंकारस्य विषयः । गम्यत्वं तु प्रस्तुतानिष्ठमप्रस्तुतप्रशंसाविषयः अप्रस्तुतनिष्ठं तु समासोक्तिविषयः । तत्र च निमित्तं विशेषणसाम्यम् । विशेष[ष्य]स्यापि साम्ये श्लेषप्राप्तेः । विशेषणसाम्याद्धि प्रतीयमानमप्रस्तुतं प्रस्तुतावच्छेदकत्वेन प्रतीयते । अवच्छेदकत्वं च व्यवहारसमारोपः न रूपसमारोपः । रूपसमारोपे तु अवच्छादितत्वेन प्रकृतस्य तद्रूपरूपित्वादेव रूपकम् । तच्च विशेषणसाम्यं श्लिष्टतया साधारण्येनौपम्यगर्भत्वेन च भावात् त्रिधा भवति ।


(iii) In प्रतिवस्तूपमा, तुल्ययोगोपमा, तुल्ययोगिता, and अर्थान्तरन्यास, for one reason or another, both the प्रस्तुत and the अप्रस्तुत are शब्दोपात्त; in समासोक्ति only one of them is present, the second being गम्य by one of the three modes described at the end of the above quotation. We have just referred to Daṇḍin's conception of अप्रस्तुतप्रशंसा. Daṇḍin does not recognise the figure called श्लेष, regarding which the प्रतापरुद्रीय says (p. 410)—समासोक्तौ विशेषणविशेष्ययोर्द्वयोरुपादानाभावाच्छ्लेषाद्विशेषः। Lastly the commentators spend much ingenuity in distinguishing एकदेशविवर्ति रूपक from समासोक्ति, regarding which the following brief statement of conclusion should suffice (Jayaratha, p. 85)—एवं समासोक्तौ व्यवहारसमारोपादप्रस्तुतेन प्रस्तुतस्य वैशिष्ट्यलक्षणमवच्छेदकत्वं विधीयते रूपके तु रूपसमारोपाद्रूपरूपितत्वाख्यमाच्छादकत्वम् इत्यनयोर्भेदः । This statement of the case has however been much criticised. We would refer the curious to Sāhityadarpaṇa (p. 530), Kuvalayānanda (stanza 60, Vṛiti), Rasagaṅgādhara (pp. 373 ff.), Alaṁkārkaustubha (pp. 254 ff.) and Sāhityasāra, (pp. 446 ff.).

(iv) For sub-divisions of Samāsokti see Notes to ii. 208 below. Samāsokti is liable to a दोष called अनुपादेयत्व, which Mammaṭa (p. 958) thus explains—साधारणविशेषणवशादेव समासोक्तिरनुक्तमपि उपमानविशेषणं प्रकाशयतीति तस्यात्र पुनरुपादाने प्रयोजनाभावादनुपादेयत्वम् । यथा

स्पृशति तिग्मरुचौ ककुभः करै-
र्दयितयेव विजृम्भिततापया ।
अतनुमानपरिग्रहया स्थितं
रुचिरया चिरयापि दिनश्रिया ॥

अत्र तिग्मरुचेः ककुभां च यथा सदृशविशेषणवशेन व्यक्तिविशेषपरिग्रहेण च नायकतया नायिकात्वेन च व्यक्तिः तथा ग्रीष्मदिवसश्रियोपि प्रतिनायिकात्वेन भविष्यतीति किं दयितयेति स्वशब्दोपादानेन ।

Notes to II. 208–213—(i) A detailed classification of this figure is as follows (cp. Alaṁkārasarvasva pp. 88f.)—



And this has been combined (*loc. cit.*) with another four-fold classification—सर्वत्र चात्र व्यवहारसमारोप एव जीवितम् । स च लौकिके वस्तुनि लौकिकवस्तुव्यवहारसमारोपः । शास्त्रीये वस्तुनि शास्त्रीयवस्तुव्यवहारसमारोपः । लौकिके वा शास्त्रीयवस्तुव्यवहारसमारोपः । शास्त्रीये वा लौकिकवस्तुव्यवहारसमारोप इति चतुर्धा भवति । तदेवं बहुप्रकारा समासोक्तिः ।

(ii) Bhoja gives an independent eight-fold classification as under (iv. 47)—

प्रतीयमाने वाच्ये वा सादृश्ये सोपजायते ।
श्लाघां गर्हामुभे नोभे तदुपाधीन् प्रचक्षते ॥

as also the varieties called अन्योक्ति, अनन्योक्ति, and उभयोक्ति, the अनन्योक्ति (= अध्यासविषया तद्भावापत्तिः) being further distinguished into शुद्धा and चित्रा.

(iii) Bhoja quotes stanza ii. 208 (= Bhoja iv. 48) reading तुल्यातुल्य for भिन्नाभिन्न. Mammaṭa would regard ii. 209 as an अतिशयोक्ति of the first variety.

Notes to II. 214—(i) The treatment of अतिशयोक्ति by Ālaṁkārikas falls under two main categories. Some writers look to the etymology of the word and describe the figure in a general manner as a heightened or hyperbolic mode of expression. The main definitions in accordance with this view are the following—

Agnipurāṇa (344. 25)—

लोकसीमातिवृत्तस्य वस्तुधर्मस्य कीर्तनम् ।
भवेदतिशयो नाम संभवासंभवाद्द्विधा ॥

Bhāmaha (ii. 81) and Udbhaṭa (p. 40)—

निमित्ततो वचो यत्तु (यत्तु वचः Udbhaṭa) लोकातिक्रान्तगोचरम्।
मन्यन्तेतिशयोक्तिं तामलंकारतया यथा (बुधाः Udbhaṭa) ॥

Hemachandra (p. 264)—

विशेषविवक्षया भेदाभेदयोगायोगव्यत्ययोतिशयोक्तिः ।

Vāgbhaṭa (p. 37)—

अत्युक्तिरतिशयोक्तिः ।

Vāmana (iv. 3. 10)—

संभाव्यधर्मतदुत्कर्षकल्पनातिशयोक्तिः ।

and Bhoja who, besides quoting Kāvyādarśa ii. 214 and ii. 220, gives the following extra characterisation of the figure (iv. 82, 83)—

सा च प्रायो गुणानां च क्रियाणां चोपकल्प्यते ।
नहि द्रव्यस्य जातेर्वा भवत्यतिशयः क्वचित् ॥
प्रभावातिशयो यश्च यश्चानुभवनात्मकः ।
अन्योन्यातिशयो यश्च तेपि नातिशयात् पृथक् ॥

(ii) It is during the process of division and sub-division of the possible hyperbolic statements of a thing—the most complete is by अप्पय्यदीक्षित, (Kuvalayānandavṛitti on stanza 36) into [रूपकातिशयोक्ति,] भेदकातिशयोक्ति, संबन्धातिशयोक्ति, असंबन्धातिशयोक्ति, अक्रमातिशयोक्ति, चपलातिशयोक्ति, and अत्यन्तातिशयोक्ति—that the later idea of the five-fold अतिशयोक्ति as understood by Mammaṭa comes to the fore. Some of these later division-definitions are—

Mammaṭa (p. 762)—

निगीर्याध्यवसानं तु प्रकृतस्य परेण यत् ।
प्रस्तुतस्य यदन्यत्वं यद्यर्थोक्तौ च कल्पनम् ॥
कार्यकारणयोर्यश्च पौर्वापर्यविपर्ययः ।
विज्ञेयातिशयोक्तिः सा............ ॥

Viśvanātha (x. 47)—

भेदेप्यभेदः संबन्धेसंबन्धस्तद्विपर्ययौ ।
पौर्वापर्यात्ययः कार्यहेत्वोः सा पञ्चधा ततः ॥

Ruyyaka (p. 65) is most explict in the matter—

अध्यवसाने त्रयं संभवति—स्वरूपं विषयो विषयी च । विषयस्य हि विषयिणान्तर्निगीर्णत्वेध्यवसायस्य स्वरूपोत्थानम् । तत्र साध्यत्वे स्वरूपप्राधान्यम् सिद्धत्वे त्वध्यवसितत्वप्राधान्यम् । विषयप्राधान्यमध्यवसाये

नैव संभवति । अध्यवसितप्राधान्यैवातिशयोक्तिः । अस्याश्च पञ्च प्रकाराः । भेदेभेदः । अभेदे भेदः । संबन्धेसंबन्धः । असंबन्धे संबन्धः । कार्यकारणपौर्वापर्यविध्वंसश्च ।

Rudraṭa perhaps marks the middle stage in this process of evolution in as much as he regards अतिशय not as an independent figure-of-speech but as a rhetorical devise of the same kind as comparison or contrast and giving rise to a number of figures (12 in all) which he thus enumerates (ix. 1-2)—

यत्रार्थधर्मनियमः प्रसिद्धिबाधाद्विपर्ययं याति ।
कश्चित् क्वचिदतिलोकं स स्यादित्यतिशयस्तस्य ॥
पूर्वविशेषोत्प्रेक्षाविभावनातद्गुणाधिकविरोधाः ।
विषमासंगतिपिहितव्याघाताहेतवो भेदाः ॥

Just the opposite of this is the view of Hemachandra who says (p. 267)—एवंविधे च सर्वत्र विषये अतिशयोक्तिरेव प्राणत्वेनावतिष्ठते तां विना प्रायेणालंकारत्वायोगादिति न सामान्यमीलितैकावलीनिदर्शनाविशेषाद्यलंकारोपन्यासः श्रेयान् ।

(iii) Atiśayokti understood in this extended sense is called वक्रोक्ति by Bhāmaha in the oft-quoted stanza (ii. 85)—

सैषा सर्वैव वक्रोक्तिरनयार्थो विभाव्यते ।
यत्नोऽस्यां कविना कार्यः कोऽलंकारोऽनया विना ॥

Vakrokti is formally defined by Vāmana (iv. 3.8) as सादृश्याल्लक्षणा, the point being—यत्र सादृश्यलक्षणा सहृदयहृदयेष्वविलम्बेन लक्ष्यार्थप्रतिपत्तिमुद्भावयितुं प्रगल्भते तत्र वक्रोक्तिरलंकार इति रहस्यम् ।

(iv) The most modern school as represented by Jagannātha (p. 313) and others refuses to recognise the five or more sub-varieties for the figure put forward by the Middle School. As the Alaṁkārakaustubha observes (p. 285)—उपमानोपमेयस्य निगीर्याध्यवसानमेवातिशयोक्तिः। प्रकारान्तरे त्वतिरिक्तालंकारान्तरकल्पनमेवोचितम् । न ह्येतच्चतुष्टयसाधारणमतिशयोक्तिलक्षणं संभवति यत्रैकधर्मावच्छिन्नत्वेनालंकारत्वं स्यात् । न चैतदन्यतमत्वमेव सर्वानुगतमस्तीति वाच्यम् । विच्छित्तिवैलक्षण्यसत्त्वेन्यतमत्वस्याप्रयोजकत्वात् । अन्यथा उपमानरूपकादिकतिपयान्यतमत्वं सकलान्यतमत्वं वातिशयोक्तिलक्षणं विधाय उपमादीनामप्येतद्भेदत्वापत्तेः । This school therefore approaches the most ancient school represented, amongst others, by Daṇḍin.

(v) Bhoja's statement (iv. 82) quoted above probably differentiates अतिशयोक्ति from कान्ति (i. 85); see also our Sanskrit Commentary p. 236 ll. 6-12.

Notes to II. 215-216—(i) Verse 215 is given by Bhoja (p. 462) as an example of कान्त्यतिशय with the remark—अत्रैवं चन्द्रालोकस्य लोकसीमातिक्रमेण बाहुल्योत्कर्षविवक्षा येन तस्मिन् सम्मानाभिहारेणाभिसारिका अपि न लक्ष्यन्ते सोयं कान्त्यतिशयो नामातिशयभेदः। Hemachandra (p. 265) cites this as an example of योगे अयोगः—अत्राभिसारिकाणां लक्षणक्रियायोगेपि ज्योत्स्नाबाहुल्योत्कर्षविवक्षया अयोग उक्तः। Mammaṭa would regard the example as containing an independent figure called मीलित or पिहित; but Bhoja observes—अथास्य पिहितात् को विशेषः। उच्यते। पिहिते चन्द्रातपस्योत्कर्षेणाभिसारिकातिरस्कारो विवक्ष्यते इह त्वभिसारिकातिरस्कारेण चन्द्रातपोत्कर्ष इति।

(ii) The foot-note on p. 237 contains a misprint. For सर्वाङ्गीणार्द्र *read* सर्वाङ्गेणार्द्र for सर्वाङ्गीणार्द्र; and for क्षोमवत्यो in the last line *read* क्षोमवन्त्यो.

Notes to II. 217-218—(i) Bhoja (p. 462) gives this as an example of तनुत्वातिशय with the remark—अत्रैवं मध्यस्य लोकसीमातिक्रमेण तानवातिशयविवक्षा येन तदस्ति नास्तीति वा संदिह्यते। सोयं तनुत्वातिशयो नामातिशयभेदः।

Notes to II. 219—(i) Bhoja (p. 462) gives this as an example of गुणातिशयेन महत्त्वातिशयः and remarks—अत्रैवं यशोराशेरशक्यमानस्याप्यतिशयोक्त्या विशेषविवक्षा येन त्रिभुवनोदरमपि संकीर्णमाशङ्क्यते। सोयं महत्त्वातिशयो नामातिशयभेदः। Mammaṭa and others recognise this as an independent figure-of-speech called अधिक.

Notes to II. 220—(i) Bhoja gives other sub-varieties of this figure such as प्रभावातिशय, अनुभवातिशय, and अन्योन्यातिशय or क्रियातिशय.

(ii) Bhāmaha also delivers himself in a similar strain (ii. 84)—

इत्येवमादिरुदिता गुणातिशययोगतः।
सर्वैवातिशयोक्तिस्तु तर्कयेत् तां यथागमम्॥

We have already mentioned Rudraṭa's attempt to regard अतिशय as a fundamentum divisionis for classifying figures.

Notes to II. 221–225—(i) We give below some of the more important definitions of Utpreksha—

Agnipurāṇa (344.24)—

> अन्यथोपस्थिता वृत्तिश्चेतनस्येतरस्य च ।
> अन्यथा मन्यते यत्र तामुत्प्रेक्षां प्रचक्षते ॥

Udbhaṭa (p. 43)—

> साम्यरूपाविवक्षायां वाच्येवाद्यात्मभिः पदैः ।
> अतद्गुणक्रियायोगादुत्प्रेक्षातिशयान्विता ॥

Bhāmaha (ii. 91)—

> अविवक्षितसामान्या किंचिच्चोपमया सह ।
> अतद्गुणक्रियायोगादुत्प्रेक्षातिशयान्विता ॥

Vāmana (iv. 3.9)—

> अतद्रूपस्यान्यथाध्यवसानमतिशयार्थमुत्प्रेक्षा ।

Ruyyaka (p. 55)—

> अध्यवसाये व्यापारप्राधान्ये उत्प्रेक्षा ।

Rudraṭa (viii. 32, 36)—

> अतिसारूप्यादैक्यं विधाय सिद्धोपमानसद्भावम् ।
> आरोप्यते च तस्मिन्नतद्गुणादीति सोत्प्रेक्षा ॥
> यत्र विशिष्टे वस्तुनि सत्यसदारोप्यते समं तस्य ।
> वस्त्वन्तरमुपपत्त्या संभाव्यं सापरोत्प्रेक्षा ॥

Vāgbhaṭa (p. 34)—

> अत्यन्तसादृश्यादसतोपि धर्मस्य कल्पनमुत्प्रेक्षा ।

Vāgbhaṭa (iv. 90)—

> कल्पना काचिदौचित्याद्यत्रार्थस्य सतोन्यथा ।
> द्योतितेवादिभिः शब्दैरुत्प्रेक्षा सा स्मृता यथा ॥

Bhoja (iv. 50)—

> अन्यथावस्थितं वस्तु यस्यामुत्प्रेक्ष्यतेन्यथा ।
> द्रव्यं गुणः क्रिया चापि तामुत्प्रेक्षां प्रचक्षते ॥

Hemachandra (p. 247)—

> असद्धर्मसंभावनमिवादिद्योत्योत्प्रेक्षा ।

Vidyānātha (p. 383) and Chitramīmānsā (p. 73)—

यत्रान्यधर्मसंबन्धादन्यत्वेनोपतर्कितम् ।
प्रकृतं हि भवेत् प्राज्ञास्तामुत्प्रेक्षां प्रचक्षते ॥

Vidyādhara (viii. 12)—

अप्रकृतत्वेन स्यादध्यवसायो गुणाभिसंबन्धात् ।
साध्यः प्रकृतस्य यदा कथितोत्प्रेक्षा तदा तज्ज्ञैः ॥

Mammaṭa (p. 707)—

संभावनमथोत्प्रेक्षा प्रकृतस्य समेन यत् ।

Viśvanātha (x. 40)—

भवेत् संभावनोत्प्रेक्षा प्रकृतस्य परात्मना ।

Jagannātha (p. 285)—

तद्भिन्नत्वेन तदभाववत्वेन वा प्रमितस्य पदार्थस्य रमणीतद्वृत्तितत्समानाधिकरणान्यतरतद्धर्मसंबन्धनिमित्तकं तत्त्वेन तद्वत्त्वेन वा संभावनमुत्प्रेक्षा ।


And Viśveśvara (p. 180)—

संभाव्यते सह यदा साम्यप्रतियोगिना तदुपमेयम् ।
तामुत्प्रेक्षामाहुर्भिन्ना हेत्वादिविषयत्वात् ॥


(ii) All these definitions from the simplest to the most elaborate agree as to the essentials. The points to be noted are 1. that it should be a संभावन = अन्यथोत्प्रेक्षण = अन्यथाध्यवसान = अन्यथा कल्पन = अन्यत्वेनोपतर्कण = असदारोपण, i. e., उत्कटकोटिकसंदेह. 2. That it should be deliberate or आहार्य and not due to actual error. 3. That it should be between things having similarity, and so based on similarity. 4. That it should be striking or picturesque. 5. And that it should concern itself with the धर्म or गुण and क्रिया or व्यापार of the thing under discussion. Regarding this last requirement Pratīhārendurāja observes (p. 44)— द्रव्यधर्मः सिद्धो गुणः । साध्यस्वभावस्तु क्रिया । इदं खलु विश्वं स्वतन्त्रपरतन्त्रपदार्थात्मकत्वात् द्विविधम् । यश्च स्वतन्त्रः पदार्थः स धर्मीत्यभिधीयते । तच्च इदं तदिति सर्वनामप्रत्यवमर्शयोग्यत्वात् द्रव्यम् । परतन्त्रस्य पदार्थस्य धर्मरूपता । तस्य च द्वैविध्यम् सिद्धसाध्यताभेदात् । तत्र यः सिद्धो धर्मः स गुणः यस्तु साध्यः सा क्रिया । एतावन्तश्च लौकिकाः पदार्थाः सामान्यादीनामत्रैव प्रातीतिकेन रूपेणान्तर्भूतत्वात् ।

(iii) Numerous subdivisions of this figure are given by Alamkārikas: compare Alaṁkārasarvasva (p. 57),


Rasagaṅgādhara (pp. 286-87), and especially Pratāparudrīya (p. 386). We can exhibit them in a tabular form thus—



Further subdivisions of each of these varieties are as under—



The four main divisions of वाच्या are in this way divisible into 8 sub-varieties, thus giving rise to a total of 32 varieties under वाच्या. Each of these varieties can be further sub-divided into three sorts thus—



Thus we have—

वाच्या जातिविषया	of	24	varieties ;
वाच्या गुणविषया	of	24	varieties ;
वाच्या क्रियाविषया	of	24	varieties ;
वाच्या द्रव्यविषया	of	8	varieties (द्रव्यस्य प्रायः स्वरूपोत्प्रेक्षणमेव) ;
प्रतीयमाना जातिविषया	of	12	varieties (निमित्तस्यानुपादानं तस्यां न संभवति) ;

प्रतीयमाना गुणविषया of 12 varieties;
प्रतीयमाना क्रियाविषया of 12 varieties;
प्रतीयमाना द्रव्यविषया of 4 varieties;

Total 120 varieties.

Illustrations for all these varieties, especially the प्रतीयमाना varieties, are not always quotable. Jagannātha's criticism of these manifold varieties is also worth quoting. He says (p. 295)--इह जात्यादयो हि भेदाः प्राचामनुरोधादुदाहृताः। वस्तुतस्तु नैषां चमत्कारे वैलक्षण्यमस्तीत्यनुदाहार्यतैव। चमत्कारवैलक्षण्यं पुनर्हेतुफलस्वरूपात्मकानां त्रयाणां प्रकाराणामेव।

(iv) For the distinction between उत्प्रेक्षा and उत्प्रेक्षितोपमा compare our Note to ii. 23. Bhoja, however, considers (iv. 51) उत्प्रेक्षोपमा as उपमागर्भोत्प्रेक्षा and says that it is not distinct from उत्प्रेक्षा proper. His example is--

किंशुकव्यपदेशेन तरुमारुह्य सर्वतः।
दग्धादग्धामरण्यानीं पश्यतीव विभावसुः॥

अत्र व्यपदेशशब्देन किंशुककुसुमानामग्निसादृश्यमभिधाय दर्शनक्रिया उत्प्रेक्ष्यते। This however is distinct from the उपमा variety recognised by Daṇḍin.

(v) As to उत्प्रेक्षावयव being उत्प्रेक्षा compare our Notes to ii. 359.

Notes to II. 226-234—(i) This famous discussion of the लिम्पतीव stanza which has been taken over from our author by most subsequent writers such as Ruyyaka, Mammaṭa, Viśvanātha, Jagannātha, etc, raises certain side issues which we shall first dispose of. Daṇḍin refers to this stanza as 'having been already, before his days, the subject of discussion: it cannot therefore be of Daṇḍin's own composition, and he cannot be reasonably supposed to have been the author of the work from which the stanza is taken. The next question is to determine the source of the quotation. Until the discovery of Bhāsa's [Daridra–]Chārudatta all were content to assign the Mṛichchhakaṭika i. 34 as the source for Daṇḍin; but there are reasons to suppose that the Mṛichchhakaṭika is itself an elaboration of the Chārudatta (compare a paper on the subject

read by me before the First Oriental Conference held at Poona, 1919), and this leaves it an open question as to whether Daṇḍin was indebted to Śūdraka or to Bhāsa. Exact grounds are lacking for determining the question one way or the other; but so much we have gained by the discovery of Bhāsa's plays: we need not any more link the date of Daṇḍin to that of Śūdraka. (or of Bhāsa). If Śūdraka is to be assigned, say to cir. 600 A. D., and if reasons exist to assign Daṇḍin to an earlier date, we can do so by making him refer to Bhāsa who gives our stanza in Chārudatta i. 19 as well as in Bālacharita i. 15. If on the other hand Bhāsa turns out to be a ninth-century play-wright (I have seen this only asserted but not actually proved or even made probable) and if Daṇḍin comes earlier, we can still preserve our countenance and make Daṇḍin borrow from Śūdraka. Daṇḍin here quotes the first half of the stanza. One of our Mss. quotes the full stanza in this place and gives besides another extra stanza which is noticed in the Chitramīmāṅsā (p. 77). The full stanza is repeated also as [ii. 362] which we regard as an interpolation (see Note to the stanza).

(ii) The word इव is used in उपमा as well as उत्प्रेक्षा. Compare Note (x) to ii. 14. In the latter half of ii. 227 Daṇḍin is actually quoting the words of Patañjali. See our Sanskrit Commentary.

(iii) The पूर्वपक्ष in ii. 228-229 can be thus exhibited: The stanza लिम्पतीव तमोङ्गानि contains an उपमा with—

उपमान—लिम्पति }
उपमेय—तमस् } i. e. तमसः अधःप्रसरणं लेपनमिव ।

साधारणधर्म—लेपन

वाचक—इव.

Here of course one word is made to perform two functions, which is obviously a mistake.

(iv) In the above पूर्वपक्ष the verb लिम्पति was interpreted as लेपनव्यापार following the usual practice of the Vaiyākaraṇas or Grammarians. According to them

लिम्पति = अमुककर्तृक-अमुककर्मक-लेपनव्यापार. Now we have seen that we cannot make the व्यापार the उपमान. Can we make the simile turn upon the subordinate elements of the व्यापार, the कर्तृ and the कर्म ? This is the point considered in ii. 230. The answer is in the negative; for if the व्यापारप्रधान interpretation of लिम्पति is to be retained, the गौण factors are lost in the principal and can have no independent locus standi. This is quite obvious.

(v) The पूर्वपक्ष in ii. 231 suggests that, following the Naiyāyikas, we should so interpret the verb लिम्पति as to give a non-subordinate position to the कर्तृ of the लेपनक्रिया. In this view लिम्पति=अमुक[कर्म]वृत्तिफलजनक-लेपनानुकूलकृतिमान्-कर्ता. So the proposed उपमा statement is—

उपमान—लिम्पतिकर्ता or लेपक

उपमेय—तमस्

साधारणधर्म—?

वाचक—इव

Now the question is, who is the लेपक? If the idea is यथा कश्चित् पुरुषः [भित्तिं] लिम्पति तथा तमः अङ्गानि लिम्पति, we obviously can connect अङ्गानि with the उपमेय alone and not with the उपमान also, whereas, as a matter of fact, अङ्गानि seems to be intended in the stanza as going with both. Hence Dandin says—अङ्गानीति न संबद्धम् (or adopting the variant which also has good ms. authority—संगतः अङ्गानीति न संबन्धः). Further, the point of similarity between the proposed उपमान and उपमेय (or, adopting the variant, the point in which तमस् the उपमेय is compared with the लेपक the उपमान) has got to be extraneously supplied: it is not actually given in the stanza.

(vi) Can we not, as a possible alternative, connect अङ्गानि with both the उपमान and the उपमेय proposed in (v) above, and in this manner?—यथा कश्चित् पुरुषः अङ्गानि लिम्पति (or लिम्पेत्) तथा तमः अङ्गानि लिम्पति। This would obviate the first difficulty of अङ्गानीति न संबद्धम्; but the second difficulty still remains. We can, it is true, conceivably imagine सान्द्रत्व or some such characteristic of the लेपन as the supposed common dharma, but it is क्लिष्ट and

more or less unsatisfactory. The common property in an उपमा, as Daṇḍin says (ii. 232), ought to be evident, which is not the case here.

(vii) The proper way to understand the verse is not to regard it as containing an उपमा but rather an उत्प्रेक्षा. The poet intends to ascribe to तमस् the character of a लेपक—the उपश्लेषण or व्यापन is भ्रमातिशयकारकत्वसकलवस्तुमलिनीकरणत्वादिनिमित्तेन लेपनादिरूपतया संभावितम् as it has been well observed. The word इव accordingly can be a वाचक of उत्प्रेक्षा also.

(viii) We have said that the line लिम्पतीव etc. contains an उत्प्रेक्षा. There are however two possible ways of understanding the उत्प्रेक्षा. We could say that here तमःकर्तृक-अङ्गकर्मक-व्यापनं (which is the अनुपात्तविषयप्रस्तुत) नभःप्रभृतिभूपर्यन्तसकलवस्तुसान्द्रमलिनीकरणेन निमित्तेन (which is also अनुपात्त) तमःकर्तृक-अङ्गकर्मक-लेपनतादात्म्येन संभाव्यते। Or we could say that here—अङ्गवृत्तिफलजनकव्यापनानुकूलकृतिमत्तमः (the उपात्तविषय) व्यापनेन निमित्तेन (this being अनुपात्त) अङ्गवृत्तिफलजनकलेपनानुकूलकृतिमत्कर्तृतादात्म्येन संभाव्यते। The first is the वैयाकरण view adopted by Daṇḍin, Mammaṭa, Viśvanātha, Appayya-Dīkshita and others; the second, the नैयायिक view countenanced by Alaṁkārasarvasva, Rasagaṅgādhara and other modern texts. The difference does not however seem to be very vital. Compare Alaṁkārakaustubha pp. 194-195.

(ix) Some Mss. give here (after ii. 226, first half) an extra verse which can be thus rendered—

"The Ocean, by its billowy summits, is as-if grounding sandal-ointment-in-the-form-of-foam; taking that by his hands <rays> the moon is besmearing as-it-were the Ladies-in-the-form-of-Quarters."

(x) It is usual to render उत्प्रेक्षा by Poetic-fancy. Fancy, however, is a lighter product of our plastic or creative faculty, which generally concerns itself with associations or combinations of ideas which are remote, recondite, arbitrary, and unexpected; while Ut-

prekshā knows of no such limitations. At the same time, while a simile is a more or less sustained effort of the imagination to hold two things together in one consciousness with a view to establish a complete picture, an Utprekshā is a passing suggestion of the intended similarity, which may occasionally be very picturesque and which, while it lasts, gives a point of view from which the poet wishes us to understand the fact, the quality, or the action described. Hence we would render the word by Poetic-Conception.

Notes to II. 235—(i) The three figures हेतु, सूक्ष्म, and लेश, and in this order, are enumerated by Bhāmaha (ii. 86) who however says— हेतुश्च सूक्ष्मो लेशोथ नालंकारतया मतः ।, the view of Daṇḍin being just the contrary. The question about the chronological relation between the two writers cannot be settled either way on the strength of this circumstance alone. Compare, however, Notes to 244 below. Other writers who recognise all these three figures by these names are भोज (iii. 12, iii. 21, iv. 56), रुद्रट (vii. 82, vii. 98, vii. 100), वाग्भट (p. 43), and कुवलयानन्द (stanzas 166, 150, 137). Others recognise one or two of them only, subsuming the remaining under some other figure or figures. Daṇḍin illustrates Hetu in ii. 236–259, defines and illustrates Sūkshma in ii. 260–264, and treats of Leśa in ii. 265–272.

(ii) Hetu is a poetic cause, and Indian Ālaṁkārikas recognise a number of figures of speech based upon causal relation. These are (cp. Note (i) to ii. 2 also)—अर्थान्तरन्यास (ii. 169), विभावना (ii. 199), समाहित (ii. 298), विशेषोक्ति (ii. 323), निदर्शन (ii. 348),—amongst the alaṁkāras recognised by Daṇḍin—as also the alaṁkāras known as काव्यलिङ्ग, अनुमान, कारणमाला, अहेतु, विषम, विचित्र, समुच्चय, समाधि, व्याघात, असंगति, etc., not to mention alaṁkāras like दृष्टान्त, प्रतिवस्तूपमा, or तुल्ययोगिता (where similarity serves to illustrate as well as to corroborate), or some sub-varieties like कारणाक्षेप or Mammaṭa's last variety of अतिशयोक्ति (where causal relation comes in only secondarily).

Ignoring the last two groups of alaṁkāras, and considering first the alaṁkāras not found in the Kāvyādarśa, it is to be noted that समाधि=समाहित, Daṇḍin preserving the first word for the गुण and the second for the alaṁkāra. Writers like Bhoja (iii. 34, iv. 44), Ruyyaka (p. 163, p. 189), and Viśvanātha (x. 86, x. 96), it is true, recognise both समाधि and समाहित as two distinct alaṁkāras, but the समाहित of the last two writers is a रसालंकार, while we have already commented upon Bhoja's Samādhi as an alaṁkāra (see Note (ii) to ii. 99). About समुच्चय we shall have something to say in the Notes to ii. 298, while कारणमाला is only the हेतु with शृङ्खलावैचित्र्य super-added. The figure अहेतु as recognised by Bhoja (iii. 18), Rudraṭa (ix. 54), and वाग्भट (p. 44) comes very near to our author's विशेषोक्ति (ii. 323). The figure काव्यलिङ्ग (defined by Mammaṭa as हेतोर्वाक्यपदार्थता) is practically the same as Daṇḍin's हेतु, while अनुमान is the same हेतु set forth with the usual व्याप्ति and other paraphernalia of a logical inference. For the rest compare Notes (i) to (vi) to ii. 169. The other figures need not be here considered in details. See however Notes on चित्रहेतु varieties.

(iii) Daṇḍin has given illustrations for 16 varieties of हेतु of which 14 are illustrations of कारकहेतु and only 2 (viz. ii. 244, ii. 245) are of the ज्ञापकहेतु. We have already (p. 127 above) explained the distinction between कारक and ज्ञापक हेतु, from which it will be clear that the कारकहेतु (e. g. वह्नि) normally precedes the कार्य (धूम), while the ज्ञापक is the logical mark or लिङ्ग (e. g. धूम) which *in its most valid from* is actually the कार्य of the ज्ञाप्यवस्तु (viz. (वह्नि). But a poetic ज्ञापक need not always have that rigorous validity in its व्याप्ति which logic requires. For instance in ii. 245 the व्याप्ति—यत्र इन्दुपादाबाध्यश्चन्दनाम्भसामसाध्यश्च देहोष्मा तत्र कामातुरत्वम्—may conceivably be vitiated in a particular person who is restless, but *not* by love. It is only if the ज्ञापक is the कार्य of the ज्ञाप्य that the व्याप्ति is invariably valid.

(iv) An अर्थान्तरन्यास, as we have seen above (p. 128), involves a साध्यसाधन relation between two things or वस्तुs. Now although it is true that the most valid form of proof is the one that depends at each stage upon demonstrable causal relation between one thing and another, we are not always so rigorously exacting in ordinary life and much less so in poetry. Even analogy is often given and accepted as valid proof. Generally, however, the साध्य and the साधन are related as particular to universal, or vice versa. The particular is the result of the universal by deduction, while the universal is the result of the particular by induction. In अर्थान्तरन्यास, accordingly, the causal relation between the two statements (even where it is demonstrable) is ignored and attention is fixed upon the समर्थ्यसमर्थक relation between them. In a हेतु, even in the ज्ञापक variety, the causal relation is naturally what comes to the fore; and as the two वस्तुs in question are normally two particular objects (e. g. ऊष्मा and काम in ii. 245) and not two statements as in an अर्थान्तरन्यास, the distinction between that figure and ज्ञापकहेतु is generally not very difficult to make.

(v) Some important definitions of हेतु are given below:—

Agnipurāna (344.29-32)—

सिषाधयिषितार्थस्य हेतुर्भवति साधकः ।
कारको ज्ञापक इति द्विधा सोप्युपजायते ॥

Bhoja (iii. 12)—

क्रियायाः कारणं हेतुः कारको ज्ञापकश्च सः ।
अभावश्चित्रहेतुश्च चतुर्विध इहेष्यते ॥

Vāgbhaṭa (iv. 105)—

यत्रोत्पादयतः कंचिदर्थं कर्तुः प्रकाश्यते ।
तद्योग्यतायुक्तिरसौ हेतुरुक्तो बुधैर्यथा ॥

Rudrața (vii. 82)—

हेतुमता सह हेतोरभिधानमभेदकृद्भवेद्यत्र ।
सोऽलंकारो हेतुः स्यादन्येभ्यः पृथग्भूतः ॥

Vāgbhața (p. 43)—

कार्यकारणयोरभेदो हेतुः ।

Viśvanātha (x. 64)—

अभेदेनाभिधा हेतुर्हेतोर्हेतुमता सह ।

Kuvalayānanda (stanzas 166-167)—


हेतोर्हेतुमता सार्धं वर्णनं हेतुरुच्यते ।

....

हेतुहेतुमतोरैक्यं हेतुं केचित् प्रचक्षते ।

(vi) Of these definitions while the first two and the first given by the Kuvalayānandakāra agree with that of Daṇḍin, in the others is distinctly noticeable an attempt to give a special वैचित्र्य to the figure besides the mere fact of one thing being the हेतु of another. Bhāmaha, it will be remembered, had already raised his voice against the recognition of हेतु as a distinct figure in as much as there was no वक्रोक्त्यभिधान in it at all; and this criticism has so much weighed upon later Ālaṁkārikas that even so astute a writer as Jagannātha questions the validity of काव्यलिङ्ग (which with these later writers does duty for हेतु) as a distinct figure-of-speech. The view is thus set forth and criticised by Viśveśvara (p. 340 f.)—यत्तु [रसगङ्गाधरे]—काव्यलिङ्गं नालंकारः कविप्रतिभानिर्मितत्वप्रयुक्तचमत्कारविशेषात्मकविच्छित्तिविरहात् । हेतुहेतुमद्भावस्य लोकसिद्धत्वात् । श्लेषादिसंमिश्रणजन्यस्तु चमत्कारः श्लेषप्रयुक्तत्वात् तदंशस्यैवालंकारतां कल्पयति न तु काव्यलिङ्गस्य तत्प्रयोज्यचमत्कारान्तराभावादिति तत्तुच्छम् । लौकिकत्वेपि कविप्रतिभामात्रजन्यतया चमत्कारजनकत्वात् । ...... । एवमुपमादेरप्यलंकारत्वं न स्यात् सादृश्यस्य वास्तवत्वेन कविप्रतिभाकल्पितत्वविरहात् ।

(vii) The sixteen varieties of Hetu illustrated by Daṇḍin are exhibited in the following Tabular statement. Bhoja has elaborated Daṇḍin's own scheme adding minor sub-varieties.—


हेतु
कारक
ज्ञापक ii. 244, 245
भावरूपहेतु
चित्रहेतु
अभावरूपहेतु
निर्वर्त्य
विकार्य ii. 242
प्राप्य ii. 243
भावरूपकार्य ii. 236
अभावरूपकार्य ii. 238
दूरकार्य ii. 255
कार्यसहज ii. 256
कार्यानन्तरज ii. 257
अयुक्तकार्य ii. 258
युक्तकार्य ii. 259
भावप्रतियोगिकाभावरूप
अभावप्रतियोगिकाभावरूप
प्रागभाव ii. 247
प्रध्वंसाभाव ii. 248
अन्योन्याभाव ii. 249
अत्यन्ताभाव ii. 250
प्रागभावप्रति० ii. 251
प्रध्वंसा०
अन्योन्या०
अत्यन्ता०
not illustrated

Notes to II. 235-237—(i) Bhoja thus explains the illustration—सोयं यथोक्तो मलयमारुतः प्रीत्युत्पादनक्रियासमावेशात् प्रवर्तको नाम कारकहेतुभेदः ।

Notes to II. 238-239—(i) Bhoja thus explains the illustration—अत्रैवंविधस्य पवनस्य पथिकप्रमाथसाधनक्रियायां कर्तृत्वेनावेशान्निवर्तको नामायं .... कारकहेतुभेदः ।

(ii) In ii. 239[d] the reading आरोचक, as being the *lectio difficilior* and as yielding a very good sense has to be naturally preferred to the other variants available.

Notes to II. 240—(i) The threefold division of कर्म here given by Dandin is also to be found in the Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛihari (iii. 45-88, कर्माधिकार), some pertinent stanzas from the section being—

निर्वर्त्यं च विकार्यं च प्राप्यं च त्रिविधं मतम् ।
तत्रेप्सिततमं कर्म चतुर्धान्यत्तु कल्पितम् ॥ ४५ ॥
औदासीन्येन यत् प्राप्तं यच्च कर्तुरनीप्सितम् ।
संज्ञान्तरैरनाख्यातं यद्यच्चाप्यन्यपूर्वकम् ॥ ४६ ॥
सती वा विद्यमाना वा प्रकृतिः परिणामिनी ।
यस्य नाश्रीयते तस्य निर्वर्त्यत्वं प्रचक्षते ॥ ४७ ॥
प्रकृतेस्तु विवक्षायां विकार्यं कैश्चिदन्यथा ।
निर्वर्त्यं च विकार्यं च कर्म शास्त्रे प्रदर्शितम् ॥ ४८ ॥
यदसज्जायते सद्वा जन्मना यत् प्रकाशते ।
तन्निर्वर्त्यं विकार्यं च कर्म द्वेधा व्यवस्थितम् ॥ ४९ ॥
प्रकृत्युच्छेदसंभूतं किंचित्काष्ठादिभस्मवत् ।
किंचिद्गुणान्तरोत्पत्त्या सुवर्णादिविकारवत् ॥ ५० ॥
क्रियाकृतविशेषाणां सिद्धिर्यत्र न गम्यते ।
दर्शनादनुमानाद्वा तत् प्राप्यमिति कथ्यते ॥ ५१ ॥
विशेषलाभः सर्वत्र विद्यते दर्शनादिभिः ।
केषांचित् तदभिव्यक्तिसिद्धिर्दृष्टिविषादिषु ॥ ५२ ॥
....
यथा चैकमपादानं शास्त्रे भेदेन दर्शितम् ।
तथैकमेव कर्मापि भेदेन प्रतिपादितम् ॥ ७७ ॥
निर्वर्त्यो वा विकार्यो वा प्राप्यो वा साधनाश्रयः ।
क्रियाणामेव साध्यत्वात् सिद्धरूपोभिधीयते ॥ ७८ ॥

(ii) Professor K. B. Pathak (Ind. Ant. XLI, Oct. 1912, p. 237) has argued that this three-fold division of कर्म—

unknown both to Pāṇini and Patañjali—was evolved out of Pāṇini's sūtra I. iv. 49 by the genius of Bhartṛihari himself, Daṇḍin having borrowed it from Bhartṛihari. No definite proof, however, has been adduced to prove that the three-fold division of कर्म was first made by Bhartṛihari himself. The fragmentary Berlin Ms. of Bhartṛihari's commentary on Patañjali's Mahābhāshya—the only Ms. of the work hitherto discovered—unfortunately does not go beyond I. i. 55, and we have no other clear evidence one way or the other. Seeing, however, that Bhartṛihari himself, as Kielhorn points out (M. Bh., vol. ii, Preface p. 20), had an 'extensive commentorial literature' before him, it is unsafe to assert in the absence of compelling evidence that a particular doctrine originated with Bhartṛihari, and to base upon that assertion other chronological superstructure. So far as the evidence goes therefore it is not proved that Daṇḍin lived after 650 A. D., the traditional date of Bhartṛihari's death.

(iii) A निर्वर्त्यकर्म is कट in the sentence भृत्यः कटं करोति। Here the causal activity consists in the manufacture of the कट, and its exact nature is determined by the object to be produced. A विकार्यकर्म is सुवर्ण in the sentence सुवर्णकारः सुवर्णं संस्करोति. Here again the exact nature of the causal operation depends upon the sort of विकार or संस्कार effected. As distinct from these is the प्राप्यकर्म, viz. ग्राम in the sentence रामो ग्रामं याति or रामो ग्रामं पश्यति. Here the गमन or दर्शन involves the same kind of activity whether its object is ग्राम or something else. Hence Daṇḍin says that in निर्वर्त्य and विकार्य कर्मs the हेतुत्व is कर्मापेक्ष; while in प्राप्य it is generally (प्रायःशब्देन बुद्धिसुखदुःखादिषु च प्राप्येषु तदपेक्षयैव हेतुत्वमिति ज्ञाप्यते—says Ca) क्रियापेक्ष only. As a further consequence it follows that in the first two instances other साधनs (expressed by other कारक cases) are required; but they are unnecessary for the last. It will be incidently noted that दर्शन involves the गमन or the issuing out of the चक्षुरिन्द्रिय to its objects, in accordance with the इन्द्रियाणां प्राप्यकारिता theory of sense-perception.

Notes to II. 241-245—(i) In ii. 242 the forests have been transformed into poison. A विकार involves a change of form and quality, the inner substance remaining the same.

(ii) Bhoja has given ii. 243 as an illustration of what he calls प्रयोजकः क्रियानाविष्टो हेतुः । For explanation see Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa, p. 274 f.

(iii) Daṇḍin has given for प्राप्यकर्म an illustration that depends upon our understanding the doctrine of इन्द्रियाणां प्राप्यकारिता. A straight-forward illustration would have used an ordinary verb of motion. This he has done in ii. 244; only, mere statements like "birds are repairing unto their nests" have no poetry if interpreted wholly and solely as containing the statement of a प्राप्यकर्म. Bhāmaha criticises such bald or unpoetic statements in the following words (ii. 87)—

गतोऽस्तमर्को भातीन्दुर्यान्ति वासाय पक्षिणः ।
इत्येवमादि किं काव्यं वार्तामेनां प्रचक्षते ॥

(iv) Here an interesting chronological question has been raised. Is Daṇḍin by his words—इतीदमपि साध्वेव (ii. 244^c)—expressing his dissent from Bhāmaha's unjust condemnation of the काव्य; or is Bhāmaha criticising Daṇḍin by refusing to allow as poetry what Daṇḍin gives as good poetry. At first blush both views seem to be equally correct; but it seems to us that *if* one of the two writers is quoting the other at all, it is Bhāmaha who is criticising Daṇḍin, though it is *possible* that the verse was one of the floating traditional lines—like many another in Patañjali's Mahābhāshya—which had been made the object of exposition by several Ālaṁkārikas before them. Daṇḍin, we think, gives it as his opinion that the line is unpoetic, and so is not an illustration of कारकहेतु with प्राप्यकर्म. But it can be a good ज्ञापकहेतु for indicating the time. Mammaṭa thus brings out the suggestion about the कालावस्था (P. 290)—गतोऽस्तमर्कः इत्यतः सपत्नं प्रत्यवस्कन्दनावसर इति अभिसरणमुपक्रम्यतामिति प्राप्तप्रायस्ते प्रेयानिति कर्मकरणान्निवर्तामहे इति सांध्यो विधिरुपक्रम्यतामिति दूरं मा गाः इति सुरभयो गृहं प्रवेश्यन्तामिति संतापोऽधुना न

भवतीति विक्रेयवस्तूनि संह्रियन्तामिति नागतोद्यापि प्रेयानित्यादिरनवधिर्व्यङ्ग्योर्थ-स्तत्र तत्र प्रतिभाति ।

(v) Dandin uses the words इतीदमपि साध्वेव to explain why he has not taken a regular verb implying motion as his illustration for प्राप्यकर्म. A mere motion as that of birds to their nests has no वैचित्र्य if understood as an illustration of a कारकहेतु with प्राप्यकर्म. But, says he, the instance can be a good illustration for a ज्ञापकहेतु. After this Dandin proceeds to give a regular example of a ज्ञापकहेतु in ii. 245. Similarly Bhāmaha *can* be understood as criticising the line in question even as the illustration of a ज्ञापकहेतु. It then becomes mere वार्ता, mere report of the weather, and hence void of any alaṁkāra. The chronological relation between Dandin and Bhāmaha cannot in any case be made to rest upon the doubtful testimony of this passage alone.

Notes to II. 246-252—(i) Bhoja quotes from Dandin stanzas ii. 247, 248, 249, 250 and 251. His comments on these are: ii. 247—अत्र विद्यानभ्यासादेः प्रागभावस्य व्यसनादिकारणत्वम्। ii. 248—अत्र कामकथोन्मादगमनादेः प्रध्वंसाभावस्य पुण्याश्रमानुसंधानकारणत्वम् (with the variant गतो for क्षतो). ii. 249—अत्र वनानि अमूनि न गृहाणीत्यादेरितरेतराभावस्य मनःप्रमोदकारणत्वम् । ii. 250–अत्रानालोचितचेष्टितस्यात्यन्ताभावो विभूतीनां निर्विघ्नवृद्धिहेतुः (with the variants तेषु for तेषां and निर्विघ्ना विभूतयः for सततं सर्वसंपदः). ii. 251—अत्र वस्तुन उत्पादः प्रागभावाभाव उच्यते। तेनेह सहकारमञ्जरीणामुद्भेदस्य पथिकनारीणां मरणे कारणत्वम्। For a more accurate explanation of the last illustration see our Sanskrit commentary ii. 251[7]. The commentary also gives the other three illustrations not given by Dandin.

Notes to II. 253-254—(i) A चित्रहेतु is a violation of the law of Nature. Hence Dandin suggests that the violation should not be prominently expressed but should be conveyed in a secondary or subdued tone. Otherwise it would be a different figure-of-speech.

Notes to II. 255—(i) The example given involves only स्थलकृतदूरता; Bhoja gives also an example of कालकृतदूरता in the verse अनश्ववानेन etc. quoted by us in our Sanskrit commentary to ii. 255.

(ii) Several writers who do not recognise Hetu as a distinct alaṁkāra designate the स्थलकृतविदूरत्व between कारण and कार्य as a distinct figure-of-speech known as असंगति. Mammaṭa thus defines it (p. 869)—

भिन्नदेशतयात्यन्तं कार्यकारणभूतयोः ।
युगपद्धर्मयोर्यत्र ख्यातिः सा स्यादसंगतिः ॥

explaining the point thus in his Vṛitti—इह यद्देशं करणं तद्देशमेव कार्यमुत्पद्यमानं दृष्टम् यथा धूमादि । यत्र तु हेतुफलरूपयोरपि धर्मयोः केनाप्यतिशयेन नानादेशतया युगपदवभासनम् सा तयोः स्वभावोत्पन्नपरस्परसंगतित्यागादसंगतिः ।

Notes to II. 256—(i) A more familiar example of this variety is—

सममेव समाक्रान्तं द्वयं द्विरदगामिना ।
तेन सिंहासनं पित्र्यमखिलं चारिमण्डलम् ॥

regarding which Bhoja observes—अत्र राज्याभिषेकरिपुमण्डलाक्रमणयोर्हेतुहेतुमद्भावेन सत्यपि पौर्वापर्ये क्षिप्रकारित्वात् तुल्यमेव कार्यकारणभावो विवक्षितः । तेन सहजो नामायं चित्रहेतुः ।

(ii) The figure can be confused with सहोक्ति (ii. 352–354). The distinction between the two is explained in our Sanskrit Commentary, p. 324, lines 8–10. Compare, for the distinction between this figure and the Dīpaka variety illustrated in ii. 106 our Note to this last stanza.

(iii) Several later writers have subsumed this चित्र variety under अतिशयोक्ति, and particularly that variety of it known as कार्यकारणयोः पौर्वापर्यविपर्ययरूपा. विपर्ययश्च द्विविधः कार्यस्य प्राथम्येन सहभावेन चेति—as a commentator explains. Thus this variety of अतिशयोक्ति would include also the next or the कार्यानन्तरज variety of चित्रहेतु.

Notes to II. 257—(i) Bhoja thus explains the illustration—
अत्र चन्द्रोदयलक्षणाद्धेतोः पूर्वकालमेव रागसागर उदीर्ण इति कार्यस्योदयलाभः । स इह गुणवृत्त्याश्रयणे हेतावतिशयं पुष्यतीत्ययं कार्यानन्तरजो नाम चित्रहेतुः ।

Notes to II. 258-259—(i) The figure called विचित्र as recognised by रुय्यक (who defines it, P. 133, as—स्वविपरीतफलनिष्पत्तये प्रयत्नः), by विश्वनाथ, and by most later writers differs from these two varieties, if at all, only in the circumstance that the कारण is in that figure supposed to be making a voluntary effort to produce an unsuitable effect. When such an effect is produced unexpectedly and disconcerts the agent we have the figures-of-speech called विषम in its several varieties, thus defined by Mammaṭa (p. 875)—

क्वचिद्यदतिवैधर्म्यान्न श्लेषो घटनामियात् ।
कर्तुः क्रियाफलावाप्तिर्नैवानर्थश्च यद्भवेत् ॥
गुणक्रियाभ्यां कार्यस्य कारणस्य गुणक्रिये ।
क्रमेण च विरुद्धे यत् स एष विषमो मतः ॥

or, the figure of speech known as व्याघात, if the agent of the unexpected or disconcerting result is different from the original agent. Cp. Mammaṭa (p. 911)—

यद्यथा साधितं केनाप्यपरेण तदन्यथा ।
तथैव यद्विधीयेत स व्याघात इति स्मृतः ॥

(ii) Bhoja quotes Kāvyādarśa ii. 83 as an illustration for the अयुक्त variety of चित्रहेतु. Daṇḍin apparently regards the हेतु alaṁkāra in the stanza as subordinate to the रूपक. Probably there is a mixture (संसृष्टि) of both these figures in that stanza. The अहेतु alaṁkāra defined by Bhoja as (iii. 18)—

वस्तुनो वा स्वभावेन शक्तेर्वा हानिहेतुना ।
अकृतात्मीयकार्यः स्यादहेतुर्व्याहतस्तु यः ॥

can also be—यथासंभवम्—subsumed under Daṇḍin's चित्रहेतु.

Notes to II. 260-264—(i) Ruyyaka, Rudraṭa, Mammaṭa, Vāgbhaṭa, Viśvanātha and most subsequent writers recognise Sūkshma as a distinct alaṁkāra. It is not easy to understand why Bhāmaha found the alaṁkāra void of वक्रोक्ति or वैचित्र्य. Sūkshma involves a process of inference, but it is not to be confused with ज्ञापकहेतु since the ज्ञाप्य is here subtle and discovered only by shrewd observation of gestures or postures.

(ii) A figure-of-speech called पिहित and defined in the कुवलयानन्द (151) as—पिहितं परवृत्तान्तज्ञातुः साकूतचेष्टितम् । is very difficult to distinguish from सूक्ष्म. The चन्द्रिकाकार thus formulates the distinction (ibid, p. 191)—सूक्ष्मालंकारे पराभिप्रायमवगत्य साकूतचेष्टितेनोत्तरसमर्पणम् । पिहितालंकारे तु गुढं परवृत्तान्तं ज्ञात्वा साकूतचेष्टया तत्प्रकाशनमिति भेदो बोध्यः । Normally, however, पिहित is understood differently. Vāgbhaṭa (p. 43) defines it as—एकत्राधारे यत्राधेयद्वयस्यैकेनैकं पिधीयते तत् पिहितम् । Rudraṭa on the other hand defines it as (ix. 50)—

यत्रातिप्रबलतया गुणः समानाधिकरणमसमानम् ।
अर्थान्तरं पिदध्यादाविर्भूतमपि तत् पिहितम् ॥

Notes to II. 265-267—(i) In सूक्ष्म there is the discovery of the hidden thing, but not disclosure. In लेश (No. 1) there is (a) a concealing, (b) a discovery leading to imminent disclosure, and (c) an attempt to prevent the disclosure under some other pretext. This figure is known in other writers as व्याजोक्ति defined by Rudraṭa (p. 174) as—उद्भिन्नवस्तुनिगूहनम् and by Viśvanātha (x. 92) as—व्याजोक्तिर्गोपनं व्याजादुद्भिन्नस्यापि वस्तुनः । Vāmana's definition (iv. 3. 25)—व्याजस्य सत्यसारूप्यं व्याजोक्तिः is tantamount to the same thing.

(ii) This figure has to be distinguished from अपह्नुति (ii. 304). As will be clear from Daṇḍin's definition of the latter figure (cp. also Note (iii) to ii. 95) he does not regard साम्य as the invariable basis of an अपह्नुति; and so the usual distinction between these two figures cannot be stated as it is generally stated by commentators—साम्यमूलकापह्नवोपह्नुतिः । अत्र (i. e. [व्याजोक्तौ or लेशे) तु न साम्यविवक्षेति भेदः । We can perhaps formulate the distinction between them by saying that in an अपह्नुति neither the thing negated nor the thing asserted is anything like subtle or mysterious. In लेश the subtlety of the thing constitutes the very essence of the figure.

(iii) Vāmana's example for the figure is—

शरच्चन्द्रांशु(v. l. च्छशाङ्क)गौरेण वाताविद्धेन भामिनि ।
काशपुष्पलवेनेदं साश्रुपातं मुखं कृतम् (v. l. मम) ॥

This is from Bhāsa's Svapnavāsavadattā (iv. 7). Our example (ii. 267) uses the same व्याज but under entirely different circumstances.

Notes to II. 268-272—(i) Writers who define लेश in the alternative way mentioned are—

Bhoja (iv. 56)—

दोषस्य यो गुणीभावो दोषीभावो गुणस्य यः ।
स लेशः स्यात् ततो नान्या व्याजस्तुतिरपीष्यते ॥

Rudraṭa (vii. 100)—

दोषीभावो यस्मिन् गुणस्य दोषस्य वा गुणीभावः ।
अभिधीयते तथाविधकर्मनिमित्तः स लेशः स्यात् ॥

Kuvalayānanda (137)—

लेशः स्याद्दोषगुणयोर्गुणदोषत्वकल्पनम् ।

Vāgbhaṭa (p. 43)—

कार्यतो गुणदोषविपर्ययो लेशः ।

and Jagannātha (p. 512)—

गुणस्यानिष्टसाधनतया दोषत्वेन दोषस्येष्टसाधनतया गुणत्वेन च वर्णनं लेशः ।

But none of these writers are earlier than Daṇḍin, and it is difficult to ascertain what writers Daṇḍin designates by एके. Bhāmaha cannot be one of them, as he rejects लेश in both the alternative forms.

(ii) Bhoja already has raised the question of the distinction of this figure from व्याजस्तुति (ii. 343). We have already quoted the view of Appayya Dīkshita on the point in our Sanskrit Commentary (p. 269[13]—p. 270[51]). Daṇḍin who recognises both लेश (No. 2) and व्याजस्तुति as distinct figures makes the distinction turn naturally upon the word लेशतः in ii. 268[d]. The Alaṁkārakaustubha (p. 407 f.) would subsume लेश (No. 2 under व्याघात, an alaṁkāra not recognised by Daṇḍin.

(iii) The निन्दा or स्तुति may at times involve a similarity between things; and Bhoja accordingly gives

examples involving what he calls a समासोक्ति and also not involving it (see p. 409). For further remarks see Notes to ii. 343.

Notes to II. 273-274—(i) Except Bharata, Agnipurāṇa, Hemachandra, and Alaṁkāraśekhara this figure-of-speech is recognised by all extant writers. Some distinctive definitions may here be collected—

Bhāmaha (ii 89) and Udbhaṭa (p. 42)—

भूयसामुपदिष्टानामर्थानामसधर्मणाम् ।
क्रमशो योऽनुनिर्देशो यथासंख्यं तदुच्यते ॥

Rudraṭa (vii. 34)—

निर्दिश्यन्ते यस्मिन्नर्था विविधा यथैव परिपाट्या ।
पुनरपि तत्प्रतिबद्धास्तथैव तत् स्याद्यथासंख्यम् ॥

Vāmana (iv. 3. 17)—

उपमेयोपमानानां क्रमसंबन्धः क्रमः ।

Bhoja (iv. 79)—

शब्दस्य यदि वार्थस्य द्वयोरप्यनयोरथ ।
भणनं परिपाट्या यत् क्रमः स परिकीर्तितः ॥

and Mammaṭa (p. 803)—

यथासंख्यं क्रमेणैव क्रमिकाणां समन्वयः ।

(ii) It will be noticed that while Vāmana requires that the things mentioned in succession should have between them a relation of similarity, Bhāmaha contrarywise holds that the things should not be so related. Jagannātha, as also Hemachandra before him, argues (p. 478) that यथासंख्य should not be recognised as a distinct figure. His words are—यथासंख्यमलंकारपदवीमेव तावत् कथमारोढुं प्रभवतीति तु विचारणीयम् । न ह्यस्मिल्लोकसिद्धे कविप्रतिभानिर्मितत्वस्यालंकारताजीवातोर्लेशतोऽप्युपलब्धिरस्ति येनालंकारव्यपदेशो मनागपि स्थाने स्यात् । अतोऽपक्रमत्वरूपदोषाभाव एव यथासंख्यम् । Vāmana's requirement of similarity would probably supply the element of वैचित्र्य needed for the figure. It is however a fact that quite apart from the similarity there is a charm even in the orderly succession of things, and hence the alaṁkāra deserves to be recognised as an independent alaṁkāra.

Notes to II. 275—(i) Dandin now defines together a group of three Alaṁkāras known as रसालंकारs. Bhāmaha (iii. 1-7) and Udbhaṭa (p. 49, generally following Bhāmaha in his treatment) are alone amongst ancient writers to recognise these three alaṁkāras in the sense in which Daṇḍin understands them. Ruyyaka (P. 185), Viśvanātha (x. 95-96) and one or two later writers accept these alaṁkāras and even add to their number the alaṁkāras designated as Samāhita, Bhāvodaya, Bhāvasaṁdhi, and Bhāvaśabalatā (see Kuvalayānandachandrikā on stanzas 169f.), but they have radically altered the nature of these figures in as much as they require that in these figures the रस, भाव, etc. ought to be introduced in subordination to another वाक्यार्थ and not prominently and for their own sake. This view was first propounded by the author of the ध्वनिकारिकाs (cp. ii. 5, p. 71)—

प्रधानेन्यत्र वाक्यार्थे यत्राङ्गं तु रसादयः ।
काव्ये तस्मिन्नलंकारो रसादिरिति मे मतिः ॥

Ānandavardhana's Āloka on this kārikā runs as follows :—यद्यपि रसवदलंकारस्यान्यैर्दर्शितो विषयस्तथापि यस्मिन् काव्ये प्रधानतयान्योर्थो वाक्यार्थीभूतस्तस्य चाङ्गभूता ये रसादयस्ते रसादेरलंकारस्य विषय इति मामकीनः पक्षः । Daṇḍin, Bhāmaha, or some predecessor of them is perhaps intended to be alluded to in the kārikā in question : Abhinavagupta in his ध्वन्यालोकलोचन to the passage actually mentions Bhāmaha. Our Sanskrit Commentary on ii. 275 lines 123ff. quotes Premachandra's attempt to defend the position taken by Daṇḍin and Bhāmaha as against the new school.

(ii) We have explained in a general way in our Note (i) to i. 18 the nature of Rasa, but it is necessary to afford a detailed exposition of the theory of Rasas in all its bearings. Poetry consists of two elements : words and sense (ignoring the question of their relative prominence). Now there are excellences and defects belonging to words and to sense, and these are treated at great length in the works of the earlier Alaṁkārikas. They were considered as character-

istics inherent in the "body" of poetry. Daṇḍin calls them प्राणs or life-breaths (i. 42). And as a body can have extraneous ornaments to set forth its natural charm so poetry also had its "ornaments" or alaṁkāras, these being specific turns of expression or thought which could not be covered by the usual गुणs (and दोषs). For a time advance in the science of Poetics consisted mainly in an elaboration of the गुणs and अलंकारs, their number and mutual distinction. The next step of importance taken was the formulation of the doctrine of रीतिs or styles. It was probably discovered that certain schools, courts, or literary coteries developed only specific guṇas and alaṁkāras to the exclusion of others; and as these originally were confined to definite territorial divisions the styles cultivated by them got the nicknames of वैदर्भी, गौडी, पाञ्चाली, etc. This may have led to emulation which in time degenerated into jealousy and animosity; and the ultimate compromise effected only ended in the doctrine that all the रीतिs had each an element of good and of evil in it.

(iii) All this time however no attempt was made to explain why certain गुणs or अलंकारs afford pleasure more than others. A mere external labelling and classification was naturally felt to be inadequate in a science of Æsthetics. Help was sought at first from the sister science of Dramaturgy. The Nāṭyaśāstra had led down the Sūtra—विभावानुभावव्यभिचारिसंयोगाद्रसनिष्पत्तिः (Adhyāya vi, p. 62, where this ancient theory is quoted and explained). The generating and intensifying factors (आलम्बन and उद्दीपन विभावs) are सीता, शकुन्तला, etc. and वसन्त, ज्योत्स्ना, मेघोदय, etc. And they produce in राम, दुष्यन्त etc. in the first place one or more of the 8 सात्त्विक अनुभावs, which are somewhat involuntary and physiological in origin, and along with them a number of psychological moods or feelings through which the hero passes. These latter are some of them dominent feelings or स्थायिभावs of which there are nine enumerated; and some, concurrent feelings or व्यभिचारिन्s of

which no less than 33 are enumerated. The अनुभावs, स्थायिभावs and व्यभिचारिभावs together make up the 49 (50) kinds of भावs, and these भावs, belonging to राम, दुष्यन्त, etc. (or to the actors representing them), called into existence by definite "factors," produce in the audience by sympathy the nine रसs or sentiments. This is the theory of the Nāṭyaśāstra which can be graphically thus presented :—

आलम्बन उद्दीपन	विभावs produce (in Actor)	8 सात्त्विक अनुभावs 8 (9) स्थायिभावs 33 व्यभिचारिन्s	produce 8(9) रसs. (in Audience)

The eight अनुभावs are enumerated in our Sanskrit Com. ii. 275^{75-76}, the स्थायिभावs in ii. 275^{58-59}, and व्यभिचारिन्s in ii. 275^{83-90}. The eight (or nine) रसs correspond to the nine स्थायिभावs—

रति to श्रृङ्गार	क्रोध to रौद्र	जुगुप्सा to बीभत्स
हास to हास्य	उत्साह to वीर	विस्मय to अद्भुत
शोक to करुण	भय to भयानक	[निर्वेद to शान्त]

(iv) Daṇḍin is aware of the existence of the रस theory (cp. i. 51, ii. 280, iii. 170, and especially the last passage) but he did not know how to organically incorporate it with his theory of Poetics. Accordingly he merely gives a recognition to the रस theory by introducing a new variety of अलंकारs for cases where the रसs for their own sake were pre-eminently developed in a poem which was otherwise devoid of the usual गुणs or अलंकारs. The रस comes in for recognition also in connection with Daṇḍin's treatment of माधुर्य (i. 51). This was merely borrowing a feather from the sister science. Rasa is of the nature of an inner consciousness (hence called चर्वणा), and it is evident that it can be felt even in poems not containing the रसवत् alaṁkāra. Some Ālaṁkārikas, as we saw, tried to get out of the problem by recognising रसवत् alaṁkāra only in those cases where the रस is felt as being subordinated to the वाक्यार्थ proper.

(v) The real solution of the matter came from the grammarians. If poetry consists of words having specific sense (or words and sense), it is necessary to

determine at first the varieties of sense or अर्थ. There is the expressed sense or the वाच्यार्थ and the figurative or indicative sense or लक्ष्यार्थ. In the stock instance गङ्गा means literally and primarily the stream, which is the वाच्यार्थ. But in statements like गङ्गायां ग्रामः the word must mean not the stream but the bank. This is the secondary significance of the word or its लक्ष्यार्थ. Now why should a person be prompted to say गङ्गायां ग्रामः instead of गङ्गातटे ग्रामः ? Clearly there must be a प्रयोजन (ignoring for the moment the few cases where रूढि overpowers it), and this was discovered to be the intention to bring out the शैत्य, पावनत्व, and other qualities inherent in the ग्राम by reason of its proximity to the stream. The प्रयोजन of a लक्षणा is therefore the व्यङ्ग्य sense. In cases like the above where the वाच्य and the लक्ष्य senses can be clearly distinguished from the व्यङ्ग्य sense there is no difficulty of any kind. But there are cases where the व्यङ्ग्य is असंलक्ष्यक्रम; where the statement as a whole brings in a subtle suggestion without our being able to locate it as resulting from some specific word or words; and all रसs could now come in under the असंलक्ष्यक्रमव्यङ्ग्य.

(vi) One inevitable consequence of the share which the grammarians had in the formulation of the ध्वनि theory was the adoption of their स्फोट theory by the Ālaṁkārikas. Ānandavardhana in his ध्वन्यालोक (p. 47-48) clearly recognises this indebtedness. He says—प्रथमे हि विद्वांसो वैयाकरणाः व्याकरणमूलत्वात् सर्वविद्यानाम् । ते च श्रूयमाणेषु वर्णेषु ध्वनिरिति व्यवहरन्ति । तथैवान्यैस्तन्मतानुसारिभिः सूरिभिः काव्यतत्त्वार्थदर्शिभिर्वाच्यवाचकसंमिश्रः शब्दात्मा काव्यमिति व्यपदिश्यते व्यञ्जकत्वसाम्याद्ध्वनिरित्युक्तः । In other words :—

वैया॰ call शब्द = ध्वनि, as being the व्यञ्जक of स्फोट (to which गकारादि sounds are subordinate);

आलं॰ call शब्दार्थ = ध्वनि, as being the व्यञ्जक of व्यङ्ग्य (to which the वाच्य sense is subordinate).

This means that there is no उत्पत्ति but only an अभिव्यक्ति of the रसs. That is to say, the gestures and movements of the actor can prevail over you only if you are सहृदय and have once experienced feelings and emo-

tions answerable to those depicted or enacted. The Ālaṁkārikas who followed this view of the case naturally gave no independent place to रसवत् and other Alaṁkāras. If Mammaṭa in one place (Ullāsa i. p. 23) mentions the रसवत् it is भामहभट्टोद्भट प्रभृतिचिरंतनालंकारिकमतेन, as a commentator explains it.

(vii) If शब्द (or शब्दार्थौ) be the body and गुणs the life-breaths of poetry, the question—what is the soul of poetry—which is naturally suggested by the metaphor is answered (i) by Vāmana (I. ii. 6) as रीतिरात्मा काव्यस्य; (ii) by the ध्वनि school (ध्वनिकारिका 1) as काव्यस्यात्मा ध्वनिः and (iii) by Viśvanātha (i. 3) as वाक्यं रसात्मकं काव्यम्. On this point compare Notes to i. 10. The question can have only an academic interest once we have realised the function of रस, रीति or ध्वनि in poetry.

(viii) How रस is produced in the heart of the सहृदय प्रेक्षक, its exact *modus operandi*, has given rise to a number of divergent views which it would take us too far afield to discuss here in detail. Consult on the question ध्वन्यालोकलोचन p. 69, Mammaṭa, Ullāsa iv., pp. 101–111, and Rasagaṅgādhara pp. 22–31.

(ix) The distinction between प्रेयस्, रसवत्, and ऊर्जस्विन् can be thus formulated. If the 50 भावs described above (Note iii) are any of them produced by certain विभावs the nature of which prevents the manifestation of a corresponding full-fledged रस in the audience or the reader—when, for instance, the स्थायिभाव called रति is produced not by some lady-love but by गुरु, देव, नृपति, पुत्र, etc.—we have an incomplete रस or rather अप्राप्तरसावस्थभाव, which gives rise to प्रेयोलंकार. The alaṁkāra is sometimes called भावालंकार also;—cp. अलंकारसर्वस्व p. 189. A रसवत् alaṁkāra of course exhibits the विभावs, अनुभावs, and व्यभिचारिन्s in regular sequence. As Bhāmaha says (iii. 6) रसवद्दर्शितस्पष्टशृङ्गारादिरसं यथा । Finally an ऊर्जस्विन् exhibits an inchoate Rasa (as in Preyas) or a full-fledged Rasa (as in Rasavat), but the manner of exteriorisation adopted is अनुचित, is शास्त्रसंविद्विरुद्ध, is in flagrant opposition to the normal or the conventional, purposely with a view to stamp one's own individuality upon it. Thus in the

example given (ii. 293–4), to allow an enemy hemned in battle to depart is what is unexpected; but the hero does it owing to his over-weening self-confidence.

Notes to II. 276–277—(i) The same example is given by Bhāmaha iii. 5. Cp. also our Note (iii) to ii. 37. The verse seems to be an adaptation of the last verse in the 92nd Adhyāya of the Udyogaparvan. It is difficult to ascertain whether the adaptation was the work of Bhāmaha or of Daṇḍin or of an unknown predecessor of both. The example illustrates the प्रीति of विदुर for श्रीकृष्ण and also of श्रीकृष्ण for विदुर.

Notes to II. 278–279—(i) The example illustrates the प्रीति on the side of the King alone. The श्रुतानुपालिनी gives **us** this information about the King—रातवर्मा नाम केरलानामधिपतिरत्यन्ताशिवभक्तः । सोपि दिग्विजयवशेन कैलासं प्राप्तः पाशुपतमन्त्रेण पशुपतिं त्र्यम्बकमाराध्य दृष्टवान् । The Keralas are mentioned in Rock Edict II of Asoka. Their most ancient capital was Vanji or Vanchi about 28 miles from Cochin on the Malabar Coast. But as our knowledge of their geneology is almost nil Daṇḍin's mention of **a** king of **that** line—supposing he really belongs to that line—gives us no solid ground for any chronological conclusion. On the other hand Daṇḍin in iii. 114 mentions a city with a name of 5 varṇas, the middle one being a nasal, where rule kings with a name of 8 वर्णs. Here although the city could be वञ्ची or वञ्जी (the capital of ancient Kerala) as well as काञ्ची (Conjeeveram) the capital of the Pallavas, yet the name पल्लवाः consists of 8 वर्णs (including the visarga) while the Kerala kings, even adopting their ancient local name of 'Cheraḷādan' do not give the required number of varṇas. In the present state of our knowledge therefore Daṇḍin seems to have definitely alluded to the Pallavas of Kāñchī; and the temptation to regard रातवर्मन् as a Pallava king is irresistible. Unfortunately, in the published names of the Pallava kings, there is none of this name; but if the variant राजवर्मन् is adopted we can identify him

with नरसिंहवर्मा II who had राजसिंहवर्मा as his other name. Narasiṁhavarman's date is A. D. 690–715 (see G. Jouveau-Dubreul, Ancient History of the Deccan, p. 70), and he is described as a devout Śaiva and as a builder of several Śiva temples including the noble Kailāsanātha temple (Indian Antiquary for 1912, p. 90–92). Hiuen Tsang who visited Kāñchī in A. D. 640 during the reign of Narasiṁhavarman I (630–668) affords some testimony for the triumph of Śaivism at the time.

(ii) In partial variance with this we have the testimony of the Ms. of अवन्तिसुन्दरीकथासार (Report of the Peripatetic Party of the Government Or. Mss. Library, Madras, for the years 1916–19, Ms. No. 194) which connects Daṇḍin's grand-father with the Pallava king Siṁhavishṇu (575–600) thus making Daṇḍin a contemporary of Narasiṁhavarman I (630–668). The pertinent verses from the poem (copied down on the occasion of the First Oriental Conference in Poona, where the Ms. was amongst the exhibits) may here be given:—

अस्ति प्रासादविस्तारग्रस्तव्योमान्तरा पुरी ।
काञ्चीपुराख्या कल्याणी ककुभः कुम्भजन्मनः ॥

....

तस्यां जज्ञे बुधव्रातध्वस्ताखिलविपल्लवः ।
पल्लवेषु महीपालः सिंहविष्णुरिति श्रुतः ॥

....

अदृष्टपूर्वो गन्धर्वस्तं सभासदमेकदा ।
उदञ्जलि महीपालमुपवीणयदार्यया ॥

....

श्रुत्वेनामत्युदारार्थां कुतूहलबलान्नृपः ।
अब्रवीद्भद्र केनेयं निर्मिता वर्णपद्धतिः ॥
इत्युचिवांसं प्रत्यूचे गन्धर्वस्तं धनेश्वरम् ।

....

अस्त्यानन्दपुरं नाम प्रदेशे पश्चिमोत्तरे ।
आर्यदेशशिखारत्नं तत्रासन् बहवो द्विजाः ॥
ततोभिनिस्सृता काचित् कौशिकी ब्रह्मसंततिः ।

....

तस्यां नारायणस्वामिनाम्नो नारायणोदरात् ।
दामोदर इति श्रीमान्.................... ॥

स मेधावी कविर्विद्वान् भारविः(विं) प्रभवं गिराम् ।
अनुरुध्याकरोन्मैत्रीं नरेन्द्रे विष्णुवर्धने ॥
....
तस्यान्तिके वसत्येष तेनार्येयमुदीरिता ॥
इति श्रुत्वा महीपालस्तदालोकनलोलुपः ।
....
नृपनिर्बन्धनिर्दिष्टे प्रकृष्टविभवे गृहे ।
वहतः पैतृकीं वृत्तिं तस्यासीत् तनयत्रयम् ॥
मनोरथाह्वयस्तेषां मध्यमो वङ्गवंशगः (?) ।
ततस्तनूजाश्चत्वारः स्रष्टुर्वेदा इवाभवन् ॥
श्रीवीरभद्र इत्येषां..................... ।
यवीयानस्य च श्लाघ्या गौरी नामाभवत् प्रिया ॥
ततः कथंचित् सा गौरी द्विजाधिपशिखामणेः ।
कुमारं दण्डिनामानं व्यक्तशक्तिमजीजनत् ॥
स बाल एव मात्रा च पित्रा चापि व्ययुज्यत ।
अयुज्यत गरीयस्या सरस्वत्या श्रुतेन च ॥
सविक्रिये पुरे तस्मिन् परचक्रोपरोधतः ।
स चचार शुभाचारः सर्वामुर्वीमुदारधीः ॥
....
अथाहूतः क्षितीशेन प्रशान्तोपद्रवे पुरे ।
स्वसुहृद्बन्धुमध्यस्थः स भेजे निजमास्पदम् ॥

The story goes on to mention a visit which Daṇḍin subsequently pays to the temple of Vishṇu in Mahāmallapuram in Keral country adjoining the sea—

महामल्लपुरे देवः स्वैरं वारिधिसंनिधौ ।
आस्ते मुकुन्दः सानन्दं फणीन्द्र इव मन्दिरे ॥

(iii) We need not of course take all the gossiping tales in the अवन्तिसुन्दरीकथा as sober history; but the present story has some verisimilitude about it. Daṇḍin is here made a contemporary of Siṁhavishṇu's successors Mahendravarman I (600–630) and Narasiṁhavarman I (630–668), the first of whom is famous as the king under whose orders were constructed the remarkable monolithic temples known as the 'Seven Pagodas' at Māmallapuram (see Smith's Early History, 3rd ed., p. 474). The trouble hinted at in the last verse above quoted is therefore probably the invasion of the Pallava

country by the Chālukya monarch, Pulakeśin II, about 609 or 610. Pulakeśin was victorious at first, but was later defeated by Narasiṁhavarman I in 642 A. D. Mahendravarman is reported to have been a Jain originally, and to have been converted to faith in Śiva by a famous Tamil saint. If therefore we can imagine that राजवर्मन् is a poetic variant for महेन्द्रवर्मन् or that महेन्द्रवर्मन् bore रातवर्मन् as an additional name, we have here all the evidence that we can expect from tradition for placing Daṇḍin at the court of the Pallavas of Kāñchī in the first half of the 7th century. And as the Pallava power was at its height during this very period, their kingdom might have at this time included the old Chera or Kerala country. We may add that the king Vishṇuvardhana mentioned in the earlier part of the extract can be the prince Vishṇuvardhana who founded, about A. D. 615, the line of the Eastern Chālukyas. Ānandapura the city I am unable to identify.

(iv) The eight forms of manifestation mentioned in ii. 278 are of course the same as the अष्टविधा तनु or प्रकृति alluded to by Kālidāsa in the benedictory verse of the Śākuntala.

Notes to II. 280-281—(i) Daṇḍin is now going to give in succession the illustrations for रसवत्, a separate one for each रस.

(ii) Our Ms. N., in a different hand, gives the marginal note identifying अवन्ती with वासवदत्ता. Vāsavadattā was an Avantī Princess; compare Svapnavāsavadattā V. 5. An interesting question is to determine whether Daṇḍin is referring to Bhāsa. Definite indications are unfortunately lacking. The pretended burning of Vāsavadattā at Lāvāṇaka is an old story not invented by Bhāsa. Many dramatists besides Bhāsa have worked on the theme. Tāpasavatsarāja is a play later than Ratnāvali (see the account given by Hultsch in Nach. K. G. W. Gött., 1886). Abhinavagupta in his Nāṭyavedavivṛiti (Madras Ms., vol iii, p. 44) speaks of a play

of Subandhu dealing with the story of उदयन and वासवदत्ता His exact words are— तत्रास्य बहुतरव्यापिनो बहुगर्भस्वप्रायिततुल्यस्य नाट्यायितस्योदाहरणं महाकविसुबन्धुनिबद्धो वासवदत्तानाट्यधाराख्यः (?) समस्त एव प्रयोगः । तत्र हि बिन्दुस्वरः प्रयोज्यवस्तुत उदयनचरिते सामाजिकीकृतोप्युदयनो वासवदत्ताचेष्टिते......तत्र ह्युदयने सामाजिकीकृते सूत्रधारप्रयोगः—तव सुचरितैरेव जयतीति । तत उदयनः—कुतो मम सुचरितानीति सास्रं विलपति । From this it appears that this particular play made use of a play-within-the-play in the *dénouement.* There is also a newly discovered play called Vīṇāvāsavadatta (?) affording analogy in construction with the Bhāsa plays. Besides there are the आख्यायिकाs dealing with the story of Vāsavadattā which were probably known even to the author of Vyākaraṇamahābhāshya (see Kielhorn's ed., vol. ii, p. 284), which however could not have contained a verse like the one given by Daṇḍin. Seeing that Bhāsa's Svapnavāsavadattā does not contain the present verse, it is perhaps possible that Daṇḍin is here alluding to the unknown play of Subandhu referred to by Abhinavagupta, or to some other unknown work.

(iii) In the variants to ii. 280 read—" R, B., सैषा तन्वी P, Rn; " instead of " P, R, B; ".

(iv) The following quotation from Abhinavagupta's Nāṭyavedavivṛiti (Madras ms. p. 204) is worth noting– चिरंतनानां चायमेव पक्षः । तथाहि दण्डिना स्वा(रसा ?)लंकारलक्षणेभ्यधायि—रतिः शृङ्गारतां गता रूपबाहुल्ययोगेनेति । अधिरुह्य परां कोटिं कोपो रौद्रात्मतां गत इत्यादि च ।

Notes to II. 282–285—(i) The stanzas ii. 282, and ii. 284 are apparently of Daṇḍin's own composition; and the same explanation might have been available in the case of ii. 280 also.

Notes to II. 286—(i) The stanza is undoubtedly reminiscent of Raghuvaṁśa viii. 57—

नवपल्लवसंस्तरेपि ते मृदु दूयेत यदङ्गमर्पितम् ।
तदिदं विषहिष्यते कथं वद वामोरु चिताधिरोहणम् ॥

Notes to II. 287–291—(i) It is difficult exactly to perceive the point of ii. 290. Possibly एषां is not to be construed with नन्दनशाखिनाम् but rather refers to certain denizens of heaven that are the topic on hand. The poet is struck to find all their wants answered by a mere tree.

Notes to II. 292—(i) Having introduced रस as constituting the essence of a variety of Alaṁkāra as well as of guṇa, Daṇḍin guards against the possibility of every माधुर्यगुणवत् काव्य necessarily containing the रसवदलंकार, and vice versa. In माधुर्य the emphasis is primarily upon अग्राम्यता.

(ii) Daṇḍin apparently recognises only 8 रसs, ignoring शान्ति, the ninth. This is in conformity with the older view; compare नाट्यशास्त्र vii. 98.

Notes to II. 293–294—(i) Udbhaṭa thus defines ऊर्जस्विन् (p. 51)—

अनौचित्यप्रवृत्तानां कामक्रोधादिकारणात् ।
भावानां च रसानां च बन्ध ऊर्जस्वि कथ्यते ॥

A good example of it is Mālatīmādhava iii. 12—

धत्ते चक्षुर्मुकुलिनि रणत्कोकिले बालचूते
मार्गे गात्रं क्षिपति बकुलामोदगर्भस्य वायोः ।
दाहप्रेम्णा सरसबिसिनीपत्रमात्रोत्तरीय-
स्ताम्यन्मूर्तिः श्रयति बहुशो मृत्यवे चन्द्रपादान् ॥

where Mādhava the desperate lover seeks the very objects that ordinarily lovers would carefully avoid, he being regardless of life and callous to all suffering.

Notes to II. 295–297—(i) Vāmana is the only other writer besides भरत who does not recognise पर्यायोक्त. Bhoja and Rudraṭa designate it as simply पर्याय, a name which some writers reserve for a distinct alaṁkāra not recognised by Daṇḍin. A few leading definitions are here assembled—

Agnipurāṇa (345.18) and Bhāmaha (iii. 8)—

पर्यायोक्तं यदन्येन प्रकारेणाभिधीयते ।

Udbhaṭa (p. 51) adds the extra line—

वाच्यवाचकवृत्तिभ्यां शून्येनावगमात्मना ॥

Rudraṭa (vii. 42)

वस्तु विवक्षितवस्तुप्रतिपादनशक्तमसदृशं तस्य ।
यदजनकमजन्यं वा तत्कथनं यत् स पर्यायः ॥

Bhoja (iv. 80)—

मिषं यदुक्तिभङ्गिर्यावसरो यः स सूरिभिः ।
निराकाङ्क्षोश्च साकाङ्क्षः पर्याय इति गीयते ॥

Ruyyaka (p. iii)—

गम्यस्यापि भङ्ग्यन्तरेणाभिधानं पर्यायोक्तम् ।

Mammaṭa (Ullāsa x. p. 828)—

पर्यायोक्तं विना वाच्यवाचकत्वेन यद्वचः ।

Vāgbhaṭa (iv. 108)—

अतत्परतया यत्र कल्प्यमानेन वस्तुना ।
विवक्षितं प्रतीयेत पर्यायोक्तिरियं तथा ॥

Vāgbhaṭa (p. 36)—

ध्वनिताभिधानं पर्यायोक्तिः ।

Hemachandra (p. 263)—

व्यङ्ग्यस्योक्तिः पर्यायोक्तम् ।

Pratāparudrīya (p. 446)—

कारणं गम्यते यत्र प्रस्तुतात् कार्यवर्णनात् ।
प्रस्तुतत्वेन संबद्धं तत् पर्यायोक्तमुच्यते ॥

Ekāvali (viii. 29)—

यत्र व्यङ्ग्यस्य सतो हेतोः कार्याभिधानभङ्गीभिः ।
स्यादभिधानं सुधियः पर्यायोक्तं विदुस्तदिदम् ॥

Sāhityadarpaṇa (x. 61)—

पर्यायोक्तं यदा भङ्ग्या व्यङ्ग्यमेवाभिधीयते ।

Kuvalayānanda (67)—

पर्यायोक्तं तु गम्यस्य वचो भङ्ग्यन्तराश्रयम् ।

and Jagannātha (p. 409)—

विवक्षितस्यार्थस्य भङ्ग्यन्तरेण प्रतिपादनम् ।

(ii) Most of the definitions (except those of Bhāmaha or Bhoja) contemplate the necessity of distinguishing an ordinary case of व्यञ्जना from पर्यायोक्त. Thus गङ्गायां ग्राम: is a round about way of saying that the ग्राम is cool and holy; but it is a case of pure ध्वनि or suggestion, and not an instance of पर्यायोक्त. Why? Daṇḍin, Bhāmaha, and the earlier writers would answer that there is no poetic pretext (मिष, प्रकार) that makes the periphrasis peculiarly charming. Writers who adopted the ध्वनि theory would reply that *if* the sentence is uttered merely with the primary purpose of telling us just the location of the village, and consequently if the शैत्य and पावनत्व come in only by way of a back-door suggestion, then it is not पर्यायोक्त. If, however, the direct object of the speaker were to tell us that the ग्राम is शैत्यपावनविशिष्ट, and if the writer merely says गङ्गायां ग्राम: or even गङ्गातीरे ग्राम: with an emphasis on गङ्गा, the case does not differ from an ordinary पर्यायोक्त except that the instance is चमत्कृतिशून्य or unpoetic, perhaps. In other words in पर्यायोक्त the व्यङ्ग्यार्थ (शैत्यादि) is itself the वाच्यार्थ or primarily intended, though it is not conveyed as a वाच्यार्थ, but only प्रकारान्तरेण. Mammaṭa means the same thing when he writes in his Vṛitti—यदेवोच्यते तदेव व्यङ्ग्यम् यथा तु व्यङ्ग्यं न तथोच्यते। Compare also the प्रदीप on the passage :—अत्र सन्नपि व्यङ्ग्योर्थ: अतिस्फुटतया न तथातिशेते यथा उक्तेर्वैचित्र्यमिति न ध्वनित्वम् नापि गुणीभूतव्यङ्ग्यत्वम्।

(iii) Ruyyaka, Vidyānātha, and Vidyādhara go a step further. They not only require that the पर्यायोक्त should convey the गम्य or the व्यङ्ग्य sense primarily; but also that the exact mode or प्रकार of conveying it be by describing the effects of it, or the cause of it, or by an analogue of it—the last two modes being recognised by Jagannātha. Compare the Rasagaṅgādhara (p. 415)—अयं चालंकार: क्वचित् कारणेन वाच्येन कार्यस्य गम्यत्वे क्वचित् कार्येण कारणस्य क्वचिदुभयोदासीनेन संबन्धिमात्रेण संबन्धिमात्रस्य चेति विपुलविषय:। This last is a limitation of the sphere of the figure which is not generally recognised.

(iv) Paryāyokta along with two or three other alaṁkāras has played in the hands of Bhāmaha and

others the same rôle that was subsequently assigned to ध्वनि. Jagannātha (p. 415) observes on the point as follows—ध्वनिकारात् प्राचीनैर्भामहोद्भटप्रभृतिभिः स्वग्रन्थेषु कुत्रापि ध्वनिगुणीभूतव्यङ्ग्यादिशब्दा न प्रयुक्ता इत्येतावतैव तैर्ध्वन्यादयो न स्वीक्रियन्त इत्याधुनिकानां वाचोयुक्तिरयुक्तैव यतः समासोक्तिव्याजस्तुत्यप्रस्तुतप्रशंसाद्यलंकारनिरूपणेन कियन्तोपि गुणीभूतव्यङ्ग्यभेदास्तैरपि निरूपिताः । अपरश्च सर्वोपि व्यङ्ग्यप्रपञ्चः पर्यायोक्तकुक्षौ निक्षिप्तः । न ह्यनुभवसिद्धोर्थो बालेनाप्यपह्नोतुं शक्यते । ध्वन्यादिशब्दैः परं व्यवहारो न कृतः । न ह्येतावतानङ्गीकारो भवति ।

(v) The sense intended to be conveyed and the sense actually expressed by the words used in a Paryāyokta (as Daṇḍin understands the figure) are both of them प्रस्तुत but they are not therefore of co-ordinate or equal importance; and there is not between the two any relation of सादृश्य etc, as there is in Samāsokti (including under the figure अप्रस्तुतप्रशंसा as defined by modern writers—see our Note (ii) to ii. 205). Hence समासोक्ति and पर्यायोक्त are adequately differentiated from one another.

(vi) Bhoja gives (p. 457)—

मया विमुक्ता बहिरेव वल्लकी व्रजेदवद्यायकणैश्च सार्द्रताम् ।
द्रुतं तदेनां करवै निचोलके कयाचिदेवं मिषतो विनिर्યયે ॥

as an example of निराकाङ्क्ष पर्यायोक्त, because there is the express statement that the friend left the room under the pretext of putting back the lute into its case. Our verse ii. 296 he quotes as an example of the साकाङ्क्ष variety.

Notes to. II. 298-299—(i) See Note (ii) to ii. 235. Bharata, Agnipurāṇa, Bhāmaha, Ubdhaṭa, Rudraṭa and Hemachandra do not recognise the alaṁkāra at all. Ruyyaka, Mammaṭa, Bhoja, Viśvanātha and Jagannātha designate it as समाधि, making समाहित a रसालंकार, defined by Udbhaṭa (p. 52) as—

रसभावतदाभासवृत्तेः प्रशमबन्धनम् ।
अन्यानुभावनिःशून्यरूपं यत् तत् समाहितम् ॥

Bhāmaha's illustration from Rājamitra (iii. 10) points to a similar conception of the alaṁkāra. Vāmana

makes समाहित a new category altogether in as much as he defines it (iv. 3. 29) as—यत्सादृश्यं तत्संपत्तिः समाहितम् illustrating it by the verse तन्वी मेघजलार्द्रपल्लवतया etc. from the Vikramorvaśīya, Act iv, with the remark—अत्र पुरूरवसो लतायामुर्वश्याः सादृश्यं गृह्णतः सैव लतोर्वशी संपन्नेति । Ruyyaka defines the figure as—कारणान्तरयोगात् कार्यस्य सुकरत्वम् and quotes Daṇḍin's example ; and Mammaṭa does the same thing. Finally Jagannātha gives the definition in these words—एककारणजन्यस्य कार्यस्याकस्मिककारणान्तरसमवधानाहितसौकर्यं समाधिः ।

(ii) The figure-of-speech known as समुच्चय (not recognised by Daṇḍin) involves also a number of co-operating causes, and the distinction between समुच्चय and समाधि (i. e समाहित) is thus formulated in the Alaṁkārasarvasva (p. 161)—[यत्र] ह्येकस्य कार्यं प्रति पूर्णं साधकत्वम् अन्यस्तु कार्याय काकतालीयेनापतति तत्र समाधिर्वक्ष्यते । यत्र तु खले कपोतिकया बहूनामवतारस्तत्रायं समुच्चयः । To the same effect also Jagannātha (p. 490)—समाधौ हि एकेन कार्ये निष्पद्यमानेप्यन्येनाकस्मिकमापतता कारणेन सौकर्यादिरूपोतिशयो यत्र संपाद्यते स विषयः । अस्मिंस्तु समुच्चयप्रभेदे यत्रैककार्यं संपादयितुं युगपदनेके खले कपोता इवाहमहमिकया संपतन्ति कार्यस्य च न कोप्यतिशयः सः ।

(iii) Bhoja distinguishes between different varieties of this figure according as the सहायाप्ति is दैवकृता or अदैवकृता, and according further as each of these is आकस्मिकी or बुद्धिपूर्वा. Daṇḍin's example he gives as आकस्मिकी दैवकृता सहायाप्तिः ।

Notes to II. 300-303—(i) Most writers who recognise उदात्त are agreed in giving two varieties of it similar to those of Daṇḍin. For instance,

Bhāmaha (iii. 11-13)—

उदात्तं शक्तिमान् रामो गुरुवाक्यानुरोधगः ।
विहायोपवनं राज्यं यथा वनमुपागमत् ॥
एतदेवापरेन्येन व्याख्यानेनान्यथा विदुः ।
नानारत्नार्धियुक्तं यत् तत् किलोदात्तमुच्यते ॥

Udbhaṭa (p. 53)—

उदात्तमृद्धिमद्वस्तु चरितं च महात्मनाम् ।
उपलक्षणतां प्राप्तं नेतिवृत्तत्वमागतम् ॥

Ruyyaka (p. 183–184)—

सम्रृद्धिमद्वस्तुवर्णनमुदात्तम् । अङ्गभूतमहापुरुषचरितं च ।

Mammaṭa (x. p. 831 ff.)—

उदात्तं वस्तुनः संपन्महतां चोपलक्षणम् ।

Viśvanātha (x. 94 f.)—

लोकातिशयसंपत्तिवर्णनोदात्तमुच्यते ।
यद्वापि प्रस्तुतस्याङ्गं महतां चरितं भवेत् ॥

(ii) Some writers refuse to recognise the figure. Thus Hemachandra observes (p. 293)—उदात्तं तु ऋद्धिमद्वस्तुलक्षणमतिशयोक्तेर्जातेर्वा न भिद्यते । महापुरुषवर्णनारूपं च यदि रसपरं तदा ध्वनेर्विषयः । It will be noted—and Udbhaṭa lays it down as a distinct condition—that the महापुरुषचरित must be introduced only subordinately. As Pratīhārendurāja observes (p. 54)— न खल्वत्र महापुरुषचेष्टितं वाक्यतात्पर्यगोचरतामनुभवति। अर्थान्तरोपलक्षणपरत्वात् । यत्र च रसास्तात्पर्येणावगम्यन्ते तत्र तेषां वाक्यविश्रान्तिस्थानत्वेन चतुर्वर्गतादितरप्राप्तिपरिहारोपायभूतस्थायिभावपरिपोषात्मनास्वाद्यमानत्वाद्रसवदलंकारो भवति । This disposes of the second objection of Hemachandra and serves to distinguish उदात्त from रसवत्.

(iii) The उदात्त which is विभूतिवर्णनपर is not mere स्वभावोक्ति; cp. Note (iii) to ii. 9-13. The Alaṁkārasarvasva also distinguishes उदात्त from भाविक (अतीतानागतयोः प्रत्यक्षायमाणत्वम्) but this last is understood by Daṇḍin in quite a distinct sense (cp. ii. 364 ff.). The words of Ruyyaka are these (p. 183f.)—स्वभावोक्तौ भाविके च यथावद्वस्तुवर्णनम्। तद्विपक्षत्वेन आरोपितवस्त्वात्मन उदात्तस्यावसरः । तत्रासंभाव्यमानविभूतियुक्तस्य वस्तुनो वर्णनं कविप्रतिभोत्थापितमैश्वर्यलक्षणमुदात्तम् ।

Notes to II. 304—(i) A few leading definitions of Apahnuti are given below—

Agnipurāṇa (345. 18) same as Daṇḍin.

Bhāmaha (iii. 20) and Udbhaṭa (p. 59)—

अपह्नुतिरभीष्टा च किंचिदन्तर्गतोपमा ।
भूतार्थापह्नवादस्याः क्रियते चाभिधा यथा ॥
[निबन्धः क्रियते बुधैः ॥ Udbhaṭa].

Rudraṭa (viii. 57)—

अतिसाम्यादुपमेयं यस्यामसदेव कथ्यते सदपि ।
उपमानमेव सदिति च विज्ञेयापह्नुतिः सेयम् ॥

Vāmana (iv. 3.5)—

समेन वस्तुनान्यापलापोपह्नुतिः ।

Bhoja (iv. 41)—

अपह्नुतिरपह्नुत्य किंचिदन्यार्थदर्शनम् ।
औपम्यवत्यनौपम्या चेति सा द्विविधोच्यते ॥

Ruyyaka (p. 50)—

विषयस्यापह्नवेपह्नुतिः ।

Mammaṭa (x, p. 735)—

प्रकृतं यन्निषिध्यान्यत् साध्यते सात्वपह्नुतिः ।

Vāgbhaṭa (p. 39)—

प्रकृतस्य सदृशेनापलापोपह्नुतिः ।

Vāgbhaṭa (iv. 86)—

नैतदेतदिदं ह्येतदित्यपह्नवपूर्वकम् ।
उच्यते यत्र सादृश्यादपह्नुतिरियं यथा ॥

Keśavamiśra (p. 34)—

किंचिदपह्नुत्य यदन्यार्थप्रदर्शनं सापह्नुतिः ।

Hemachandra (p. 281)—

प्रकृताप्रकृताभ्यां प्रकृतापलापोपह्नुतिः ।

Vidyādhara (p. 380)—

निषिध्य विषयं साम्यादन्यारोपे ह्यपह्नुतिः ।

Viśvanātha (x. 38f.)—

प्रकृतं प्रतिषिध्यान्यस्थापनं स्यादपह्नुतिः ।
गोपनीयं कमप्यर्थं द्योतयित्वा कथंचन ॥
यदि श्लेषेणान्यथा वान्यथयेत् साप्यपह्नुतिः ।

Jagannātha (p. 278)—

उपमेयतावच्छेदकनिषेधसामानाधिकरण्येनारोप्यमाणमुपमानतादात्म्य-मपह्नुतिः ।

Viśveśvara (p, 235)—

प्रकृतं निषिध्य भिन्नात्मतया प्रोक्तावपह्नुतिः कथिता ।

and Achutarāya (viii. 131)—

विषयत्वनिषेधस्य सामानाधिकरण्यतः ।
आरोप्यमाणविषयितादात्म्यं स्यादपह्नुतिः ॥

(ii) It will be seen that while the majority of these definitions require that there should be a sort of a similarity between the thing negated and the thing asserted, Daṇḍin does not admit that necessity. A सादृश्यमूलक अपह्नुति, according to Daṇḍin, constitutes what he calles तत्त्वापह्नवरूपक (see Note (iii) to ii. 95). The Alaṁkārakaustubha clearly states the position (p. 235)—अत्र केचित् सादृश्यस्थल एवापह्नुतिः। न पञ्चेषुः स्मरस्तस्य सहस्रं पत्रिणां यतः—इत्यादौ तु नापह्नुतिः किंतु प्रकृतस्य यदन्यत्वम् इत्येवंरूपातिशयोक्तिरित्याहुः। अन्ये तु...साहित्यदर्पणोक्तदिशा किंचिदपह्नुत्य कस्यचिद्दर्शनमपह्नुतिः ... इत्याहुः। Bhoja, as we have seen, admits both cases.

(iii) For the distinction between अपह्नुति and भ्रान्तिमान् consult Note (ii) to ii. 66; and for that between अपह्नुति and लेश (or व्याजोक्ति) our Note (ii) to ii. 265.

Notes to II. 305–308—(i) Daṇḍin gives only two varieties of अपह्नुति, viz. विषयापह्नुति and स्वरूपापह्नुति. Rasagaṅgādhara gives the varieties सावयव and निरवयव which are based upon a different principle of division. So also are the divisions into शाब्दी where the negation is directly conveyed and आर्थी where it is suggested by words like कपट, मिष, छल, छद्म, कैतव, व्याज, वपुः आत्मन्, परिणाम, etc. More important is the six-fold division given by the Kuvalayānanda (stanzas 25–30), viz. शुद्ध, हेतु, पर्यस्त, भ्रान्त, छेक, and कैतव. Of these the first variety is a normal case of Apahnuti which can be made to include both the varieties recognised by Daṇḍin, while the last is an आर्थी अपह्नुति. His other varieties with definitions and illustrations are as under—

सयुक्तिके सदारोपे हेत्वपह्नुतिरुच्यते ।
नेदमिन्दुरनङ्कत्वात् किंत्विदं मुकुरो रतेः ॥
पर्यस्तापह्नुतिर्धर्मनिह्नवोन्यत्र सिद्धये ।
नायं सुधांशुः किं तर्हि सुधांशुः प्रेयसीमुखम् ॥
भ्रान्तापह्नुतिरन्यस्य शङ्कायां भ्रान्तिवारणे ।
तापं करोति सोत्कपं ज्वरः किं न सखि स्मरः ॥
छेकापह्नुतिरन्यस्य शङ्कातस्तथ्यनिह्नवे ।
प्रजल्पन् मत्पदे लग्नः कान्तः किं न हि नूपुरः ॥

(ii) In the illustration in ii. 305 the real nature of चन्दन etc. is admitted as perceivable by others: it however does not hold good in the case of the speaker himself. In ii. 306 the negated thing is declared to be entirely void of its very essence: is assigned an altogether contradictory nature, so that the moon can no longer be called moon (अमृतदीधिति = चन्द्र). In the example in ii. 304 only a part of the nature of the thing was negated, in ii. 305 even the negation of this part was tempered by limiting its विषय. In ii. 306 the negation is absolute as regards its contents and its range. Such seems to be the basis of Daṇḍin's distinction.

Notes to II. 309—(i) Compare Note (ii) to ii. 94-95. As we saw there पूर्वम् can mean ii. 34 (प्रतिषेधोपमा), ii. 36 (तत्त्वाख्यानोपमा), or ii. 95 (तत्त्वापह्नवरूपक). In view of the difference of view noted above, Note (ii) to ii. 304, the temptation to accept the last of these interpretations is very strong. For Daṇḍin must have known the view which makes सादृश्य the sine qua non of अपह्नुति. Bhāmaha in any case knows the view and even adopts it. Differing from him Daṇḍin considers सादृश्यमूलकापह्नुति as a variety of रूपक. He consequently must have made a slip here or we can adopt the justification of Ca—उपमारूपकयोरनतिभेदात् । There is something चिन्त्य whatever the view we finally adopt.

Notes to II. 310—(i) It is rather unfortunate that the same name (श्लेष or श्लिष्ट) should signify both a Guṇa and an Alaṁkāra. For the nature of the guṇa see Note (iii) to i. 43. The alaṁkāra has nothing to do with the guṇa.

(ii) That Ślesha involves the use of paronomastic words, or words conveying more than one sense, is conceded by all. The main controversy is as to whether we should regard it as a शब्दालंकार only or an अर्थालंकार only or partly the one and partly the other. There are writers holding all these views with more or less show of reason. As so much depends in a Ślesha upon the

use of specific words it seems reasonable to treat it as a शब्दालंकार and to assign to it a lower place in criticism. At the same time it is necessary that we should understand the two-fold sense of the words in question: the words as words do not give us the pleasure of the figure as is done for instance by an alliteration. Hence it is equally plausible to regard the श्लेष as exclusively an अर्थालंकार, as is done by Udbhaṭa and Alaṁkārasarvasvakāra. Jagannātha (p. 401-2) gives a clear exposition of these views in these words—सोयं श्लेषः सभङ्गोभङ्गश्चार्थालंकार एवेत्यौद्भटाः ॥ उभावप्येतौ शब्दालंकारौ शब्दस्य परिवृत्त्यसहत्वादन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां तदाश्रितत्वावधारणात् । .... । इति मम्मटभट्टाः ॥ अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां हि हेतुत्वावगमो घटं प्रति दण्डादेरिवास्तु । न त्वाश्रयत्वावगमः । .... अन्यथा प्रत्यर्थं शब्दनिवेश इति नये पराभिमतोर्थश्लेषोपि शब्दालंकार एव स्यात् ॥ A reasonable view to hold is that of Mammaṭa (ix, p. 626), who observes—इह दोषगुणालंकाराणां शब्दार्थगतत्वेन यो विभागः सोन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यामेव व्यवतिष्ठते ॥ यत्र हि पर्यायान्तरपरिवृत्तिसहत्वं नास्ति तस्य शब्दगतत्वम् यत्र तु तत्सहत्वं तत्रार्थगतत्वमिति सिद्धान्तादिति भावः —as a commentator explains it.

(iii) Others try to get out of the difficulty by recognising a distinct variety of शब्दश्लेष and of अर्थश्लेष. Thus Bhoja gives six varieties of शब्दश्लेष (ii. 68ff.) viz. प्रकृति, प्रत्यय, विभक्ति, वचन, पद, and भाषा. Mammaṭa adds two more varieties to the list: वर्ण and लिङ्ग, while Bhoja includes the former under the पद variety and the latter under the प्रकृति variety. In these varieties the word-element is distinctly the all-in-all. For illustrations see, besides the two works in question, Sāhityadarpaṇa pp. 457ff., and Alaṁkārakaustubha pp. 242ff.—The अर्थश्लेष on the other hand includes the cases where the use of the paronomastic words brings about prominently a comparison between the प्रकृत and the अप्रकृत statements. As we have a two-in-one statement in समासोक्ति so also we have it in अर्थश्लेष, only the method is different. Daṇḍin does not bring out this point in his definition (and it is in this sense that we wish to have our remark on Ślesha in Note (iii) to ii. 207 understood), but most other writers including even Bhāmaha (iii.14) use उपमान and उपमेय in the very definitions of the figure.—Rudraṭa is so much impressed by the different uses to which

paronomastic words can be put that he makes श्लेष a basic principle of subdivision for alamkāras along with वास्तव, औपम्य, and अतिशय. He gives (x. 1 – 23) ten sorts of श्लेषमूलालंकारs, viz. अविशेष, विरोध, अधिक, वंक, व्याज, उक्ति, असंभव, अवयव, तत्त्व, and विरोधाभास. For illustrations see the Kāvyālamkāra itself.

(iv) For the distinction of this figure from Samāsokti see Note (ii) to ii. 207. Our remarks there apply to the developed conception of Ślesha leading to औपम्य as it is found in other writers. Daṇḍin's illustrations do indeed suit the definitions of the later Ālamkārikas, but his definition is non-commital.

Notes to II. 311—(i) Bhoja quotes this illustation and thus comments upon it (p. 465)—अत्रायमुदीयमानश्चन्द्रमा लोकस्य हृदयं हरतीत्युक्तेर्युक्तिमाह—राजा अनुरक्तमण्डल उदयी मृदुकरः कान्तिमानिति । यो ह्येवंभूतो राजा सोवश्यं लोकस्य हृदयहारी भवति । अत्रापि च प्राकरणिकेर्थेप्राकरणिक उपश्लिष्यमाणः पदानामभेदेनाभिन्नपदश्लेषो भवति ।

Notes to II. 312—(i) Bhoja's comment on the figure is as follows—अत्र प्रदोषो रात्रेः प्रथमयामः किमिति प्रियारहितं मां न बाधते इत्युक्तेर्युक्तिमाह—इत्थम् अनुभूयमानप्रकारेण राज्ञा संबध्नन् । कीदृशेन दोषाकरेण नक्षत्रपथवर्तिनेति । यो हि दोषाणामाकरेण राजमार्गातिगामिना च राज्ञा प्रकृष्टदोषः संबध्यते सोप्रियमवश्यं बाधत एव । तदत्र पूर्वस्मिन् प्राकरणिकेर्थे द्वितीयोर्थोप्राकरणिकः पदभेदेनोपश्लिष्यमाणो भिन्नपदश्लेषापदेशमासादयति ।

Notes to II. 313—(i) Paronomasia constitutes the ingredient of so many figures that a question has been started as to whether in these several cases the alamkāra is primarily Ślesha alone, or the other figure [उपमा (ii. 28), रूपक (ii. 87), आक्षेप (ii. 159), व्यतिरेक (ii. 185), etc.], or a संसृष्टि or mixture of both. The discussion is started by Udbhaṭa's statement (p. 54)—

अलंकारान्तरगतां प्रतिभां जनयत् पदैः ।
द्विविधैरर्थशब्दोक्तिविशिष्टं तत् (श्लिष्टं) प्रतीयताम् ॥

Jagannātha (p. 393ff.) gives a résumé of it in these words—अयं चालंकारः प्रायेणालंकारान्तरस्य विषयमभिनिविशते तत्र किमस्य

बाधकत्वं स्यादाहोस्वित्संकीर्णत्वमुताहो बाध्यत्वमिति । अत्राहुरुद्भटाचार्याः—येन नाप्राप्ते य आरभ्यते स तस्य बाधक इति न्यायेनालंकारान्तरविषय एवायमारभ्यमाणोलंकारान्तरं बाधते। न चास्य विविक्तः कश्चिदस्ति विषयो यत्र सावकाशो नान्यं बाधेत । .... । तस्मादुपमादिप्रतिभोत्पत्तिहेतुः श्लेष एव स्वविषये सर्वत्रालंकारः ॥ एतच्चापरे न क्षमन्ते । तथा हि.................... । एवं च सावकाशत्वाच्छ्लेषस्यालंकारान्तरापवादकत्वं न युक्तम् । अत एवोपमादीनां प्रतिभानमात्रमिति यदुक्तं तदपि न संगतम्............प्रत्युत श्लेषस्यैव प्रतिभानमात्रमिति वक्तुं युक्तम् । तस्माच्छ्लेषस्य नापवादकत्वं संकीर्णत्वं तु स्यात् ॥ अन्ये तु—अलंकारा हि प्राधान्येन चमत्काराधायकाः स्वां स्वांमाख्यां लभन्ते । त एव परोपकारकतया वर्तमानास्तां त्यजन्ति । .... । एवं चालंकारान्तरोपस्कारकतया स्थितः श्लेषः कथंकारं स्वगृहस्थ इव श्लेषालंकारव्यपदेशं वोढुमीष्टामिति बाध्यप्राय एव इत्यप्याहुः ॥ The most reasonable view to hold is that it all depends upon the particular circumstances of the case, and these differ in different illustrations, so that no hard and fast rule of universal application can be laid down.

Notes to II. 314-315—(i) Daṇḍin's classification is somewhat peculiar. Bhoja gives the varieties भिन्नपद-अभिन्नपद, भिन्नक्रिय-अभिन्नक्रिय, भिन्नकारक-अभिन्नकारक. Bhāmaha, after defining the figure (iii. 14) as—

उपमानेन यत् तत्त्वमुपमेयस्य साध्यते ।
गुणक्रियाभ्यां नाम्ना च श्लिष्टं तदभिधीयते ॥

gives illustrations for श्लेषs involving सहोक्ति, उपमा, and हेतु respectively as under—

छायावन्तो गतव्यालाः स्वारोहाः फलदायिनः ।
मार्गद्रुमा महान्तश्च परेषामेव भूतये ॥
उन्नता लोकदयिता महान्तः प्राज्यवर्षिणः ।
शमयन्ति क्षितेस्तापं सुराजानो घना इव ॥
रत्नवत्त्वादगाधत्वात् स्वमर्यादाविलङ्घनात् ।
बहुसत्त्वाश्रयत्वाच्च सदृशत्वमुदन्वता ॥

It will be seen that the last example is श्लेषमूलक हेतुपमा (ii. 50), the second, a regular श्लेषोपमा (ii. 28), while the first has greatest affinity with ii. 316.

Notes to II. 316—(i) Bhoja reads स्वभावमधुराः स्निग्धाः instead of वक्राः स्वभावमधुराः । His comment is (p. 467)—अत्र कर्षन्ति इत्येतस्यां क्रियायां दृशां दूतीनां च श्लिष्टपदत्वेनावेशादयमभिन्नक्रियो नाम श्लेषविशेषः ।

Notes to II. 317—(i) Bhoja (p. 466) explains the point thus—
अत्र आकर्ण्यन्ते श्लिष्यन्ते च इति क्रियापदद्वितयस्य प्राधान्यतः समुच्चयेनोपात्तस्य मधुराः इत्यादिभिः श्लिष्टपदैः कोकिलागिरः असितेक्षणाः इति वा विशेष्यैकपदवर्जं पर्यायतः संबन्धो भवति। तद्यथा—आकर्ण्यन्ते। काः। कोकिलागिरः। कीदृश्यः। मधुराः................ । श्लिष्यन्ते च। काः। असितेक्षणाः हरिणचक्षुषः। किंभूताः मदकलाः............ इति।

Notes to II. 318—(i) Here as also in ii. 322 below we have a combination of श्लेषवैचित्र्य with the वैचित्र्य of विरोध as exemplified in ii. 334. For the distinction of this from तुल्ययोगिता see Notes to ii. 330 below.

Notes to II. 319–320—Most writers with the exception of, besides Daṇḍin, भामह, उद्भट, भोज, वामन, and रुय्यक,—to say nothing of भरत and अग्निपुराण,—admit a figure of speech called परिसंख्या which consists in a तादृगन्यव्यपोह. An example will explain the nature of this figure—

भक्तिर्भवे न विभवे व्यसनं शास्त्रे न युवतिकामास्त्रे।
चिन्ता यशसि न वपुषि प्रायः परिदृश्यते महताम्॥

The Sāhityadarpaṇa (p. 563) from which this illustration is taken goes on to observe—श्लेषमूलत्वे चास्य वैचित्र्यविशेषो यथा—यस्मिंश्च राजनि जितजगति पालयति महीं चित्रकर्मसु वर्णसंकराश्चापेषु गुणच्छेदाः इत्यादि।

Notes to II. 321–322—(i) It is difficult to distinguish ii. 321 from ii. 87, the illustration of a श्लिष्टरूपक. All that we can say at the utmost is that in ii. 87 the identity with a lotus is given an exclusive prominence, while here the king receives at least as much prominence as दक्ष or कार्तिकेय. It cannot at the same time be श्लेषापमा illustrated in ii. 28 because there is an absence of any उपमाप्रतिपादकशब्द.

(ii) Compare Note (i) to ii. 87 and Note (i) to ii. 318 above.

Notes to II. 323—(i) Some distinctive definitions of Viseshokti are—

Agnipurāṇa, same as Daṇḍin's definit

Bhāmaha (iii. 22)—

एकदेशस्य विगमे या गुणान्तरसंस्थितिः ।
विशेषप्रथनायासौ विशेषोक्तिर्मता यथा ॥

Udbhaṭa (p. 58)—

यत् सामग्र्येपि शक्तीनां फलानुत्पत्तिबन्धनम् ।
विशेषस्याभिधित्सातस्तद्विशेषोक्तिरुच्यते ॥
दर्शितेन निमित्तेन निमित्तादर्शनेन च ।
तस्या बन्धो द्विधा लक्ष्ये दृश्यते ललितात्मकः ॥

Vāmana (IV. iii. 23)—

एकगुणहानिकल्पनायां साम्यदार्ढ्यं विशेषोक्तिः ।

Bhoja, same as Daṇḍin.

Ruyyaka (p. 126)—

कारणसामग्र्ये कार्यानुत्पत्तिर्विशेषोक्तिः ।

Mammaṭa (x. p. 800)—

विशेषोक्तिरखण्डेषु कारणेषु फलावचः ।

and Jagannātha (p. 437)—

प्रसिद्धकारणकलापसामान्याधिकरण्येन वर्ण्यमाना कार्यानुत्पत्तिर्विशेषोक्तिः । —compare his definition of Vibhāvanā— कारणव्यतिरेकसामान्याधिकरण्येन प्रतिपाद्यमाना कार्योत्पत्तिर्विभावना।

(ii) While Vāmana's definition of this figure (which he illustrates by द्यूतं हि नाम पुरुषस्यासिंहासनं राज्यम्) is put down by later writers as a case of रूपक (as Jagannātha says :— अत्र हि द्यूते राज्यं तादात्म्येनारोप्यते । तत्र सिंहासनरहितं हि द्यूतं सिंहासनसहितराज्यतादात्म्यं कथं वहेदित्यारोपोन्मूलकयुक्तिनिरासायारोप्यमाणे राज्येपि सिंहासनराहित्यं कल्प्यते । तेन दृढारोपं रूपकमेवेदम्) it must be admitted that Daṇḍin's conception of Viśeshokti, in as much as it does not bring the causal relation prominently to the fore, is a development from a root conception of the figure quite allied to that of Vāmana. It is rather difficult to accurately distinguish this figure from कारणाक्षेप (ii. 131), कार्याक्षेप (ii. 133), and विभावना (ii. 199). Compare Note (ii) to ii. 131-132, Note (i) to ii. 133-134, Notes (i) and (ii) to ii. 199, and Note (ii) to ii. 235. Keeping ourselves strictly to the conceptions of these figures as Daṇḍin gives them, we can say that while in a normal case of cause producing effect we have the

presence of (i) principal cause, (ii) presence of accessory causes, (iii) presence of extraordinary circumstances favouring the production of the cause, (iv) presence of agreeable natural conditions, and (v) absence of special hindrances,—all co-operating to produce the normal result,—we have—

IN कारणाक्षेप

Principal cause absent *
Accessory causes present } —Effect absent ;

IN कार्याक्षेप

Principal cause present
[Extra circumstances lacking ?] } —Effect absent; *

IN विभावना 1ST KIND

Principal cause absent
Extra circumstances inferrable * } —Effect present ;

IN विभावना 2ND KIND

Principal cause absent
Exceptional natural circumstances inferrable * } —Effect present ;

IN विशेषोक्ति

Principal cause present
but with special hindrances } —Effect present through greatness of cause ; *

IN अहेतु (Bhoja iii. 18)

Principal cause present
[अदृष्ट unpropitious ?] } —Effect absent.*

The point of the figure in each case is the item marked by an asterix (*).

Notes to II. 324—(i) Bhoja reads (p. 431) जितमेवाभूत् for जितमेवासीत्. His comment on the stanza is—अत्र तीक्ष्णेनाकठोरेण चायुधेन पुष्पधन्वा त्रीणि जगन्ति विजयते इति तस्य प्रभावातिशयः प्रतीयते। सेयं प्रतीयमानविशेषहेतुर्गुणवैकल्यवती विशेषोक्तिः।

Notes to II. 325—(i) On this stanza Bhoja observes—अत्र देवकन्यकात्वाभावेप्येषा वेधसोपि तपोभङ्गं विधातुमलमिति वर्णनीयाया रूपातिशयः प्रतीयते । सेयं प्रतीयमानविशेषहेतुर्जातिवैकल्यवती विशेषोक्तिः ।

Notes to II. 326—(i) Bhoja (p. 432) explains the point thus—अत्र भ्रूभङ्गादेरभावेपि योयं द्विषतां जयस्तेन वर्णनीयस्य प्रतापातिशयः प्रतीयते । सेयं प्रतीयमानविशेषहेतुः क्रियावैकल्यवती विशेषोक्तिः ।

Notes to II. 327—(i) Bhoja remarks—अत्र रथादेरभावेपि जगत्त्रयविजयहेतुः स्त्रीणामपाङ्गावलोकनमभिधीयते । सेयमभिधेयविशेषहेतुर्द्रव्यवैकल्यवती विशेषोक्तिः । Bhoja however is not correct in supposing that the हेतु is here expressed. The real हेतु is the मनोहारित्व of the glances which is to be understood.

Notes to II. 328–329—(i) Bhoja reads जगत्त्रयम् for नभस्तलम्. His remarks are—अत्र रथादीनां द्रव्याणामेकचक्रत्वादिभिर्वैकल्येपि यदेतद्भगवतो भास्करस्य भुवनत्रयाक्रमणं तस्येह तेजस्विता हेतुरभिधीयते। सेयमभिधेयविशेषहेतुर्वैकल्यवद्द्रव्या नामापरा विशेषोक्तिः ।

Notes to II. 330–332—(i) We have already given a few definitions of Tulyayogitā in our Notes (i) and (iii) to ii. 48-49. We make room here for a few more—Vāgbhaṭa (iv. 88)—

उपमेयं समीकर्तुमुपमानेन योज्यते ।
तुल्यैककालक्रियया यत्र सा तुल्ययोगिता ॥

Kuvalayānanda (43, 45, 46)—

वर्ण्यानामितरेषां वा धर्मैक्यं तुल्ययोगिता ।
....
हिताहिते वृत्तितौल्यमपरा तुल्ययोगिता ।
....
गुणोत्कृष्टैः समीकृत्य वचोन्या तुल्ययोगिता ॥

and Jagannātha (p. 317)—

प्रकृतानामेवाप्रकृतानामेव वा गुणक्रियादिरूपैकधर्मान्वयस्तुल्ययोगिता ।

(ii) It will be noted that more than one conception of this figure is current amongst the Ālaṁkārikas.

Vāmana. Bhāmaha, Vāgbhaṭa, Kuvalayānandakāra, Bhoja, and Daṇḍin are all attempting, each in his own way, to define the figure in conformity with the etymology of its name. Under the circumstances we will have to keep close to our author's conception of the figure and try to distinguish it from प्रतिवस्तूपमा (ii. 46), तुल्ययोगोपमा (ii. 48), दीपक (ii. 97), समासोक्ति (ii. 205), श्लेष (ii. 310 ff.), अप्रस्तुतप्रशंसा (ii. 340), व्याजस्तुति (ii. 343) and निदर्शन (ii. 348). To begin with, in प्रतिवस्तूपमा (cp. the illustration in ii. 47) the उपमान is not intended to be extraordinarily superior to the उपमेय and the समीकरण between them is not directly expressed, but is प्रतीत only; whereas in तुल्ययोगिता there are things decidedly superior or गुणोत्कृष्ट with which an inferior thing is joined in an assertion. The समीकरण (not the साम्य) is direct, and not left to be suggested. Further, the intention in the present figure is either स्तुति or निन्दा, and this is absent in प्रतिवस्तूपमा.

(iii) In तुल्ययोगोपमा (ii. 48) we have the superior and inferior relation between the things and an attempt to equate them, as in तुल्ययोगिता. But while in the former उपमा is consciously sought to be expressed by reference to identical क्रिया (or गुण), in the latter the उपमा relation is subordinate and the point of it is not fully brought out. Further in तुल्ययोगिता the desire to praise or blame is prominently present, the same being absent in the उपमा variety.

(iv) Consider the दीपक illustrations in ii. 99, and ii. 100. In these there is no अधिकहीन relation and no स्तुतिनिन्दा intended as a definite end. Further, the point of similarity is expressed with one statement and has to be supplied with the other. So the distinction of these varieties from तुल्ययोगिता is quite obvious.

(v) In a समासोक्ति the two things are तुल्य, neither being by nature अधिक or हीन. Besides, only one of them (प्रकृत or अप्रकृत) is expressed directly, the other being प्रतीत only. Nor is there here any conscious desire to praise or blame. In तुल्ययोगिता, besides the अधिक-

हीन relation and स्तुतिनिन्दाप्रयोजन, we are required to make an express mention of the two objects compared.

(vi) Though the illustration of a श्लेष (ii. 310 ff.) might offer points of comparison with तुल्ययोगिता, the figure श्लेष always turns upon an unmistakable peculiarily which is its sufficient distinctiveness. The paronomasia in ii. 332[d] is not intended or indispensable.

(vii) Aprastutapraśaṁsā as Daṇḍin conceives it involves स्तुति, if not स्तुति or निन्दा, but there is an absence of अधिकहीन relation, and an implication of प्रस्तुत through अप्रस्तुत statement, in place of the direct statement of the two found in a तुल्ययोगिता.

(viii) Vyājastuti (ii. 343) involves स्तुति (or निन्दा) but it is feigned. And it is a स्तुति made of a certain thing which might not be joined with any thing else in simile. A तुल्ययोगिता is necessarily based upon a relation between at least two things.

(ix) In निदर्शन the साम्य between the two things is not a well-established fact so that we could know before hand which is गुणोत्कृष्ट or गुणनिकृष्ट. The साम्य is evolved just in the very act presented to our eyes.

Notes to II. 333–339—(i) All writers except Bharata admit विरोध as a distinct figure. A few leading definitions are given below :—

Agnipurāṇa (344. 28)—

संगतीकरणं युक्त्या यदसंगच्छमानयोः ।
विरोधपूर्वकत्वेन तद्विरोध इति स्मृतम् ॥

Bhāmaha (iii. 24) and Udbhaṭa (p. 59)—

गुणस्य वा क्रियाया वा विरुद्धान्यक्रियाभिदा [v. l. वचः] ।
या [v.l. यद्] विशेषाभिधानाय विरोधं तं विदुर्बुधाः [v.l प्रचक्षते]॥

Rudraṭa (ix. 30)—

यस्मिन् द्रव्यादीनां परस्परं सर्वथा विरुद्धानाम् ।
एकत्रावस्थानं समकालं भवति स विरोधः ॥

Vāmana (IV. iii. 12) and Ruyyaka (p. 121)—

विरुद्धाभासत्वं विरोधः ।

Bhoja (iii. 24)—

विरोधस्तु पदार्थानां परस्परमसंगतिः ।
असंगतिः प्रत्यनीकमधिकं विषमश्च सः ॥

Mammaṭa (X. p. 807)—

विरोधः सोविरोधेपि विरुद्धत्वेन यद्वचः ।

Vāgbhaṭa (iv. 121)—

आपाते हि विरुद्धत्वं यत्र वाक्येन तत्त्वतः ।
शब्दार्थकृतमाभाति स विरोधः स्मृतो यथा ॥

Vāgbhaṭa (p. 38)—

अविरोधेपि विरोधप्रतीतिर्विरोधः । साक्षाद्विरोधे तु काव्यत्वासंभवात् ।

Keśavamiśra (p. 35)—

विरोधो द्विविधः । पारमार्थिकाविरोधेपि औचित्येन विरुद्धतया प्रतीयते यत्र । द्वितीयस्तु यथाश्रुते विरोध[?धा]संधानेपि यत्राभिप्रेतार्थमादाय विरोधः । अयमेव विरोधाभास इत्युच्यते ।

Hemachandra (p. 269)—

अर्थानां विरोधाभासो विरोधः ।

Vidyādhara (viii. 33)—

स्फुरति विरोधाभासे भवति विरोधाभिधो दशधा ।

Vidyānātha (p. 416)—

आभासत्वे विरोधस्य विरोधालंकृतिर्मता ।

Viśvanātha (x. 68)—

जातिश्चतुर्भिर्जात्याद्यैर्गुणो गुणादिभिस्त्रिभिः ।
क्रिया क्रियाद्रव्याभ्यां यद्द्रव्यं द्रव्येण वा मिथः ॥
विरुद्धमेव भासेत विरोधोसौ दशाकृतिः ।

Kuvalayānanda (st. 75)—

आभासत्वे विरोधस्य विरोधाभास इष्यते।
विनापि तन्वि हारेण वक्षोजौ तव हारिणौ ॥

Jagannātha (p. 427)—

एकाधिकरणसंबद्धत्वेन प्रतिपादितयोरर्थयोर्भासमानैकाधिकरणसंबद्धत्वमेकाधिकरणासंबद्धत्वभानं वा विरोधः ।

Viśveśvara (p. 321)—

अविरोधेपि विरोधो यत्रोक्तः स्याद्विरोधः सः ।

Achyutarāya (viii. 202)—

विरोधस्याल्पभासश्चेद्विरोधाभास उच्यते ।

(ii) The figure is said to be शाब्द when a word like अपि is used in the statement; otherwise it is आर्थ. This division is however disputed (cp. Rasagaṅgādhara p. 428). It is called शुद्ध when not based upon श्लेष or paronomasia. Daṇḍin's last example (ii. 339) is श्लेषमूलक. The ten-fold division of the figure given by most writers is, like that of स्वभावोक्ति or दीपक, based upon the four-fold संकेत of words recognised by grammarians. Jagannātha (p. 428) rightly calls this classification अहृद्य. Bhoja gives four kinds, viz. असंगति, प्रत्यनीक, अधिक, and विषम. Rudraṭa gives 13 varieties, denying the validity of जातिद्रव्यविरोध, and adding 4 additional varieties (cp. ix. 33, exemplified in ix. 41-44) not generally recognised by other ālaṁkārikas. Daṇḍin's classification is based on no definite principles.

(iii) Virodha enters into the composion of a number of other figures such as उपमा (ii. 33), रूपक (ii. 84), दीपक (ii. 109), etc., while figures like विभावना or certain varieties of आक्षेप are, on ultimate analysis, special kinds of विरोध only. Cp. the list of विरोधमूलक figures on p. 69 above, as also Note (iii) to ii. 199. Hemachandra in fact even observes (p. 272) —एवं च विभावनाविशेषोक्त्यसंगतिविषमाधिकव्याघाततद्गुणाः पृथगलंकारत्वेन न वाच्याः । विरोध एवान्तर्भावात् । The Kāvyaprakāśakāra however takes a different view. These alaṁkāras, as being special cases of विरोध and having a distinct charm of their own, *can* be considered as independent figures. For he says (about असंगति, p. 871)—एषा च विरोधबाधिनी न विरोधः .... अपवादविषयपरिहारेणोत्सर्गस्यावस्थितेः ।

(iv) Strictly speaking every poetical identification such as मुखं कमलम् involves an element of विरोध; but that has to be ignored. Jagannātha observes (p. 430)—इह हि अलंकारवर्गे यो यत्र सहृदयचमत्कृतिपथमवतरति स एव तत्रालंकार इति निर्विवादम् । एवं च रूपके......यद्यप्यस्ति विरोधस्तथापि न स तत्र प्रतिपिपादयिषितः । .... । विरोधस्थले तु कुसुमानि शराः इत्यादौ.........अभेदस्य...विरोधोत्थापनार्थमुपात्तस्याचमत्कारित्वात् रूपकालंकारत्वमयुक्तम् ।

(v) Daṇḍin and Bhāmaha are alone in putting विशेषदर्शन specially into the very definition of this figure. Other definitions imply this.

(vi) In ii. 339 the reading दुःशासनीयत्वं etc. for विश्वसनीयत्वं etc. is worth noting. It is a deliberate attempt to improve the original.

Notes to II. 340–342—(i) Daṇḍin understands अप्रस्तुतप्रशंसा in the literal sense of अप्रस्तुतस्य [प्रस्तुतनिन्दार्थं] प्रशंसा, and so strictly limits the application of this figure to this case alone. Cp. note (ii) to ii. 205, where (p. 143 line 11 from bottom) read 'latter' for 'former' and 'former' for 'latter'. The definitions of other writers for this figure are—

Bhāmaha (iii. 28)—

अधिकारादपेतस्य वस्तुनोन्यस्य या स्तुतिः ।
अप्रस्तुतप्रशंसेति सा चैवं कथ्यते यथा ॥

Udbhaṭa (p. 61) reads the second line thus—

अप्रस्तुतप्रशंसेयं प्रस्तुतार्थानुबन्धिनी ॥

Vāmana (IV. iii. 4) and Vāgbhaṭa (p. 36)—

[उपमेयस्य] किंचिदुक्तौ [समानवस्तुन्यासः] अप्रस्तुतप्रशंसा ।

Bhoja (iv. 52)—

अप्रस्तुतप्रशंसा स्यादस्तोतव्यस्य या स्तुतिः ।
कुतोपि हेतोर्वाच्या च प्रत्येतव्या च सोच्यते ॥

Ruyyaka (p. 104)—

अप्रस्तुतात् सामान्यविशेषभावे कार्यकारणभावे सारूप्ये च प्रस्तुतप्रतीतावप्रस्तुतप्रशंसा ।

Mammaṭa (x, p. 750)—

अप्रस्तुतप्रशंसा या सा सैव प्रस्तुताश्रया ।
कार्ये निमित्ते सामान्ये विशेषे प्रस्तुते सति ॥
तदन्यस्य वचस्तुल्ये तुल्यस्येति च पञ्चधा ॥

Vāgbhaṭa (iv. 134)—

प्रशंसा क्रियते यत्राप्रस्तुतस्यापि वस्तुनः ।
अप्रस्तुतप्रशंसां तामाहुः कृतधियो यथा ॥
स्वैरं विहरति स्वैरं शेते स्वैरं च जल्पति ।
भिक्षुरेकः सुखी लोके राजचौरभयोज्झितः ॥

Jagannātha (p. 402)—

अप्रस्तुतेन व्यवहारेण सादृश्यादिवक्ष्यमाणप्रकारान्यतमप्रकारेण प्रस्तुतव्यवहारो यत्र प्रशस्यते साप्रस्तुतप्रशंसा, adding in explanation, प्रशंसनं च वर्णनमात्रम् न तु स्तुतिः ।

(ii) It will be seen that while to later writers—

अप्रस्तुतवर्णनेनं प्रस्तुतवर्णनप्रतीतिः is अप्रस्तुतप्रशंसा ;

to Daṇḍin—

अप्रस्तुतप्रशंसनेन प्रस्तुतनिन्दाप्रतीतिः is अप्रस्तुतप्रशंसा.

This has saved Daṇḍin from the necessity (i) of distinguishing this figure from समासोक्ति, अर्थान्तरन्यास, श्लेष, etc. ; and (ii) of explaining the circumstances which make it possible for the अप्रस्तुत to suggest प्रस्तुत. These circumstances give the several varieties of the figure as admitted by subsequent writers. In order to show how very complicated the whole business of classification has become at the hands of these later writers we give below a tabular statement based on the Kāvyaprakāśa—

अप्रस्तुतप्रशंसा {
(i) कार्ये प्रस्तुते कारणाभिधानम्
(ii) कारणे प्रस्तुते कार्याभिधानम्
(iii) सामान्ये प्रस्तुते विशेषाभिधानम्
(iv) विशेषे प्रस्तुते सामान्याभिधानम्
(v) तुल्ये प्रस्तुते तुल्यान्तराभिधानम्

Variety (v) further divided into

A. Use of श्लिष्ट words for विशेषण + विशेष्य	B. Through व्यवहारारोप as in समासोक्ति (with विशेषण alone श्लिष्ट)	C. Through simple सादृश्य

Or again, independently, into

A_1. अनध्यारोपेण	B_1. अध्यारोपेण	C_1. अंशेष्वध्यारोपेण

(iii) Bhoja gives for अप्रस्तुतप्रशंसा the twofold classification into वाच्या and प्रत्येतव्या, his instance for the latter being Daṇḍin's illustration in ii. 341 paraphrased ; viz.—

कामं वनेषु हरिणास्तृणानि खादन्त्ययत्नसुलभानि ।
विदधति धनिषु न दैन्यं ते किल पशवो वयं सुधियः ॥

The वाच्या variety he illustrates by—

पङ्गो वन्द्यस्त्वमसि न गृहं यासि योऽर्थी परेषां
धन्योऽन्ध त्वं धनमदवतां नेक्षसे यन्मुखानि ।
श्लाघ्यो मूक त्वमपि कृपणं स्तौषि नार्थाशया यः
स्तोतव्यस्त्वं बधिर न गिरं यः खलानां शृणोषि ॥

Notes to II. 343–347— (i) A few representative definitions of this figure are—

Bhāmaha (iii. 30)—

दूराधिकगुणस्तोत्रव्यपदेशेन तुल्यताम् ।
किंचिद्विधित्सोर्या निन्दा व्याजस्तुतिरसौ यथा ॥

Udbhaṭa (p. 61)—

शब्दशक्तिस्वभावेन यत्र निन्देव गम्यते ।
वस्तुतस्तु स्तुतिश्रेष्ठा व्याजस्तुतिरसौ मता ॥

Rudraṭa (x. 11)—

यस्मिन् निन्दा स्तुतितो निन्दाया वा स्तुतिः प्रतीयेत ।
अन्या विवक्षिताया व्याजश्लेषः स विज्ञेयः ॥

Vāmana (IV. iii. 24)

संभाव्यविशिष्टकर्माकरणान्निन्दा स्तोत्रार्था व्याजस्तुतिः ।

Bhoja (iv. 56)—

दोषस्य यो गुणीभावो दोषीभावो गुणस्य यः ।
स लेशः स्यात्ततो नान्या व्याजस्तुतिरपीष्यते ॥

Ruyyaka (p. 112)—

स्तुतिनिन्दाभ्यां निन्दास्तुत्योर्गम्यत्वे व्याजस्तुतिः ।

Mammaṭa (x, p. 815)—

व्याजस्तुतिर्मुखे निन्दा स्तुतिर्वा रूढिरन्यथा ।

Hemachandra (p. 276)—

स्तुतिनिन्दयोरन्यतरपरता व्याजस्तुतिः ।

Vidyādhara (viii. 30)—

यत्र प्रक्रान्तायां स्तुतौ कथंचित् प्रतीयते निन्दा ।
निन्दायां स्तुतिरथवा सेयं व्याजस्तुतिर्द्विविधा ॥

Vidyānātha (p. 443)—

निन्दया वाच्यया यत्र स्तुतिरेवावगम्यते ।
स्तुत्या वा गम्यते निन्दा व्याजस्तुतिरसौ मता ॥

and Jagannātha (p. 416)—

आमुखप्रतीताभ्यां निन्दास्तुतिभ्यां स्तुतिनिन्दयोः क्रमेण पर्यवसाने व्याजस्तुतिः ।

(ii) It will be noted that all writers except Daṇḍin, Bhāmaha, Udbhaṭa, and Vāmana consider both निन्दया स्तुतिः and स्तुत्या निन्दा as the legitimate spheres of this figure. It is not certain therefore whether Daṇḍin really would permit the उपलक्षण which we have put upon the definition in our Sanskrit Commentary ii. 343[7]. Rudraṭa gives the figure as a variety of श्लेषमूलक figures, and so requires that it be based necessarily upon paronomasia. Bhoja, finally, makes no distinction between व्याजस्तुति and लेश defined as in Kāvyādarśa ii. 268.

(iii) According to Daṇḍin's view it seems that Leśa No. 2 is distinguished by the presence of a subtle element in the praise or blame, while in a व्याजस्तुति no such subtle element is necessary. This is the only distinction between these two figures. Hence we must either suppose that Daṇḍin did not intend to accept Leśa No. 2 without reserve, or that Bhoja is justified in making लेश = व्याजस्तुति.

(iv) In an अप्रस्तुतप्रशंसा there are two things: a प्रस्तुत and an अप्रस्तुत. Further the स्तुति of the अप्रस्तुत is real and not intended to be withdrawn. So also the निन्दा of the अप्रस्तुत. The स्तुति and निन्दा, it is also to be noted, is of two distinct things: it is not a case that the same thing is outwardly censured but really praised [and vice versa], as in a व्याजस्तुति.

(v) Similarly, while in व्याजस्तुति the apparent निन्दा is to be ultimately set aside, and स्तुति obtained by implication, the case is not one of simple ध्वनि, in as much as the वाच्य is here entirely thrown overboard—a thing which does not necessarily happen in an ordinary ध्वनि. Cp. on the point Jagannātha (p. 416)—अत एव नास्या ध्वनित्वम् । ध्वनौ हि वाच्येनागूरणमहिम्नार्थान्तरमवगम्यते । न चैवं प्रकृते ।

(vi) Bhoja quotes both the examples given by Daṇḍin and remarks (p. 410)—व्याजस्तुतिर्गुणदोषीभावलक्षणाल्लेशान्न पृथक् ।

(vii) In ii. 345[c] °वंद्यस्य is a better reading than °वंशस्य, but we have no Ms. authority for adopting the improved reading.

Notes to II. 348–350—(i) A few representative definitions of निदर्शन or निदर्शना are here assembled. The figure is not recognised by भरत, अग्निपुराण, रुद्रट, हेमचन्द्र, केशवमिश्र, and both the वाग्भटs.—

Bhāmaha (iii. 32)—

क्रिययैव विशिष्टस्य तदर्थस्योपदर्शनात् ।
ज्ञेया निदर्शना नाम यथेववतिभिर्विना ॥

Udbhaṭa (p. 62)—

अभवन्वस्तुसंबन्धो भवन् वा यत्र कल्पयेत् ।
उपमानोपमेयत्वं कथ्यते सा विदर्शना ॥

Vāmana (IV. iii. 20)—

क्रिययैव स्वतदर्थान्वयख्यापनं निदर्शनम् ।

Bhoja (iii. 31)—

दृष्टान्तः प्रोक्तसिध्द्यै यः सिद्धेर्थे तन्निदर्शनम् ।
पूर्वोत्तरसमत्वे तदृजु वक्रं च कथ्यते ॥

Ruyyaka (p. 76)—

संभवतासंभवता वा वस्तुसंबन्धेन गम्यमानं प्रतिबिम्बकरणं निदर्शना ।

Mammaṭa (x, p. 744 ff.)—

[निदर्शना] अभवन् वस्तुसंबन्ध उपमापरिकल्पकः ।
स्वस्वहेत्वन्वयस्योक्तिः क्रिययैव च सापरा ॥

Vidyādhara (viii. 19)—

प्रतिबिम्बनस्य करणं संभवता यत्र वस्तुयोगेन ।
गम्यमसंभवता वा निदर्शना सा द्विधाभिमता ॥

Vidyānātha (p. 433)—

असंभवद्धर्मयोगादुपमानोपमेययोः ।
प्रतिबिम्बक्रिया गम्या यत्र सा स्यान्निदर्शना ॥

Viśvanātha (x. 51)—

संभवन्वस्तुसंबन्धोसंभवन्वापि कुत्रचित् ।
यत्र बिम्बानुबिम्बत्वं बोधयेत् सा निदर्शना ॥

Kuvalayānanda (st. 52 ff.)—

वाक्यार्थयोः सदृशयोरैक्यारोपो निदर्शना ।
यद्दातुः सौम्यता सेयं पूर्णेन्दोरकलङ्कता ॥
पदार्थवृत्तिमप्येके वदन्त्यन्यां निदर्शनाम् ।
त्वन्नेत्रयुगुलं धत्ते लीलां नीलाम्बुजन्मनः ॥
अपरां बोधनं प्राहुः क्रिययासत्सदर्थयोः ।
नश्येद्राजविरोधीति क्षीणं चन्द्रोदये तमः ॥

Jagannātha (p. 339)—

उपात्तयोरर्थयोरार्थाभेद औपम्यपर्यवसायी निदर्शना ।

and Viśveśvara (p. 262)—

उपमापर्यवसन्नो यत्रार्थोन्योन्यमन्वयानर्हः ।
यच्च क्रियया कारणकार्यान्वयधीर्निदर्शना सोक्ता ॥

(ii) It will be observed that Daṇḍin, Bhāmaha, Vāmana, and others admit what is known as the बोधननिदर्शना as the only variety of the figure, while Mammaṭa and most other writers admit an additional variety. Daṇḍin's conception of this figure has the advantage of keeping true to the etymological sense of the figure.

(iii) This बोधननिदर्शना is the same as the संभवद्वस्तुनिदर्शना of Ruyyaka, Viśvanātha, and most later writers. As Appaya Dīkshita observes in his Chandrikā (p. 74)—स्वक्रियया परान् प्रति सदसदर्थबोधनं संभवदेव समतां गर्भीकरोति । To the same effect also Jagannātha (p. 345). The second, and with later writers, the more usual variety is असंभवद्वस्तुनिदर्शना divided into वाक्यार्थनिदर्शना and पदार्थनिदर्शना, a good example of the former being Mudrārākshasa (vii. 6)—

केनोत्तुङ्गशिखाकलापकपिलो बद्धः पटान्ते शिखी
पाशैः केन सदागतेरगतिता सद्यः समापादिता ।
केनानेकपदानवासितसटः सिंहोऽर्पितः पञ्जरे
भीमिः केन च नैकनक्रमकरो दोर्भ्यां प्रतीर्णोर्णवः ॥

The qualification which requires a बिम्बप्रतिबिम्ब relation between the two statements is to be noted. This relation has to be assumed in order to explain the prima facie impossiblility of the relation between the two statements, which is dogmatically asserted. As Daṇḍin does not recognise this असंभवत् variety, we need not enter in details into the exact scope of the figure as also its distinction from दृष्टान्त, which is another figure not recognised by our author. See on the point Alaṁkārasarvasva (p. 77).

(iv) Bhoja (p. 299 ff.) introduces in Daṇḍin's निदर्शना one or two minor principles of sub-division. The similarity is directly asserted in the statement or is left to be inferred. The former is ऋजु the latter,

वक्र. Further we have cases when there is a complete दृष्टान्त statement given at first, the दार्ष्टान्तिक statement being given almost as an after-thought; or the relation is the reverse of this; or the two statements are simultaneous. According to Bhoja, Daṇḍin's first example (ii. 349) is पूर्वमृजु, his second (ii. 350), सममृजु. His comment on ii. 354 is—अत्र राजविरुद्धानामिति श्लिष्टपदेन दर्शयन्तीति वर्तमानकाललक्षणात् सद्य इति ताद्धितेन च समकालमेव दृष्टान्तदार्ष्टान्तिकयोः शब्दत ऋजूक्त्यैवोक्तत्वादिदमृजु समं च निदर्शनम् ।

Notes to II. 351–354—(i) A few other definitions of this figure are—

Agnipurāṇa (344. 23)—

सहोक्तिः सहभावेन कथनं तुल्यधर्मिणाम् ।

Bhāmaha (iii. 38) and **Udbhaṭa** (p. 67)—

तुल्यकाले क्रिये यत्र वस्तुद्वयसमाश्रये [समाश्रिते v. l.] ।
पदेनैकेन कथ्येते सहोक्तिः सा मता यथा [सताम् v. l.] ॥

Rudraṭa (viii. 99 f)—

सा हि सहोक्तिर्यस्यां प्रसिद्धदूराधिकक्रियो योर्थः ।
तस्य समानक्रिय इति कथ्येतान्यः समं तेन ॥
यत्रैककर्तृका स्यादनेककर्माश्रिता क्रिया तत्र ।
कथ्येतापरसहितं कर्मैकं सेयमन्या स्यात् ॥

Vāmana (iv. 3. 28)—

वस्तुद्वयक्रिययोस्तुल्यकालयोरेकपदाभिधानं सहोक्तिः ।

Bhoja (iv. 57 ff.)—

कर्त्रादीनां समावेशः सहान्यैर्यः क्रियादिषु ।
विविक्तश्चाविविक्तश्च सहोक्तिः सा निगद्यते ॥
यत्रानेकोपि कर्त्रादिः प्रविविक्तैः क्रियादिभिः ।
विविक्तभावं लभते विविक्ता सापि कथ्यते ॥

Ruyyaka (p. 81)—

उपमानोपमेययोरेकस्य प्राधान्यनिर्देशेपरस्य सहार्थसंबन्धे सहोक्तिः ।

Mammaṭa (x, p. 817)—

सा सहोक्तिः सहार्थस्य बलादेकं द्विवाचकम् ।

Vāgbhaṭa (iv. 119)—

सहोक्तिः सा भवेद्यत्र कार्यकारणयोः सह ।
समुत्पत्तिः कथाहेतोर्वक्तुं तज्जन्मशक्तिताम् ॥

Vāgbhaṭa (p. 38)—

सहभावकथनं सहोक्तिः ।

Keśavamiśra (p. 36)—

समानकालोक्तिः सहोक्तिः। सा द्वयी—उदासीनयोस्त्वराप्रतिपत्तये कार्य-कारणयोरपि ।

Hemachandra (p. 273)—

सहार्थबलाद्धर्मस्यान्वयः सहोक्तिः ।

Vidyānātha (p. 400)—

सहार्थेनान्वयो यत्र भवेदतिशयोक्तितः ।
कल्पितौपम्यपर्यन्ता सा सहोक्तिरितीष्यते ॥

Viśvanātha (x. 55)—

सहार्थस्य बलादेकं यत्र स्याद्वाचकं द्वयोः ।
सा सहोक्तिर्मूलभूतातिशयोक्तिर्यदा भवेत् ॥

and Jagannātha (p. 357)—

गुणप्रधानभावावच्छिन्नसहार्थसंबन्धः सहोक्तिः ।

(ii) The statement of simultaneity between the qualities or actions of two objects, which constitutes the essence of this figure, is not a matter-of-fact description as in पुत्रेण सहागतः पिता. It is अतिशयोक्तिमूलक. **Ruyyaka** however goes further and says (p. 81)—तत्र नियमेनातिशयोक्तिमूलत्वमस्याः । सा [अतिशयोक्तिः] च कार्यकारणप्रतिनियमविपर्ययरूपा अभेदाध्यवसायरूपा च । अभेदाध्यवसायश्च श्लेषभित्तिकोन्यथा वा। **Ruyyaka** thus recognises, amongst others, a variety of सहोक्ति based on कार्यकारणपौर्वापर्यविपर्यय, giving as an example—भवदपराधैः सार्धं संतापो वर्धतेतरामस्याः । Jagannātha refuses however to recognise this variety. As **Alaṁkārakaustubha** (p. 331) observes—कार्यकारणयोः पौर्वापर्यविपर्ययात्मकातिशयोक्तिमूलभेदस्तु प्राचीनोक्तो न युक्तः। तत्रातिशयोक्तेरेवालंकारत्वसंभवात् ।

तव कोपोरिनाशश्च जायेते युगपन्नृप ।

इत्यतिशयोक्त्यपेक्षया

तव कोपोरिनाशश्च सहैव नृप जायते ।

इति सहोक्तौ विच्छित्ति[=चमत्कार]विशेषाननुभवात् । The relation between the two objects brought together in a सहोक्ति should be merely गुणप्रधानभाव (cp. Pāṇini II. iii. 19, सहयुक्तेऽप्रधाने). Daṇḍin would endorse the view of **Jagannātha**

though his conception of अतिशयोक्ति, as we have seen (Notes, p. 146–47), is somewhat different. The हेत्वलंका illustrated by Daṇḍin in ii. 256 would be considered by Ruyyaka as सहोक्ति; but the very fact that Daṇḍin regards it as a separate alaṁkāra proves his non-acceptance of पौर्वापर्यविपर्ययमूला सहोक्ति variety. In none of the examples given by Daṇḍin for सहोक्ति is there in evidence a कार्यकारण relation, the real cause in ii. 352 and ii. 353 being प्रियजनविरह and in ii. 354, probably, प्रियजनसंनिधान.

Notes to II. 355-356—(i) The figure is defined by Daṇḍin in ii. 351, latter half. Other definitions for this figure are—

Bhāmaha (iii. 40)—

विशिष्टस्य यदादानमन्यापोहेन वस्तुनः ।
अर्थान्तरन्यासवती परिवृत्तिरसौ यथा ॥

Udbhaṭa (p. 69)—

समन्यूनविशिष्टैस्तु कस्यचित् परिवर्तनम् ।
अर्थानर्थस्वभावं यत् परिवृत्तिरभाणि सा ॥

Rudraṭa (vii. 77)—

युगपद्दानादाने अन्योन्यं वस्तुनाः क्रियेते यत् ।
क्वचिदुपचर्येते वा प्रसिद्धितः सेति परिवृत्तिः ॥

Vāmana (IV. iii. 16)—

समविसदृशाभ्यां परिवर्तनं परिवृत्तिः ।

Bhoja (iii. 29 f.)—

व्यत्ययो वस्तुनो यस्तु यो वा विनिमयो मिथः ।
परिवृत्तिरिहोक्ता सा काव्यालंकारलक्षणे ॥
सा त्रिधा व्यत्ययवती तथा विनिमयात्मिका ।
तृतीया चोभयवती निर्दिष्टा काव्यसूरिभिः ॥

Ruyyaka (p. 152)—

समन्यूनाधिकानां समाधिकन्यूनैर्विनिमयः परिवृत्तिः ।

and Jagannātha (p. 481)—

परकीययत्किंचिद्वस्त्वादानविशिष्टं परस्मै स्वकीययत्किंचिद्वस्तुसम...
परिवृत्तिः ।

(ii) Two points deserve to be noted. The barter ought to be कविकल्पित and charming. An actual commercial transaction howsoever noteworthy cannot be an instance of this figure. Secondly, there ought to be a regular sales-agent in the transaction. Accordingly a case like—किमित्यपास्याभरणानि यौवने धृतं त्वया वार्धकशोभि वल्कलम् or किशोरभावं परिहाय रामा बभार कामानुगुणां प्रणालीम् where there is only a व्यत्यय or किंचित् त्यक्त्वा किंचिदादानमात्रम् cannot be a regular परिवृत्ति in the normal acceptance of the term विनिमय. Mammaṭa and Jagannātha also are against admitting व्यत्यय, while वामन and रुय्यक admit it. Bhoja attempts to hold the balance evenly by recognising व्यत्यय as a sub-variety of Parivṛitti. His example (p. 297) is—

जो तीअ अहराउ रत्तिं उव्वासिओ पिअअमेण।
सोच्चिअ दीसइ गोसे सवत्तिणअणेसु संकन्तो॥
[यस्तस्या अधररागो रात्रावुद्वासितः प्रियतमेन।
स एव दृश्यते प्रातः सपत्नीनयनेषु संक्रान्तः॥]

(iii) In the above example several things belong to or reside in one and the same object. Conversely we can have a case where one object resides in succession in several places. Both these are taken by Mammaṭa and later writes to be instances of पर्याय (an alaṁkāra not recognised by our author) which is thus defined by Jagannātha (p. 478)—क्रमेणानेकाधिकरणकमेकमाधेयमेकः पर्यायः। क्रमेणानेकाधेयकमेकमधिकरणमपरः।

Notes to II. 357—(i) Vāgbhaṭa the author of the काव्यानुशासन is the only writer besides भामह and दण्डिन् to recognise आशीः as a figure of speech. Vāgbhaṭa defines it as (p. 46)—इष्टार्थस्याशंसनम् while the definition of Bhāmaha (iii. 54) is—

आशीरपि च केषांचिदलंकारतया मता।
सौहृदस्याविरोधोक्तौ प्रयोगोस्याश्च तद्यथा॥

Hemachandra (p. 294) declares himself against the recognition of this figure in the words—आशीस्तु प्रियोक्तिमात्रं भावज्ञापनेन गुणीभूतव्यङ्ग्यस्य विषयः। See his commentary on the passage.

(ii) At the same time it is necessary to point out that the 36 embellishments of speech involving specific emotional modes which are enumerated by Bharata at the beginning of the 16th Chapter of the Nāṭyaśāstra, and which occur also in Jayadeva's Chandrāloka, Mayūkha iii, include (along with such things as गुणकीर्तन, 'प्रोत्साहन, आक्रन्द, प्रतिषेध, परिदेवन, etc.) आशीः or benediction. Now it must be admitted that, in a given situation, benediction can become a very effective mode of expressing one's thoughts; and a dramaturgist has every right to collect all such effective modes of expression together. But why Daṇḍin should have selected only one of them for inclusion amongst the regular अलंकारs cannot be determined. We may however point out in passing that some others out of the 36 have been universally regarded as forming the basis of some of the regular figures.

(ii) It is worth noting—as pointing to an independence of tradition and perhaps an absence of interdependence between Daṇḍin and Bhāmaha—that Daṇḍin takes आशीः as a regular benediction. Bhāmaha gives two illustrations for the figure. In the first (see our Com. ii. 357[8–11]) two friends, who have been estranged from one another by malicious and mendacious gobetweens, perceive their error, and one of them calls upon the other to join hands again. On this Hemachandra remarks—तत्र च तस्य चेतोवृत्तिविशेषः स्नेहात्मा रतिभावविशेषरूप आशीर्द्वारेण प्रतीयत इति भावध्वनिरेवायम् । .... । अत्र आशास्यमानस्य मैत्रीसंबन्धस्योपनिबन्धो न त्वप्राप्तप्राप्तीच्छात्मिका आशिषः । In the second example also (see our Com. ii. 357[12–13]), Hemachandra points out that the hostile cities have already been vanquished. Hence, तथाविधानां शत्रुनगरीणां दर्शनमत्र प्राप्तकालतयाऽभ्यनुज्ञायते । The illustration given by Daṇḍin is of course अप्राप्तप्राप्तीच्छात्मिका आशीः । And the same is the case with Vāgbhaṭa.

Notes to II. 358–359ab.—(i) Before winding up his treatment of the regular alaṁkāras and passing on to a consideration of the mixed alaṁkāras (ii. 360), Daṇḍin

vindicates the completeness of his list, by remarking that अनन्वय, ससंदेह, उपमारूपक, and उत्प्रेक्षावयव, which are normally given by Ālaṁkārikas as independent figures, have been—the first three—included by him as sub-varieties of regular figures, while the last, though not actually so included, can easily be subsumed under a regular figure. Compare also ii. 309. See note (ii) to ii. 37; Note (ii) to ii. 26 (where in the last line on p. 90 read 'Daṇḍin' for 'Bhāmaha'); and Note (iii) to ii. 88.

(ii) The alaṁkāras अनन्वय and ससंदेह, though not separately given by Daṇḍin, are treated as independent alaṁkāras by almost all other writers, including Bhāmaha. The figures उपमारूपक and उत्प्रेक्षावयव are however given by Bhāmaha alone amongst extant writers; and Daṇḍin's specific rejection of them raises the question as to Daṇḍin's chronological position with reference to Bhāmaha. In our notes to ii. 88–90 we have adduced reasons to show that Daṇḍin's posteriority to Bhāmaha need not be regarded as an inevitable conclusion so far as the treatment of उपमारूपक by these two writers is concerned. As to उत्प्रेक्षावयव, in as much as Daṇḍin gives us no indication as to his own idea of the figure, the means for forming any opinion one way or the other are unfortunately lacking.

(iii) An उत्प्रेक्षावयव is—to judge from the illustration of it given by Bhāmaha (see our Com. ii. 359[4–5]) is a combination of उत्प्रेक्षावैचित्र्य with श्लेषवैचित्र्य and रूपकवैचित्र्य, and as Daṇḍin's sub-varieties often exhibit such combined वैचित्र्य, Daṇḍin is justified from his own point of view in regarding उत्प्रेक्षावयव as उत्प्रेक्षाभेद. Abhinavagupta in his ध्वन्यालोकलोचन (p. 41) discusses Bhāmaha's illustration for उत्प्रेक्षावयव and regards it as a regular variety of संकर.

(iii) That a very large number of alaṁkāras recognised by modern writers are absent in Daṇḍin's book is no impeachment of it. Science must grow.

Notes to II. 359^{cd} to 360—(i) It will be remembered that in ii. 7 संसृष्टि was designated संकीर्ण. Later writers make a distinction between these terms, reserving संसृष्टि for co-ordinating or समकक्ष mixture and संकर for preponderaing mixture or mixture with the अङ्गाङ्गिभाव relation. Although Daṇḍin is aware of this two-fold method of mixture he has not deemed it necessary to appropriate a distinct name for each. Bhāmaha, Rudraṭa, Vāmana, Bhoja, Hemachandra, and the two Vāgbhaṭas have likewise contented themselves with just one name: Bhāmaha, Vāmana, and Bhoja choosing संसृष्टि the others having fixed upon संकर. The later ālaṁkārikas including रुय्यक, मम्मट, विश्वनाथ, and others clearly distinguish between संसृष्टि and संकर, some adding also a third category of संदेह or अनिश्चय.

(ii) The more important statements of these Ālaṁkārikas are here assembled for easy reference—

Bhāmaha (iii. 48)—

वरा विभूषा संसृष्टिर्बह्वलंकारयोगतः ।
रचिता रत्नमालेव सा चैवमुदिता यथा ॥

Vāmana (IV. iii. 30f.)—

अलंकारस्यालंकारयोनित्वं संसृष्टिः । तद्भेदावुपमारूपकोत्प्रेक्षावयवौ ।

Rudraṭa (x. 25)—

योगवशादेतेषां तिलतण्डुलवच्च दुग्धजलवच्च ।
व्यक्ताव्यक्तांशत्वात् संकर उत्पद्यते द्वेधा ॥

Bhoja (iv. 88 ff.)—

संसृष्टिरिति विज्ञेया नानालंकारसंकरः ।
सा तु व्यक्ता तथाव्यक्ता व्यक्ताव्यक्तेति च त्रेधा ॥
तिलतण्डुलवद्व्यक्ता छायादर्शवदेव च ।
अव्यक्ता क्षीरजलवत् पांशुपानीयवच्च सा ॥
व्यक्ताव्यक्ता च संसृष्टिर्नरसिंहवदिष्यते ।
चित्रवर्णवदन्यस्मिन् नानालंकारसंकरे ॥

Hemachandra (p. 289)—

स्वातन्त्र्याङ्गत्वसंशयैकपद्यैरेषामेकत्र स्थितिः संकरः । परस्परानिरपेक्षत्वं स्वातन्त्र्यम् । उपकारत्वमङ्गत्वम् । एकस्य ग्रहेन्यस्य त्यागे साधकबाधकप्रमाणाभावादनिर्णयः संशयः । एकस्मिन् पदेर्थाच्छब्दालंकारयोः समावेश ऐकपद्यम् ।

Pratīhārendurāja (p. 66)—

अनेकालंकारविकल्पात् संदेहसंकरः । विभिन्नाधारत्वेन शब्दार्थवर्तिनोरलंकारयोरवस्थानाद्व्यवस्थासमाश्रयः शब्दार्थवर्त्यलंकारसंकरः । एकशब्दाभिधानसंकरे तु समुच्चयेनानेकोलंकार एकस्मिन् वाक्यांशे इवादावनुप्रविशति । अनुग्राह्यानुग्राहकसंकरे त्वनेकस्यालंकारस्याङ्गाङ्गिभावः । अतो विकल्पव्यवस्थासमुच्चयाङ्गाङ्गिभावसंश्रया एते चत्वारः संकरभेदाः

Mammaṭa (x, p. 915 ff.)—

सेष्टा संसृष्टिरेतेषां भेदेन यदिह स्थितिः ॥
अविश्रान्तिजुषामात्मन्यङ्गाङ्गित्वं तु संकरः ।
एकस्य च ग्रहे न्यायदोषाभावादनिश्चयः ॥
स्फुटमेकत्रविषये शब्दार्थालंकृतिद्वयम् ।
व्यवस्थितं च तेनासौ त्रिरूपः परिकीर्तितः ॥

Viśvanātha (x. 98 f.)—

मिथोनपेक्षयैतेषां स्थितिः संसृष्टिरुच्यते ।
अङ्गाङ्गित्वेलंकृतीनां तद्वदेकाश्रयस्थितौ ।
संदिग्धत्वे च भवति संकरस्त्रिविधः पुनः ॥

(iii) It will be noticed that Daṇḍin has not yet treated of the शब्दालंकारs, and although a mixture of शाब्द and आर्थ alaṁkāras is possible, Daṇḍin is not primarily thinking of such a mixture but probably a mixture of two (or more) अर्थालंकारs, as the illustration given by him goes to prove. We have already seen that many a sub-division under the several alaṁkāras given by Daṇḍin is based upon a combination of वैचित्र्यs proceeding from more than one figure-of-speech. All the same of course we would be justified in extending the scope of Daṇḍin's definition of संसृष्टि so as to include mixtures of शाब्द and आर्थ alaṁkāras.

(iv) Should we admit संसृष्टि or संकर as an independent figure-of-speech at all? This question is analogous to the question in Indian Logic as to the recognition of of चित्ररूप or चित्रगन्ध. Ruyyaka (p. 193) gives his conclusion on the point in these words—तत्र यथा बाह्यालंकाराणां सौवर्णमणिमयप्रभृतीनां पृथक्चारुत्वहेतुत्वेपि संघटनाकृतचारुत्वान्तरं जायते तद्वत् प्रकृतालंकाराणामपि संयोजने चारुत्वान्तरमुपलभ्यते । तेन अलंकारान्तरप्रादुर्भावो न पृथक्पर्यवसानमिति निर्णयः । अलंकारान्तरत्वेपि च संयोगन्यायेन स्फुटावगमो भेदः । समवायन्यायेन वास्फुटत्वावगम इति द्वैधम् । पूर्वत्र संसृष्टिरुत्तरत्र संकरः ।

Notes to II. 361-362—(i) In the first half of ii. 361 there is an उपमा statement which can stand by itself. The उपमा is thus the principal figure. The श्रुतानुपालिनी considers the figure in the first half to be उत्प्रेक्षा ; but आक्षिपति can be an उपमावाचकशब्द though not actually enumerated by Daṇḍin. In the second half we have an अर्थान्तरन्यास based upon श्लेष. The particular statement about the invasion of the beauty of the face by lotuses is corroborated by the general fact that, given कोश and दण्ड, any body can invade. The awkwardness of the general statement containing a pronoun (एषां) referring to a noun in the particular statement can be got over by making एषाम्=एषां लोकानाम्. Nor is the difficulty so very serious at all. We need not accordingly make the figure a हेतु instead of an अर्थान्तरन्यास, as suggested by some commentators.

(ii) Daṇḍin has not apparently given an illustration for सर्वेषां समकक्षता. The stanza ii. 362 (cp. ii. 226[ab]) supplies the deficit. But it is omitted in most Mss. and Cb quotes the stanza with the remark—समकक्ष्यताया अप्युदाहरणमन्यत्र द्रष्टव्यम् । It may be added in passing that Bhoja gives as his example for this kind of संसृष्टि (which he calls तिलतण्डुलसंसृष्टि) the extra stanza पिनष्टीव तरङ्गाग्रैः etc. mentioned in the variants to ii. 226 above. Even the श्रुतानुपालिनी does not notice ii. 362; and surely it would have been possible for Daṇḍin, without repeating himself, to give another instance for समकक्षसंसृष्टि if he had thought it necessary. We should in this connection recall the fact that Daṇḍin has not given illustrations for all the मध्यदीपक or the अन्त्यदीपक varieties. Compare our Commentary to ii. 104 ff.

Notes to II. 363.—(i) Of the three figures-of-speech contained in ii. 361 the relation between श्लेष and अर्थान्तरन्यास is perhaps much more immediate than that between अर्थान्तरन्यास and उपमा; but it would be incorrect to suggest that the former is अङ्गाङ्गिभाव and the latter समकक्षता. All the same, श्लेष forms, as Daṇḍin himself says ii. 313, the ingredient of quite a large number of figures, with

which it generally has an अङ्गाङ्गिभाव relation. Compare our Note to ii. 313 and the illustrations in ii. 28, ii. 87, ii. 159, ii. 185, etc. In fact there is no figure-of-speech the charm of which cannot be heightened by introducing an element of श्लेष into it somewhere. Of course the charm resulting from paronomasia is artificial and so cannot be said to reflect accurately the charm of the original object in Na ture which the poem seeks to describe in the most effective and agreeable fashion. Paronomasia is like the frame of the picture. It can set off the beauty of the portrait: but the beauty of the portrait must be there. Svabhāvokti is the beauty of the portrait; Vakrokti is the contribution of the frame-maker.

(ii) It is thus evident that Vakrokti is Daṇḍin's general name for any rhetorical device used to garnish or embellish some normal matter-of-fact description or narration. As the श्रुतानुपालिनी remarks—स्वभावोक्तिर्नाम यथावस्थितपदार्थरूपकथनम् वक्रोक्तिर्नाम यथावस्थितमन्यथीकृत्य। अत्र उपमादयः संकीर्णपर्यन्ता वक्रोक्तिषु पतिताः स्वभावोक्तिः पुनराद्यालंकार इति। We should in this connection recall Daṇḍin's earlier assertion (ii. 13) about स्वभावोक्ति—शास्त्रेष्वस्यैव साम्राज्यं काव्येष्वप्येतदीप्सितम्। Mahimabhaṭṭa in his Vyaktiviveka (Triv. Sans. Series ed. p. 28) is more precise on the point. Quoting the view, presumably, of Kuntaka the author of वक्रोक्तिजीवित (a work which has been brought to light only a few months ago in a solitary and fragmentary ms. from the South) he says—शास्त्रप्रसिद्धशब्दार्थोपनिबन्धनव्यतिरेकि यद्वैचित्र्यं तन्मात्रलक्षणं वक्रत्वं नाम काव्यस्य जीवितमिति सहृदयमानिनः केचिदाचक्षते। The वैचित्र्य of a Śāstra proceeds from its description of facts as facts. In a poem the वैचित्र्य is, in the words of Jayaratha (p. 8), a कविप्रतिभानिर्वर्तित व्यापार, or as another puts it, a वैदग्ध्यभङ्गीभणितिः। Compare also—

प्रसिद्धं मार्गमुत्सृज्य यत्र वैचित्र्यसिद्धये।
अन्यथैवोच्यते सोर्थः सा वक्रोक्तिरुदाहृता॥

(iii) Bhāmaha's conception of वक्रोक्ति can be gathered from the following passages in his work—(i. 36)—वक्राभिधेयशब्दोक्तिरिष्टा वाचामलंकृतिः— where वक्रोक्ति is given as a part of his definition of alaṁkāra; (cp. Abhinava-

gupta's comment— शब्दस्य हि वक्रता अभिधेयस्य च वक्रता लोकोत्तीर्णेन रूपेणावस्थानमित्ययमेवासावलंकारस्यालंकारान्तरभावः) ; (i. 30)—युक्तं वक्रस्वभावोक्त्या सर्वमेवैतदिष्यते—where he tells us, like Daṇḍin, that वक्रोक्ति and स्वभावोक्ति constitute the contents of all poetic writing; (ii. 34, 35)—where he intends to say that the वैदर्भी style, in spite of its प्रसाद, ऋजुता, or कोमलत्व, will be no better than a sweet choppy music, if devoid of पुष्टार्थता and वक्रोक्ति; and that, per contra, Gauḍīya poetry with its many alaṁkāras, provided it is not vulgar or confusing and has some sense to convey, is also not unacceptable; and lastly the oft-quoted verse (ii. 85)—

सैषा सर्वैव (v. l. सर्वत्र) वक्रोक्तिरनयार्थो विभाव्यते ।
यत्नोस्यां कविना कार्यः कोलंकारोनया विना ॥

which, coming as it does in connection with his treatment of अतिशयोक्ति, leads to the equation अतिशयोक्ति = वक्रोक्ति which Mammaṭa (x. p. 906) and Hemachandra (p. 267) distinctly lay down—सर्वत्र विषयेतिशयोक्तिरेव प्राणत्वेनावतिष्ठते । तां विना प्रायेणालंकारत्वायोगात् । Other testimony to this extended application of the term वक्रोक्ति is Alaṁkārasarvasva (p.8)–वक्रोक्तिजीवितकारः पुनर्वैदग्ध्यभङ्गीभणितिस्वभावां बहुविधां वक्रोक्तिमेव प्राधान्यात् काव्यजीवितमुक्तवान् । व्यापारस्य प्राधान्यं च काव्यस्य प्रतिपेदे । अभिधानप्रकारविशेषा एव चालंकाराः । .... । उपचारवक्रतादिभिः समस्तो ध्वनिप्रपञ्चः स्वीकृतः । केवलमुक्तिवैचित्र्यजीवितं काव्यं न व्यङ्ग्यार्थजीवितमिति तदीयं दर्शनं व्यवस्थितम् । And again (p. 177)—वक्रोक्तिशब्दश्चालंकारसामान्यवचनोपीहालंकारविशेषे संज्ञितः । To the same effect also अभिनवगुप्त in his ध्वन्यालोकलोचन (p. 208)—यातिशयोक्तिर्लक्षिता सैव सर्वा वक्रोक्तिः अलंकारप्रकारः सर्वः ।................ । लोकोत्तरेण चैवातिशयः । तेनातिशयोक्तिः सर्वालंकारसामान्यम् । Compare also Kāvyādarśa ii. 220.

(iv) As against this earlier conception of वक्रोक्ति (or अतिशयोक्ति) given by Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin, Kuntaka and others, we have the subsequent restriction of it to a specific figure-of-speech defined by Ruyyaka (p. 175) as—अन्यथोक्तस्य वाक्यस्य काकुश्लेषाभ्यामन्यथा योजनम् । and illustrated by—

अहो केनेदृशी बुद्धिर्दारुणा तव निर्मिता ।
त्रिगुणा श्रूयते बुद्धिर्न तु दारुमयी क्वचित् ॥

Another illustration given by Kuvalayānanda (st. 158) is—मुञ्च मानं दिनं [मा नन्दिनं] प्राप्तं नेह नन्दी हरान्तिके । Rudraṭa (ii. 14-17), Mammaṭa (ix, p. 593), Hemachandra (p. 234),

Vidyānātha (p, 410), and most later writers have the same limited conception of वक्रोक्ति, which some go to the length of regarding as a शब्दालंकार only. Rudraṭa (x. 9) gives besides a variety of श्लेष called वक्रश्लेष.

(v) As coming between these two conceptions of वक्रोक्ति, though not therefore necessarily forming the transition between them, is Vāmana's conception of वक्रोक्ति as (IV. iii. 8)—सादृश्याल्लक्षणा वक्रोक्तिः। A लक्षणा, the Kāmadhenu explains, is possible in five ways—

अभिधेयेन संबन्धात् e. g. द्विरेफ-भ्रमर-भृङ्ग;
सादृश्यात् e. g. सिंहो माणवकः (a case of वक्रोक्ति);
समवायतः e. g. गङ्गायां घोषः;
वैपरीत्यात् e. g. बृहस्पतिरयं मूर्खः;
and, क्रियायोगात् e. g. महति समरे शत्रुघ्नस्त्वम्.

Vakrokti is thus, according to Vāmana, a metaphorical mode of poetic expression, while Daṇḍin regarded it as any striking mode of poetic expression. If we now recall that to Vāmana all figures-of-speech are उपमाप्रपञ्च only, while they are वक्रोक्तिप्रपञ्च or अतिशयोक्तिप्रपञ्च to the earlier school, it will be perhaps evident that between Vāmana's conception of वक्रोक्ति and that of Daṇḍin, Bhāmaha, and others there is not that wide gulf that is sometimes made out.

(vi) At the same time, comparing Kāvyādarśa ii. 93–94 with Vāmana's example for वक्रोक्ति, viz.—उन्मिमील कमलं सरसीनां कैरवं च निमिमील मुहूर्तात् (अत्र नेत्रधर्मावुन्मीलननिमीलने सादृश्याद्विकाससंकोचौ लक्षयतः) it is evident, as Jacobi has said (Z. D. M. G., vol. lxiv, p. 130 ff.), that Vāmana has turned what was a गुण (समाधि in Daṇḍin, प्रसाद in Bharata xvi, 95) into an अलंकार. Samādhi is declared, like वक्रोक्ति and अतिशयोक्ति, as the all-in-all (ii. 100) of poetry; and it is difficult to talk of more than one thing in the superlative and yet maintain a distinction between them, especially if we remember that with Vāmana the boundary-line between Guṇas and alaṁkāras was very vague indeed (cp. II. 3. 172—काव्यशोभायाः कर्तारो धर्मा गुणाः तदतिशयहेतवस्त्वलंकाराः). As far as the facts of the case go, we have no definite ground to regard Vāmana's treatment of वक्रोक्ति as either a forerunner or

a subsequent development of Daṇḍin's and Bhāmaha's conception of the same. Even if Udbhaṭa, Bhāmaha's commentator, is to be regarded as a rival contemporary of Vāmana, yet Vāmana may have persisted in following his own indendent अलंकारसंप्रदाय. The chronological relation between Daṇḍin and Vāmana cannot be made to turn upon their account of वक्रोक्ति.

(vii) The ultimate conception of वक्रोक्ति as a शब्दालंकार cannot be genetically connected with either Daṇḍin's or Vāmana's conception of the same. The art of speaking at cross purposes was regarded as an accomplishment of a cultured beauty (महिलागुण), and it is conceivable that it was raised to the dignity of a regular alaṁkāra irrespective of what the Texts had already to say about the other वक्रोक्ति.

Notes to II. 364–366—(i) Compare Note (*iii*) to ii. 13 above. The normal conception of Bhāvika found in Ruyyaka (p. 178), Mammaṭa (x, p. 822), and Viśvanātha (x. 93–94), and most later writers is contained in the following definition of it in the Kāvyaprakāśa—प्रत्यक्षा इव यद्भावाः क्रियन्ते भूतभाविनः । तद्भाविकम्. Some writers add to this the further condition that the object (भाव) should be अत्यद्भुत, and should be expressed in vivid and non-confusing terms (वाचामनाकुल्येन). An example of a past incident revivified is Mṛichchhakaṭika (iii. 6)—

तं तस्य स्वरसंक्रमं मृदुगिरः श्लिष्टं च तन्त्रीस्वनं
वर्णानामपि मूर्छनान्तरगतं तारं विरामे मृदुम् ।
हेलासंयमितं पुनश्च ललितं रागद्विरुच्चारितं
यत्सत्यं विरतेपि गीतसमये गच्छामि शृण्वन्निव ॥

For a future incident anticipatorily glimpsed Ruyyaka (p. 182) gives the instance—

अनातपत्रोप्ययमत्र लक्ष्यते सितातपत्रैरिव सर्वतो वृतः ।
अचामरोप्येष सतेव वीज्यते विलासबालव्यजनेन कोप्ययम् ॥

(ii) In accordance with this later conception of the figure its name is explained as—भावः कवेरभिप्रायोत्रास्तीति । or (अलं॰ स॰, p. 178)—कविगतो भाव आशयः श्रोतरि प्रतिबिम्बत्वेनास्तीति । भावो भावना वा पुनः पुनश्चेतसि निवेशनम् सोत्रास्तीति । This etymology

probably goes back to Kāvyādarśa ii. 364[cd], where however भाव apparently is used in a rather peculiar sense. We would there translate it by Sustained Intuition especially as Daṇḍin makes it a प्रबन्धविषयगुण. Bhāmaha also calls it (ii. 52) a प्रबन्धविषयगुण laying down for it the four-fold requirement, viz.—

चित्रोदात्ताद्भुतार्थत्वं कथायाः स्वभिनीयता ।
शब्दानाकुलता चेति तस्य हेतुं प्रचक्षते ॥

But Daṇḍin's requirements for the figure as enumerated in ii. 365–366 seem to be peculiar to him, as also his whole conception of the same, wherein he is probably following a tradition distinct from that of Bhāmaha. Bhoja's conception of Bhāvika (which he identifies with उद्भेद, iv. 85–86) is so very far removed from the two conceptions discussed hitherto that it need not be here taken into consideration at all.

(iii) The Bhāvika of later writers is distinguishable from the गुण called प्रसाद, the रस named अद्भुत, and अलंकारs like स्वभावोक्ति or भ्रान्तिमान् or अतिशयोक्ति. Compare साहित्यदर्पण (x. p. 574f.)—न चायं प्रसादाख्यो गुणः भूतभाविनोः प्रत्यक्षायमाणत्वे तस्याहेतुत्वात् । न चाद्भुतो रसः विस्मयं प्रत्यस्य हेतुत्वात् । न चातिशयोक्तिरलंकारः अध्यवसायाभावात् । न च भ्रान्तिमान् भूतभाविनोर्भूतभावितयैव प्रकाशनात् । न च स्वभावोक्तिः तस्या लौकिकवस्तुगतसूक्ष्मधर्मस्वभावस्यैव यथावद्वर्णनं रूपम् अस्य तु वस्तुनः प्रत्यक्षायमाणत्वरूपो विच्छित्तिविशेषोस्तीति । Hemachandra however refuses to admit this figure. He says (p. 293)—भाविकं तु भूतभाविपदार्थप्रत्यक्षीकारात्मकमभिनेयप्रबन्ध एव भवति । यद्यपि मुक्तकादौ दृश्यते तथापि न तत् स्वदते ।

(iv) Confining our attention to Daṇḍin's own conception of भाविक it will be observed that Daṇḍin's treatment of it is quite in place, coming as it does after his treatment of वक्रोक्ति; whereas, it is not quite clear why Bhāmaha should have called his भाविक a प्रबन्धविषयगुण. Bhāvika is the quality belonging to a poem taken as a whole, and it suggests the formulation of questions like,—Is there a meaning to the whole? Is it consistently carried out? Is there a harmony and proportion of parts? Is it a clear and self-sufficient theme? These are questions of higher

criticism; and it is creditable to Daṇḍin that he has recognised their importance and made room for them in his treatment of poetry.

Notes to II. 367-368—(i) Having considered a poem from the point of view of higher criticism and constructive technique, Daṇḍin is naturally led to think of the dramatic Nodes and their minor constituents, or the Rhetorical-modes and their further literary distribution, these being respectively treated at length in the Nāṭyaśāstra, Chapters xix and xx. Daṇḍin here permits the possibility of an application of similar critical canon to the appreciation of poetry. It is to be wished however that Daṇḍin had made himself more explicit. For vṛittis compare our Note (ii) to i. 40.

(ii) Here again, as at the end of the first Parichcheda, Daṇḍin emphasises, for an aspiring poet, the necessity of constant practice. *Repetitio mater studiorum.*